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 Prologue: What does it Mean to Break with Bismarck?
 Gøsta Esping-Andersen
The task of an editor is to take one step back and digest the core message 
that emerges from the various contributions to the volume. The prologue 
writer should, I suppose, do the same but with the proviso that he, or she, 
will then take one great leap forward and interpret all the material in a 
new light. I shall try my best, but please do not expect an earthshattering 
eureka. My task has unquestionably been eased by the admirable efforts 
to make the chapters in this volume as homogenous and comparable as 
possible. I can think of few edited volumes that manage so successfully to 
furnish the reader with rich detail and holism all at once. And not least, 
these contributions to our never-ending concern with the welfare state 
provide interesting reading, indeed.
The core question is straightforward: is the Bismarckian or, if you wish, 
the Conservative , or Continental welfare model being undone? Where is 
it heading? The answers I have managed to distill from my reading are 
less straightforward. In an attempt to arrive at some kind of clarity, I am 
tempted to conclude the following: one, the glass seems only half full (or 
half empty if you prefer); two, there is a striking degree of convergence 
in the Bismarckian nations’ adaptation profiles; three, and rather para-
doxically, almost all nations’ reform endeavors look rather incoherent. 
They are moving in a similar direction, but whereto? Is it just the same 
old model in new packaging? Are they forging a new, hitherto undefined, 
model? Are they closing in on either the Liberal or Social Democratic 
alternative? Or will they emerge as hybrids? In order to assess where the 
Bismarckian model is heading we obviously also need to keep in mind that 
its regime-competitors are in the midst of transformation, too.
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The Push for Reform
What above all else strikes the reader is how similar the sequencing and 
overall thrust of nations’ adaptation has been over the past decades. One 
might be led to believe that an invisible coordinating hand reigned su-
preme. To an extent, as many chapters emphasize, the Maastricht accords, 
EMU and the common currency no doubt set the stage in terms of im-
posing identical constraints as well as signaling the urgency of financial 
reform. My impression, nonetheless, is that the invisible hand was pri-
marily given by the increasingly dysfunctional logic of the model itself. Its 
dysfunctionalities came to the fore on three key dimensions.
Firstly, population aging in tandem with the labor shedding , early-re-
tirement strategy of the 1980s-1990s overburdened the system because 
they produced adverse effects on the financial nominator and denomina-
tor simultaneously. The nominator became bloated with benefit recipi-
ents; the denominator shrunk because of the smaller post-baby boom co-
horts, sluggish growth of female participation, and because of high youth 
unemployment . One result was sky-rocketing social contribution rates 
that, in turn, depressed demand for labor.
Rather than courageously breaking this Gordian knot, the common 
response was to save the model with policies aimed at restoring finan-
cial equilibrium: shifting some welfare financing towards general revenue 
taxation , and adjusting contribution and benefit calculations, especially 
in pensions and unemployment benefits. These steps were paralleled in 
labor market policy : partial employment deregulation and a few cautious 
steps towards an activation approach.
Secondly, the model proved ever more dysfunctional because the two 
main pillars that sustained the edifice, namely familialism and a full-
employment, male breadwinner -based labor market could no longer be 
counted on to ensure against the risks not covered by the welfare state. 
Lack of jobs meant that the outsiders , primarily youth and women , came 
to rely on family support. The lack of affordable market alternatives mean 
that families cannot realistically purchase care services. And this, in turn, 
implies repressed female labor supply and, indirectly, less tax revenue.
Thirdly, as many chapters highlight, the Bismarck model is inherently 
ill-equipped to confront ‘new’ risks, such as frailty and long-term depen-
dency or labor market exclusion. Attempts to manage these within the 
standard insurance logic, as Germany attempted, proved sub-optimal. 
Hence, the search for alternatives, be it an approximation to the Scan-
dinavian model, as in the case of long-term care in Spain, or a more fa-
PROLOGUE
milialistic version, as in the case of Austria ’s general revenue financed 
cash-for-care approach. As far as early childhood care is concerned, most 
Bismarckian countries remain essentially familialistic, providing either 
no support at all or using cash payments to induce mothers to stay home 
with their children.
Where is the Bismarckian Welfare State Heading?
The catalogue of adjustments and reforms that are documented in this 
book points, it would seem, in all directions. Hence the apparent lack 
of policy coherence. Most country chapters highlight changes in con-
tribution and benefit schedules, particularly those related to pensions. 
The common story here is a move towards defined contribution plans 
and changes in the assessment of pension accruals, the latter primarily 
meant to postpone the retirement age. Such reforms present, in my view, 
no departure at all from Bismarck . To the contrary, they simply imply a 
return to the principles that guided the model prior to the 1970s, namely 
a tighter link between entitlements and contributions. In some respects, 
then, the aim seems to be to reconsolidate the core logic of the model. On 
other counts, however, key attributes of the model are weakening. Many 
countries have sought to diminish the ‘corporativistic’ character of social 
insurance by homogenizing both contribution requirements and benefit 
eligibility across social strata.
We are oﬀ ered plentiful evidence of moves towards the liberal regime. 
Almost all Bismarckian countries are introducing some kind of basic non-
contributory safety net, such as the French RMI, the social pension in Italy , 
or minimum retirement guarantees. Th ese are invariably minted on the 
social assistance logic with income testing designed to target the needy. 
Th is approach is neatly captured in Maurizio Ferrera ’s concept of selective 
universalism . Via tax subsidies, governments are also encouraging citizens 
to embrace the market for supplementary private pensions . Th is seems to 
have been especially successful in Austria and, to an extent, also in Spain . 
It remains, nonetheless, a subsidy primarily for the top-income quintile 
populations and, as such, it installs new inequities that may replace the tra-
ditional inequities associated with narrow corporative risk-pooling. Many 
chapters highlight the convergence towards liberalism in the case of labor 
market deregulation. True, almost all countries have taken steps in this 
direction, albeit primarily at the margins, by relaxing conditions related to 
private employment exchanges, ﬁ xed-term contracts, part-time jobs and 
the like. But even if, as in Spain , partial deregulation produced massive 
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eﬀ ects – that were unanticipated – it has not attacked the classical notion 
of job security for insiders in any radical manner. Th ese reforms seem, in-
stead, to be motivated primarily by the need to provide bridges to the labor 
market for the outsiders , primarily youth and women .
And there certainly are moves in the Social Democratic direction 
as well. The principle of entitlement based on citizenship rather than 
employment has found its way into health reforms in many countries, 
including France , Italy and Spain . Despite income testing, the new mini-
mum social guarantees, especially in pensions, signal a cautious shift in 
this direction, too. Indeed, we should remember that the universalistic 
‘people’s pension’ model in the Scandinavian social democracies has its 
roots in the social assistance tradition. The Bismarck countries are in-
disputably weakening their traditional male breadwinner bias, and we 
detect a trend towards defamilialization on many fronts. All countries 
have introduced job security provisions for mothers and have, rather 
cautiously, begun to encourage fathers to take childcare leaves. Tradi-
tional familialism , such as the obligation to support kin in need, is erod-
ing. Germany , a stalwart case of familialism , has abolished this crite-
rion in terms of eligibility for old-age assistance. But, with the only very 
partial exception of Spain , it is difficult to see any major social democ-
ratization with regard to family policy . Most countries prefer to give 
cash incentives to care for children (and the frail elderly ) at home. With 
the exception of Belgium and France , no country provides early child-
care that meets demand even remotely. This may, however, change in 
the coming decade. Both Germany and Spain are launching relatively 
ambitious childcare policies for the under-3s. As yet, however, the con-
ventional male breadwinner logic remains basically intact in most Con-
tinental European welfare states.
It would appear accordingly as if the Bismarckian countries are con-
verging, if perhaps only at the margins, with both rivals. But the conver-
gence is perhaps less real than it seems, basically because they are chas-
ing a moving target. The adoption of general revenue financed assistance 
programs would seem like a push towards the liberal fold. But it is actually 
towards a liberalism that is increasingly passé. The liberal welfare states 
have, over the past decades, shifted towards a work conditional, negative 
income approach, such as the US Earned Income Credit and the British 
family credit schemes. And the apparent shifts towards the Social Demo-
cratic paradigm seem, likewise, a bit dated and also hugely incomplete. 
The Bismarckian countries are, no doubt, adopting a more active family 
policy , at least in terms of child allowances and parental leave subsidies. 
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These steps will bring the Bismarckian group closer to Denmark or Swe-
den in the 1970s. But meanwhile, the Nordic countries came to prioritize 
family services which, as far as I can see, are only reluctantly – if at all – 
embraced by the Bismarckian countries.
Why Reform the Model?
There is a pervasive common thread in this book, namely that the Bis-
marckian logic is near-immune to any radical transformation. The social 
insurance system has created its own powerfully institutionalized veto 
points, and it enjoys huge popular legitimacy. But does the model really 
require any radical reform? The contributors to this volume cite numer-
ous reasons for why it performs sub-optimally: it has great difficulties in 
responding to new emerging risks; it creates dualisms between the core 
of insured and the growing population that relies on assistance, a dualism 
that largely mirrors peoples’ attachment to the labor market. The Bis-
marckian countries have developed a conception of social exclusion that 
has no direct parallel elsewhere. Many also cite the severe difficulties that 
women face in reconciling work and motherhood.
A Paretian optimality framework is as good as any in terms of gaug-
ing the workings of a model.1 Would a reorganization of the welfare state 
help push these countries towards a superior Pareto frontier? This would 
entail both superior efficiency and equity outcomes. I would argue that 
there are several core attributes, shared by most (but not all) members of 
the Bismarckian model that, if reformed, would yield a superior Pareto 
frontier.
The first symptom is related to fertility and, by implication, to popula-
tion aging. With few exceptions, the Continental European countries are 
stuck in a persistent lowest-low fertility trap. Their fertility rates hover 
between 1.2 and 1.5 which compares unfavorably with the Nordic coun-
tries, Britain (and France ) where the rate is around 1.8. This difference 
has huge effects on population growth and, unsurprisingly, the projected 
aging burden is vastly greater in Germany , Italy and Spain than elsewhere. 
It has been popular to explain low fertility in terms of the advance of post-
material values. It is, however, difficult to imagine that the Spaniards are 
more post-material than, say, the Swedes. The telling statistic comes from 
fertility surveys that ask citizens what is their desired number of children. 
Across all EU countries, people invariably embrace the 2-child norm. Any 
major deviation from this signals, I believe, a crucial welfare deficit. The 
irony is that the child-deficit is greatest where familialism is most in-
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grained. If institutional arrangements work against family formation they 
clearly need to be reformed. Helping citizens attain their desired number 
of children will, unquestionably yield efficiency and welfare gains.
The preconditions for higher fertility are now well-established: ad-
equate parental leave provisions, job security and, above all, access to 
childcare . More generally, fertility in advanced societies depends on gen-
der equalization, and major obstacles to women ’s employment are bound 
to harm fertility. All this suggests that the typical cash incentive for caring 
at home may be counter-productive and that a concerted servicing ap-
proach is sine qua non.
Secondly, repressed female labor supply related to motherhood not only 
widens the gender divide but also reduces potential economic growth. 
The employment gap of women due to motherhood is substantial in most 
Continental European countries – the activity rate typically drops by 20 
percent among mothers with pre-school children while, simultaneously, 
mothers are overwhelmingly in part-time jobs , especially in Germany and 
the Netherlands . To provide an idea of the associated growth-opportunity 
cost, we have simulations that show that were Spanish women to adopt an 
employment profile identical to Danish women , the Spanish GDP would 
be roughly 15 percent larger. The absence of affordable childcare and too 
brief paid maternity leaves (typically four months in the Continental Eu-
ropean member states) bear much of the responsibility for the employ-
ment and, thus, income gap. Universal provision of childcare is doubly Pa-
retian because it can be shown that the initial cost to government is fully 
reimbursed via mothers ’ superior life-time earnings and tax payments.
The third instance, almost never examined in the welfare state litera-
ture, has to do with human capital investment. In this book we find re-
peated examples of moves towards a more active labor market policy . This 
is of course aimed at adult workers and it is rather clear that, by and large, 
remedial activation policies are costly and quite ineffective. There are two 
sets of evidence that suggest that the typical Continental European welfare 
state pursues a failed human capital policy. One, comparatively speaking, 
the correlation between social origin and destiny is substantially higher 
than in the Nordic countries. This is less the case for the Netherlands , but 
strongly so for France , Germany and Italy . Two, several of the Continental 
countries (Italy and Spain in particular) exhibit very high rates of early 
school-leavers. If the opportunity structure is very unequal and up to a 
third of each youth cohort fails to obtain the skills required for a knowl-
edge economy, a large amount of potential productivity is lost while the 
demand for passive income support will increase.
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Traditional familialism bears a major responsibility for these problems. 
It is now well-established that the key foundations for cognitive abilities 
and learning are laid in the pre-school ages. If the main impulse in these 
years comes solely from parents (or grandparents) it is to be expected 
that conditions in the family of origin predict so strongly how children 
fare later on. High quality early childhood programs have been shown to 
be extremely effective in evening the playing field – again a strong case 
for abandoning the familialistic ideology and moving towards a service-
intensive welfare state. This case is additionally bolstered by the results of 
evaluation studies which suggest that the returns to every dollar invested 
in quality early childhood services yields a return anywhere between 5 and 
12 dollars.
The upshot is that one of the core characteristics of the Bismarckian 
model, namely familialism , has adverse consequences for equity and ef-
ficiency. But I think we can push the argumentation yet further and con-
clude that a stubborn adherence to familialistic principles has become 
anathema to family well-being. Defamilializing care responsibilities is a 
precondition for functioning solidarities in the kind of society and econo-
my that is emerging. This comes out very clearly in recent research on in-
tergenerational care giving. If we distinguish between the frequency and 
intensity (hours committed) of caring we find, to the surprise of many, 
that Danes and Swedes care for their aged parents 50 percent more fre-
quently than their Italian or Spanish counterparts. In contrast, the Ital-
ian and Spanish care less frequently but far more intensely. The profile 
is identical in terms of grandparents caring for grandchildren. It would 
appear that intergenerational solidarity suffers when the commitment be-
comes very heavy; it strengthens when the burden is lighter.
My search for a superior Pareto frontier has, so far, centered on family 
policy and here the conclusion is clear: defamilialize . There are, however, 
also aspects that are inherent to the social insurance model that will, over 
the coming decades, provoke ever more intense equity problems. Sev-
eral of the chapters in this book have examined how Bismarckian welfare 
states have adjusted their pension insurance so as to stave off intergenera-
tional inequities associated with aging. The move towards defined contri-
bution plans and postponed retirement implies that the additional costs 
of aging will be allocated more fairly between the retired generations and 
the working age population.
So far, so good. I have, however, seen no serious discussion of the 
heightened intragenerational inequities that are inherent in Bismarckian 
pension systems. The problem has to do with strong – and growing – so-
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cial differentials in life expectancy: a manual worker, at age 60, can typi-
cally expect to live five or six fewer years than a professional . Considering 
the financial logic of pension contributions, namely a proportional share 
of wages (usually capped at some income level), the result is a hugely un-
fair redistribution in favor of those who live the longest.
I can think of two solutions to the problem. The first would conform 
to the principles of the Bismarckian model; the second would, over the 
years, most likely produce a genuine ‘regime-shift’. If the aim is to rescue 
Bismarck , policy-makers would have to adjust pension entitlements so 
that expected years of life expectancy are explicitly weighted into the for-
mula. The most logical option would be to index age of retirement posi-
tively to lifetime earnings: high income groups would then have to retire 
later than their low-income fellows. The second option would be to un-
couple total retirement income from workers’ contribution record to a far 
greater extent than now. The case for a first tier universal ‘people’s pen-
sion’, as in the Nordic countries is, in this respect, obvious. It gains added 
relevance when we consider the new risk structure and the foreseeable 
large proportion of future pensioners that will have accumulated insuf-
ficient retirement wealth. As we have seen in this book, the Bismarckian 
countries have in fact moved towards an assistance-type basic income 
support system.
Were the Bismarckian countries to emphasize family services, and were 
they to take the leap towards a universal ‘people’s pension’ we would, I 
believe, have irrefutable evidence of change that goes beyond path depen-
dency or, as it often seems, ad hoc kinds of adjustments. More generally, 
some convergence with the Social Democratic model appears far more re-
alistic, and arguably also more Paretian, than going for genuine liberalism . 
Emulating the liberal model in any serious way would imply a massive 
process of dismantling; emulating the Scandinavians implies, in contrast, 
an extension of social citizenship in view of novel risks that most ordinary 
citizens face with growing intensity.

1 Ordering Change: Understanding the ‘Bismarckian ’ 
 Welfare Reform Trajectory 
 Bruno Palier
1.1 Introduction1
How did Continental European welfare systems change over the last 30 
years? What have they become? Were they eventually able to address the 
main challenges that they have been confronted with since the mid-1970s? 
The central research questions of this book are based on a striking puzzle. 
It was an accepted wisdom of the comparative welfare state literature pub-
lished on the threshold of the 21st Century that the Continental European 
welfare systems were the least adaptable. In the mid-1990s, when he com-
pared the capacity of different welfare regimes to face the new economic 
challenges, Gøsta Esping-Andersen emphasized the rigidity of the Conti-
nental welfare state arrangements, speaking of a ‘frozen Continental land-
scape’ (Esping-Andersen 1996a). Since ‘Conservative corporatist ’ welfare 
systems were ‘the most consensual of all modern welfare states’, their edi-
fice would remain ‘immune to change’ (ibid.: 66-67). Esping-Andersen 
concluded that in Continental Europe ‘the cards are very much stacked 
in favor of the welfare state “status quo ”’ (ibid.: 267). Fritz Scharpf and 
Vivien Schmidt (2000) similarly argued that even though all welfare states 
are in various ways vulnerable to increasingly open economies ‘Christian 
Democratic ’ welfare systems based on social insurance not only face the 
greatest difficulties of all, but are also the most difficult to reform. Paul 
Pierson (2001a) also observed that significant welfare state reform has 
been rarest and most problematic in Continental Europe.
Since the advent of the new millennium, however, major changes have 
become highly visible in the welfare arrangements of Continental Euro-
pean countries. During the 2000s, as a comparison of reforms in differ-
ent social insurance fields (old-age , unemployment , health insurance ) has 
shown2, all Continental European countries have implemented important 
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structural reforms of their welfare systems. Employment policies and un-
employment insurance systems have changed, shifting away from a ‘labor 
shedding ’ strategy and towards the development of activation policies 
(Clegg 2007). Austria , France , Germany , Italy and Spain have each gone 
through several waves of pension reform, the last introducing innovations 
such as voluntary private pension funds and emphasizing increasing em-
ployment rates among the elderly (Bonoli and Palier 2007). In health care , 
reforms grafted two new logics onto the traditional insurance approach: 
a logic of universalization through state intervention, and a market logic 
based on regulated competition (Hassenteufel and Palier 2007). Further-
more, countries well known for their ingrained familialism and tradition-
al approach to the gender division of labor have radically changed their 
child- and elderly care policies. Since the late 1990s they have developed 
formal caring facilities and parental leave schemes, facilitating the com-
bination of work and family life for women – and the creation of ‘low end’ 
jobs in the personal service sector (Morel 2007).
Notwithstanding the best informed predictions, to the contrary, then, 
important welfare reforms have occurred in Continental Europe. This is 
not simply a question of a belated ‘catch up’, either. Even though these 
changes have only become fully apparent since the early 2000s, our claim 
in this book is that they must be understood as the culmination of a longer 
and more drawn-out reform trajectory , rather than the result of an abrupt 
political revolution or a sudden rupture in an institutional or political 
equilibrium due to exogenous crises. This book is devoted to substantiat-
ing this claim through detailed analysis of national welfare reform trajec-
tories in 12 countries of Continental Europe – Austria , Belgium , France , 
Germany , Italy , the Netherlands , Spain , Switzerland and the Visegrad 
Countries, the Czech Republic , Hungary , Poland and Slovakia .
Taken together, the chapters that follow represent a systematic and 
comprehensive empirical account of the welfare reforms that have taken 
place across Continental Europe since the early 1980s. Empirically, the 
focus is mainly on the nature, politics, timing and magnitude of social 
policy change, though consideration is also given to their economic and 
social impacts. Subjecting these cases to systematic comparative analysis 
furthermore serves to reveal a second puzzle; not only have all these Con-
tinental European countries eventually been able to introduce structural 
reforms into well-entrenched social insurance systems, but they have 
done so by following a very similar route. Our common analytical frame-
work, based on the most recent developments in neo-institutionalist the-
ory, helps us to explain why.
A HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALIST FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
The next part of this introductory chapter is devoted to the presen-
tation of this analytical framework. In the following part the origins of 
Bismarckian welfare systems will be explored, as well as their functioning 
and characteristics from their creation up to the start of the more contem-
porary period – from the late 1970s to the present – that is the main focus 
of the chapters that will follow.
1.2 A Historical Institutionalist Framework for Analysis
It is recent developments in historical institutionalism that provide the 
tools that frame our approach to the long-term transformation of wel-
fare systems in Continental Europe. In this literature, recent theoreti-
cal and empirical work has departed from ‘institutional determinism’ 
and been able to combine appreciation of the impact of institutions on 
policy development, with the possibility for substantial and transforma-
tive policy change , as a cumulative effect of successive smaller reforms 
(Streeck and Thelen 2005). Drawing inspiration from this insight, as well 
as from Peter Hall ’s work on policy change, a common analytical frame-
work has been developed and applied to each national country study in 
this volume. Trying to adapt the general historical institutionalist per-
spective for our more specific purpose, this common approach is based 
on a particular understanding of ‘Bismarckian ’ welfare systems, on the 
importance given to ‘welfare institutions ’, and on the key notion of ‘re-
form trajectory ’.
‘Bismarckian ’ Welfare Systems
There has been continuous and lively debate around Esping-Andersen ’s 
famous typology of welfare systems (for reviews, see Abrahamson 2003; 
Arts and Gelissen 2002). Despite a number of criticisms, recent research 
on welfare reforms inevitably comes back to this three-fold distinction. 
Indeed, most collective books either refer to the ‘three worlds’ in their 
choice of countries (Scharpf and Schmidt 2000; Pierson 2001b), or orga-
nize comparison explicitly through groups of countries that reproduce 
this division (Esping-Andersen 1996b; Sykes, Palier and Prior 2001). 
Moreover, findings from comparative studies usually suggest that there 
are ‘three worlds of welfare reforms’, concluding that different process-
es of welfare state adaptation are associated with each world of welfare 
(Scharpf and Schmidt 2000; Pierson 2001b). The three paths for welfare 
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state change result from the different historical and institutional con-
straints associated with each welfare system.
Research that has been conducted to date has either included all types 
of welfare regimes3 or focused on liberal or Scandinavian regimes.4 Despite 
the existence of isolated national case studies5, no systematic comparative 
research has been conducted on the recent developments of ‘Bismarck-
ian ’, ‘Conservative corporatist ’ or ‘Christian Democratic ’ welfare regimes. 
The aim of this book is thus to provide a systematic comparison of welfare 
reforms within the ‘Conservative corporatist ’ world of welfare capitalism , 
with the idea that more has occurred within these systems than is usually 
recognized. In this context, a specific reading of Esping-Andersen helps 
to define the field of the research. We focus on reforms to existing social 
policies and the introduction of new types of social policies in welfare sys-
tems and specific social programs that share the common features usually 
associated with the ‘Bismarckian ’ tradition of social insurance.
These features have already been characterized in the comparative 
welfare state literature. Titmuss (1974), Esping-Andersen and others have 
identified three main approaches to the conception, implementation and 
management of social protection. Instead of trying to read Esping-An-
dersen ’s typology as a description of ‘real worlds’ of welfare capitalism , 
it is useful to conceptualize it as isolating and distinguishing ideal-types, 
differentiated both in terms of policy goals (logics or conceptions) and 
policy instruments (‘ways of doing’, institutions). These ideal types define 
a body of principles and values and political, economic and social objec-
tives, and can be associated with a prevailing institutional configuration 
determining the rights and benefits, the financing and the management 
of the social protection arrangements for individuals resident in a nation. 
They also help to identify the role and position given to social protection 
institutions in relation to other factors of social protection (the market, 
the family and the voluntary sector), as well as the objectives pursued 
in terms of individual welfare and social stratification. Such ideal-typical 
categories can help to situate the core features of any real welfare system, 
or even any welfare program, notwithstanding the complexities that in-
evitably characterize any empirical reality.
As is well known, with respect to policy goals , three political logics 
can be identified in Esping-Andersen ’s work: the Liberal , the Social-
Democratic and the Conservative -corporatist . These logics have to be 
supplemented by consideration of the gender relationships underpinning 
each model (Lewis 1992; Orloff 1993). The underlying principle of the 
Liberal type of social protection is to give emphasis to the market rather 
A HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALIST FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
than the state in resource allocation. The state only intervenes as a last 
resort and its means of action seek to encourage a rapid return to the 
market (benefits must not discourage beneficiaries from working). The 
liberal approach discourages the state from meddling in the private af-
fairs of the family and therefore involves few family policy measures. 
The so-called Social Democratic model is designed to provide a truly 
universal system of social protection. The principal objective of the wel-
fare state is to ensure the equality, cohesion and homogeneity of social 
groups within an all-embracing middle class. The underlying concept 
is based on the dual breadwinner model, without distinction between 
men and women (Lewis 1992). Though the main characteristics of Bis-
marckian welfare regimes will be developed in greater detail below, we 
can here recall that according to Esping-Andersen and many others the 
typical Conservative-corporatist goal is less to reduce inequality than to 
preserve status. In the name of subsidiarity , this type of welfare provi-
sion is also aimed at supporting a family structure based on the male 
breadwinner , implying that women are left with primary responsibility 
for care giving (Lewis 1992).
To achieve their different objectives, the various systems make use of 
a range of techniques, including: means-tested assistance benefits; flat-
rate benefits or social services provided by universal systems and financed 
through taxation ; and contributory benefits provided by social insurance 
on the basis of social contributions . From a comparative perspective, one 
can distinguish four principal parameters by which these techniques can 
be differentiated (cf. Ferrera 1998; Bonoli and Palier 1998), which will 
henceforth be referred to as ‘welfare institutions ’:
1 the rules and criteria governing eligibility and entitlement: who is en-
titled to benefit?
2 the form taken by benefits: what types of benefits are provided?
3 the financing mechanisms: who pays, and how?
4 the organization and management of the scheme: who decides and 
who manages?
International comparisons have shown that each social protection sys-
tem has its own specific and principal – though not exclusive – means of 
combining these four variables, which provide a basis for comparing and 
distinguishing between the various national systems. In most cases, the 
manner in which these four variables are combined is common and rela-
tively similar across all the branches of the system. Each welfare regime 
associates a specific institutional configuration with a relatively coherent 
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doctrine: residual benefits with the primacy of the market and the need 
to combat poverty ; universal benefits with the quest for equality; and so-
cial insurance schemes with the protection of specific occupational cat-
egories. They have different impacts with respect to the quality of social 
rights, social stratification and the structure of the labor market.
In this book, we analyze and compare reforms that occurred in coun-
tries where welfare systems are mainly based on the ‘Conservative -cor-
poratist ’ approach to welfare, and where the ways of providing social 
protection share a number of commonalities in respect of the four key 
institutional variables:
1 Entitlements are associated with employment status, with modes of 
access to social protection based on work/contribution; as will be un-
derlined below, these systems were primarily aimed at insuring indus-
trial salaried workers who paid contributions.
2 Social benefits are in cash, transfer-based, proportional, earnings-
related , and expressed in terms of replacement rates; in Continental 
Europe, such benefits are often called ‘contributory benefits’ (mean-
ing that the right to and the amount of benefit is linked to the contri-
bution previously paid).
3 Financing mechanisms are based principally on social contributions , 
or what in the USA are called payroll taxes .
4 Administrative structures are para-public, involving the social part-
ners in the management of the social insurance funds (‘Kassen’, ‘caiss-
es’, ‘cassa’...). Because these systems are thus not organized in and by 
the public administration (as well as for historical and political rea-
sons – see below), the notion of ‘welfare systems’ captures their es-
sence better than the concept of the ‘welfare state’.
Even though some of these characteristics exist elsewhere (but rarely all 
together, especially regarding financing and governance structures), wel-
fare systems based on these four institutional traits are to be found mostly 
in Continental Europe. Indeed, as will be exemplified and demonstrated 
in the national chapters in this volume, most countries of the European 
continent, having followed the Bismarckian route to welfare state devel-
opment, can be considered as ‘social insurance states’ and share these 
common welfare institutions . As the comparative welfare state literature 
has shown, and as this volume confirms, Germany , Austria , France , the 
Netherlands , Luxembourg , Italy , Spain , Belgium , the Czech Republic , Po-
land , Slovakia and Hungary have all developed welfare systems (more or 
less) close to this ideal-type.
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In suggesting that these countries share a logic that is mostly or main-
ly Bismarckian , and their institutions mostly or mainly based on social 
insurance, it should be emphasized and acknowledged that no real wel-
fare system is ever pure and always represents a complex mix of policy 
goals and institutions. For sure, family policies in France are universalis-
tic, the health care systems in Italy and Spain are of Beveridgean inspira-
tion and the Italian trade unions do not traditionally play an important 
role in the management of the welfare system (etc.). However, all these 
countries are closer to each other than they are to other welfare systems. 
The French, Austrian or Belgian welfare systems are thus certainly not 
identical to the German one, but they are considerably closer to it than 
to the Swedish system, and thus reflect both similar principles of wel-
fare and comparable ‘ways of doing’ welfare. A central hypothesis of 
this research project is that these Continental European systems should 
therefore also experience some shared difficulties and show similar re-
form dynamics.
Our book identifies the welfare institutions that these Bismarckian 
welfare systems have to a greater or lesser extent in common as the cen-
tral variable for understanding the politics of recent welfare reform. The 
basic hypothesis is that the similarity of welfare conceptions and institu-
tions largely explains the similarities in the problem profiles and in the 
developmental trajectories of these welfare systems.
Welfare Institutions Matter
The most important contribution of new institutionalism to the current 
research on policy change is of course the insight that ‘institutions mat-
ter’. The definition of institutions often varies according to the approach 
(Hall and Taylor 1996). In accounts of welfare state stability and change, 
the institutions which are most frequently referred to are macropoliti-
cal institutions such as state structures and constitutional norms (unitary 
versus federal state, the relationship between the executive and legisla-
tive powers, majoritarian versus consensual democracy) (for a review, see 
Bonoli 2001), or the profile of representative institutions and bodies (the 
party system, the electoral system and systems of interest intermediation) 
(See for instance Levy 1999; Ross 2000; Huber and Stephens 2001; Korpi 
and Palme 2003). In his edited volume, Paul Pierson and his contributors 
provide insightful institutionalist explanations of the politics of welfare 
reforms by focusing on how these kinds of institutions shape the ‘new 
politics’ of welfare reform (Pierson 2001b: parts two and three).
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However, as Paul Pierson himself has elsewhere acknowledged, ‘major 
public policies also constitute important rules of the game, influencing 
the allocation of economic and political resources, modifying the costs 
and benefits associated with alternative political strategies, and conse-
quently altering ensuing political development’ (Pierson 1993: 596)6. In 
this volume, we share the conviction that the structure and institutional 
design of social policies needs to be integrated into our explanatory ac-
counts in order to understand the types of problems, politics and pro-
cesses of change that welfare systems have undergone.
Constitutional and political system variables take very different values 
within the family of Bismarckian welfare regimes : for example, Germany 
has a federal political system and France a highly centralized one. As will 
be shown in the various chapters of this book, these types of variations ex-
plain much of the difference in the timing and political framing of reforms 
in the countries studied. However, our aim is also to highlight and under-
stand the similarities in the politics of the reforms. Since these countries 
have such diverse political systems, macropolitical variables can hardly 
explain similar trends in the content and sequencing of reforms. To un-
derstand the politics of the reforms in these cases, it seems more promis-
ing to look at the kind of incentives that their similar social policy institu-
tions create.
In our approach, welfare institutions play a central role and serve sev-
eral analytical functions. First, they are used to both describe and situate 
specific national welfare systems in a comparative perspective and over 
time. No one country – not even Germany – has ever been purely ‘Bis-
marckian ’ in the ideal-typical sense outlined above. Hence each national 
case will be specified by assessing ‘how Bismarckian they are’ at the begin-
ning of the period under study (late 1970s, early 1980s) as well as at the 
end of it (late 2000s), by specifying the share of contributory benefits in 
the various social programs, the share of social contribution financing 
and the governance-mix in the social policy-making and management. 
This will allow for both better characterization of each ‘real world’ of the 
national welfare system, and for qualitative, but rigorous and systematic, 
measurement of institutional change.
Measuring welfare state changes is one of the major difficulties in the 
current comparative welfare state literature (Clasen and Siegel 2007). As 
we know, social spending measures tend to obfuscate rather than dem-
onstrate welfare state transformations.7 Our common reference to the 
four institutional variables allows us to measure institutional welfare 
state change through a much better set of indicators than social spend-
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ing. Characteristics of a program before and after a reform – the specific 
combination of the four institutional variables – then serve as objective 
criteria to reveal change. These categories become benchmarks against 
which these changes can be assessed.8
As mentioned above, welfare institutions will also play a central role 
in our explanatory framework. As shown elsewhere (Bonoli and Palier 
2000), welfare institutions structure debates, political preferences and 
policy choices. They affect the positions of the various actors and groups 
involved in reform processes. They frame the kind of interests and re-
sources that actors can mobilize in favor of, or against, welfare reforms. 
In part, they also determine who can and who cannot participate in the 
political game leading to reforms, and thus the identity and the number of 
‘veto players ’. Depending on how these different variables are set, differ-
ent patterns of support and opposition are likely to be encountered. This 
will be illustrated in the various country chapters to follow.
Finally, our focus on welfare institutions helps reveal often neglected 
types of reform that in the long run have very profound consequences: in-
stitutional reforms . In this case, the factor that was determining the poli-
tics of other welfare reforms becomes an object of reform itself: changes 
in the entitlement rules, and even more importantly, changes in the fi-
nancing mechanisms or in the structure and functioning of welfare gov-
ernance.9 We will emphasize how important these institutional reforms 
have been to divert Bismarckian welfare institutions from their ‘path-de-
pendent’ reform trajectories.
Accounting for Social Policy Changes
Historical institutionalists claim that ‘history matters’, that the past weighs 
on the present and future. In the welfare state literature, this importance 
given to the past has most often been used to explain resistance to change 
and path dependency. Writing in 1994, Pierson emphasized the stabil-
ity of American and British welfare arrangements in the face of Reagan 
and Thatcher ’s attempts at radical retrenchment . He explained this re-
sistance to change with reference to the force of past commitments, the 
political weight of welfare constituencies and the inertia of institutional 
arrangements, factors which coalesce to engender a phenomenon of path 
dependency. Emphasizing the importance of negative policy feedbacks, 
he concluded that ‘any attempt to understand the politics of welfare state 
retrenchment must start from a recognition that social policy remains the 
most resilient component of the post-war order’ (Pierson 1994: 5).
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Even when they acknowledge some changes, many comparative stud-
ies conclude that the reforms had little real impact on the structure of 
the different welfare states, since the very nature of each system has been 
preserved (Huber and Stephens 2001). Up to the late 1990s, reforms were 
seen as essentially reinforcing the logic of each welfare system. The liberal 
welfare states, through the different processes of marketization of their 
social policies, thus seemed to have become even more residual and lib-
eral (Taylor-Gooby 2001). The Social Democratic welfare states, thanks 
to an egalitarian distribution of cuts and a rediscovery of ‘the workline’, 
had come back to their traditional road to welfare (Kuhnle 2001). As men-
tioned above, in the wave of comparative welfare state studies published 
at the turn of the century, most of the Continental welfare states were 
presented as having remained the same, not so much because reforms 
reinforced their characteristics, but rather because they seemed unable to 
implement any important reforms in the first place.
An emphasis on path dependence thus went hand in hand with the con-
clusions of prevailing continuity. But important structural reforms have 
been introduced in the 2000s, and most – like means-tested benefits as-
sociated with activation measures for the long-term unemployed, or fully 
funded pension schemes – clearly do not belong to the traditional logic 
and institutions of the Bismarckian welfare regime . How can one under-
stand the process that led to these structural changes ? Can we combine a 
framework of analysis that takes the weight of institutions into account, 
but also helps account for structural ‘path-shifting’ changes? In address-
ing this analytical challenge, we have drawn inspiration both from the 
general literature on policy change and the most recent advances in neo-
institutional theory.
When emphasizing the inertia of institutions (‘frozen landscapes’ and 
‘path dependency’), current research often seems to ignore the struc-
tural impact that public policies may sometimes have. While integrating 
phenomena of path dependency in welfare state analysis is essential, this 
should not preclude an examination of the impact of diﬀ erent reforms on 
social policy. In other words, recent developments within the social pro-
tection systems are not only due to self-generating evolutionary dynam-
ics, but also to the implementation of public policies. Incorporating public 
policy aspects of change into the study of the ways in which social protec-
tion systems adapt suggests a need to make better use of the tools of public 
policy analysis, such as Hall’s seminal approach to issues of policy change.10
Hall (1993: 278) argues that we ‘can think of policymaking as a process 
that usually involves three central variables: the overarching goals that 
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guide policy in a particular field, the techniques or policy instruments 
used to attain those goals, and the precise settings of these instruments...’ 
Using this approach, it is possible to recast our understanding of welfare 
regimes in terms of public policies. The instruments of social policy are 
mainly the four institutional variables outlined above (the mode of ac-
cess, the benefit structure, financing mechanisms and management ar-
rangements). The overarching goals can be related to the three different 
political logics that are associated with the three welfare state regimes 
(Esping-Andersen 1990); the centrality of the market in the allocation of 
resources and the residuality of state intervention in the liberal regime; 
the centrality of equality, social citizenship and ‘harmonization’ of the 
population in social-democratic welfare regime ; and the centrality of se-
curity, work, status and occupational identity in Conservative -corporatist 
social insurance systems.
Elaborating his framework for analyzing macroeconomic policy chang-
es, Hall (1993) distinguished between three different types of changes. ‘We 
can identify three distinct kinds of changes in policy... First, [a change of ] 
the levels (or settings) of the basic instruments. We can call the process 
whereby instrument settings are changed in the light of experience and 
new knowledge, while the overall goals and instruments of policy remain 
the same, a process of first order change in policy... When the instruments 
of policy as well as their settings are altered in response to past experience 
even though the overall goals of policy remain the same, [this] might be 
said to reflect a process of second order change ... Simultaneous changes 
in all three components of policy: the instrument settings, the instru-
ments themselves, and the hierarchy of goals behind policy... occur rarely, 
but when they do occur as a result of reflection on past experience, we 
can describe them as instances of third order change ’ (Hall 1993: 278-279).
This approach helps to distinguish the differential impacts that a re-
form will have, depending on whether or not it changes the instruments 
and the overall logic. It provides a grid for assessing the type of change 
beyond a purely quantitative approach (more or less retrenchment ), and 
a means for judging the degree of innovation introduced by a specific 
reform. A first order change will not entail profound changes as far as a 
historical path is concerned; it simply involves a change in the setting of 
instruments (such as raising the level of social contributions , or lowering 
benefit levels without changing the mode of financing, the type of benefit 
or the mode of access), without a change in the general principles and 
logic. Second order changes involve the introduction of new instruments 
(i.e. the introduction of new calculation rules or new entitlement rules in 
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pension). These types of changes also appear to be path-dependent, as 
new instruments are introduced in order to preserve the existing system 
and its principles. Yet, such reforms may lead to more substantial change 
once they have been put in place and developed over time.11 More di-
rectly, however, a further type of reforms may introduce new instruments 
associated with new goals, and thus possibly represent in the long run 
what Hall has termed ‘paradigmatic changes’ (Hall refers to the shift from 
Keynesian to monetarist policies; an equivalent in social policy might be 
the shift from unemployment compensation to activation policies).
Visser and Hemerijck (1997) have added to these three categories of 
change by identifying an intermediary type between instrumental and 
paradigmatic change, which they call ‘institutional change’. This is when 
a basic institution of a welfare system is reformed, such as through the 
privatization of a public service, or a change in the financing mechanism 
(taxes replacing social contributions , for instance). These institutional 
reforms are focused on institutions themselves, without explicitly men-
tioning the goals. As will be shown in the various chapters of this volume, 
institutional reforms – especially concerning financing and governance 
– played a crucial role in softening blockages and allowing for more struc-
tural substantive change.
Beyond quantitative criteria such as more or less spending, it is thus 
possible to distinguish different categories of change according to the 
innovation they entail for the social protection system, on the basis of 
qualitative, but objective, criteria. In the following chapters, each reform 
or phase of reforms is categorized according to the nature of the changes 
it introduced within the welfare system. This serves to define different 
sequences in the reform trajectory followed by each welfare system, with 
each sequence or phase being dominated by one specific type of social 
policy change.
From Social Policy Changes to Reform Trajectory 
In addition to helping us diﬀ erentiate among social policy changes, Hall 
(partly following Heclo 1974) also points our attention to the consequential 
linkages between the various types of policy change, with the consequences 
of ‘ﬁ rst order’ changes often leading to the development of ‘second or-
der’ ones, and so on. First order changes can be understood as the initial 
 response that governments turn to when faced with a diﬃ  culty, which at 
this stage is not necessarily perceived as a new problem as such. In only 
changing the settings of the usual instruments, it is ‘old recipes’ that are re-
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sorted to, repeating what governments are used to doing. Hall thus points 
out that in their ﬁ rst response to the ﬁ rst oil shock in the early 1970s, Brit-
ish governments applied ‘traditional’ Keynesian policies with the aim of 
boosting consumer demand. Similarly, we will see that in Continental Eu-
rope, governments ﬁ rst turned to available social insurance instruments 
when faced with the social consequences of the economic crisis.
However, in something which is little-by-little perceived as a new con-
text, these old recipes start to produce unintended effects or ‘anomalies’. 
Advised by different kinds of experts (among them, at times, comparative 
social policy analysts) governments gradually acquire the conviction that 
they need to abandon traditional ways of doing things, which are now 
perceived to be wrong. Faced with mounting difficulties, policy actors 
consent to introduce some instrumental innovations, provided that these 
will help to preserve the logic of the system (for example, in our field, the 
first retrenchments of the early 1990s).
But it may be that even these innovations do not produce the expected 
results. In the macroeconomic policy case studied by Hall , this led to the 
crisis of the whole policy paradigm (both the goals and the associated 
instruments of Keynesian macroeconomic policies were denounced as 
counter-productive), and from there to the emergence and implementa-
tion of a new policy paradigm (monetarist policies) by new political ac-
tors. The chapters in this volume show that things did not occur in exactly 
this way in the transformation of Continental European welfare systems. 
More reforms (including institutional ones) were necessary, and it is still 
hard to speak of a radical transformation of the entire welfare systems, 
even though we will show that political actors adopted a new social policy 
paradigm in the 2000s.
In our cases we see no instances of brutal departure from the Bismarck-
ian ways of thinking and doing, but rather a progressive change of these. 
Starting from an initial reaction to crisis that was highly determined 
by the institutional logic of the Bismarckian system itself (labor shed-
ding and increase in social contribution), the orientation of reforms has 
changed only progressively, by a succession of measures that build on the 
consequences of the preceding ones. In all the cases studied in this book, 
changes have been implemented through a succession of reforms and not 
through an abrupt paradigmatic change. Therefore, if we want to under-
stand the more recent structural reforms and the general process through 
which Continental European welfare systems have been transformed, we 
cannot analyze any one (big or small) reform in isolation from the whole 
reform process. This reform process we refer to as the ‘reform trajectory ’.
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As we have shown for pension reforms in Continental Europe (Bonoli 
and Palier 2007), the reform trajectory is made of a succession of reforms, 
with the new one being, at least partly, based on the consequences of 
the previous one. Each stage in the process opens up new reform oppor-
tunities, by changing the political context in which reforms take place. 
One cannot attribute the overall transformation of the welfare system to 
a single ‘one-shot’ reform. In this book, we demonstrate that the trans-
formation of welfare systems happens instead through an incremental 
process, in which the adoption of given measures facilitates the accep-
tance and growth of certain policy options – that would otherwise have 
been extremely difficult, if not impossible, politically – and undermines 
others. Individuals and collective political actors can exploit the new op-
portunities that earlier – and apparently marginal – reforms open up, and 
through their actions come to change the whole system. In order to ac-
count for these processes, the contributions to this volume thus make 
heavy use of the various categories that have been elaborated by Thelen 
and Streeck (2005a) to grasp the variety of incremental but cumulatively 
transformative changes that characterize institutional evolution.12
Welfare Reforms: Their Dimensions, their Consequences
We therefore claim in this book that the process of welfare state trans-
formation has to be understood as the result of a ‘reform trajectory ’ made 
up of different phases, with each characterized by a predominant type of 
policy change or reform. Each national country chapter will analyze their 
specific national reform trajectory , making reference to contingent and 
particular national circumstances. But in order to distinguish, compare 
and analyze each phase, we have identified the various dimensions that 
are analyzed across all the cases.
As shown by Hall (1997) among others, governmental action is not a 
purely rational and neutral reaction to a problem that is ‘out there’, such 
as an economic shock or a social change. If socio-economic transforma-
tions like globalization or ageing are unquestionably the triggers of wel-
fare state reform, the timing , the content and the politics of these reforms 
have to be understood with reference to many more variables than just 
the problems they are supposed to solve. In this context three sets of vari-
ables should be taken into account in particular: ideas , institutions and 
interests.
It is difficult to claim that reforms are purely social and political con-
structions with no link to ‘real’ developments. Socio-economic changes 
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are obviously triggering welfare state difficulties and reforms. In our 
approach, socio-economic developments are considered to provide the 
context for reforms. These reforms, however, are also framed by policy 
ideas and interpretations. In this case, it seems crucial to look both at the 
national debates around macroeconomic and social policy paradigms , as 
well as the lessons that actors draw from previous reforms and their con-
sequences (Hall 1993). We thus pay special attention to the diagnoses that 
actors develop regarding the main problems to be solved and the optimal 
policies to be implemented in consequence. The same problem can be 
understood in various ways, and each diagnosis leads to a specific policy 
response.13
As has been extensively developed above, governmental action is also 
shaped by its institutional environment (the broader political system as 
well as the prevailing programmatic structure of past policies). We there-
fore take into account the general political context of each national case, 
and of each reform, as well as the specific impacts of the welfare arrange-
ments and of preceding reforms. As also detailed above, we claim that 
specific welfare reforms can entail more or less important changes for 
welfare systems. It is thus important to qualify the main characteristics of 
the reforms as far as principles and institutions are concerned. Hence the 
type of policy changes that a reform involves (which order of change?) and 
the content of the reform (according to its goals and instruments) are cru-
cial objects of analysis, notably in order to assess the institutional changes 
they entail.
Finally, it is of course necessary to focus on the politics of reforms, that 
is the interests of the main actors, their positions and mobilizations, and 
the patterns of conflict and negotiation. Here, the political orientation of 
government is certainly one variable to take into account, but in the case 
of Continental European social policies, political actors are not the only 
actors to analyze. As Pierson has demonstrated, the politics of welfare re-
forms are heavily determined by the interests and reactions of ‘program-
matic constituencies’, i.e. those who benefit from welfare programs and 
their representatives. This can of course be the beneficiaries of welfare 
systems themselves, those who receive (or will receive) social benefits, 
but it can also be those whose organizations depend on, or at least are 
linked to, the structure of the welfare system (Bonoli and Palier 1996). In 
our cases, due to the historical development of social insurances and their 
governance arrangements (see below), the ‘social partners ’ (trade unions 
and employers’ representatives) have long been in a position to act as the 
most important ‘veto players ’.14
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Furthermore, in order to grasp the mechanisms over time and the con-
sequential linkages between phases of reforms, we specify what the conse-
quences of each phase of reforms are. The focus here is on policy feedbacks 
that are not only blocking further changes (as in the path dependency/
resilience theories), but also ‘reform feedbacks’ that are creating oppor-
tunities for further changes over time. Four types of consequences and 
feedback effects can be mentioned:
a) Policy outputs, institutional consequences: How much do the reforms 
change the welfare system?
b) Policy outcomes: Did the reform succeed in its objectives? Did it solve 
the problem(s) it was supposed to address?
c) Social outcomes: Who wins, who loses? What are the social conse-
quences of the reforms?
d) Policy and political feedback effects: Does the reform lead to new op-
portunities? To new problems? Does it change the political strength 
and weakness of actors? What do the actors learn from it?
For each country chapter, authors summarize the reform trajectory in a table 
or ﬁ gure laying out the various dimensions mentioned above (See table 1.1).
Table 1.1 – The main dimensions of welfare reform trajectories
The Problems The reforms The Politics of the 
reforms
Outcomes/Consequences of the 
reforms
Context Diagnosis Content 
of the 
policy
Types of 
change
Who 
are the 
actors?
What 
are their 
relation-
ships?
Changes 
in the 
welfare 
arrange-
ment?
Results? 
Are 
problems 
solved?
Who 
wins, who 
loses?
Failures? 
New 
oppor-
tunities 
for new 
reforms?
Along with our common analytical grid, these tables are very useful for 
highlighting the commonalities and differences in the welfare reform tra-
jectories followed across Continental Europe in recent decades, an issue 
to which I return in the concluding chapter. The final section of this intro-
duction turns instead to look more closely at the origins of Bismarckian 
systems of social protection and at their basic characteristics and func-
tioning through their ‘heyday’ up to the late 1970s, on the eve of the pe-
riod that is covered by the contributions to this volume.
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1.3 Bismarckian Welfare Systems as they Were15
This section will focus on the origins of ‘Bismarckian ’ welfare systems, on 
the main goals they tried to achieve through their historical development, 
on the specific principles on which they rely and the institutional arrange-
ments that characterized them in the late 1970s, just before the beginning 
of the period studied in all country chapters.
The Industrial Origins of ‘Bismarckian ’ Welfare Systems
Using the notion of ‘welfare state’ to designate the social protection sys-
tems of Continental Europe is misleading, since the state did not create 
the social insurances, nor did it (and still does not) totally finance or im-
plement them. The state’s initial role was mainly to make social insurance 
compulsory. But social insurance bodies were created before the state in-
tervened, at the firm or on an industry level, either by workers themselves 
or by their employers.
With the advent of industrialization, conditions of life changed. Most 
industrial workers lived in urban areas, far from their extended families 
and other traditional support networks. They had to sell their labor power 
to survive – in effect, as Marx and Polanyi amongst others have suggested, 
they were transformed into commodities. This meant, of course, that they 
confronted huge problems if they could not work for reasons such as old 
age and incapacity, sickness, accidents at work – frequent in the early 
stage of industrialism – or simply because there were no jobs to be found. 
In Continental Europe as elsewhere, these situations gradually came to be 
recognized as and named ‘social risks’.
To cope with these circumstances, during the 19th century certain 
workers – usually the more politicized, educated and skilled ones – be-
came organized. In certain urban occupations they copied the mecha-
nisms that had existed under the guilds and corporations of the Middle 
Ages, and created what were called ‘friendly societies’ (in England), ‘Hil-
fskassen’ (in Germany ), ‘Sociétés de secours mutuelles’ (in France ). These 
were a kind of solidaristic club among people belonging to the same 
profession, who paid a contribution out of their wage in return for so-
cial support in the event of a ‘social risk’. These societies also became 
places of political discussion, they could organize social movements and 
strikes, and were also part of the origin of the development of trade 
unions . As shown by the ‘power resources approach’ (Korpi 1983), the 
more workers were organized the more they could exert pressure on 
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their employers to seek the improvement of their members’ wages and 
working conditions.
Employers did not always seek to repress these organizations. On the 
contrary, some saw themselves as having an interest in developing or at 
least subsidizing these solidaristic societies, particularly for the provision 
of social insurance. Mares (2003) has shown that employers had two main 
interests in the provision of social insurance for their workers. First, they 
could pool the risks that they themselves were facing, for example the 
risk of having to pay compensation to those who suffered from indus-
trial injuries. Once workers were organized and could sue for negligence, 
it often made sense to admit a degree of responsibility and collectivize 
risk by creating work accident insurance systems (Ewald 1986). Secondly, 
confronted with the volatility of labor markets and at a time before the 
widespread use of labor contracts, employers could not be certain of hold-
ing onto their ‘good’ workers, those who were peaceful, worked well and 
especially those in whom employers had invested heavily in terms of skills 
training. Offering higher wages was often not sufficient to retain the best 
workers, and so proposing social protection to skilled workers to ensure 
their attachment to the company became a tool of workforce management 
(Mares 2003).
For sure, it was not just German , French or Belgian employers who pur-
sued their economic interest in promoting and financing social insurance 
schemes for their employees. Swenson (2002) has shown that American 
or Swedish employers also supported social protection for their workers , 
for similar reasons. What was specific to Continental Europe though – es-
pecially in Germany , France and Belgium , and, to a lesser degree, Austria 
and the Netherlands or Italy and Spain – was the type of social protection 
mechanisms chosen and the political context in which they were expand-
ed thereafter.
While market solutions were chosen in the United States – with em-
ployers contracting with private pension funds or private health insur-
ances for their employees – and national insurance was eventually set up 
in the United Kingdom and Scandinavia, Continental European countries 
preferred to rely on collective occupational social insurance funds (the 
German Kassen and the French Caisses), run not as private companies 
but as not-for-profit bodies headed by representatives of employees and 
employers (afterwards called the ‘social partners ’). These social insurance 
funds were not – and still are not – public bodies, their representatives 
seeking on the contrary to remain independent from the state as far as 
possible. Hence, when there was debate in mid-19th century France about 
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whether the state should legislate to make social insurance compulsory, 
many MPs opposed the idea of ‘l’Etat-providence’ because of their resis-
tance to state interference in the social protection domain (Castel 1995). 
In the same vein, when after passing the three social insurance laws in 
1883 (sickness), 1884 (accident) and 1889 (old-age and invalidity ) Bismarck 
wanted to re-enforce the role played by the state in the administration 
and the financing of the insurance bodies, he was vigorously opposed by 
the social partners , who distrusted the authoritarian state and wanted to 
defend their autonomy of management (Selbstverwaltung ) and the self-
financing of the social insurance schemes they ran (through social insur-
ance contributions levied on wages rather than through taxes ).
This distrust of state or market solutions was echoed in catholic social 
doctrine as elaborated in the late 19th Century in reaction to the increased 
involvement of many European states in the traditional domains of church 
intervention, i.e. education and poor relief (on conflicts between church 
and state, see van Kersbergen and Manow 2009). This doctrine promoted 
subsidiarity as the main principle for distributing competences in respect 
of social issues, with family responsibility given precedence, religious 
charities and other communities (including working ones) intervening in 
the case of family failure, and the state playing a role only as a last resort if 
these other institutions failed. As demonstrated by van Kersbergen (1995), 
this social catholic doctrine was crucial in shaping the approach to so-
cial issues of the emergent European Christian Democratic parties, which 
were to become one of the driving forces for the expansion of welfare sys-
tems in Continental Europe over the course of the 20th Century (see also 
Huber and Stephens 2001; van Kersbergen and Manow 2009).
The Main Goals: Providing Income Security to Workers and their 
Families, Promoting Social Peace
This short historical account helps us better understand the main char-
acteristics of these systems of social protection that survived after World 
War II. Born with industrial capitalism , these systems of collective social 
insurance were primarily focused on providing job and income security 
for male industrial workers. Security seems indeed the basic word, and 
appears in the name of the main social insurance schemes: Soziale Ver-
sicherung, Sécurité sociale, seguridad social, sicurrezza soziale, sociální 
zabezpečení, zabezpieczenia społeczne, etc.
Hence, as far as social justice is concerned, these schemes were less 
concerned with poverty or inequality than with ensuring the proportion-
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ality of benefits in respect of former wage levels and contribution records, 
with reinforcing the so-called equivalence principle (Äquivalenzprinzip). 
As Titmuss put it: ‘the industrial achievement-performance model of so-
cial policy (...) incorporates a significant role for social welfare institu-
tions as adjuncts of the economy. It holds that social needs should be met 
on the basis of merit, work performance and productivity’ (1974: 31).
This is partly why these welfare systems are so often labeled Conserva-
tive : they are not aimed at changing the income distribution, but rather 
at securing people’s position in the labor market and at securing their 
income. From a political point of view, these systems appear less as the 
result of workers’ victory over employers than as initiatives by Conserva-
tive governments to guarantee social peace by building cross-class com-
promises. As Ebbinghaus reminds us in this volume, societies with Social-
Christian orientations and worker wings of Christian Democratic parties 
provided a favorable political context for their expansion (van Kersbergen 
1995). Esping-Andersen and Korpi (1984) argued that the weaker and frag-
mented labor movements of Continental Europe went together with Con-
servative occupationalist welfare regimes , a legacy of the divide and rule 
strategies of authoritarian states. Conservative elites introduced welfare 
reforms ‘from above’, in a bid to legitimate the national state (Flora and 
Alber 1981; Ferrera 2005).
As stated by Susanne Fuchs and Claus Offe (2008: 6):
An essential feature of Bismarckian social security policies is that they 
are designed to prevent the outbreak of non-institutional distributive 
class conﬂ ict. Th ey do so by installing three institutional features into 
social policy: (a) the selective provision of beneﬁ ts to those segments of 
the population (i.e. the core working class ) whose economic opposition 
would be most destructive to the orderly process of economic develop-
ment, (b) the forging of interclass alliances (e.g. in the form of social 
security funding being shared by employers and employees), and (c) 
the creation of institutional arrangements that subdivide the clientele 
of social security into a number of administrative categories (deﬁ ned 
by region, gender , and type of beneﬁ ts, as well as by such divisions as 
the employed vs. the unemployed, blue collar vs. white collar workers , 
ordinary pensioners vs. early retirees , workers in core or ‘heavy’ indus-
tries vs. workers engaged in the production of consumer goods and ag-
riculture, etc.), thus shifting the focus of distributive conﬂ ict from a 
conﬂ ict between encompassing class coalitions to a conﬂ ict between 
status groups.
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In this framework, professional belonging is crucial in defining an indi-
vidual’s social identity; social rights are largely obtained through work 
and emphasis is given to collective protection and collectively negotiated 
rights. Social insurance schemes are less an arena of industrial conflict 
than an instrument of social partnership designed to address the issue of 
the social and political integration of industrial workers – die Arbeiter-
frage in German, la question sociale in French. They are first and foremost 
a guarantee of social peace.
Full (Male ) Employment as the Condition for Full Coverage and Full 
Income Guarantee
Th e expansion of Bismarckian welfare systems was based on a speciﬁ c post-
war compromise. While all the governments of Western Europe shared the 
view that everybody should be protected against the main social risks, the 
institutional basis for this diﬀ ered. In the United Kingdom and in the Nor-
dic countries existing state solutions were expanded. In Continental Eu-
rope, where Christian Democrats either dominated governments or played 
a pivotal role, post-war reforms also built on existing institutions and uti-
lized ‘Bismarckian means’ to reach Beveridgean objectives, i.e. to protect all 
individuals for all social risks (Palier 2005a). Instead of radically changing 
the system of social insurance that had been inherited from the interwar 
period, they progressively extended these schemes to cover all the risks of 
all dependent workers and the self-employed (and their relatives), suppos-
ing that mainly men would be in the workforce while women would stay 
at home and care for the children and/or dependent elderly (Lewis 1992). 
Instead of a major rupture, the story of these systems’ expansion during the 
‘trente Glorieuses’ (the Golden Era of the welfare state, from 1945-75) is thus 
one of progressive extension of both the coverage and the generosity of the 
various social insurance schemes that were already in existence.
As far as risks are concerned, social insurances protect people against 
events of life that may lead them to not be able to work and to lose their 
income, temporarily or permanently. From the interwar period for indus-
trial workers, and for all professions after World War II, all of what are 
now called ‘old social risks’16 were progressively covered by compulsory 
social insurance schemes: old-age , invalidity , work accident , sickness and 
unemployment . Extra costs induced by having children were also com-
pensated in some Continental European countries.
Regarding the scope of application of these schemes, instead of inte-
grating the whole population within one unique and universal scheme, 
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very often different occupational groups were eager to preserve or create 
their own schemes. As a result, these systems had become ‘quasi-univer-
sal ’ (Leisering 2009) by the 1970s, that is providing social insurance to 
all workers and providing derived social rights to their relatives. Social 
insurance systems nonetheless remained fragmented and unequal, pro-
viding better benefits to some professions (core industrial workers, pub-
lic servants ) than others (agricultural workers or the self-employed ). The 
aim was to render social assistance redundant by providing all workers 
with social insurance and by sustaining full (male ) employment. The sys-
tem covered everybody as long as all male workers would be employed 
with a full-time open-ended working contract, families remained stable, 
and unemployment was only frictional.
In terms of redistribution, in line with the ‘equivalence’ principle, the 
goal was not to reduce income inequalities or to prevent poverty , but to 
guarantee the highest replacement rate possible. Compulsory social in-
surance should replace lost wages, without the need for a privately pro-
vided supplement. During the 1960s and 1970s the aim became explicitly 
to guarantee total maintenance of living standards during temporary (un-
employment , sickness) or definitive (old age , invalidity ) periods of inac-
tivity for all workers who met the required levels and duration of con-
tributions. The levels of benefits were thus aimed at guaranteeing ‘full 
income maintenance ’ to workers (Lebenstandardsicherung in German).17
The Institutional, Social and Economic Characteristics of Social 
Insurance Welfare Systems in their Heyday
As shown in the first sections of national country chapters in this volume, 
in the early 1980s, the Bismarckian welfare systems of Germany , France , 
Austria , Belgium and the Netherlands shared the same basic institutional 
features (with Switzerland , Spain , Italy and the Visegrad countries show-
ing many more exceptions, see their respective chapters):
– old age , health and work accident insurance were compulsory for all 
dependent workers and for the self-employed (with the exception of 
the richest for the purposes of health care in Germany and the Neth-
erlands ), and unemployment insurance was generalized;
– access to social insurance was based mainly on prior contributions 
paid out of earnings;
– beneﬁ ts were provided in cash, proportional to past earnings, ex-
pressed in terms of replacement rates and dependent on the prior pay-
ment of social contributions – hence their name ‘contributory ben-
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eﬁ ts’. In the early 1980s, the share of contributory beneﬁ ts ranged from 
two-thirds of all beneﬁ ts paid in Germany to 80 percent in France . In 
Belgium , France , Germany , Austria and the Netherlands , even health 
provision was partly conceived of in terms of cash beneﬁ ts, with health 
insurance covering or reimbursing the cost of health services as well 
as replacing wages during sickness. Th e Bismarckian welfare systems 
were thus strongly cash oriented, leaving services (such as care) to 
women or to the third sector, in the name of the subsidiarity principle;
– financing came mainly from social contributions – from almost 70 
percent of all welfare system resources in Austria or Germany to more 
than 80 percent in France ;
– administrative structures were para-public, with the social partners 
heavily involved in the management of the social insurance funds . 
Even if the state was often involved too, it had to share managerial 
responsibility; and in some instances, a state presence in the admin-
istration of schemes was wholly absent, such as in old age and health 
insurance in Germany, or in unemployment and complementary oc-
cupational pension schemes in France.
With separate insurance schemes in different industries or firms, Bis-
marckian welfare systems were highly fragmented and heterogeneous. As 
shown in the various chapters in this book, the strong fragmentation of 
these systems was – and still is – one of their defining characteristics. In 
the late 1980s, there were 1200 separate regional occupational or compa-
ny-based health insurance funds in Germany , though pension provision 
was much more integrated, with two main schemes – one for blue-collar 
and one for white-collar workers – and special schemes for miners, civil 
servants and the self-employed . In France , there were 19 different health 
insurance schemes, over 600 basic pension schemes and more than 6000 
complementary pension schemes. Italy , Switzerland , Belgium and Aus-
tria also manifested strong fragmentation. The Netherlands has a (Bev-
eridgean ) basic universal pension system, but many ‘pillarized’ comple-
mentary pension schemes and a number of health insurance providers. 
The Spanish system was much more centralized and not divided into vari-
ous funds, even though occupational fragmentation, especially in pension 
and health insurance (before its universalization), was present. Despite 
developing under centralized Communist regimes after World War II, 
the Visegrad Countries maintained the organization of social protection 
in funds and retained some occupational fragmentation. In general, un-
employment insurance is much less fragmented, but it still manifests a 
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high degree of ‘corporatism ’, being run either by both social partners or 
uniquely by the trade unions, as in Belgium .
Social assistance schemes were always strictly separate from insurance 
provision, generally being locally run, tax-financed and managed by the 
public authorities. Family benefits such as family allowances were some-
times well developed, as long as they supported families and did not ‘de-
familialize ’ caring roles; they were also generally not linked to previous 
contributions, but either given to all families or targeted to the poorest. 
Southern countries have however long been characterized by almost no 
family policies (Ferrera 1996; Guillén, this volume; Jessoula and Alti, this 
volume), while France and Belgium not only supported families with gen-
erous family benefits (like their northern Continental neighbors), but also 
provided families with childcare facilities that have allowed more women 
to enter the labor market (Lewis 1992).
In terms of social outcomes, these systems were traditionally character-
ized by medium levels of decommodification and a strong reproduction 
of social stratification (Esping-Andersen 1990) i.e. by quite significant 
levels of (income and gender ) inequality. In these systems, the level of 
social protection offered depends on the employment situation, profes-
sional status, gender and age of the individual. As a result of the relatively 
generous replacement rate of social benefits (around 70 percent of net 
wages for old-age pensions in France , Austria or Germany and between 50 
and 90 percent for sick pay or unemployment insurance), these systems 
guarantee insured individuals a certain level of independence from the 
market in the event of a contingency. Dependence on the market is indi-
rect, in so far as the level of social benefits provided by these systems is it-
self related to prior employment (and family situation), and since benefits 
are proportional to earnings and contributions, high levels of inequality 
in the labor market (between blue and white collars, between skilled and 
unskilled workers, between men and women ) are simply reproduced by 
social insurance schemes.
Due to the weight of the male breadwinner model in most of these 
systems, with France and Belgium being to some degree exceptions (Lew-
is 1992), most women obtained social protection mainly indirectly, in 
their roles as spouses and/or mothers . Children also obtained protection 
through derived benefits, and not as individuals, thus creating problems 
for young adults with no prior work record. Given that entitlements were 
heavily employment and contribution related, and given that women of-
ten did not have paid work but instead shouldered caring responsibilities, 
they often received far lower benefits throughout the pension-, unem-
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ployment -, accident- and disability insurance systems (Häusermann, this 
volume and 2010b). Although this strong gender bias and the inequalities 
in rights and benefits it creates have been strongly criticized by femi-
nist scholars, it must be noted that many Continental European femi-
nist movements have themselves been long-time advocates of freedom 
of choice (financial support either to care or to enter the labor market) 
rather than merely campaigning for support to enter the labor market 
(Naumann 2005).
From an economic perspective, the focus of social insurance on the 
‘standard employment relation’ (Hinrichs, this volume) typical of industry 
and public service employment, was consistent with the type of capital-
ist development that characterized Continental Europe. The expansion 
of the Bismarckian welfare systems was linked to mass industrialization, 
and occurred largely in the context of the (post-war) heyday of Fordist, 
industrial capitalism . In this it differed both from the British welfare state, 
that was partly established earlier, and the Social Democratic welfare 
states, that only took off later, in a more post-industrial economic context 
(Bonoli 2007).
Continental European welfare systems must also be understood in the 
context of the development of the specific forms of ‘coordinated market 
economies ’ (Hall and Soskice 2001) typical of some Continental European 
countries, and requiring patient capital, labor market stability, coopera-
tion between employers and employees, and high skill levels. As Ebbing-
haus notes in this volume:
Neo-corporatist theory saw the post-war expansion of Continental 
welfare systems as part of an implicit social pact: social protection was 
expanded in exchange for the acceptance of the uncertainties of social 
market economies (Crouch 1993). In export-oriented economies, social 
protection became an important buﬀ er against the cyclical proclivity 
of the international market, thereby helping to maintain the social con-
sensus typical in corporatist , small European states such as Austria , 
the Netherlands and Switzerland (Katzenstein 1985). More recently, 
the Varieties of Capitalism approach (Hall and Soskice 2001) linked 
the development of coordinated market economies in Germany and its 
neighbours to the emergence of social welfare institutions that were 
beneﬁ cial to maintain a skilled labor force (Estevez-Abe et al. 2001). 
Recent historical research rediscovered the role of employers in provid-
ing corporate welfare and suggests that it was not always against the 
interests of ﬁ rms to support public social policies (Mares 2003).
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In sum, the Bismarckian welfare state in the post-war period assumed that 
men were working full-time, and that they would have long and uninter-
rupted careers leading up to a relatively brief retirement. In most coun-
tries on the continent, the concept of full employment involved primarily 
the male breadwinner . It was he who was supposed to provide support 
for the entire family; it was by virtue of his salary that social benefits 
were acquired. Indeed, steps were often taken to discourage women from 
working. This dependence by families on the income and social privileges 
of male family heads resulted in greater importance being given to job 
security and to guarantees of employment status (the seniority principle, 
regulation of hiring practices and employment termination) than to the 
development of employment for all (Esping-Andersen 1996).
It is precisely the assumption of ‘full male employment’ that has been 
undermined by the changes in the economic and social context since the 
1970s. These changes (increasing capital mobility, intensified competition 
between economies, deindustrialization, mass and structural unemploy-
ment , population ageing, rising female labor market participation ) have 
increasingly challenged the functioning of the Bismarckian welfare sys-
tems and called for adaptation and reforms. The following nine chapters 
trace the processes of reforms through which each Continental European 
country has tried to respond to these challenges. Chapters 10 and 11 focus 
on particular aspects of Bismarckian welfare systems (the governance and 
the financing of social protection) and their changes. Chapter 12 shows 
how the Bismarckian welfare systems have gone from a strategy based 
on labor shedding to implementing employment-friendly reforms and as-
sesses the successes and limits of such a U-turn. In chapter 13, I propose 
a transversal reading of all the chapters in order to highlight the common 
characteristics of the Bismarckian welfare reform trajectories, and to con-
tribute to the understanding of how the Bismarckian welfare systems have 
changed, what they have become, and what the main economic and social 
consequences of these transformations are.
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2 A Social Insurance State Withers Away. Welfare State 
 Reforms in Germany – Or: Attempts to Turn Around 
in a Cul-de-Sac
 Karl Hinrichs
2.1 Introduction
Within the European Union , Germany is still the ‘social insurance state’ 
par excellence. In 2007, 46 percent of the general government ’s outlays ran 
through the various social insurance schemes, and they disbursed roughly 
two-thirds of total social expenditure (according to national calculations). 
Social insurance spending amounted to almost one fifth of GDP which 
demonstrates the substantial impact of these social security institutions 
on the economy and on people’s living conditions. The predominance of 
the institutionally segmented social insurance system stems from the still 
effective Bismarckian legacy that made Germany the prototype for a com-
paratively large and, at the same time, transfer-heavy welfare state.1 The 
strong reliance on earnings-related contributions – the combined rate 
paid by employers and employees standing at 40 percent in November 
2008 – is widely regarded as the major weakness of the arrangement, im-
peding employment growth that, in turn, would ease the financial stress 
of social insurance and state budgets.
Since about the mid-1990s, we have observed intensiﬁ ed eﬀ orts to 
transform welfare state institutions. Th ree directions of change are distin-
guishable. First, wage replacement schemes, traditionally aimed at status 
maintenance , are reoriented towards basic protection for pensioners and 
unemployed. Furthermore, the strategy of reducing the labor supply in view 
of increased open unemployment after 1974 was abandoned in favor of acti-
vating social policy. Instead of income support, the focus is now on a maxi-
mum integration of (long-term) unemployed, older workers and mothers 
into paid employment. Finally, in order to make welfare state ﬁ nancing more 
employment-friendly , there is a shift away from social insurance contribu-
tions towards a higher share of tax-funding , mainly out of the federal purse.
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Although we have witnessed unprecedented structural reforms, mainly 
after the millennium, political attempts to arrive at an employment- and 
family-friendly ‘post-Bismarckian ’ shape of the welfare state have been 
hampered by a combination of unfavorable and interrelated factors which 
constrain the room to maneuver: low economic growth rates in almost 
all the years after 1992, picking up not before 2005, resulted in an almost 
stagnant employment level and enlarged the ‘problem load’. The costs of 
unification remained an impediment to attaining an overall balanced pub-
lic budget and narrowed the opportunities to further shift welfare state 
financing away from contributions. Finally, within given political struc-
tures in Germany , drastic (and sometimes even small) reforms require a 
high degree of consensus among the political actors involved, and party 
politics has notably slowed down (if not recurrently foreclosed) changes 
in the welfare state edifice. Larger leaps of policy change are only possible 
when, temporarily or on a certain issue, party competition is neutralized 
by a tacit or actual ‘Grand Coalition’ of the two large political parties, and 
that is the way the substantial reconstruction of the German welfare state 
occurred.
These structural reforms after the year 2000, emanating from para-
digmatic changes, represent the latest stage of a sequential reform pro-
cess that Germany shares with other Bismarckian welfare states (Palier 
and Martin 2007a: 542-50 and first chapter of this volume). This reform 
sequence will be analyzed in what follows. In the next section (2.2), tra-
ditional traits of the German welfare state arrangement around 1980 are 
highlighted in order to evaluate later how and to what degree the core 
elements of this arrangement have changed after the sudden death of full 
employment in the mid-1970s when the long phase of welfare state expan-
sion largely came to a halt.
It will be shown (section 2.3) that the subsequent development until 
2008 can be divided into three periods. During the ﬁ rst period, that lasted 
from about the mid-1970s until the mid-1990s, mainly ‘ﬁ rst’ or ‘second or-
der changes’ (according to Hall’s [1993] terminology) occurred. While the 
ﬁ rst period was thus marked by bounded, largely path-dependent changes 
within the established social insurance paradigm , the second one during 
the latter half of the 1990s may be characterized as a transitional period or 
phase of gradual ‘defrosting’ of the German Sozialstaat. Not least triggered 
by the ﬁ scal costs of uniﬁ cation, the political discourse shifted from social 
insurance as an eﬀ ective problem-solving technology to a perception of 
social insurance as a problem in itself. Th us, non-wage labor costs , global-
ization and generational equity emerged as catchwords for the ‘social con-
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struction of an imperative’ to reform (Cox 2001) and paved the way for an 
ideational change that materialized in substantial structural changes dur-
ing the third period. It started around the year 2000 and, still unﬁ nished, 
means a transformation of certain policy areas within new paradigms .
The fourth section will be an evaluation of the magnitude and the pat-
terns of change compared to the shape of the welfare state arrangement 
around the late 1970s. In the fifth section I will search for factors that help 
to explain the cumbersome process of transforming the social insurance 
state as well as the leaps which occurred during the third period. The con-
cluding section provides some propositions about the adopted change in 
direction away from the Bismarckian legacy, the political consequences, 
and whether Germany has (temporarily) entered a fourth period which 
might be called ‘the end of impositions’.
2.2 The German Social Insurance State as we Knew it
Social Security Based on the Standard Employment Relationship 
Right from the start in the 1880s, the social security system in Germany 
centered on wage laborers. It developed along the concept of a ‘standard 
employment relationship’ (SER), although this term was not coined be-
fore 1985 as a kind of yardstick for exploring changes, and concomitant 
risks in the labor market, and in the social protection system (Mücken-
berger 1985). Through the interplay of state intervention into the working 
of the labor market (regulatory policies), the achievements of collective 
bargaining and the rules of social custom, the labor contract was incre-
mentally enriched with individual and collective status rights regulating 
dependent labor and its exchange (Hinrichs 1991; 1996). As a norm and 
the (once) predominant reality, the SER implies continuity and stability of 
employment with not more than short interruptions of gainful work. This 
is supposed to be dependent work, bound to directives and performed as 
a full-time job based on an unlimited contract from the end of education 
until retirement at a certain age. Resting upon employment at ‘standard’ 
conditions, but separately organized, social insurance schemes provide 
wage replacement for well-defined circumstances, namely, when typical 
risks of wage labor occur and workers are temporarily unable to earn a 
market income (sickness, unemployment ) or are no longer expected to 
do so (invalidity , old age ). These earnings-related benefits are also meant 
to marginalize poverty policy, i.e. to reduce the dependence on regularly 
lower subsidiary assistance benefits which are subject to a means test.
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As a societal arrangement of production and reproduction the SER was 
clearly gender biased. It was assumed that, ensured by collective agree-
ments, a full-time job (even at the lowest wage rate) delivers a ‘family wage’ 
which is an income sufficient to maintain the needs of a nuclear family. 
Social insurance schemes stabilized the emerging male breadwinner fam-
ily because own and derived entitlements were usually high enough to 
also cover the needs of dependants. Thus, not much attention had to be 
paid to the social security of predominantly female workers in atypical or 
marginal employment, who provided merely a temporary or supplemen-
tary income. In this way, the female homemaker family was constituted 
as the opposite side of the coin, which largely rendered unnecessary state 
provisions for child and elderly care and thus impeded the continuous 
integration of women in the labor market. Instead, cash transfers (child 
and housing allowances, tax advantages) met the income needs of family 
households during certain phases of the life course.2
Social Insurance Schemes: Institutional Features
Social insurance schemes are the core of the Bismarckian welfare state. 
As with any other welfare state program, they can be analyzed along four 
dimensions (cf. Bonoli and Palier 1998). The information given below re-
lates to the situation around the late 1970s which represents the end of 
expansionary development, but includes the long-term care (LTC) insur-
ance scheme which came into effect not earlier than 1995 (see section 2.3).
(1) Starting with financing, the revenues of all social insurance schemes 
by definition stem mainly or completely from earnings-related contri-
butions, unrelated to individual risk. They are equally divided between 
employers and employees. Contributions are levied up to certain earn-
ings ceilings (higher for the unemployment and pension scheme) and 
above that no entitlements to cash benefits are earned. However, from 
the outset tax subsidies have been a funding component in the pension 
scheme and, recurrently, the federal government had to cover deficits of 
the unemployment insurance scheme. LTC insurance and the health care 
scheme (until 2003) always met their expenses solely out of contributions, 
and all schemes operate on the pay-as-you-go principle. On behalf of the 
recipients of cash beneﬁ ts the respective scheme actually transfers con-
tributions to other schemes (e.g. from unemployment insurance to the 
sickness funds, the pension and, nowadays, also to the LTC scheme). Due 
to this ﬁ nancial interdependence, rule changes in one scheme (e.g. of the 
contribution rate) often aﬀ ect the ﬁ nancial status of other schemes as well.
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(2) In general, access to benefits is dependent upon prior contributions 
paid out of actual earnings. Most members of the schemes are compul-
sorily insured. The sickness funds and the public pension scheme may 
also be joined voluntarily (e.g. by self-employed ), and employees with 
earnings above a certain ceiling may either remain voluntary members of 
the statutory sickness funds or opt out and seek private insurance cov-
erage. Beginning with blue-collar (industrial) workers in the 1880s, the 
extension of mandatory coverage to further categories of the gainfully 
employed was almost completed by the end of the 1970s. In contrast, 
LTC insurance started as an almost universal scheme, requiring mem-
bership even for those who had voluntarily taken out private health care 
coverage. This scheme and also the sickness funds provide in-kind ben-
efits to dependent family members with no earnings or earnings below a 
certain ceiling. They are exempted from contributions as their eligibility 
rests upon the coverage of the principal person insured. The pension 
scheme also offers ‘derived’ benefits for survivors of a deceased worker/
pensioner.
(3) Regarding benefit structure, cash benefits clearly prevail (nearly 
two-thirds of the social insurance schemes’ expenditure in 1980), and in 
all schemes they are related to former earnings. The equivalence prin-
ciple (individual equity) is most strictly applied in the pension scheme 
because the length of covered employment counts as well. Nevertheless, 
before the implementation of a series of pension reforms beginning in 
1992, several provisions were included in the benefit formula which, in 
order to attain a socially adequate pension, produced additional entitle-
ments for periods with zero or low earnings. The level of earnings-relat-
ed benefits is meant to ensure status maintenance , although the replace-
ment ratio varies across the schemes. No income losses occur to workers 
whose sickness lasts less than six weeks and, after the employer’s wage 
continuation ends, sick pay regularly amounted to 90 percent of net earn-
ings in 1980. That year, the target replacement rate (net) for a ‘standard 
pensioner’ – which assumed an insurance career of 45 years and always 
having earned the average wage – stood at 70.3 percent. Unemployment 
insurance benefits, paid up to a maximum of 12 months, amounted to 68 
percent of former net earnings until 1984 (the level of indefinitely paid 
tax-financed unemployment assistance benefits was 58 percent). All four 
social insurance branches also or solely grant in-kind benefits – reha-
bilitation (pension scheme), training (unemployment insurance), medi-
cal care (which makes up 95 percent of the sickness funds’ expenditure) 
and long-term care (100 percent). Here we find a dualism of principles. 
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Contributions are levied according to earnings capacity, whereas in-kind 
benefits are awarded depending on ascertained (medical) need or ap-
propriateness to facilitate the return to employment (rehabilitation and 
active labor market policies ). Thus, interpersonal redistribution within 
the risk pool of insured is more pronounced than in the realm of cash 
benefits.
(4) Finally, regarding administrative and organizational structures, all 
social insurance schemes are para-public entities with separate budgets. 
Right from their inception, corporatist self-administration has been a 
central feature and a correlative of contribution financing. However, the 
composition of the respective governing bodies varies. In the Federal La-
bor Agency (FLA – unemployment insurance), beside the social partners , 
representatives of public authorities (e.g. from the states) are involved. 
The pension scheme is administered solely by the employers and the in-
sured (predominantly: trade unionists). This is also true for most sick-
ness funds and the LTC insurance units which are organizationally tied 
to them.3
While participation in self-administration may have provided organi-
zational support for trade unions in the late 19th century and still offers 
both social partners a legitimate right to put forward their point of view 
in public and to be heard in legislative procedures, self-administration as 
such has lost much of its relevance (except for the health care scheme). 
Ever more detailed legislation has hollowed out the scope for autonomous 
decision-making by the respective (corporatist ) bodies and largely made 
self-administration a symbolic feature (see Ebbinghaus, this volume). 
Moreover, the social insurance units have been forced to adopt a more 
managerial structure of governance for the day-to-day matters. Represen-
tatives of employers and employees are confined to supervisory boards, 
similar to those in joint stock companies. These organizational changes 
aim at higher efficiency and lower administrative costs, and the same is 
true for mergers within the social insurance branches. The formal separa-
tion of public pension schemes by occupational status was finally abol-
ished in October 2005 when they were merged into one. Due to voluntary 
mergers of sickness funds into larger units their number has been drasti-
cally reduced (1992: 1,223; 2008: 210) and will further decline. Recent ad-
ministrative and organizational restructuring was a relatively low-profile 
issue and has not played a central role in substantively changing the Ger-
man social insurance state. Therefore, this dimension will not be dealt 
with further.
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2.3 A Sequential Reform Trajectory 
Germany’s social protection system has been confronted with an al-
most continuously increasing ‘problem load’ since the early 1990s, while 
political institutions have constrained the timely adjustment of policy 
goals and instruments. Thus, the large German welfare state may be 
typified as a truck steadily moving further into a cul-de-sac, hence, fac-
ing ever more limited opportunities to turn around and get a clear run 
again. Figure 2.1 depicts the overall reform trajectory as a U-turn divid-
ed into three phases. Factually, the sequential process does not fit neatly 
for all social policy domains looked at in the following. There was some 
overlap, development was not always straightforward, and the modes of 
institutional change varied between policy areas. However, except for 
the domain of health and long-term care policy, the process has arrived 
at structural reforms following a conception clearly different from the 
past.
Figure 2.1 Welfare State Turnaround in Germany
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Period I (1976-1995): Smooth Consolidation and a Last Victory for Social 
Insurance
Increasing unemployment figures in 1974/75 and again after 1980 put fi-
nancial pressure on the social insurance schemes. The most obvious re-
sponse to cost increases in health care and more spending on the un-
employed and on early retirees was to raise revenues. Thus, the total 
contribution rate rose by 5.3 percentage points between 1975 and 1990 
(see Table 2.1). However, there were also retrenchments. Up to the end 
of the 1980s, they remained moderate and amounted to nothing more 
than ‘smooth consolidation’ (Offe 1991). Those restrictions of benefit gen-
erosity were concluded in consensual manner and if not, the respective 
political party in opposition expressed hardly more than ‘dutiful protest’. 
At that time, the two large ‘people’s parties’ (Volksparteien), the Christian 
Democrats and the Social Democrats, were both committed to preserving 
the structures of the social insurance state and to retaining a high level of 
state-guaranteed protection.
Table 2.1 Combined Contribution Rate 
 (Employer + Employee) to 
 Social Insurance Schemes
1960 24.4%
1970 26.5%
1975 30.5%
1980 32.4%
1990 35.8%
1995 39.3%
1998 42.1%
2000 41.0%
2003 42.1%
2005 42.3%
2007 40.6%
2008 40.0%
Almost immediately after unemployment figures started to soar, a series 
of incremental changes (moderately) increased the pressure on unem-
ployed people to accept job offers, ‘nibbled’ on the eligibility criteria for 
claiming unemployment benefits and impaired the entitlements in vari-
ous way over and above the reductions of the replacement rate in 1984 
and 1994 (for further details, see Clasen 2005: 54-76). In contrast, ben-
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efits in case of early retirement remained generous and the corresponding 
options were even extended. All actors – the government , trade unions , 
employers and the older workers themselves – preferred a premature exit 
from the labor market to higher open unemployment . Thus, early retire-
ment was widely utilized and, factually, a reversal set in not long before 
the year 2000.
Since the late 1970s, numerous reforms of the statutory health insur-
ance (SHI) scheme stopped mainly supply-side driven spending hikes only 
for a few subsequent years. The health care providers who held numerous 
veto points within the institutional setting of this policy domain were able 
to ward off more ambitious reform proposals affecting their income or au-
tonomy. Comparatively successful in stabilizing the average contribution 
rate was the ‘Seehofer reform’ that went into effect in 1993. Different from 
the largely ineffective 1989 reform, it came about as a negotiated compro-
mise between the Christian-Liberal government and the Social Demo-
crats whose majority of votes in the Bundesrat (since 1991) was crucial for 
pursuing a comprehensive reform approach. Two organizational changes 
stimulated competitive pressure on the sickness funds and paved the way 
for further intensification in the latest reform of 2007. First, cross-subsi-
dies between sickness funds were introduced so as to balance varying risk 
profiles of their membership (according to age and sex) and differences 
in their revenue structure. These risk-adjustment subsidies narrowed the 
hitherto broad range of contribution rates levied by the different sickness 
funds. They were a prerequisite for the second change: all members (and 
not only the white-collar workers as before) were allowed to choose from 
nearly all sickness funds and applicants could not be rejected. The idea 
was that sickness funds should compete for members on the basis of effi-
ciency and service quality, particularly when given more latitude to nego-
tiate with service providers, and the reform indeed resulted in a declining 
number of sickness funds due to mergers (see above).
In comparative perspective, the pension reform of 1989 (becoming ef-
fective in 1992) was an early response to imminent population aging and a 
highlight of corporatist incrementalism, as well as a continuation of con-
sensual pension politics including the social partners and the major po-
litical parties. As a change of instruments, it formally introduced net wage 
indexing of new and current pensions. De facto it had been applied already 
since the late 1970s due to arbitrary manipulations of the adjustment for-
mula. After 1992 a net replacement level of 70 percent for the ‘standard 
pensioner’ was ensured. Moreover, in the long run workers taking out a 
first pension before reaching the normal retirement age (65) would have 
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to face permanent deductions. Federal subsidies to the public pension 
scheme were increased and expected to durably amount to 19 percent of 
the scheme’s spending. Finally, credits for childcare that had been first 
recognized as an equivalent to waged work in 1986 were improved (three 
instead of one year for births after 1991). The cumulative effect of the vari-
ous reform elements was expected to facilitate a contribution rate of 26.9 
percent instead of 36.4 percent in 2030 (Sozialbeirat 1998: 242). Among 
all relevant political actors the assessment prevailed that no substantial 
readjustments had to be considered before the year 2010.
The legislation of the long-term care insurance (LTC) in 1994 was the 
last manifestation of consensual reform policy carried out by the two 
Volksparteien until 2001, and it was the last expansionary reform within 
the social insurance approach, although this institutional innovation to a 
large extent replaced previous spending on means-tested care benefits. 
In view of this social risk becoming ever more virulent in an ageing so-
ciety, the proponents within both parties almost unanimously regarded 
the LTC scheme as the completion of the social insurance state. However, 
the new scheme had not come off without the states’ and municipalities’ 
insistence on being relieved from rising social assistance spending on the 
needy elderly . While a compromise on the contours of the benefit side 
(graded according to need classes with no full-cost coverage) emerged 
quite early, legislation was delayed for many years by the struggle over or-
ganizational form and, hence, how to finance such fundamental reform – 
concretely, whether to opt for a tax-transfer scheme, a mandatory private 
insurance, or an additional social insurance scheme. It was a principled 
conflict over either creating or warding off a precedent for future social 
policy development. Ultimately, the two large parties compromised upon 
a variant that was most faithful to the traditional social insurance path, 
namely, a separate branch under the roof of the sickness funds. In this 
way it avoided further burdening the federal budget, circumvented the 
‘double payment problem’ of a private funded LTC insurance, and applied 
the technique most familiar and comprehensible to the public as contri-
bution payments entitling to non-means-tested benefits in the case of risk 
occurrence (Götting et al. 1994).
Nevertheless, the new scheme included two unprecedented features: 
factually, employers are burdened with less than half of the contribution 
rate since one paid holiday was abolished. Furthermore, the contribution 
rate (1.7 percent) and the (maximum) benefit levels were fixed by law. 
That way a dilemma was created when the number of beneficiaries in-
creases (as it in fact happens): Either a higher contribution rate has to be 
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legislated or a deterioration of the benefits’ real value due to rising costs 
of care services must be accepted. It was not until 2007 that the govern-
ment decided to depart from a stable contribution rate (plus 0.25 percent-
age points to be balanced by a lower rate to unemployment insurance) in 
order to upgrade benefit levels in 2008 and thereafter. Thus, by resort-
ing to higher contributions the 2008 reform partly reversed the ‘policy 
drift ’ (Streeck and Thelen 2005a) of the scheme. In view of rising numbers 
of frail elderly , a structural reform of financing (a departure from pure 
pay-as-you-go) is being debated, but no contours are recognizable as yet.
Germany participated in the worldwide recovery of economic growth 
during the 1980s. As a result, the employment level increased, the public 
deficit dropped from 3.9 percent of GDP to zero in 1989, and the social 
spending/GDP ratio went down from 30.4 percent (1981) to 26.9 percent 
(1990) (BMGS 2005: 192). This altogether favorable situation on the eve 
of unification supported the belief that the social and economic conse-
quences of this singular event could be mastered. After implementing 
the pension (1992) and health care reform (1993), still in the mid-1990s, 
there was broad-based confidence in the ability to modernize the single 
social insurance schemes one by one, to improve their poverty alleviating 
function and to maintain the schemes’ financial viability in the long run 
(Nullmeier and Rüb 1994: 60-3; Leisering 1995). Moreover, the passing of 
the LTC scheme had obviously proven the social insurance technology to 
be capable of becoming applied to new social risks .
Period II (1996-2000): From (Unfounded) Optimism to ‘Reform Blockade’
The second period was characterized by a not unanimously shared ide-
ational change. Rather, adversarial politics prevailed between the two 
party blocs — the Social Democrats and the Green party in one camp, the 
Christian Democrats and the Liberal party in the other. Within Germany’s 
specific political institutions such a constellation provided ample incen-
tives for blame generation and stalemate. In view of retrenchments only 
partly implemented or revoked and the absence of structural changes , the 
term ‘reform blockade’ was frequently used during the second half of the 
1990s (cf. Manow and Seils 2000).
When the LTC insurance went into full effect in July 1996 optimism 
regarding the ability to safeguard the social insurance state by incremen-
tal adjustments had vanished. The fiscal costs of unification came to the 
fore and strongly influenced the reform trajectory after 1995. Contrary to 
expectations in 1990/91, it would trigger a replication of the ‘economic 
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miracle’ of the 1950s and early 1960s (Abelshauser 2004: 402-7), the ‘uni-
fication boom’ was short-lived, and more than one third of jobs got lost in 
East Germany between 1989 and 2000. The advancing deindustrialization 
process in West Germany put additional strain on both unemployment 
insurance and, due to massive inflows into early retirement in both parts 
of the country, also on the public pension scheme. The result of the ‘wel-
fare without work ’ syndrome (Esping-Andersen 1996a) was that the total 
contribution rate rose from 35.8 percent in 1990 to 39.1 percent in 1996 
(plus 1.7 percent for LTC insurance after June 1996).
Consequently, the discourse on social policy reform altered dramati-
cally after 1995. At that time globalization spread as a term in the politi-
cal debate and was immediately related to high non-wage labor costs as a 
threat to international competitiveness and job growth. Social insurance 
contributions has become a central topic in almost any reform debate since 
then and favored strategically interested interpretations about the detri-
mental eﬀ ects. Th ose arguments had not been absent in the debate before 
the mid-1990s, but as the new diagnosis of the problem came to the fore 
they condensed into irrefutable facts justifying more serious social policy 
changes. One quotation from the spokeswoman of the Liberal Party, Gisela 
Babel, may suﬃ  ce to show how the interpretative pattern had changed. 
When the 1997 pension reform bill was read in the Bundestag she referred 
to the reform of 1989 and said: ‘At that time no discontent with a contribu-
tion rate to the pension scheme of 26 percent or 28 percent was discern-
ible. Th at was ﬂ atly considered acceptable then. Today we do not consider 
it acceptable anymore’ (Deutscher Bundestag 1997b: 16780-1).
Similarly, causal beliefs regarding the unemployment problem moved 
further away from macroeconomic constellations as a prime cause. In-
stead, too little labor market — due to excessive state intervention and 
the effects of industry-wide collective bargaining — was identified as 
root cause (Bleses and Seeleib-Kaiser 2004: 110-3, 121-3). Consequently, 
removing rigidities through deregulation was the answer as well as ex-
tended recommodification, i.e. more incentives for the unemployed to 
take up job offers and stricter sanctions if they refused. Later, a somewhat 
biased interpretation of ‘employment miracles’ abroad (the Netherlands , 
Denmark ), already applying stricter activation policies, was utilized to 
emphasize the necessity of further changes.
Although official estimates on demographic ageing had hardly wors-
ened since the legislation of the pension reform in 1989, they were per-
ceived as more dramatic than before. Generational equity, hitherto absent 
in the German discourse, became an issue for the first time in 1997 when 
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it appeared in the explanatory statement to the draft law of the pension 
reform that was legislated the same year (Deutscher Bundestag 1997a: 1, 
47). A declining replacement ratio for present and future pensioners was 
justified in order not to overburden the younger generations. Interested 
actors, like the financial market industry, and policy entrepreneurs re-
inforced arguments about the non-sustainability of the PAYG pension 
scheme and the exhaustion of the one-pillar approach to deliver appropri-
ate retirement income and thus prepared the ground for the multi-pillar 
paradigm to become ever more predominant.
In reaction to previous reforms regarded as insufficient, the new inter-
pretative patterns were most energetically advanced by the government 
parties (and the employers ). The Social Democrats, the smaller opposi-
tion parties (the Greens and the left-wing PDS) and the labor unions – 
none of them suitably prepared to enter a social learning process – did not 
adopt them. Therefore, the Christian Democrats departed from the com-
mitment to a strong welfare state they hitherto had shared with the Social 
Democrats for electoral reasons and because of the strong stance of the 
Labor wing within the party’s membership. Largely because of pressure 
from the Liberal party, the coalition government turned to a unilateral ap-
proach, and no longer actively sought a compromise with the Social Dem-
ocrats, who then utilized the Bundesrat to block policy changes wherever 
possible. In the run-up to the 1998 federal election they promised to undo 
the ‘social atrocities’ the Christian-Liberal government had committed 
(and actually repealed several policy changes immediately after coming 
into office). Thereafter, the Christian Democrats turned the tables when 
they attempted to bloc reform legislation of the Red-Green government .
It meant that all health care reforms from 1996 until 2003 were highly 
contested between the respective government and opposition. Because 
of the required consent of the Bundesrat, the hospital sector, the larg-
est spending component, was hardly tackled. Nonetheless, these reform 
packages put a temporary brake on expenditure increases. The incoming 
Red-Green government never implemented some ‘privatization ’ measures 
legislated by its predecessor and partly revoked increased co-payments 
for patients.
Changes in the public pension scheme were no less controversial. 
In view of a steep rise of elderly unemployed prematurely claiming an 
old-age pension (at age 60), the phasing-out of early retirement options 
without permanent deductions was accelerated in 1996. Moreover, vari-
ous entitlements, not based on individual contributions out of earnings, 
were further reduced and thus strengthened the link between contribu-
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tions and benefits. These retrenchments were a prelude for a more sub-
stantial reform legislated one year later and, once again, bitterly opposed 
by the Social Democrats who were closing ranks with the labor unions . In 
particular, they resisted impairments for disability pensioners and the in-
clusion of a ‘life expectancy factor’ in the benefit formula (that would have 
led to a gradually declining replacement rate). After coming into office, 
the Red-Green government suspended both controversial elements and 
passed a more moderate reform of disability pensions in 2000 instead.
However, the Social Democrats agreed to one element of the 1997 pen-
sion reform, namely, higher federal subsidies to be ﬁ nanced out of an in-
creased VAT rate. Consensus on this issue (Bundesrat approval was re-
quired) marks a turning point as well as the start of an institutional reform 
that subsequently extended to the health care and the unemployment in-
surance scheme. Before, by an artfully arranged cost- and revenue-shift-
ing game between the diﬀ erent social insurance branches and the federal 
purse, the scheme most pressured was relieved at the expense of those 
in less ﬁ nancial straits but, predominantly, the social insurance system at 
large became burdened by the relief of the federal budget. Particularly, 
after 1990 signiﬁ cant parts of uniﬁ cation costs had been shifted onto the 
unemployment and pension scheme. Since the mid-1990s, the social insur-
ance institutions demanded a reversal, arguing that beneﬁ t components 
not based on contributions out of own earnings (versicherungsfremde Leis-
tungen) should not be borne by the community of insured, but rather, the 
general public was ﬁ nancially responsible for redistribution of this kind. 
Th us, in order to attain the front-ranking objective of a combined contri-
bution rate below the 40 percent threshold, infusing (more) tax revenues 
into the budgets of social insurance schemes immediately facilitated a low-
er contribution rate without (further) reducing beneﬁ ts. To that end, the 
Red-Green government introduced (and subsequently hiked) an energy 
tax (Ökosteuer) and transferred the revenues into the budget of the public 
pension scheme. Such a reﬁ nancing eased reforms in other Bismarckian 
welfare states as well (see Palier, chapter 13, this volume).
Period III (2001-2007): New Momentum for a Reform Process ‘Beyond 
Incrementalism’
The ‘reform blockade’ was not dissolved before 2001 when a tacit con-
sensus re-emerged. Subsequently, a number of institutional changes and 
structural reforms passed after compromises had been negotiated be-
tween the Red-Green government and the opposition.
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Health Care : More Effi  ciency through More Competition
The new Red-Green government was unable to carry through a compre-
hensive health care reform after the majority in the Bundesrat had shifted 
to its disadvantage in 1999. It could, however, legislate a pared-down pack-
age in 2000 that focused on the governance structure. The reform aimed 
at more efficient and qualitatively improved delivery of medical services, 
and this attempt was continued in 2003 when the government turned to 
the Christian Democrats and negotiated a compromise on another reform 
package that was approved by the Bundesrat (Gerlinger 2003). It also in-
cluded tax revenues from an increased tobacco tax that were funneled 
into SHI and meant to cover spending items ‘alien’ to this scheme (like 
maternity benefits). Again, the 2003 reform further shifted the costs of 
health care to the patients (among others, they have to pay an ‘entrance 
fee’ of 10 euros per quarter when seeing a doctor in private practice) and 
to the insured. Since July 2005 the contribution rate is no longer equally 
shared between employers and employees, but rather, employees have to 
pay an additional 0.9 percentage points, and employers are relieved cor-
respondingly.
Further reforming the health care system was announced to be a cen-
tral project of the new ‘Grand Coalition’ government that came into of-
fice in autumn 2005. It was legislated in February 2007 after substantial 
controversies between the government and all other actors involved in 
this policy domain, and among the government parties. Prior to the 2005 
elections, both the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats ex-
pressed their determination to change the financing of health care but in 
an entirely different way. The compromise does not foreclose the realiza-
tion of one or the other concept after the next federal elections. The core 
element is a newly established ‘health fund’ which, beginning in 2009, col-
lects all contributions at a uniform rate fixed by the government (i.e. no 
longer determined by the self-governing bodies). Additionally, the federal 
government contributes to the ‘health fund’. Tax subsidies will increase to 
14 billion euros per annum and effectuate a lower contribution rate than 
would have to be raised otherwise. Transfers to the individual sickness 
funds are allocated according to the risk structure (age, sex and morbid-
ity) of the respective membership. In case revenues do not meet their ex-
penses, those sickness funds have to raise a supplementary contribution 
from which the employers are exempt while others may refund surpluses 
to their members. This element of the 2007 reform package shows its 
main thrust, which is to further strengthen competition within the health 
care system, a development opened up by the institutional reform of 1993. 
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Strengthened competition is moreover expected to improve efficiency 
and quality of health care delivery. To that end, provisions that have been 
legislated during Red-Green incumbency in 2000 and 2003 and which 
allow for more flexible contractual relationships between sickness funds 
and providers, are extended.
Pension Policy: Adopting the Multi-Pillar Approach
In pension policy the Red-Green government executed a paradigmatic 
change when it departed from the supposedly ‘exhausted’ social insur-
ance approach (Bönker 2005) in 2001. Three innovations included in the 
reform package are most important (Hinrichs 2005). First, the reference 
point shifted from the benefit to the revenue side: the standard replace-
ment ratio of 70 percent (net), established in 1992, was replaced with a 
fixed contribution rate that is not supposed to exceed 20 percent until 
2020 and 22 percent until 2030. In order to keep to these targets, ‘brake 
mechanisms’ were included in the benefit formula. The expected decline 
of the standard replacement ratio meant a clear departure from the dogma 
of status maintenance (after a complete full-time career) to be attained by 
public pensions alone. Second, in order to close the arising pension gap, 
the core of the 2001 reform was the institutionalization of the so called 
Riester-Rente. The voluntary take-up of certified savings plans is encour-
aged by offering tax advantages or direct subsidies. Such an extension to 
retirement income policy has irrevocably put the German pension system 
on a multi-pillar track again, since 1957 having been equivalent to a public 
pension policy and a one-pillar approach.
Finally, old-age (and disability ) pensioners with insufficient resources 
are no longer referred to the general social assistance scheme, but rather 
are entitled to benefits from a special basic security scheme which are still 
means-tested and not higher than before. However, the traditional obliga-
tion of adult children to financially support their elderly parents is lifted. 
This third innovation may be regarded as a pre-emptive policy; eased and 
less stigmatized access to benefits from the new scheme will make the 
combined effects of a more flexible labor market (fewer regular full-time 
employment careers) and of past and future pension retrenchments so-
cially more bearable (see section 2.4).
The 2001 reform gained a majority in the Bundestag after the labor 
unions and the ‘traditionalists’ within the SPD were acquiesced by some 
(symbolic) concessions (Trampusch 2006). A tacit interparty consensus 
emerged after further accommodations were granted to the CDU/CSU 
so that the party abstained from determined efforts to close the ranks 
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in the Bundesrat and, actually, no unified bloc of states with the CDU in 
government obstructed the reform package.4 A similar pattern of con-
flict and, ultimately, of conflict resolution occurred in 2004. Calculations 
made prior to the 2001 reform had proven overly optimistic, and so as not 
to miss the contribution targets, the benefit formula was changed again. 
Following the recommendations of a reform commission, the inclusion 
of a so called ‘sustainability factor’ (the changing ratio of pensioners and 
insured) will lead to a further decline of the replacement rate when the 
adjustment of the value of one ‘earnings point’, relevant for both new and 
current pensioners , will lag behind the growth of average covered earn-
ings (cf. Schmähl 2007). The net standard replacement rate is going to 
drop from about 69 percent at the beginning of this decade to about 52 
percent in 2030.
In order to ensure adherence to the contribution rate targets, the re-
form commission further proposed a higher standard retirement age 
(Kommission 2003). The Red-Green government abstained from includ-
ing this most controversial and unpopular issue in the 2004 legislation, 
but closed the last loopholes for early retirement at age 60. Therefore, 
it was the ‘Grand Coalition’ government who decided in 2007 to lift the 
normal retirement age from 65 to 67 years between 2012 and 2029. This 
implies lower benefits for future retirees who, for whatever reason, (have 
to) claim their public pension at an earlier age.
Protecting the Unemployed: Bifurcated Benefi ts
A second paradigmatic change, again meaning a departure from the Bis-
marckian principle of status maintenance , took place in labor market 
policy when the ‘Hartz laws’ were implemented between 2003 and 2005 
(Hinrichs 2007; Konle-Seidl et al. 2007; Oschmiansky et al. 2007). They 
emanated from proposals of the reform commission named after its chair-
man Peter Hartz (Kommission 2002). A compromise with the Bundesrat 
(concretely: the Christian Democrats) had to be attained on the most im-
portant provisions.
The Hartz laws came in four parts. The first three included changes in 
the governance structure of the Federal Labor Agency (FLA) and mea-
sures to improve the services provided to its clients, new instruments of 
labor market policy , stricter ‘activation’ of the unemployed, and a cur-
tailment of insurance benefit eligibility for the unemployed age 55 and 
older (with a maximum 18 months instead of 32). Most controversial was 
the Hartz IV act which implied lower benefits for many long-term unem-
ployed. It abolished the awkwardly constructed unemployment assistance 
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scheme that was tax-financed (federal budget) and means-tested, but at 
the same time, earnings-related . This benefit had meant to (indefinitely) 
ensure status preservation at a lower level of provision than did unem-
ployment insurance benefits. In fact, after 1999 it was contingent on prior 
contribution payments because only those (long-term) unemployed who 
had received unemployment insurance benefits before were entitled to 
claim unemployment assistance.
The Hartz IV reform fused the unemployment and social assistance 
schemes into one institution (and renamed the insurance benefit as ALG 
I). Eligible for the new benefit type Arbeitslosengeld II (ALG II), in place 
since January 2005, are people of employable age who are ‘able to work’ 
(defined as at least three hours per day) and obliged to seek employment. 
For their dependants ‘not able to work’ (mostly children) there are supple-
ments. Flat-rate ALG II is contingent upon a comprehensive means-test. 
As of July 2009, the monthly cash benefit amounts to 359 euros for a single 
person and, additionally, the actual costs of ‘appropriate’ housing (rent 
plus heating costs) are covered. If a long-term unemployed person has 
received a sufficiently high ALG I the transition towards the lower ALG 
II income is smoothed out over a two-year period. Thus, only the unem-
ployed with no prior or insufficient ALG I entitlements are dependent on 
the flat-rate benefit from the very start. ALG II is not merely a basic secu-
rity scheme for the registered unemployed: rather, it is designed to serve 
all needy people of working age. As with social assistance before, ALG II 
may be paid as an in-work benefit if income from employment is too low 
to meet the needs of the household.
The Hartz reforms have not only changed access to and the structure of 
benefits. They have also shifted the financing of unemployment , foremost 
at the expense of the federal budget and to the benefit of contributors to 
the unemployment insurance scheme and the municipalities. The latter 
gained because the federal government fully covers the expenditure on 
ALG II cash benefits and social insurance contributions on behalf of the 
recipients, and because the government partakes in spending on housing 
costs. Prior to the implementation of ALG II the FLA also had to bear in 
full the costs of active labor market policies for beneficiaries of unem-
ployment assistance and related administrative expenses. As of 2008, it 
has to cover only half of the costs of the reintegration measures provided 
to ALG II recipients, while the other half is taken over by the federal purse. 
Furthermore, the FLA saves on unemployment insurance benefits (ALG I) 
due to the shortened eligibility period. Finally, since 2007 the revenues of 
one percentage point from the increased sales tax (VAT) are transferred 
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to the FLA (about 7.2 billion euros in 2007). For this reason, though more 
importantly because of declining numbers of ALG I recipients after 2005, 
it was possible to lower the contribution rate to the unemployment insur-
ance scheme from 6.5 to 4.2 percent in 2007 and once more to 3.3 percent 
in 2008.
Family Policy: Overcoming the Male Breadwinner Family
Another reorientation which may also be termed a paradigmatic change 
happened in family policy which traditionally focused on stabilizing the 
‘female homemaker family’. The reorientation that has yet to fully materi-
alize is part of what Bleses and Seeleib-Kaiser (2004: 89-93) have called the 
‘dual transformation’ of the German welfare state arrangement, namely, 
the aim to shrink social policies centered on the (male) wage earner and to 
expand policy areas that help to reconcile paid work and family life. The 
expansion during the Christian-Liberal government (see Clasen 2005: 
153-66; Ostner 2006), however, was based on the concept of sequencing 
parenthood and employment: one parent (read: the mother ) should take 
a parental leave for the first three years after giving birth to the (young-
est) child and return to (part-time) employment thereafter (the job being 
guaranteed in the meantime), when the child is entitled to a place in the 
(part-time) kindergarten. Social transfers should (partly) compensate for 
the loss of earnings and improve the income situation of young families. 
To that end and beginning in the second half of the 1980s, the govern-
ment introduced or increased various cash benefits (e.g. child allowances, 
pension credits for child and elderly care, parental leave benefits), and on 
that account Germany is nowadays spending more than most European 
countries (Bundesregierung 2006: 38-40).
In contrast, the Red-Green government regarded any long interruption 
of employment as being detrimental for utilizing and expanding the hu-
man capital of mothers and, thus, their career prospects. It therefore pro-
vided incentives for a speedier return into paid employment (e.g. higher 
parental leave benefits when taken out for a shorter period or, with regard 
to pension credits, a revaluation of covered earnings until the child reach-
es age ten) and offered federal subsidies to create facilities for full-day 
schooling, thus easing mothers ’ full-time employment . The unfinished 
project to reform parental leave benefits (Elterngeld) was continued by 
the ‘Grand Coalition’ government and put into effect in 2007. The new 
benefit type is paid for merely 12 months (plus an additional two months 
if the other parent also goes on leave; always 14 months for single parents). 
The Elterngeld is most advantageous for middle-class women (Henninger 
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et al. 2008) because it amounts to two thirds of former net earnings (up 
to a maximum of 1,800 euros per month; minimum benefit: 300 euros), 
is financed out of federal taxes , and is no longer income-tested (as the 
former flat-rate benefit of 300 euros). In order to render possible a high-
er employment rate for mothers , along with increased fertility rates and 
lower child poverty rates (like in Scandinavian countries), the supply of 
affordable day care has to be substantially expanded. Therefore, by 2012 
places for one third of the children below the age of three will be created. 
Spending on those ‘defamilialization policies’ is largely financed out of the 
federal purse.
The shift towards a ‘sustainable’ family policy — i.e. one that is pro-na-
talist, promotes gender equality and the life chances of children coming 
from deprived and migrant families — is generally accepted. However, 
the coalition parties still differ on how rigorously an ‘employment-cen-
tered family policy ’ should be pursued. The Conservative factions among 
the Christian Democrats want to facilitate a choice between the ‘female 
homemaker family’ and the ‘dual earner family’ pattern (e.g. by insisting 
on a home care allowance). In contrast, the Social Democrats, all the op-
position parties, and both social partners give clear priority to the latter 
concept, which is in line with (but was not explicitly influenced by) the 
supported ‘adult worker model’ as emphasized in the revised Lisbon Pro-
cess (Annesley 2007).
2.4 The Consequences of Maneuvering out of the Cul-de-Sac
The intensification of the reform process after the year 2000 has brought 
about significant institutional changes in the German welfare state ar-
rangement which mainly correspond to the mode ‘conversion ’ (Streeck 
and Thelen 2005a). Assigning a new mission or objective to a given insti-
tution has clearly taken place in family policy (supporting the dual-earner 
instead of the male breadwinner family), in the protection of the jobless 
(abolition of earnings-replacing benefits for long-term unemployed com-
ing as a ‘big bang’), and in the public pension scheme (relinquishment of 
status maintenance through a series of incremental changes – cf. Hinrichs 
and Kangas 2003). For the old-age security system at large, the turn to-
wards the multipillar approach in 2001 has also set in motion path-alter-
ing dynamics through a mechanism of ‘differential growth’ (Streeck and 
Thelen 2005a: 23) as a voluntary private pension scheme, small in the be-
ginning, was layered upon the public system and will grow comparatively 
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faster than the public one. Starting from zero in 2002, meanwhile (De-
cember 2009), about one third (13 million) of all eligible employees have 
taken out a savings plan for the Riester-Rente. In health care policy we 
have seen institutional reforms beyond retrenchment (strengthened com-
petition) but not yet changes that come up to ‘conversion ’, and the 2008 
reform has saved the LTC insurance scheme from further ‘policy drift ’.
Contrasting the institutional conditions of the German welfare state at 
around 1980 (see section 2.2) with those after the more recent reforms, 
the changes are most clearly visible in the financing dimension. Despite 
substantial increases of the combined contribution rate to social insur-
ance schemes (see Table 2.1) there is an ongoing shift away from this 
mode of funding. The share of total social spending that is financed out 
of contributions has decreased from 65.7 percent in 1991 to less than 60 
percent since 2003 (BMAS 2008b: 12). This is largely the result of more 
tax money being infused into the social insurance schemes. To that end, 
indirect taxes have been increased (VAT and tobacco tax) or newly intro-
duced (ecology tax). The shift in financing has gone farthest in the public 
pension scheme. In 2007, payments out of the federal budget (including 
contributions for childcare credits which currently facilitate a lower rate 
being levied on earnings) covered about one third of the annual expen-
diture of this basically contribution-financed pension scheme, whereas 
in 1992 they delivered only 21 percent. These subsidies amounted to 29 
percent of the federal budget in 2007 (Bundesrechnungshof 2007: 90, 
95). Tax expenditure on the Riester-Rente still comes at the top of these 
figures.
It is the raison d’être of all refinancing measures to push the combined 
contribution rate to the social insurance schemes permanently below the 
40 percent threshold and, in particular, to exempt employers from any 
further increase of this type of non-wage labor costs . To that end, recent 
reforms have also dissolved the ‘iron principle’ of social insurance con-
tributions being equally shared between employers and employees. As 
of November 2008 a childless worker who puts in the recommended rate 
of 4 percent of her earnings into a Riester-Rente contract is burdened at 
a rate of 24.8 percent while the employer pays 19.6 percent on top of the 
gross salary. That is about the same level as in 1994.
What has continued, however, is an opportunistic ‘switchyard policy’, 
namely, to raise the contribution rate in a scheme that is in dire need of 
additional funds and to lower it in another which is under less pressure 
at the moment (as happened in 2008 when the unemployment insurance 
contribution was lowered and increased for LTC insurance). Similarly, tax 
 WELFARE STATE REFORMS IN GERMANY
subsidies to social insurance schemes are not stable, even if ostensibly 
rule-based. They vary according to the constraints of the federal budget 
and the respective scheme’s pressure (or: opportunity) to change its con-
tribution rate.
Access to benefits has changed as well. Although need and citizen-
ship as criteria of benefit receipt have gained greater weight, no definite 
trend away from predominant contribution-based entitlements can be 
observed. However, coverage has become more universal . As mentioned 
before, LTC insurance obligatorily included all people with health insur-
ance cover right from the beginning. After the latest health care reform 
(2007) all uninsured people are required to either join the statutory sys-
tem or to seek private health insurance (depending on individual circum-
stances). Moreover, mandatory pension provision of some kind for all 
self-employed who are not yet obliged to join the public or special private 
schemes is widely supported although not yet concluded (Sachverstän-
digenrat 2006: 263-75). Finally, the introduction of ALG II has made all 
recipients become members of the health care , LTC and pension schemes 
because contributions out of the federal purse are paid on their behalf. 
Sufficiently high earnings from employment prior to child birth but not 
contribution payments are a precondition for receiving an income-relat-
ed and tax-financed parental leave allowance higher than the minimum 
amount of 300 euros per month. It makes this benefit type a somewhat 
strange element within an otherwise citizenship-based system of a family 
policy that provides flat-rate benefits (and services). Here we find anoth-
er improvement in benefit access: unremunerated family work – raising 
children or taking care of frail people – has been acknowledged as equiva-
lent to paid work. It increases pension entitlements and also offers some 
advantages with regard to eligibility for unemployment benefits and labor 
market services.
The growing relevance of the needs principle is related to changes in 
the structure of cash benefits based on prior contributions and meant to 
secure one’s acquired status. As Bleses and Seeleib-Kaiser (2004: 92) cor-
rectly observe, ‘the principle of publicly guaranteeing the achieved living 
standard is on the retreat, while the principle of publicly securing a mini-
mum of existence is increasingly gaining importance’. Such development, 
amounting to paradigmatic or ‘third order’ changes (Hall 1993), shows up 
most clearly in the protection of long-term unemployed and pensioners .
The replacement of the earnings-related (though means-tested) unem-
ployment assistance benefit with a flat-rate benefit (ALG II) that entails 
stricter eligibility criteria broadened the range of unemployed claimants 
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entitled merely to basic security. Among them those who lost out from the 
change outnumbered the winners (Goebel and Richter 2007). In old-age 
security the needs principle has not been strengthened directly, apart 
from survivors’ pensions now being tested against all income of the sur-
vivor above a threshold. The introduction of the special basic security 
scheme for the elderly and disabled has led to a higher take-up rate (as in-
tended). In 2007, 2.4 percent of the population aged 65 and older received 
this type of benefit.
However, future retirees can be expected to be the main losers from the 
combined impact of pension reforms and changes in the labor market, 
meaning that more elderly will become dependent on means-tested basic 
security (Hinrichs 2008). The deterioration will arise from the declining 
standard replacement ratio, the abolition of elements in the benefit for-
mula that once ensured socially adequate pensions, and the permanent 
pension deductions in case of early retirement now almost fully effec-
tive. Therefore, limited earnings inequality and stable employment ca-
reers, preconditions for the functioning of social insurance schemes, are 
becoming ever more relevant.5 However, rising income inequality thins 
out the middle class (Grabka and Frick 2008), and even a full-time job 
no longer insures against poverty . In 2006, 14.3 percent of full-time and 
23.4 percent of (covered) part-time workers earned an hourly wage of less 
than two-thirds of the median (Bosch et al. 2008). The spreading of the 
working poor is only one aspect of increasing labor market flexibility . Fur-
thermore, fewer employment careers corresponding to the SER model re-
sult from more frequent spells of (long-term) unemployment , (marginal) 
part-time work or periods of uncovered self-employment . Very often, 
workers in low-paid or precarious jobs lack the funds to additionally save 
for a Riester-Rente that becomes indispensable to ensure a modest stan-
dard of living after retirement .
For the time being, however, poverty among the elderly population is 
a relatively minor problem compared to the increased number of poor 
children (BMFSFJ 2008). Unemployment of their parents and single par-
enthood are the primary reasons. In January 2008, three years after the 
implementation of the Hartz IV act, about 1.9 million children below the 
age of 15 lived in households of ALG II recipients (Bedarfsgemeinschaften), 
i.e. every sixth child received means-tested benefits (Bundesagentur für 
Arbeit 2008: 35). Nevertheless, families with (small) children are the win-
ners of welfare state reconstruction. The expansion of childcare facilities 
offers (lone) parents the chance to earn a (second) income already af-
ter the youngest child’s first birthday, and before they benefit from the 
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wage-replacing parental leave allowance. Moreover, the reorientation of 
family policy may attain more equal educational opportunities for chil-
dren from disadvantaged families when they are taken care of outside the 
home already during infancy and after half-day schooling.
2.5 The Bumpy Road out of the Reform Blockade: How was it Possible?
Within the tripartite sequence of reforms, the first period (section 2.3) 
is the least interesting one because Germany — like other Bismarckian 
welfare states — responded to new challenges in a ‘quasi-natural’ way. 
In order to understand why, after a (second) period of controversial re-
trenchments and reform blockade, the reconstruction process finally ar-
rived at structural reforms, it is important to consider the consequence of 
unification and the change in social policy-making.
The relatively favorable economic and fiscal situation around 1989 
nurtured self-confidence to maintain the social insurance state by incre-
mental reforms and to master the social and economic consequences of 
unification. It retarded social learning in Germany at a time when in Swe-
den , Finland and, even earlier, in the Netherlands , a universally shared 
perception of an ‘acute crisis’ helped to reframe social policy issues and 
to arrive at substantial welfare state reforms (Hinrichs 2002). Unification 
was a singular mega event but meant no immediate ‘crisis’, and all col-
lective actors were anxious to avoid or limit repercussions on the estab-
lished institutional structures that had been extended to East Germany. 
The weak economic position of the East German Länder required con-
tinuous net interregional transfers out of public purses (federal, state and 
social insurance budgets). In 2003 still, the West-East transfers amounted 
to 3.2 percent of GDP which roughly matched the total public deficit in 
the same year (Lehmann et al. 2005). Those transfers contributed to the 
slowdown of overall economic growth in Germany and aggravated the 
‘problem load’ while at the same time they limited the fiscal and political 
space available to make reforms suitable to mitigate pressures (e.g. a more 
impressive shift away from contribution towards tax financing).
Exacerbated ‘problem load’ has also meant a scissor-like growth of 
transfer recipients and fewer workers contributing to the social secu-
rity system. The number of gainfully employed people in Germany has 
hardly changed between 1991 (38.6 million) and 2005 (38.8 million). How-
ever, the number of employees liable to social insurance contributions 
dropped by about 3.8 million due to the increase of self-employed and 
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marginal workers . Additionally making things worse, among them there 
was a shift towards part-time workers (+ 1.7 million) who contribute less 
to the schemes’ revenues than do full-time employees whose total num-
ber decreased by 5.5 million. The declining share of compulsorily insured 
workers , down from 77.7 percent (1991) to 67.4 percent (2005) of all gain-
fully employed persons, is partly due to structural shifts (towards service 
sector jobs) and cyclical reasons, but also stems from policies to attain a 
more flexible labor market (Bach et al. 2005; BMAS 2008a: Table 2.4 and 
2.6A).
The almost continuously increasing ‘problem load’ was not matched 
by a corresponding reform intensity until the end of the 1990s. The ide-
ational change that emerged around the mid-1990s had left the Social 
Democrats largely unaffected and the incoming Red-Green government 
(autumn 1998) even revoked several reform pieces enacted by its prede-
cessor. After a short-lived economic upswing (1998-2000) and somewhat 
influenced by the reform concepts of New Labour in the UK, Chancellor 
Schröder and the now dominating ‘modernizers’ within his party finally 
adopted the new interpretative patterns (the Greens as well) and got ‘in 
line with the dominant social policy agenda set at the international level’ 
(Palier and Martin 2007a: 535). Consequently, at this ‘critical juncture’ the 
course was changed.
Thereby, the government further shifted the mode of policy-making 
that had already begun during the late years of the Christian-Liberal gov-
ernment : it no longer left the initiative to reform and compromise-build-
ing to corporatist bodies (of which the pension reform of 1989 was a prime 
example), but rather, took the lead and partly ignored the social partners . 
To a large extent, augmented autonomy in relation to the system of inter-
est organizations after the year 2000 and stronger reliance on state power 
was due to a generational change of the elite of ‘social politicians’. Pre-
viously, politicians and bureaucrats with (long-standing) careers in the 
labor unions , charities or other associations dominated in the Ministry of 
Labor and Social Affairs and the responsible committee of the Bundestag , 
and defenders of the traditional social insurance approach also prevailed 
in advisory councils (like the Sozialbeirat). They have been superseded by 
professional ‘party politicians’, being less committed to traditional values, 
but rather, more concerned with electoral considerations and economic 
liberalism (Trampusch 2005; Hassel and Trampusch 2006).
‘Government by commission’ was another feature of social policy-
making after the year 2000 and also meant to take agenda-setting out 
of the hands of (remaining) ‘old politics’ actors. The preparation of con-
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crete reforms was delegated to commissions (largely staffed with ‘friendly 
experts’) for the sake of mobilizing consensus and relieving the govern-
ment from the task of gaining legitimacy (Czada 2004). However, since 
1999 reform efforts of the Red-Green government were constrained by 
an adverse majority in the Bundesrat that, among others, foreclosed a 
more comprehensive health care reform in the year 2000. Thus, it was not 
before 2001 that an informal consensus between the government and the 
Christian Democrats re-emerged on reforms that involved no principled 
dissent and of which the pension reform of 2001 was the first case (see 
section 2.3).
Because the German political system is susceptible to both lasting 
blockades and sudden reform leaps, it can be concluded that all mile-
stones in changing the social policy arrangement only came about when, 
on a certain issue, competition between the two large political parties was 
suspended and the respective party in opposition was prepared to negoti-
ate a compromise (the introduction of LTC insurance, health care reforms 
1993 and 2003, the Hartz reforms) or a ‘tacit consensus’ emerged. The 
pension reforms of 2001 and 2004 were based on such a ‘tacit consensus’ 
and meant not to utilize the veto potential of the Bundesrat but neverthe-
less attaining concessions from the government . In all these cases, key 
social actors (health care providers and labor unions ) hardly had a chance 
to significantly influence or even obstruct the legislation process or were 
fobbed off with symbolic concessions (like the labor unions at the final 
stage of the ‘Riester’ reform in 2001 – see Hinrichs 2005). The results of 
the premature federal elections of 2005 left hardly any other option but to 
form an unloved ‘Grand Coalition’ government . This constellation largely 
neutralizes all veto powers (although individual state governments may 
still exert ‘voice’) but shifts conflicts about social policy change into the 
government itself where party competition between the CDU/CSU and 
the SPD is not put to rest.
2.6 Conclusion
The analysis in the preceding sections has shown that in a less stable en-
vironment the contribution and transfer-heavy German welfare state in-
creasingly came under pressure. At the same time, there was a limited, but 
flexible adjustment to internal and external challenges. The micro-insti-
tutional contexts of social insurance schemes were less an impediment to 
reform than were macro-institutions. Germany’s specific political struc-
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tures allow for determined reform steps only if an overt or tacit consensus 
between the two large political parties can be brought about. Most signifi-
cant structural reforms, following from paradigmatic changes, happened 
after the year 2000 and produced corresponding effects for citizens fi-
nancing the welfare state or receiving social benefits.
The institutional redirection of the German social insurance state has 
not followed a coherent design for a ‘new welfare state’. Nevertheless, the 
contours of a still unfinished ‘post-Bismarckian ’ welfare state arrange-
ment – a hybrid of the Anglo-Saxon and the Scandinavian model – are 
recognizable. Reduced levels of income security through wage earner 
schemes, accompanied by demands for self-responsibility and more pri-
vate provision, stronger reliance on means-tested benefits, and stricter 
activation measures signify the turn towards the Liberal model. Activa-
tion is also a central trait of the Scandinavian policy design, but more 
important reform trends related to that model are increased tax-financing 
(the prime direction of reform efforts) and more spending on family-ori-
ented services. Therefore, transformation of the ‘Bismarckian ’ welfare 
state in Germany may come down to a zero-sum situation (at best): what 
families gain as parents they lose as wage earners (higher social insurance 
contributions and expenses on private provision) or when out of waged 
work, i.e. being unemployed or of old age .
While appreciating the expansion of family policy , the public strongly 
disliked the reform of labor market policy , perceived as a threat not only 
by the currently unemployed but also by the (lower) middle classes. Thus, 
the legislation of the high-profile Hartz reforms came at a high political 
price for the Social Democrats. A flat-rate benefit for long-term unem-
ployed was disapproved by a large majority within the population because 
it violated established notions of social justice (Krömmelbein et al. 2007: 
123-4, 145-6, 176), and the Red-Green government was unable to com-
municate that the reform was not exclusively a ‘cut’ of just entitlements, 
accompanied by harsher sanctions . Additionally, Hartz IV was enacted 
when there were only scant prospects for an improved labor market situ-
ation (Eichhorst and Sesselmeier 2007). The implementation was accom-
panied by mass protests (foremost in East Germany), and it contributed 
to several defeats for the Social Democrats in subsequent state elections, 
eventually leading to premature federal elections in September 2005. Nu-
merous left-wingers turned away from the party, and the weakly orga-
nized splinter group (WASG) joined forces with the (mainly East German) 
Left Socialists (PDS). Under the label Die Linke, they gained 8.7 percent of 
the votes in 2005 and attained a foothold in West Germany.
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The various reforms put through during the 2002-2005 legislature and 
active participation in enacting a higher standard retirement age in 2007 
have also alienated the traditional allies, the labor unions and the So-
cial Democrats. Some unions or, at least, strong internal fractions openly 
sympathize with the party Die Linke. Thus, in view of this no longer neg-
ligible radical Left party and a dissatisfied rank and file, the Social Demo-
crats were first to pronounce the ‘end of impositions’. Within the ‘Grand 
Coalition’ government they successfully pressed for another extension of 
the eligibility period for ALG I benefits. As of January 2008, unemployed 
of age 58 and older are entitled to a maximum duration of 24 months (in-
stead of 18). Moreover, in order not to further exasperate the pensioners , 
both government parties agreed not to apply the legally fixed adjustment 
formula in 2008 and 2009, but rather, to arbitrarily raise public pensions 
by (a still meager) 1.1 percent in July 2008, instead of 0.46 percent accord-
ing to the formula. It remains to be seen whether the ‘end of impositions’ 
in 2007 will mark the start of a fourth period in a continuing sequence . 
After the economic upswing and the decline of unemployment figures 
suddenly came to a halt in fall 2008, welfare state reform also reached a 
standstill – at least until the next federal elections in fall 2009.
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3 The Dualizations of the French Welfare System
Bruno Palier
3.1 Introduction1
The main components of the French welfare system clearly reflect the 
Bismarckian tradition of social insurance. From 1945 to the late 1970s, 
social policies expanded as one of the important parts of the Keynesian 
compromises that underpinned the ‘Trente Glorieuses’. Social spending 
was seen as favoring economic growth and employment, social insurance 
transfers as consolidating social integration and (occupational ) solidarity, 
and welfare state institutions as supporting social peace. Subsequently, 
however, the economic, social and political functions of the social protec-
tion systems have been progressively undermined. After a long period of 
crisis and resistance throughout the 1970s and 1980s, French social pro-
grams are since then being progressively reformed to adapt to the new 
economic and social environment. As this chapter will show, though, this 
adaptation is only partial, since it has been implemented through a dual-
istic strategy of reform. This has divided French welfare and society into 
two worlds: those still insured by an increasingly contributory complex of 
public and private insurances, and those dependent on a new tier of basic 
social protection.
This chapter will first recall the content of post-war compromises on 
which French social protection was based. It will then analyze the four 
different phases of the French welfare reform trajectory , focusing on the 
intellectual, institutional and political mechanisms through which the 
French welfare system is being progressively transformed. The conclusion 
will map out the main characteristics of the new social policy institutions 
and paradigm of the French welfare system.
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3.2 The Institutional Arrangements Refl ecting the Post-War 
Compromises
In 1944, the ‘Union nationale’ French government had the ambition of 
generalizing social protection and achieving universal and uniform cov-
erage. At the time, however, there was a strong distrust of state solutions 
in social protection among groups who already had access to specific so-
cial insurance schemes, within the workers ’ movement and even from 
some senior civil servants who held corporatist views, including Pierre 
Laroque , the so-called ‘founding father’ of the French Sécurité sociale 
(Merrien 1990). It was therefore decided to generalize social protection 
within an employment-related social insurance framework rather than a 
universal state-run system, an uneasy compromise between Beveridgean 
goals and Bismarckian means. As the following overview shows, this 
compromise led to a welfare regime that almost epitomizes the typical in-
stitutional characteristics of Bismarckian welfare systems: employment-
related entitlement, earnings-related benefits, a system focused on the 
needs of the male breadwinner , contribution-financing and decentralized 
control.
Entitlement: Social Rights for Workers and their Families
The main goal of the founders of the French social security system in the 
mid-1940s was the economic and social integration of the working class 
as a means of preventing any revolutionary movement at a time when the 
Communist Party was mobilizing around 25 percent of the popular vote 
in general elections. They therefore first developed a social insurance sys-
tem for dependent workers in the private sector (the ‘régime général de la 
Sécurité sociale’), and in the following years social protection was expand-
ed through the multiplication of similar but distinct and specific schemes 
(‘régimes’) for other occupational groups. When a law declaring the gen-
eralization of social security to the whole population was passed in 1978, 
social rights were based on occupational status and acquired through the 
payment of social contributions , with indirect social rights given to family 
members (‘ayant-droits’) of the (mainly male ) worker.
Benefi ts: Contributory Benefi ts Aimed at Income Maintenance 
The main goal of the system was to guarantee income security for workers 
(‘garantir la sécurité du lendemain’: guaranteeing tomorrow’s income), 
an aim realized through cash benefits proportional to former income. In 
the early 1980s contributory cash benefits represented 70 percent of all 
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French social expenditure (IRES 1983). Benefits delivered by la Sécurité 
sociale were limited by a ceiling equivalent to roughly 133 percent of the 
average wage in pensions, and there was a co-payment in health insurance 
(called ‘ticket modérateur’). In order to improve its coverage, the first tier 
social security schemes were complemented by complementary private 
but non-profit pensions (‘retraites complémentaires’) and health insur-
ances (‘mutuelles’).
A worker having worked full-time for the required number of years 
(37.5 since 1971) could expect a pension worth 50 percent of the aver-
age best 10 years of income, plus some 25 percent from complementary 
pension schemes. Unemployment benefits were raised to quite generous 
levels in 1979, when 50 percent of the insured unemployed could receive 
90 percent of their former wage for one year (Palier 2005a). In health care , 
the main concern was to replace the income lost during sickness (sick pay 
represented 60 percent of health expenditure in the early 1950s), and it 
was chosen to reimburse the cost of treatment instead of providing public 
health care . This allowed people to choose their doctors freely, pay them 
directly and afterwards be reimbursed by their health insurance fund and, 
for some, by their mutuelles for the co-payment.
Financing: Social Contribution as a ‘Deferred Wage’
From the outset, the creators of the French social protection system want-
ed it to be as independent as possible from the state, and thus financed it 
only through specific social contributions . General (income) taxes have 
always played a marginal role in the financing of social insurance, and as 
early as the 1950s the social partners accused the state of unduly burden-
ing the system by asking social insurance funds to pay for non-contribu-
tory benefits.2 On the other hand, the social partners have always wanted 
to avoid the ‘fiscalization’ of social insurance, since it would have meant 
questioning their role as managers of the social insurance funds (Palier 
2005a: chapter 3).
In 1982, 82.5 percent of social expenditure was financed through social 
contribution, which represented 45 percent of the gross wage of workers . 
These social contributions are split into employees’ social contribution 
(20 percent of all social contributions ) and employers ’ social contribution 
(80 percent) (IRES 1983). The French conception is that social benefits 
are earned through the payment of social contribution and benefits have 
long been called a ‘deferred wage’. Social rights obtained through work are 
as result extremely legitimate: people work and pay for their own social 
security. Benefits are considered as ‘acquired rights’ in a double sense: 
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acquired thanks to workers ’ mobilizations throughout history (‘acquis so-
ciaux’)3, and through individuals’ payment of social contributions (i.e. the 
‘equivalence principle’).
Organization and Governance: A Fragmented Corporatist System
The French system is divided into a number of different programs 
(‘branches’). The ‘régime général’, which covers the dependent workers 
of the private sector in trade and industry (60 percent of the working 
population), comprises four branches: health care , old age , family and fi-
nancing. In order to complement its benefits, numerous complementary 
private collective insurances have developed, such as the complementary 
pension funds for the salaried workers of the private sectors4, which be-
came compulsory in 1972, and mutuelles, complementary health insur-
ance funds. The latter are not compulsory, but by 1980 75 percent of the 
French population was covered by one (IRES 1983). In 1958, unemploy-
ment insurance was negotiated as a national level collective agreement 
and thereafter managed by the social partners with no state intervention. 
Many other social insurance schemes have been created alongside the ré-
gime général, for different occupational groups. In 1980, there were 19 dif-
ferent health care schemes, 600 first tier old-age insurance funds, more 
than 6000 complementary pension schemes, and thousands of mutuelles 
(IRES 1983). Only family allowances (‘caisses d’allocation familiale’) and 
unemployment insurance (UNEDIC – Union nationale pour l’emploi 
dans l’industrie et le commerce) cover the whole population within one 
scheme.
French social security schemes are made up of different funds (‘Caiss-
es’) organized at national, regional and local levels. Their staff is neither 
paid by the state nor is it under its authority. Until the mid-1990s each 
fund was headed by a governing board comprising representatives of em-
ployers and employees, with a chairman elected from their ranks, and a 
director of the Fund, who was appointed by the governing board in liaison 
with the Ministry of Social Affairs. The system was supposed to be man-
aged by those who pay for it and have an interest in it, subject to only lim-
ited control by the state. In fact, the state has always decided the level of 
benefits and contributions for compulsory health insurance and for first 
tier old-age insurance; only in the complementary pension schemes and 
unemployment insurance do the social partners really decide (see also 
Ebbinghaus, this volume).
The participation of workers ’ representatives in the management of the 
social protection system is called ‘la démocratie sociale’, and aims to guar-
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antee the social and political integration of the workers within the society 
as well as the collaboration between workers and employers , hence social 
peace (Merrien 1990; Castel 1995). French unions have compensated their 
increasing weakness in the realm of production – unionization in France 
has become the lowest among the developed countries – by the material 
and symbolic resources provided by their managerial role within the so-
cial protection system (Jobert 1991).
One of the most important of these resources was the control of staff 
working for insurance funds. Responsibilities for staffing had long been 
devolved to the governing boards of the funds and belonging to the trade 
union that was chairing the fund became a criterion to be hired. The funds 
often provided pseudojobs and actual wages for people actually working 
for the trade unions (Catrice-Lorey 1995; Duclos and Mériaux 1997; Cour 
des Comptes: various years, notably 1990 and 2000). Other resources 
were more symbolic: the trade unions came to be seen as the defenders of 
the system and of the acquis sociaux associated with them in the eyes of 
the French population.
During the Trente Glorieuses, the French social protection system was 
seen as favoring economic growth and employment, promoting social 
progress and social integration, aiding the political legitimization of so-
cial order and as sustaining social peace. Step by step, these positive con-
nections between the social protection system and the economy, society 
and the polity have been questioned and transformed.
3.3 The French Reform Trajectory 
As in most of its Bismarckian neighbors, the French welfare reform tra-
jectory comprised four main sequences. Governments first responded 
to recurrent social security deficits with increases in social contribution 
rates. Meanwhile, various plans for industrial restructuring, also partly 
financed by social contributions , were launched. In the context of intensi-
fied European constraints in the early 1990s, difficult and contested re-
trenchment was attempted in unemployment , old-age and sickness insur-
ances (2nd sequence ). But faced with the increasing inadequacy of the 
French social insurances in the new economic and social context, govern-
ments also launched more institutional reforms that created new benefits, 
new sources of funding and new governance rules (3rd sequence ). The 
cumulative effect of the three previous waves of reform led to a fourth 
sequence , starting in 2001, which implemented activation in (un)employ-
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ment policies, multi-pillarization of pensions and a restructuring of the 
French health care system. The main components of these four sequences 
are summarized in table 3.1.
Plans for Rescuing the System
With the economic crisis of the 1970s, the social protection system en-
countered a vicious combination of declining resources and spiraling 
costs. These resulted in huge and recurrent deficits in the social protec-
tion budget, the famous ‘trou de la Sécu’. Furthermore, these deficits were 
no longer perceived as temporary ones that could be reabsorbed through 
reflationary measures. At the turn of the 1980s, two French governments 
– Jacques Chirac ’s in 1974-76 and Pierre Mauroy ’s in 1981-82 – learned 
the hard way that the traditional Keynesian chain was broken. In both 
cases, these governments raised social benefits in order to boost private 
consumption and economic activity, and both gained only larger public 
deficits, a negative trade balance, inflation and increases in unemploy-
ment and taxation . Henceforth the Keynesian use of social benefits was 
delegitimized for governments of both Left and Right.
Subsequent governments thus all share the idea that the social security 
deficits had to be balanced. However, of the two solutions available – in-
creasing resources or cutting expenses – only one was seriously consid-
ered during the 1970s and the 1980s. For at least 15 years, governments 
avoided major retrenchments and preferred to increase social contribu-
tions to balance the social security deficit. Instead of developing an accu-
satory rhetoric against the welfare system that would have provoked the 
whole population and trade unions , they acknowledged the importance of 
the Sécurité sociale, while at the same time underlining the dangers of its 
current situation and presenting measures to restore its viability.
From 1975 to 1995, unless an election was imminent, each announce-
ment of a deficit in Sécurité sociale was followed by the presentation of 
a ‘plan de redressement des comptes de la Sécurité sociale’ (i.e. program 
for balancing the social insurance system’s budget5). These plans typi-
cally consisted of increases in contributions paid by employees and some 
limited economizing measures, mainly in health, where the level of reim-
bursement of health care expenditure was lowered.6 However, during the 
same period, the rates of all the contributory benefits were increased or 
at best stabilized. Social benefits were perceived as a good buffer against 
the toughest social consequences of the crisis (Levy 2005). Consequently, 
social expenditure continued to increase, rapidly until the mid-1980s, 
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but more slowly ever since. The proportion of social protection expen-
diture in GDP grew from 19.4 percent in 1974 to 27.3 percent in 1985 and 
27.75 percent in 1992.7 Social contributions increased from less than 20 
percent of French GDP in 1978 to almost 23 percent by 1985, and have 
stabilized at that level ever since. While social contributions amounted 
to 45 percent of gross wage in  the early 1980s, in 1996, they amounted 
to more than 60 percent for a wage above 1.3 times the minimum wage 
(Palier 2005a).
In order to avoid conflict with social partners and with the population, 
governments applied ‘good old recipes’ and were thus able to maintain a 
high level of social protection in a period of crisis. This response was also 
in line with the labor shedding strategy adopted at this time in France, as 
in other Continental European countries (Esping-Andersen 1996a). In-
deed, during the 1980s governments used social expenditure to soften the 
hardest social consequences of industrial restructuring and mass redun-
dancies that followed, a strategy called ‘le traitement social du chômage’ 
(the social treatment of unemployment ). These policies were designed to 
remove the oldest workers from the labor market by lowering the legal age 
for retirement (from 65 to 60 in 1981) and encouraging early retirement . 
84,000 people retired early in 1975; 159,000 in 1979; 317,000 in 1981 and 
705,000 in 1983 (Bichot 1997: 132).
Mastering Social Expenditure: The First Attempts at Retrenchment 
In the 1990s, this strategy became increasingly problematic in the new 
European environment, characterized by the creation of the single cur-
rency and the imposition of the Maastricht criteria. The single market in-
creased competition between European firms, in which labor cost played 
an important role. French employers increasingly focused the debate on 
the need to stop the increase in social contributions , hence pushing to-
wards a diminution of social benefits. After 1992/1993, retrenching social 
expenditure was included in the government strategy of reducing public 
deficits in order to meet the Maastricht criteria. This new European con-
text led to reforms in unemployment insurance in 1992, old-age insurance 
in 1993 and health care in 1995. These reforms were all made ‘in the name 
of European constraints’, but were also possible thanks to one trade union, 
the CFDT (Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail), who chose 
a reformist position and new alliances with the employers ’ movement in 
order to outmaneuver its two main competitors, the CGT and FO (Confé-
dération générale du Travail and Force Ouvrière).
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The unemployment insurance system was reformed in 1992 through 
an agreement between the CFDT and the employers ’ association. The 
reform replaced all existing unemployment insurance benefits with a 
new ‘Allocation Unique Dégressive’ (AUD), payable only for a limited 
period of time, depending on the contribution record. The amount of 
this benefit was to decrease with time, and entitlement was to expire 
eventually after 30 months. Afterwards, unemployed people had to rely 
on tax-financed income-tested benefits. The level and the volume of 
unemployment benefits started to fall after 1992, the reduction being 
larger for the means-tested benefits than for AUD (Daniel and Tuch-
szirer 1999).
In 1993, the Balladur government reformed the first tier pension 
scheme, covering private sector employees (régime général). The index-
ation of benefits was based on prices, as opposed to earnings, initially for 
a five-year period but has since been extended indefinitely. The qualifying 
period for a full pension was extended from 37.5 to 40 years, and the pe-
riod over which the reference salary was calculated from the best 10 years 
to the best 25. These changes were introduced gradually over a 10-year 
transition period. Surprisingly, this reform did not provoke very much 
opposition. This was possible because the reform was limited to the pri-
vate sector general scheme and because of the introduction of a package 
that ‘traded’ benefit cuts against the tax financing of non-contributory 
benefits (Bonoli 1997). In exchange for the trade unions ’ acceptance of the 
reform, the government created a ‘Fonds de solidarité vieillesse’ for the 
funding of non-contributory benefits. The state thereby agreed to pay for 
the ‘undue charges’ and thus reassured the social partners of the continu-
ity of PAYG old-age insurance schemes. In 1995, the new prime minister 
Alain Juppé tried to impose the same conditions on public sector employ-
ees without negotiation, but had to withdraw this measure in the face of 
massive strikes (Bonoli 1997).
In the health sector, the numerous plans implemented during the 
late 1970s and the 1980s were not successful in limiting the unstoppable 
growth in demand for health care . They could only increase the co-pay-
ment paid by the patients, which for many was reimbursed afterwards 
by the mutuelles. After 1990, governments decided to force the medi-
cal professions, the health insurance funds and the state to elaborate 
a ‘convention médicale’ (medical care agreement) to help control the 
evolution of expenditure by setting a provisional target for the evolution 
of the health care spending, practitioners’ remuneration and additional 
expenses. Between 1990 and 1995, though, doctors did not sign any of 
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the proposed convention and the targets set for other paramedical pro-
fessions were not met. In 1995, in his extensive reform of social security, 
Juppé forced the social partners to sign an agreement by threatening 
state intervention. The Juppé plan also empowered the state within the 
health care system by the creation of many new state-headed agencies. 
Finally, the management of health care funds was reformed, giving more 
power to the director and less to the president (representing the social 
partners ). Unlike Juppé ’s pension plans, all these measures were main-
tained and implemented; however this was not sufficient to fundamen-
tally check the increase in health expenditure (Hassenteufel and Palier 
2007).
The Politics of First Retrenchments 
All these reforms shared some features that are related to the specific 
institutional settings of welfare systems based on social insurance. First, 
the retrenchment reforms were not presented as a means to dismantle the 
welfare system, but rather to preserve or consolidate it. Since the ben-
efits to be retrenched are extremely legitimate, these reforms were in-
troduced in the name of European constraints, but were also claimed to 
be necessary to restore the system’s viability. Second, the reform propos-
als were put together in such a way that the social partners could accept 
them. As illustrated in 1995, the social partners have the power to block 
reforms they do not agree with. The acceptance by the social partners of 
reductions in benefits relied on a quid pro quo (Bonoli 1997) based on the 
distinction between what should be financed through contribution and 
what should be financed through taxation . The government committed to 
paying for the ‘charges indues’ through the financing of non-contributory 
benefits – flat-rate social minima for the elderly , the handicapped, the 
long-term unemployed; and contribution credits for periods out of work 
because of unemployment or child rearing – in exchange for a reduction 
of social insurance benefits (Bonoli and Palier 1996). Finally, for old-age 
and unemployment insurances, these reforms reduced the level of protec-
tion by the strengthening of the link between the amount of contribution 
and the volume of the benefits. This of course relied on the already exist-
ing logic of these social insurance schemes.
These changes were based on new instruments (changes in calculation 
rules, creation of new state subsidies, etc.), but were perceived as preserv-
ing the very nature of social insurance, and in some ways even as rein-
forcing it. They did not really challenge the principles of social insurance 
and can be considered ‘second order changes’ (Hall 1993). However, since 
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these reforms diminished the coverage and generosity of social insurance, 
ever more space was created for the development of new benefits, wheth-
er on top of compulsory social insurance, or ‘beneath’ it, for those who 
lost (or never gained) their rights to social insurance. As analyzed in the 
next section, these developments led to criticism of social insurance and 
to the emergence of a new world of welfare in France.
The Institutional Reforms : New Benefi ts, New Financing, New 
Distribution of Power
The reforms presented above had spillover effects. The plans to balance 
the social security budget increased the level of social contributions , thus 
re-enforcing economic difficulties. Retrenchment measures meant less 
generous benefits and more people left out, contributing to social exclu-
sion . All these reforms were difficult to implement and accompanied by 
demonstrations and strikes, putting an end to social peace. In the 1990s, 
new diagnoses of the difficulties began to gain popularity among experts, 
politicians and even trade unionists, which implied that the system was 
not a victim of the crises, but part of the causes of France’s social, eco-
nomic and political difficulties.
With these new diagnoses, the very characteristics of the system 
came to be seen as the cause of these difficulties, and all the bases of 
the post-war compromise were undermined: protecting workers no lon-
ger supports social integration, but leads to social exclusion ; the sys-
tem no longer contributes to economic growth, but impedes it through 
its financing mechanisms; démocratie sociale no longer sustains social 
peace, but allows demonstrations and blocks reform. These new analy-
ses underpinned a change in the political discourses and agendas of all 
governments during the 1990s: from rescuing the Sécurité sociale, the 
aim became to transform it. This has been done through incremental 
institutional reforms that are often neglected in analysis of welfare re-
trenchments. These reforms aimed to change the politics of social pro-
tection, and although often marginal in the beginning their importance 
has grown more visible over time (Bonoli and Palier 1998). In the fol-
lowing, the four most important aspects of these reforms are analyzed. 
As will be seen, the reforms changed core aspects (eligibility, benefits, 
financing, management) of the Bismarckian institutional structure of the 
French welfare regime .
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The Social Crisis of the French Welfare System: The Problem of Social 
Exclusion 
Since the late 1970s, France has seen a considerable increase in unemploy-
ment . Unemployment rose from 4.1 percent of the active population in 
1974 to 10.5 percent in 1987, fell slightly in the late 1980s, but then rose 
again to 12.5 percent by 1997. It fluctuated again but has decreased ever 
since, until recently (see Hemerijck and Eichhorst, this volume). Long-
term unemployment also increased, supporting the idea that France had 
high structural unemployment . In 1974, 16.9 percent of the unemployed 
were jobless for more than one year, 2.5 percent for more than two years. 
These proportions had risen to 42.7 and 21.0 percent by 1985. The average 
length of unemployment was 7.6 months in 1974, 15 months in 1985, and 
16 months in 1998 (L’état de la France 2000-2001).
The social insurance system set up in 1945 was not designed for mass 
unemployment . This predominantly contributory system is especially 
unable to deal with those who have never been involved in the labor mar-
ket (young people) or who have been removed from it for a long period 
(long-term unemployed), because they have not contributed to social in-
surance, or because they are not contributing any more. Moreover, be-
cause of the 1992 reform of unemployment insurance, more and more un-
employed could no longer rely on unemployment insurance. The number 
of ‘excluded’ people kept increasing during the 1980s, and this became 
one of the most pressing social issues. During the 1980s, attention was 
drawn to ‘new poverty’ by the media and groups from civil society, who 
denounced the incapacity of socialist governments to face the new so-
cial problems. The 1987 Wresinski report8, ‘Grande pauvreté et précarité 
économique et sociale’ suggested that some 400,000 people were living in 
France without social protection.
In this context, the social protection system could be accused of rein-
forcing the mechanisms of social exclusion, because of the gap between 
‘insiders ’ included in the labor market and who could rely on the insur-
ance system, and ‘outsiders ’ who obtained a much lower level of protec-
tion despite needing it most. The issue finally entered the political agenda, 
leading to the introduction of ‘insertion policies’ to fight social exclusion. 
Social exclusion was framed as a problem of lack of support rather than of 
lack of work, and required a response in term of new social rights, rather 
than labor market reform (Paugam 1993).
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New Benefi ts
In order to cope with new social problems that social insurance was 
unable to deal with, governments developed new social policy instru-
ments , with reference to new social policy goals . Faced with growing 
numbers of jobless, youth or long-term unemployed and single parents, 
new benefits were created or formerly marginal benefits developed 
(Palier 2005a: chapter 6). The creation of the RMI (Revenu Minimum 
d’Insertion) is the most important of these new social benefits. This new 
non-contributory scheme, meant for those having no or a very low in-
come, was introduced in December 1988. Its main features are the guar-
antee of a minimum level of resources to anyone aged 25 or over, taking 
the form of a means-tested differential benefit. In addition, the RMI has 
a re-insertion dimension, in the form of a contract between the recipi-
ent and ‘society’. Through a contract signed between them and a social 
worker, recipients must commit themselves to take part in a re-inser-
tion program, which can entail either job seeking, vocational training 
or activities designed to enhance the recipient’s social autonomy. When 
it was created, this new benefit was supposed to be delivered between 
300,000 to 400,000 people. Since the late 1990s, more than one million 
people receive the RMI (1.1 million in 1992, 1.2 million in 2008). Includ-
ing spouses and children of recipients, 3.5 percent of the French popula-
tion is involved (DREES, various years).
Besides the RMI, France now has eight other social minimum incomes, 
and more than 10 percent of the French population is currently receiv-
ing one of these (Palier 2005a). The use of this new repertoire of social 
policy has also been extended to health care . In 2000, a new income-test-
ed benefit was created to provide the poorest with free access to health 
care (Couverture Maladie Universelle, CMU) and to provide free comple-
mentary health insurance for those who could not pay for complementary 
health care (CMU Complémentaire).
The development of benefits targeted at poverty alleviation has grad-
ually encouraged an accompanying logic that was entirely absent from 
the French social protection system previously. In Liberal welfare states, 
these benefits are traditionally accused of creating a dependency culture 
and generating unemployment traps. By the late 1990s more and more 
analyses in France emphasized that people receiving social minima, es-
pecially the RMI, would lose money and social advantages if they took a 
part-time job paid at minimum wage level. In response, people receiving 
RMI who found a job were first allowed to receive both the RMI and a 
very low wage for a short period, so that they did not lose out when tak-
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ing a job. In 2001, in order to augment the incentives to return to work, 
the Jospin government created a tax credit called ‘Prime pour l’emploi’, 
which is a negative income tax for low-paid workers . In the same vein, 
in 2003 the Raffarin government tried to transform the RMI into RMA 
(Revenu Minimum d’Activité), an in-work benefit for those having re-
ceived the RMI for two years aimed at increasing incentives to work. 
This new scheme performed poorly, though, and in 2009 was replaced by 
a new scheme, Revenu de Solidarité Active (RSA), which provides social 
contribution exemptions to employers hiring RMI beneficiaries or long-
term unemployed, and guarantees a permanent negative income tax to 
the new low-wage workers so that they get at least 200 euros more than 
what the RMI would have provided them with. Both a totally new rheto-
ric (unemployment trap, work disincentive) and a totally new type of 
social policy instrument (in-work benefit such as RSA) have thus been 
imported during the development of the world of poverty alleviation in 
France.
Changes in the Financing of the French Welfare System
Attempts to render the system more ‘employment friendly’ were also be-
hind shifts in the financing of the system. Until 1996, 80 percent of social 
protection was ﬁ nanced through employment related contributions and as 
seen above the weight of social contribution has been increased during the 
1980s. But during the 1990s, the system was increasingly assumed to be pro-
ducing unemployment and to be economically unsustainable. The employ-
ers ’ representatives, as well as more and more economists, criticized the 
excessively high level of social contributions in France, especially at the 
lower end of the salary scale. These groups claimed that in the European 
context, firms could simply not afford such a high level of social contribu-
tions (Palier 2005a: chapter 7).
Governments started to focus on this issue, and during the 1990s, low-
ering the level of social contribution became the main employment policy 
in France. Measures were first targeted on contracts for some particularly 
disadvantaged groups, such as the long-term and youth unemployed, or 
on small companies, which were considered to be the most affected by 
the relatively high cost of unskilled labor. But in 1993, with the Balladur 
‘plan quiquennal pour l’emploi’, all wages below 1.3 times the minimum 
wage were partly exempted of social contributions (DARES 1996). This 
new strategy contributed to the push for retrenchment measures, since 
the other solution to deficits, i.e. increasing social contributions , was now 
perceived as damaging economic efficiency and job creation.
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In order to generalize the movement to lower labor costs, governments 
have also tried progressively to replace some contributions with taxation . 
A new tax, originally aimed at replacing the social contribution financing 
non-contributory benefits, was created in 1990: the Contribution Sociale 
Généralisée (CSG). Unlike social insurance contributions, the CSG is lev-
ied on all types of personal incomes, including wages (even the lowest 
ones), but also extending to capital revenues and welfare benefits. Un-
like income tax in France, CSG is strictly proportional and earmarked for 
non-contributory welfare programs. In the early 1990s, the CSG appeared 
to play a marginal role, and when it was introduced, it was levied at only 
1.1 percent of all incomes. However, in 1993 the Balladur government in-
creased the CSG to 2.4 percent of incomes. The 1995 Juppé plan set it at 
3.4 percent and since 1998 the rate is now 7.5 percent, replacing most of 
the health care contributions paid by employees. As of the early 2000s, 
the CSG provides more than 20 percent of all social protection resources 
and represents 35 percent of the health care system’s resources (Palier 
2005a: chapter 7).
The introduction of this earmarked tax enabled a shift in the financ-
ing structure of the system towards more state taxation . This new instru-
ment has two main consequences, which entail a partial change in the 
logic of the system. First, since financing does not come only from the 
working population, the CSG breaks the link between employment and 
entitlement. Access to CSG-financed benefits cannot be limited to any 
particular section of society. The shift in financing has thus created the 
conditions for the establishment of citizenship-based social rights, es-
pecially in health care . Second, the shift leaves the social partners with 
less legitimacy to participate in the decision-making and management of 
social provision. In this respect the shift towards taxation constitutes a 
pressure for a transfer of control from the social partners to the state, an 
evolution that is in line with other important political changes that have 
occurred since the mid-1990s, as shown below.
A New Distribution of Power
During the 1990s, the management arrangement of the French social in-
surances started to be increasingly criticized. In 1945, the management of 
the social insurance system was given to the social partners to avoid bu-
reaucratization and the subordination of social policy to purely budget-
ary considerations. As budgetary control became an important issue dur-
ing the 1980s, the devolved management of social insurance also became 
problematic: experts and civil servants accused the social partners of hav-
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ing hijacked the social security funds, of abusing their position within 
the system at the expense of the common good and of not taking respon-
sibility for containing costs (Bonoli and Palier 1996). As seen above, the 
strongest opposition to retrenchment was not through political confron-
tation, but through social and trade union mobilization. If they wanted to 
implement any change, governments had to take the unions ’ views into 
account, limiting the scope for reform. Within the governmental sphere, 
the perception developed that the state would be better at containing the 
expenditure increase (Bonoli and Palier 1996).
Reforms have been gradually implemented in order to empower the 
state within the system at the expense of the social partners , mainly since 
the Juppé Plan of 1995. Next to the new agencies and power given to state 
civil servants , the most important reform was the vote in February 1996 
of a constitutional amendment obliging the Parliament to vote every year 
on a social security budget. For the first time in France, Parliament is 
taking part in the debate on the Sécurité sociale budget, which before 
was not seen as being part of the state budget. The use of the new parlia-
mentary competence helps the government to control the social policy 
agenda. Instead of always having to legitimize their intervention in a 
realm under the purview of labor and employers , they are now able to 
plan adaptation measures regularly, especially relating to cost contain-
ment . This new instrument also introduces a new logic of intervention. 
Instead of trying to find resources to finance social expenditure driven 
by insured persons’ demand, the vote of a loi de financement de la Sécu-
rité sociale implies that a limited budget should be allocated for social 
expenditure. Since most of the social benefits are still contributory , it is 
impossible to define a limited budget completely a priori, but govern-
ments are entering this new logic and Parliament has since then voted 
new instruments aimed at this purpose, such as limited global budgets 
for the hospitals and for ambulatory doctors, ceilings and growth limits 
for social expenditure.
The Politics of Institutional Reforms 
Contrary to the way some important policy changes have been imple-
mented in other countries or fields (Hall 1986; 1993), these institutional 
reforms were implemented in a very ambiguous and incremental way in 
France. Analysis of the politics of such reforms shows similarities be-
tween the different political processes (Palier 2005b). First, it is impos-
sible to claim that one specific group of actors has been the main, unique 
and causal agent of all these changes. Changing a welfare system as legiti-
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mate as the French necessitates ‘carrying’ almost all the actors involved 
in social policies in the reform process. Led by a coalition of high civil 
servants sharing new analyses and perspectives on welfare, governments, 
employers and some trade unions have participated in these reforms. 
Among the trade unions , the CFDT again played an important role, while 
FO and the CGT remained in a very defensive position, opposing most 
reform proposals. The CFDT was one of the most active proponents of 
re-insertion policies, and above all of CSG (and afterwards of 35 working 
hours and activation policies). During the 1980s, the CFDT had changed 
its political and strategic position, leaving calls for ‘autogestion’ and 
adopting a ‘responsible’ and ‘cooperative’ approach to social policy is-
sues. Outside the management of social insurance funds since 1967, the 
CFDT’s changed economic and social position has allowed this union to 
gain control of important responsibilities over social insurance funds, 
in alliance with the employers and at the expense of FO (Palier 2005a: 
chapter 8).
Second, all of these changes have been based on the collective acknowl-
edgment of past policy failures. The development of each new measure 
started with the politicization of a ‘new social problem’, which was inter-
preted as resulting from a failure of past policies: social exclusion , which 
social insurance is unable to deal with and can even reinforce; low-skilled 
unemployment , due to the weight of social contributions and a passive 
unemployment compensation system; and the inability of the welfare sys-
tem to be changed because of the blurred assignment of responsibilities 
within the systems. These shared diagnoses of policy failure were essen-
tial for gathering people on a new policy track. As long as the problem was 
not perceived in the same way, it was difficult to change the path of action. 
Acknowledgments of failures led to a re-interpretation of existing social 
and economic difficulties, and in the new explanations for the existing 
problems, the position of the social insurance system shifted from one of 
a victim to that of a villain. It took quite a long time before all actors came 
to share similar diagnoses of the problems, a process facilitated by the 
multiplication of commissions and reports, where the partners involved 
progressively shared the same approaches.
Third, although a large majority of the actors concerned about so-
cial protection problems agreed with the new structural measures (RMI, 
CMU, CSG, etc.) they did so for reasons that were often very different 
and sometimes contradictory. Many reforms were implemented in the 
name of the distinction between insurance and assistance (called ‘na-
tional solidarity’ in French). However, trade unions wanted this ratio-
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nalization in order to preserve their realm of social insurance, whereas 
governments and civil servants expected more responsibilities in social 
protection through these changes, at the expenses of social partners . 
Similarly, the RMI was seen by the Left as a means to provide money and 
social help through the contract, while the Right supported it as a new 
kind of conditional benefit. The Left supported the CSG because it was a 
fairer tax than social contribution for the employees, whereas the Right 
saw it as a means to lower social charges for the employers ; civil servants 
supported CSG because it increased state control over social expendi-
ture, while the employers and the CFDT argued that it would allow the 
social partners to preserve the ‘purity’ of social insurance, non-contrib-
utory benefits being financed by taxes . An important element for the 
acceptance of a new measure thus seems to be its capacity to aggregate 
different – and even contradictory – interests, based on contrasting in-
terpretations of the consequences of implementing the new instrument. 
Structural changes in social policies were achieved through ‘ambiguous 
agreement’ on new measures, rather than via a clear ideological orienta-
tion (Palier 2005b).
Finally, these types of change were introduced at the margins and grad-
ually extended, their expansion often leading to a change of their meaning 
within the system. They were first introduced to complement the system, 
but they gradually became the base for a new pillar in the social protec-
tion system. The introduction of new measures at the margins facilitated 
their acceptance by the major defenders of the core system, either because 
they did not feel concerned by them (the RMI was not for the salaried 
workers that trade unions defend), because they were targeted at those 
least able to protest (the low-skilled were the first to have their income 
exempted from social contributions , they were also the first to be targeted 
by activation policies) or because they believed that these new measures 
would help them to defend the very nature of social insurance (tax financ-
ing of non-contributory benefits). However, the French experience shows 
that the growth of initially marginal new measures can lead to a paradig-
matic change for the whole system.
Changing the Structures of the French Welfare System
The accumulation of the reforms analyzed in the previous sections cre-
ated the conditions for a series of structural reforms that have been imple-
mented in the French social protection system since the early 2000s.
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From Passive to Active Labor Market Policies 
The problem of unemployment has been understood and dealt with in 
two different ways in France since the late 1970s. In the 1980s and early 
1990s it was perceived as an unavoidable consequence of new economic 
policies and thus treated passively, especially through the development 
of minimum income benefits, early retirement schemes and traitement 
social du chômage. In the early 1990s, governments started to change their 
policies to improve job creation and to develop ‘active labor market poli-
cies’. As we have seen, governments started to reduce insurance contribu-
tions on low-paid work. After 1998, and as a consequence of the debates 
and changes associated with the insertion policies (see above), the Jospin 
government introduced explicit ‘make-work-pay’ strategies to reduce 
the risk of unemployment traps for socially excluded people. The most 
important measure is the prime pour l’emploi (PPE). In 2000, some of 
the social partners (mainly employers and CFDT, with fierce opposition 
by CGT and FO) signed a new agreement reforming the unemployment 
insurance, eliminating the degressivity of the unemployment insurance 
benefit (ex AUD) but creating a new individualized contract to ensure 
that each jobseeker is accompanied in their search for work (the Plan 
d’aide et de retour à l’emploi – Pare). The social partners who signed this 
new convention explicitly agreed upon the idea that unemployment in-
surance benefits should not only compensate the loss of income, but also 
encourage people to find a new job (Clegg 2007). The 2009 merger of 
the national employment agency and the unemployment insurance fund, 
as well as the creation of RSA (see above), have taken France yet further 
down this path towards activation.
Changing the Incentives in the Pension System
In pensions, the solutions that are currently being promoted to solve the 
future crisis of the PAYG system are not only based on the changes in 
calculation rules, but also on creating new incentives so that people con-
tribute and work longer, and so that people also rely on private savings in 
addition to the public scheme.
Since the late 1990s, measures have been implemented to increase the 
activity rate of older workers and reverse the early exit trend of French 
‘employment’ policies. A new early retirement scheme was established in 
2000, restricted to workers who had difficult working conditions.9 The 
idea was that the new scheme would progressively replace all the old, less 
selective ones. The early exit scheme for civil servants was closed in 2002, 
and another scheme, the Job Substitution Allowance Scheme, was termi-
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nated in 2003. The contributions paid by firms to early exit funds were 
raised in 2001, increasing the direct costs for all schemes.
In 2003, the Raffarin government launched a second big pension re-
form, aimed, first, at aligning the situation of the public sector to the 
private one and, second, at expanding the length of contribution for all 
workers to get the right to a full pension. As planned in 2003, the period 
of contribution was increased for everybody (public and private sector) 
to 41 years in 2008, and is planned to increase to 42 years by 2020. It was 
also announced that the indexation of pensions would be based on prices 
for everybody, civil service pensions having previously been indexed on 
wages. A new system of incentives for people to retire as late as possible 
was also created: a bonus (‘surcote’) will be given if people retire after the 
legal age, and a sanction (‘décote’) applied in case of retirement before this 
age and in case of missing years of contributions.
Since the announcement of these measures created fierce opposition by 
trade unions and many demonstrations, the government announced some 
concessions but only to certain unions (CFDT mainly, but also CFTC and 
CGC, see Häusermann 2010b), such as guaranteeing a replacement rate 
of 85 percent of SMIC – minimum wage – for the lowest pensions (the 
average rate of replacement in France in 2003 was 74 percent). It allowed 
workers who have worked more than 40 years before the age 60, and/or 
who had begun to work between 14 and 16 years old, to retire at 58. The 
reform also increased educational credits for civil servants . Furthermore, 
it unveiled the creation of a supplementary regime by points in order to 
take into account the bonus for the calculation of the pensions of the civil 
servants , and also announced an increase of 0.2 percent in social contri-
butions after 2006 in order to finance retirement before age 60, counting 
on the decrease in unemployment to finance the deficit of the pension 
systems. But in 2007, it was announced that the very specific pension 
schemes of public firms would also be progressively aligned to the new 
general rule. By then, trade unions appeared to be too weak to oppose 
the reform, and could not oppose the confirmation of the new path taken 
when discussed in 2008.
Reforms also tried to encourage the development of ‘saving’ through 
tax exemptions. Two systems of voluntary saving were created in 2004, 
one individual (PERP: Plan d’épargne retraite populaire, which can be 
proposed to individuals by any bank or private insurer), and PERCO: plan 
d’épargne retraite collective, to be organized within firms or by the social 
partners at sectoral level. In both cases, the government was explicit that 
people should try to compensate the future decrease in compulsory PAYG 
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pensions with their own savings. At the end of 2005, 1.7 million people 
had entered into a PERP contract, while 102,000 wage earners were mem-
bers of a PERCO plan. However, the growth rate in 2005 was much higher 
for PERCO plans (66,000 new members, i.e. a 168 percent annual growth 
rate) than for PERP plans (450,000 new members, i.e. a 36 percent annual 
growth rate). Moreover, the contributions paid into PERCO plans were 
four times as high as those paid into PERP plans (DREES 2007).
A Profound Reform of the Health Care System
During summer 2004 a new law on health insurance (‘Douste Blazy re-
form’) was voted by the Parliament in a context of a huge deficit in the 
health insurance system (10.6 billions euros in 2003, 11.6 billions expected 
for 2004). As with previous plans for health care, this reform continued to 
increase co-payments for the patients, through an increase of the fee pay-
able for each hospital stay, and the creation of a non-reimbursable fee of 1 
euro on each consultation (this type of fee was extended to drugs, exams 
and transportation in 2008).
The Douste Blazy reform also initiated a profound reorganization of 
the French health care system, moving towards both more direct manage-
ment of the system by state representatives at the expense of the social 
partners (étatisation) and more control over patient behavior. This struc-
tural reform, which introduced some basic features typical of National 
Health Services within the French health insurance system, was made 
possible by the changes that occurred progressively over the previous 
years, notably the extension of health care to all (through the CMU, see 
above), and the increasing role played by taxes instead of social contribu-
tion (through the CSG, see above).
The 2004 reform instigated the merging of the various health insurance 
schemes into one body – the national union of sickness funds10 – directed 
by a senior civil servant nominated by the government . The new director 
now leads negotiations with the different medical professions and has the 
power to nominate directors of local sickness funds. As a consequence, 
the power of the trade unions has been considerably diminished; the law 
disbanded the administrative boards on which they sat and replaced them 
with simple advisory councils. In 2009, new legislation was passed that 
reorganized the health care system at the regional level, here too creat-
ing a single body11 to replace the various schemes and administrations 
formerly in charge of health care provision. The circulation of patients 
within the system has also been streamlined in recent years, and since 
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2004 French patients must choose a ‘treating doctor’ (‘médecin traitant’) 
who must be seen before any other specialist is consulted. The level of 
re-imbursement by the health insurance is much lower if one does not go 
through this gate keeper.
The level of re-imbursement of non-acute/non-chronic care (mostly 
primary care) has gone down dramatically over the last 30 years. While 
more than 70 percent of primary care costs were reimbursed in the early 
1980s, today the figure is under 60 percent, part of the difference be-
ing covered by voluntary private health insurance. However, only 84.9 
percent of French people have a complementary health insurance, while 
7.4 percent are covered by the complementary universal sickness scheme 
(CMUC) and 7.7 percent have no complementary cover (IRDES 2008).12 
Moreover, though the reimbursement rates are based on the prices set 
by the compulsory health insurance system, many doctors actually over-
charge their patient, with the extra cost being covered only by expensive 
mutuelles or private health insurances. Private health insurance thus plays 
a bigger and bigger role in the primary care sector, which represents half 
of health care expenditure, as the basic health insurance retreats from its 
comprehensive coverage. The development of the French health system 
can thus been characterized by both étatisation and ‘rampant privatiza-
tion ’ (Hassenteufel and Palier 2007).
Divisive Reforms
During the 2000s, the politics of these most recent reforms were char-
acterized by strong controversies among the trade unions , with strikes 
and demonstrations being supported by some of them (led by CGT, FO 
and public sector unions ) while others (led by CFDT) sought to find 
agreement. Clearly, the governments played on this division within the 
trade union movement to weaken the mobilization and gain support 
for their reforms. In 2001, the agreement between CFDT and employ-
ers was strongly criticized by CGT and FO. In 2003, when demonstra-
tions brought two million people out against the public sector pension 
reforms, the government agreed to all the demands of the CFDT, but 
denied all those of the CGT, despite the more conciliatory attitude of 
its new leader. The health care reform was less controversial since it 
has been (implicitly) agreed since the late 1990s that the social part-
ners would withdraw from their responsibilities in the health care sector. 
However, when the first agreement between UNCAM and the medical 
profession was discussed in 2005, the specialists signed it when the gen-
eralists opposed it.
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Table 3.1 – Summary of reform trajectory : France
Types of change Context Diagnosis
Before 
retrenchment 
(1975-1992)
‘Les plans de 
sauvetage de la 
Sécurité sociale’
– Economic downturn
(mid-1970s onwards)
– Massive unemployment 
– Trou de la Sécurité sociale
– One needs to save the national 
champions
– Traitement social du chômage
First wave of 
Retrenchment
The 1990s
‘Les politiques 
de maîtrise des 
dépenses’
– Failure by both the Right and the 
Left of Keynesian refl ation plans
– Non-explicit conversion to macro-
economic supply-side policies
-Economic recession (early 1990s)
– Huge unemployment insurance 
defi cit
– Explosion of health insurance 
expenditures
– Single market
– Preparation of the single 
currency
– La Sécurité sociale est en danger
– The system has to be rescued
– A high level of social 
contribution hinders both 
competitiveness and job creation.
Institutional 
reforms
– increasing social exclusion 
– social partners have been able 
to block important reforms
– among the highest level of 
social contribution in Europe
– La Sécurité sociale is causing 
trouble and contributes to the 
crisis
– Social insurance schemes cannot 
deal with social exclusion 
– Social contributions damage 
competitiveness and create 
unemployment 
– The social partners are not ready 
to take diffi  cult decisions
The second wave 
of reforms
Path-breaking 
changes
The 2000s
– Domination of employers and 
right-wing party
– European single market
– European Monetary Union 
– Welfare systems need a 
profound adaptation to the new 
economic context
– Diff usion of the OECD , EES, OMC 
ideas 
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Content of the policy Politics of the reforms Consequences
– Massive early exit plans
– Creation of subsidized jobs
– Rise in social contributions 
– Change in the generosity 
of some benefi ts in sickness 
insurance 
– Right-wing and then 
left-wing government 
implement Keynesian 
refl ation plans
– Protest against ‘Plan de 
sauvetage de la Sécurité 
sociale’
– Increase in labor cost
– Declining employment rate 
among elderly and youngsters
– Persisting unemployment 
and social defi cit
– Stricter contributivity rules 
for unemployement and 
pension benefi ts
– Patients need to 
contribute more for their 
healthcare costs
– Creation and development 
of tax fi nancing of non-
contributory benefi ts
– Massive protest against 
direct retrenchment plans
– The state is ready to pay 
for ‘charges indues’
– Reforms are implicitly 
negotiated on the basis 
of clarifi cation between 
‘solidarité professionnelle’ and 
‘solidarité nationale’
– More and more people 
are excluded from social 
insurance schemes
– Less and less ‘social’ 
insurances
– Those who are still insured 
need to complement their 
compulsory insurance with 
private health mutuelles and 
complementary pension plans 
– New benefi ts, (universal 
or targeted), tax-fi nanced , 
managed by the state (RMI, 
CMU)
– Expansion of private 
provision
– New mode of fi nancing: 
A new tax for social 
expenditure (CSG)
– Étatisation: More power for 
the state
– ‘Virus’ strategy, layering 
– New provisions, new 
institutions are implemented 
at a marginal point, on 
the base of an ambiguous 
agreement
– Still confl ictual on 
governance issues, but the 
social partners lose various 
battles
– Weakening of social 
insurance mechanisms and 
actors
– Although initially marginal, 
new measures progressively 
develop into a second pillar 
of the system (e.g. RMI as the 
unemployment benefi t of 
last resort; e.g. the CSG as the 
main resource for health care 
sector; e.g. the empowerment 
of state representatives within 
the system)
– PARE: Activation of 
unemployed
– PERP: new private pension 
funds
– Empowerment of the state 
and of private insurances 
within the health care system
– Employers take the 
lead in welfare reforms (La 
refondation sociale)
– Divided unions 
– Governments play certain 
unions (CFDT, CGC and CFTC) 
against others (CGT, FO); 
workers ’ mobilization fails to 
prevent the reforms
– A more mixed economy 
of welfare, focused on 
employment-friendliness
– Shrinking of social 
insurance programs, further 
activation of the assisted
– Dualization of the system 
(social and private insurances/
assistance)
– We are all supply-siders 
now, but not everybody will 
pay the price of this turn
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3.4 Conclusion: Dualisms in the French Welfare System
Compared to its features in the early 1980s, one can see that the French 
welfare system has gone through important changes that are summarized 
in tables 3.2 to 3.4. However, these changes have not had the same conse-
quences for the whole population, since one of the main outcomes of the 
reform trajectory has been a progressive dualization of the French welfare 
system (and society).
We have seen that at its inception the French Sécurité sociale was meant to 
attain Beveridgean goals of universality through the social insurance means 
of Bismarck . Because of the reforms implemented during the last thirty 
years, France’s compulsory social insurances are no longer all-encompass-
ing. Th is has opened up a space for the development of other types of social 
protection mechanisms, both public (state-run) and private. Th ese changes 
have resulted in multiple dualizations in the French welfare system: the de-
velopment of two worlds of welfare within the public system; the addition 
of a private component to the public one; and the division of the population 
between the insured insiders and the assisted or activated outsiders .
Two distinct worlds of welfare have come to coexist in the public sys-
tem. One is the remaining realm of social insurance, comprised mainly of 
old-age pensions and unemployment insurance, where what is called in 
France, ‘professional solidarity’, is central and benefits are still acquired 
through work, albeit linked more closely than before to the amount of 
contribution paid. The social partners have kept their hands on the devel-
opment of these insurances, even though the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ is ever 
more visible. This world of social insurance can no longer offer compre-
hensive coverage i.e. cover the whole population and provide the insured 
with sufficient benefits to sustain their standard of living. The second 
world of welfare is one of what is called in France, ‘national solidarity’, 
comprised of health care , family benefits and policies aimed at fighting 
social exclusion . Here, eligibility is based on need and citizenship, ben-
efits are either universal (for health and family allowances) or means-test-
ed (CMU, RMI and other minimum incomes), and they are financed from 
national taxes (especially CSG) with the state playing a central role.
In France, retrenchment consisted mainly of stricter eligibility criteria 
in social insurance, and as a consequence fewer people are covered by so-
cial insurance and those covered are less well covered. This shrinking of 
social insurance leaves space both underneath – for covering the poorest 
with minimum incomes – and above – for private voluntary components 
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(private pension funds and private health insurances ) – the public system. 
This is a new architecture for the French welfare system, with social in-
surances still central but no longer hegemonic.
Th is new architecture has created new forms of vertical dualism in so-
ciety. Th e French population itself seems to be increasingly divided into, 
on the one hand, those who can rely on a rather generous social insurance 
program and continue to have access (thanks to their employers or their 
own wealth) to private complements, and on the other hand, those who 
have fallen out of that system and are dependent on minimum beneﬁ ts. To 
the latter group, one should probably add those being ‘activated’ into atyp-
ical contracts under which they beneﬁ t from second rank labor and social 
protection (Clegg 2007; Palier and Th elen 2010). Between those on mini-
mum incomes (10 percent of the French population) and the 25 percent 
of the working population with an atypical working contract (ﬁ xed term, 
part-time, with lower wage than normal, RSA and other subsidized jobs), 
it seems that around a third of the French population does not participate 
in the ‘normal’ labor market and social protection arrangements. French 
social protection reforms have thus contributed to increase inequalities 
and divide society between insiders and outsiders (Palier and Th elen 2010).
These trends have been accompanied more than they have been truly 
contested by the social partners . As seen before, most of the retrench-
ments in social insurance benefits were negotiated on the basis of a dis-
tinction between ‘insurance’ and ‘solidarity’. This led to the separation of 
the two worlds that were once associated when the system was aimed to 
reach Beveridgean goals through Bismarckian means.
We are all Supply-Siders Now!
If the French social protection system has gone through important insti-
tutional changes (see tables 3.2 to 3.4), the objectives of social policy have 
also undergone fundamental changes. Before, social protection was mainly 
conceptualized as a way of guaranteeing a substitute income for people 
who could no longer work, temporarily or permanently. Beneﬁ ts were con-
ceived as an entitlement, earned over years of social contributions . More 
and more, social policies are conceived as instruments for modifying in-
dividual behavior, in particular with regards to employment, and as a tool 
for spurring the economy – not by supporting household consumption, 
but by encouraging citizens to work as much as possible and by developing 
private social protections. Th is should, in principle, foster new economic 
activities in pension funds, the insurance industry, medical research and 
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personal services. Th e French social protection system is gradually sup-
posed to become an instrument of competitiveness: in business (decreases 
in employer social contributions , development of private social protection 
activities), of the state (decrease in taxation , control over the rise in public 
social expenditure), and of individuals (activation policies).
In France, the sécurité Sociale was part of an overall economic policy that 
both promoted and relied on full employment – essentially a Keynesian 
policy, focused on the demand side. After 30 years of change, one can say 
that French social protection is now adapted to the new dominant macro-
economic paradigm , focused on the supply side (Hall 1986; 1989). Th e turn 
of French social protection towards activation and employability (so that 
the unemployed go back to the labor market), the lowering of social contri-
butions to help private companies supply more jobs, and the development 
of the market of social protection all play a part in this paradigmatic change. 
Whether this turn ﬁ ts with the new economic and social conditions created 
by the 2008 ﬁ nancial crisis looks, however, increasingly questionable.
Table 3.2 Institutional changes in old-age insurance (changes in italics)
Early 1980s Mid-2000s
Eligibility Status based access to old-age pension 
(37,5 years of contribution, 50% of the 
means of 10 best years); contribution-
based access to compulsory 
complementary occupational pension; 
means-tested access to minimum 
pension; selective access to private 
occupational pensions 
Contribution-based access to old-age 
pension (41 years of contribution, 50% of 
the means of 25 best years); contribution-
based access to compulsory 
complementary occupational pension; 
means-tested access to minimum 
pension; selective access to private 
occupational pensions; increased fi scal 
privileges for private pension savings
Benefi t 
structure
Contributory benefi ts; means-tested 
diff erential minimum income 
Contributory benefi ts; means-tested 
diff erential minimum income ; increased 
funded benefi ts
Financing Old age insurance contributions (even 
for minimum pension)
Contributions; taxes for minimum 
pension; private occupational pensions 
are funded through tax exempted 
employee’s and employers payment
Manage-
ment
Tripartite (régime général), social 
partners only for compulsory 
complementary pensions 
Tripartite (régime général), social 
partners only for compulsory 
complementary pensions; fi rm or 
branch level agreements and private 
companies (supplementary occupational 
pensions)
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Table 3.3 Institutional changes in health care policy (changes in italics)
  Early 1980s Mid-2000s
Eligibility Status and ‘personal insurance’, 
voluntary facultative ‘mutuelles’
Universal health insurance ; voluntary 
facultative ‘mutuelles’ or private 
insurances
Benefi t 
structure
Re-imbursement (100% for hospital 
care, 75% for ambulatory care)
Re-imbursement (95% for hospital care, 
60% for ambulatory care)
Financing Health insurance contributions Employers’ contribution; CSG (for the 
employees), taxes .
Manage-
ment
Tripartite, mutuelles Central and regional government , 
mutuelles and private insurance 
companies
Table 3.4 Institutional changes in unemployment insurance (changes in italics)
Early 1980s Mid-2000s
Eligibility Mandatory insurance for employees Mandatory insurance for employees; 
tightened eligibility (longer contribution 
period); benefi ts partly dependent on job 
seeking activities
Benefi t 
structure
Income replacement (about 79% 
during the fi rst year)
Lower and degressive income 
replacement; activation policies
Financing Contribution payments Contribution payments
Manage-
ment
Bipartite Bipartite (in the shadow of hierarchy); 
merger of the employment agencies and 
the unemployment insurance funds.
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4 Janus-Faced Developments in a Prototypical
  Bismarckian Welfare State: Welfare Reforms in Austria 
since the 1970s
Herbert Obinger and Emmerich Tálos
4.1 Introduction1
Austria is nowadays widely seen as possessing a highly developed, albeit 
mainly employment-related, social security system strongly based on the 
idea of status preservation of wage earners (Obinger and Tálos 2006). The 
foundations of this model date back to the late 19th and early 20th century 
when core branches of social insurance such as accident insurance (1887), 
health insurance (1888) and old-age pensions for white-collar workers 
(1906) were introduced in the Austrian-Hungarian Empire in an attempt 
to settle the ‘labor question’ (Arbeiterfrage). The basic objectives of public 
intervention in social affairs, the organizational principles (self-admin-
istration ), the mode of financing (social security contributions), and the 
structural make-up of the welfare system laid down at that time provided 
the guiding principles that underpinned the expansion of the welfare sys-
tem in the 20th century (Hofmeister 1981; Tálos 1982). Benefits are tied to 
labor market participation , while the legacy of paternalist authoritarian 
policies is mirrored in occupationally fragmented and mandatory social 
insurance. Status preservation via earnings-related transfer payments, 
a lack of social services and the preservation of the male breadwinner 
model are core elements of the Austrian social security system giving rise 
to strong stratification effects in terms of gender and occupational status. 
With few exceptions, social insurance related benefits are financed en-
tirely through social security contributions. Social assistance, by contrast, 
is a social safety net of the last resort based on subsidiarity and tied to a 
means-test.
Given this structural make-up, the standard account in the compara-
tive welfare state literature depicts the Austrian welfare state as a pro-
totypical Bismarckian or corporatist -Conservative welfare regime (Esp-
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ing-Andersen 1990). The expansion of the Austrian welfare state during 
the trente glorieuses mainly affected the personal coverage and the level 
and spectrum of benefits offered by the various programs. Based on a 
Keynesian post-war consensus and building on the inherited Bismarck-
ian system of social security, the goal of income support was universal-
ized during the post-war period. A duopoly of pro-welfare state parties, 
consociational democracy and corporatism , as well as a Federal Con-
stitution lacking institutional veto points, provided a political configu-
ration highly conducive to welfare state expansion in the aftermath of 
World War II.
Though a U-turn in social policy occurred later than in many other 
West European nations, the speed of reform has remarkably accelerated 
during the past two decades. We show in this chapter that the contem-
porary Austrian welfare state still manifests salient Bismarckian traits. 
The contemporary arrangement of social security should not, however, 
be seen simply as a frozen landscape inherited from the past, but rather as 
what might properly best be described as a ‘partially defrosted’ Bismarck-
ian welfare state.
4.2 How Bismarckian was the Austrian Welfare State?
In the early 1980s, the Austrian social security system was based on the 
following principles and objectives (Obinger and Tálos 2006):
Eligibility to Social Benefi ts
From the 1880s onwards, labor market participation has been the crucial 
qualifying condition for drawing benefits from social insurance. The main 
objective of social insurance was to protect wage earners against losses 
of income in case of sickness, occupational injury, unemployment and 
old age . Non-employed spouses and dependent children were entitled 
to free co-insurance and survivors’ benefits. Initially, social security was 
strongly occupationally fragmented with the major dividing line running 
between blue-collar and white-collar workers on the one hand and pri-
vate sector employees and civil servants on the other. The self-employed 
and farmers were integrated into social insurance only in the aftermath 
of World War II.
Eligibility to benefits on a universal basis applied only to a limited 
number of programs such as family allowances and the long-term care 
allowance introduced in 1993.
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Subsidiarity was and still is the guiding principle of social assistance 
and unemployment assistance (Notstandshilfe). Public assistance in case 
of hardship could only be claimed if all other sources of income mainte-
nance such as employment, family support and existing social benefits 
either had been exhausted or were not sufficient to guarantee a decent 
standard of living (Pfeil 2000; Dimmel 2003). Social assistance was a 
means-tested benefit that was controlled and funded by the nine Länder.
Type of Benefi ts
Given the predominance of social insurance, benefits were mostly of-
fered in cash. Wage-centered social security was strongly imbued with 
the principle of equivalence. Social insurance as the most important pil-
lar of the welfare state therefore reproduced the inequalities inherent 
in the labor market and the employment record of individuals. A final 
salient feature of the Austrian welfare state was that benefits were mostly 
publicly provided. Markets, therefore, have been largely crowded-out as 
an alternative route to benefit provision. Until the 1990s, for example, 
90 percent of all pension benefits were provided by the statutory public 
pension scheme.
Self-Administration
The pronounced occupational fragmentation typical for Bismarckian wel-
fare states was mirrored in the organization of social insurance, which, 
from the very outset, has been based on the principle of self-adminis-
tration . Between 1947 and 1999, board members of the insurance agen-
cies and funds providing insurance cover were nominated by the Austrian 
Trade Union Federation and the so-called chambers, i.e. the statutory 
interest organizations of labor, capital and peasants. Implementation of 
social insurance affairs was the responsibility of the respective insurance 
carriers which were organized along territorial (health care ) and occupa-
tional principles. Since the 1980s, their number has declined from 28 to 22 
in the wake of a few mergers.
Unemployment insurance was directly administered by the Ministry 
of Social Affairs until the mid-1990s. In 1994, the administration was de-
centralized and outsourced to the Austrian Labor Market Service (AMS), 
which is also responsible for job placement. The AMS has offices in each 
Länder and 96 regional offices. The social partners are strongly repre-
sented in these bodies.
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Funding
The mode of financing reflected the overarching principle of wage-cen-
tered social policy. Social insurance was primarily funded through ear-
marked contributions paid by employees and their employers on a pay-
as-you-go basis. Only pensions and health care (mainly hospitals) were to 
some extent co-financed from the public purse. In 2004, about two-thirds 
of total social expenditure was financed from contributions, whereas the 
remaining share was covered by federal grants (BMSK 2007: 195).
The profound occupational fragmentation enshrined in the Austrian 
welfare state was mirrored in occupationally fragmented contribution 
rates, contribution ceilings and co-payments (e.g. health care ) which dif-
fered between blue- and white-collar workers 2 on the one hand and be-
tween employees, the self-employed and civil servants on the other. Other 
sectors of the welfare system beyond social insurance showed different 
funding patterns. Long-term care allowance (introduced in 1993) and 
social assistance benefits were entirely tax-funded, whereas family cash 
benefits were financed by employers and the public purse.
4.3 Welfare State Change since the 1970s: Reform Sequences
The development of the Austrian welfare state over the past 30 years can 
be divided into three phases, which are characterized by increasing re-
form intensity over time.
– Whereas the early 1970s were still characterized by a substantial ex-
pansion of the welfare state, the first half of the 1980s witnessed a 
turnaround towards stabilization and retrenchment . On the funding 
side, the major response was to increase social security contributions. 
However, this policy shift only included gradual or first order changes 
(Hall 1993) which did not affect the basic principles of the existing 
welfare state settlement.
– Against the backdrop of profound political and socio-economic trans-
formations (e.g. a revival of the Grand Coalition in 1987, EU member-
ship and the formation of the EMU ), a policy course aimed at fiscal 
stabilization was continued in the second half of the 1980s and early 
1990s. The EU accession in 1995 marked a watershed as the measures 
launched in the second half of the 1990s mainly had a restrictive im-
pact and included a number of second order changes . Nevertheless, 
the basic principles of the welfare state remained largely intact in this 
period.
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– The new millennium, by contrast, which in political terms was marked 
by the advent of a center-Right government (2000-2006), led to more 
far-reaching reform efforts which, in consequence, produced third or-
der changes in some policy sectors, notably pensions. In addition, the 
center-Right government imposed far-reaching institutional changes 
by altering the rules of the political game.
The 1970s and Early 1980s: From one Last Expansionary Flash in the Pan 
to a Reorientation in Social Policy towards Stabilization
In 1970, a Social Democratic single party cabinet came to power. The new 
government was committed to the idea of societal and political modern-
ization , which included not the least plans to expand and remodel the 
welfare state. Family policy, for example, was considerably restructured 
and expanded. The approach taken to increase vertical redistribution was 
to roll-back family-related tax allowances in favor of tax deductions and 
higher transfer payments such as family allowances, parental leave al-
lowance and birth allowance. New benefits in kind included free school 
books and free transport for schoolchildren and apprentices.
In terms of health care , the Social Democrats introduced general medi-
cal check-up examinations (1972) and mother and child examinations 
(1974) to strengthen preventive medicine. The coverage of accident insur-
ance was considerably enhanced when school children and students were 
integrated into this program in 1976.
The benefit spectrum of the pension system was also enhanced. Wid-
ows’ pensions (1970) and minimum pensions (1973) were raised, while 
spells of tertiary education, sickness and unemployment were considered 
for benefit calculation (see Tálos 1986: 99).
A similar expansion took place in the realm of unemployment insurance. 
Unemployment compensation as well as family supplements were raised, 
while eligibility was relaxed through the abolition of waiting days (1976).
A remarkable attribute of this period was that most reforms were based 
on compromises between the social partners . The negotiation-based style 
of politics did of course not rule out sporadic political conflicts in social 
policy with collective labor law as the prime example (Tálos 1982). Nev-
ertheless, the compromise-based pattern of decision-making prevailing 
in this period demonstrates that social partnership was widely practiced 
even in periods dominated by a single party government .
The occurrence of the oil price shocks marked a turning point. Even 
though macroeconomic performance had worsened in the wake of the 
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oil shocks, Austria outperformed most Western democracies in terms of 
macroeconomic and labor market performance in the crisis of the 1970s 
(Rothschild 1985; Scharpf 1987). The political strategy to cope with the 
repercussions of the oil shocks is captured in a famous quote by the then 
Federal Chancellor, Bruno Kreisky , who said in the run-up to the general 
elections of 1979: ‘A few billion Schillings more debt gives me fewer sleep-
less nights than would a few hundred more unemployed.’ The adopted 
policy package labeled as Austro-Keynesianism included coordinated 
wage policies, labor hoarding in state-run industry, labor shedding via 
early retirement benefits, anti-cyclical deficit spending and public pro-
motion of investment and exports. A further response to the crisis of the 
1970s was to increase social security contributions and to raise contribu-
tion ceilings for all professions and insurance branches (Talos 1982: 360-
61). Keynesianism had its price, however. The level of debt skyrocketed 
from 20.4 percent in 1970 to almost 50 percent of GDP in 1985. Whereas 
the Social Democrats and the trade unions advocated the continuation of 
welfare state expansion and Keynesian economic policies, the deteriorat-
ing economic situation also increased skepticism concerning the welfare 
state, particularly among employers associations. Leading representatives 
argued, for example, that ‘the welfare state has reached its outer limits if 
it has not already crossed them’ (Stummvoll 1977). Moreover, the welfare 
state was seen as an integral part of a ‘democracy of complaisance’ (Gefäl-
ligkeitsdemokratie) and blamed for having contributed to a financial ca-
lamity, since its expansion continued regardless of economic capabilities. 
Mounting anti-welfare rhetoric in combination with increasing economic 
difficulties triggered a trend reversal in social policy which was further 
accelerated by the Social Democrats’ loss of their absolute majority in 
1983. From 1983 to 1986, the Social Democrats (SPÖ) formed a coalition 
with the Freedom Party (FPÖ). Austro-Keynesianism was gradually re-
nounced in this era of transition (Tálos 1987; Unger 2001; Lauber and 
Pesendorfer 2006).
Against the backdrop of rising unemployment in the early 1980s, the 
reform debate initially focused on labor market policy (Tálos 1986; 1987), 
but increasingly also on pensions. Rather than demographic problem 
pressure it was budgetary pressure why the first departure from the ex-
pansionist route occurred under the SPÖ/FPÖ government . In 1984, a 
restrictive pension reform was adopted which aimed to curb expenditure 
via changes in the pension formula.
Full employment ceased to exist in 1982/83 and the rate of unemploy-
ment went up to more than 5 percent over the next years. The result-
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ing rise in expenditure devoted to this program (Tálos 1987: 153) evoked 
mounting criticism from employers . The turning point towards re-
trenchment occurred in 1983 (Tálos 2004), when the SPÖ/FPÖ govern-
ment suspended unemployment compensation in case of compensation 
payments after dismissal. Nevertheless, the government responded to 
the rise in unemployment mainly with higher contribution rates and var-
ious supply-side oriented measures rather than with large-scale benefit 
cutbacks. Active labor market policy was enhanced and the stock of the 
foreign labor force was slashed. From the late 1970s, early retirement 
served as an instrument of labor shedding and therefore helped to cush-
ion the mounting labor market problems in the short run. The spread of 
early retirement programs led to a remarkable decline in the effective 
retirement age from the mid-1970s onwards (see Figure 4.1). However, 
labor shedding created negative fiscal feedback effects in the longer run 
which, in consequence, led to more far-reaching reforms in subsequent 
years and contributed to a staged reform process in pension policy (cf. 
Bonoli and Palier 2007).
Figure 4.1 Development of the eff ective retirement age contingent upon pension type 
and gender , 1970-2005 (5 year intervals)
Source: Hauptverband der österreichischen Sozialversicherungsträger: Handbuch der 
österreichischen Sozialversicherung, Vienna (various issues).
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A first path reversal is also visible in family policy and health care , albeit 
to a lesser degree. The policy strategy in health care to cope with rising 
health expenditure was to extend co-payments. The SPÖ/FPÖ govern-
ment introduced new out-of-pocket payments for in-kind benefits such 
as glasses or prostheses in 1983, while the expansion of family-related 
benefits virtually came to an end. Some benefits such as the birth allow-
ance have even been subject to moderate cutbacks.
In sum, the early 1980s witnessed a trend reversal in social policy which 
was mainly triggered by increasing economic problems. With the excep-
tion of early retirement , the expansion of the welfare state not only came 
to a halt in this period, but was also, in some measure, put into reverse 
gear. Labor market problems were papered over by means of the pension 
system, while some first order policy changes aimed at financial stabiliza-
tion were implemented in pension and unemployment insurance. These 
measures, however, did not undercut the traditional core principles un-
derpinning the welfare state. Neither its basic objectives nor its funda-
mental structures were contested in this period.
Adaptation to a Remarkably Changed Environment (1987-1999)
In 1987, a Grand Coalition resumed office for the first time since 1966. The 
pragmatic modernizers led by Chancellor Vranitzky got the upper hand 
in the social democratic camp, while the Christian Democrats (ÖVP) in-
creasingly advocated neoliberal ideas . State intervention in economic af-
fairs and the welfare state were seen as part of the causes of the mounting 
economic difficulties. In the following years, the SPÖ/ÖVP government 
initiated a reorientation in economic policy by adopting a moderate sup-
ply-side oriented strategy committed to debt containment, liberalization 
and privatization of state-owned enterprises. This policy shift was trig-
gered by declining economic performance as well as by the cabinet’s in-
tention to join the EU , which was finally accomplished on 1 January 1995.
Macroeconomic performance further deteriorated from the mid-1980s 
onwards. Economic growth was significantly lower compared to previ-
ous decades (Stiefel 2006: 73) and the rate of unemployment increased 
from 5.2 (1986) to more than 7 percent in 1999. This development was 
paralleled by an increase in the number of the long-term unemployed 
and a spread of atypical work (Stiefel 2006: 77f; Tálos 2005a: 44 ff ). Bud-
getary pressure and labor market problems grew more acute with the de 
facto bankruptcy of large parts of state-run industry3 in the mid-1980s. In 
consequence, the level of public debt increased from 49.8 percent (1985) 
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to 69.2 percent of GDP in 1995. Austria therefore actually went over the 
critical 60 percent Maastricht threshold at just the time of its entry into 
the European Union . Soaring public debt plus high real interest rates in 
the 1980s increased the pressure to impose austerity policies. The com-
mitment to EU membership, the liberalization of capital markets in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s as well as the formation of the EMU sounded 
the death knell for Austro-Keynesianism (Winckler 1988). Under these 
circumstances, the policy route of incremental adjustment and financial 
stabilization practiced in the early 1980s was not only continued by the 
Grand Coalition but also rather implemented with greater intensity and 
speed (Tálos and Wörister 1998).
Pensions
The latter is apparent from the shorter intervals between the various re-
form initiatives pursued by the SPÖ/ÖVP government in the field of pen-
sions (e.g. 1988, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1996 and 1997). The various pen-
sion reforms were largely triggered by increases in federal funding of the 
pension system on the one hand and by mounting pressure to contain 
budget deficits on the other. In terms of the expenditure/GDP ratio, the 
Austrian pension system was, in the 1990s, one of the most expensive in 
the world, not least because the effective retirement age was one of the 
lowest. The pressure to impose austerity policies resulting from derailing 
budget deficits led to various retrenchment measures and higher contri-
bution rates. The assessment basis was extended stepwise from 5 to 15 
contribution years and the increment factor was fixed at 2 percent for 
all pension types in 1997. In addition, eligibility to early old-age pensions 
was tightened (1996), while the contribution rate for the self-employed 
and farmers was raised in 1995. Moreover, the Grand Coalition enacted 
measures to harmonize the calculation of civil servants ’ pensions with 
that of general pensions.
Th e government also changed the indexation of beneﬁ ts (adjustment 
based on net rather than gross wages) and introduced deductions in case 
of early retirement . Moreover, spells of higher education were no longer 
considered for beneﬁ t calculation. Th e inclusion of the new self-employed 
in the health and pension insurance systems was less an attempt to manage 
problems related to the ‘new social risks ’, but rather was motivated by ﬁ -
nancial considerations, i.e. to secure an increase in contribution payments.
Improvements in benefits, in contrast, remained few and far between. 
Examples included the upgrading of spells devoted to child raising for 
benefit calculation, a modification of the assessment period in 1993 (with 
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the so-called ‘best’ 15 years as basis for benefit calculation) and the pos-
sibility for employees with a non-standard employment contract to take 
out voluntary pension and health insurance .
The federal government increasingly dominated the policy-making 
process in this second phase, whereas the traditionally strong influence 
of the peak associations of labor and capital steadily declined (Karl-
hofer 1999: 16 ff.). Tensions between the social partners increased and 
the balance of power between them became more asymmetric over time, 
given the deteriorating economic situation and the greater exit options 
for capital. Moreover, EU membership further undercut the influence of 
the social partners , since traditional bargaining instruments were either 
restricted or became, like price regulations, entirely obsolete. In conse-
quence, tripartite interest mediation became less important as compared 
to the heyday of corporatism , as it was not only practiced less frequently 
but also restricted to fewer policy sectors (cf. Tálos 2005b).
Labor Market Policy 
Retrenchment in unemployment insurance also became more pronounced 
in the second period. Until 1993, however, both retrenchment and expan-
sive measures were adopted. Benefit enhancement included the abolition 
of a clause discriminating against women with regard to unemployment 
assistance (females were not entitled to unemployment assistance if the 
partner was in full-time employment ), the introduction of a uniform net 
replacement rate of 57.9 percent, the integration of foreigners into un-
employment assistance and, finally, the extension of benefit duration for 
older unemployed with long insurance records.
The mid-1990s witnessed a turnaround in labor market policy. While 
contribution rates were stabilized at 6 percent in order to freeze non-
wage labor costs , the government increasingly relied on benefit cutbacks 
and the activation of the unemployed from 1993 onwards. The restrictive 
course is apparent from the Beschäftigungssicherungsgesetz (1993) and the 
two so-called austerity packages launched in 1995 and 1996. The latter en-
tailed a series of benefit cuts in order to meet the Maastricht convergence 
criteria after the budget deficit exceeded 5 percent of GDP in 1995. Quali-
fying conditions for unemployment benefits as well as sanctions have been 
tightened. The already low net replacement rate was further scaled back, 
unemployment assistance was subject to cutbacks and the base period of 
unemployment compensation was extended from 6 to 12 months. Despite 
all these kinds of retrenchment , the reforms legislated in the 1990s did not 
lead to any real departure from established policy routines.
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Health Care 
In the health care sector, demographic changes, medical and techno-
logical progress, and an increasing numbers of doctors produced an in-
creasing expenditure trajectory after 1970. Concerns about rising costs 
dominated the political discourse with cost containment serving as the 
major impetus for health care reforms. One approach to curbing pub-
lic health expenditure was to increase the public control of the territori-
ally fragmented health care system and to reorganize both organization 
and financing of the hospital sector. The reform trajectory adopted was 
to strengthen health care planning in order to reduce the oversupply of 
hospital beds and large-scale medical equipment. Given the distribution 
of competencies in this sector4, all these efforts had to be negotiated be-
tween different branches of government and were formally based on a 
state treaty. In 1997, the remuneration for medical services provided in 
hospitals was fundamentally restructured when a payment system based 
on diagnosis related groups was introduced. As in many other countries, 
the main idea was to shorten hospitalization by adopting a performance-
oriented remuneration system. Moreover, the government not only raised 
health insurance contributions and contribution ceilings for most occu-
pational groups as well as retirees, but also introduced new co-payments 
and deductibles.
However, the 1990s also witnessed the introduction of new benefits. 
The most important expansive measure in cost terms was the introduc-
tion of a federal long-term care allowance in 1993. Strongly pushed by var-
ious organizations of disabled people, the adoption of this program has 
anchored a structurally unique pillar as part of the Austrian social secu-
rity system. In contrast to the German counterpart, the Austrian program 
is entirely tax-funded. This mode of financing was less a deliberate deci-
sion to lower non-wage labor costs and is rather a legacy from the past, as 
the new scheme has replaced special supplements for handicapped peo-
ple offered by pension insurance. The new program is designed to cover 
additional care-related costs. Entitlement is independent of income and 
the benefit is paid regardless of the cause for the need of long-term care . 
The care allowance is a lump sum benefit that is staggered (seven levels), 
contingent upon the extent of the care required. Based on a state treaty, 
the nine Länder have agreed to guarantee nation-wide provision of social 
services until 2010 and to provide a similar care allowance for people not 
qualified for a care benefit under federal law.
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Family Policy 
Family policy was considerably enhanced during the first legislative pe-
riod of the Grand Coalition. As in most other Continental countries, Aus-
tria has experienced a dramatic decline in fertility rates over the last three 
decades. Once more, however, the policy route taken was to increase cash 
benefits. Parental leave allowance was enhanced from 12 to 24 months 
and extended to fathers in 1990. In addition, tax deductions and fam-
ily allowances were raised several times. In the mid-1990s, family policy 
experienced a backlash. As in the other welfare state sectors discussed 
above, the exploding budget deficit together with EU accession increased 
the pressure to stabilize public finances. The government passed two so-
called austerity packages, which included the abolition of birth allowance 
and free public transport for students, the introduction of co-payments 
for school books, cutbacks in family allowances and a reduction of paren-
tal leave entitlement for one parent from 24 to 18 months (BMUJF 1999: 
414-418).
Family policy has traditionally been shaped by the political parties, 
with the social partners playing only a minor role. In the 1990s, however, 
family policy was considerably influenced by the Constitutional Court. 
The Court ruled in two judgments that maintenance costs for the better-
off are not adequately compensated through the tax system. In 1999, the 
Grand Coalition responded to the Court’s rulings with a comprehensive 
family policy package including increased tax credits for families as well 
as higher transfer payments. As a result, the present system of income 
support for families is again based on a more balanced dual system con-
sisting of transfer payments and a variety of tax breaks.5 The late 1990s 
also witnessed increased efforts to overcome massive shortcomings with 
regard to day care facilities for children. Austria has traditionally been an 
extreme laggard in terms of the provision of public childcare facilities, 
especially children of nursery age. In 1995, the proportion of children aged 
zero to three in child care was about 3 percent (Badelt and Österle 1998: 
156). Since the provision of formal childcare is the responsibility of the 
Länder and municipalities, the Grand Coalition provided special grants 
to subordinate governments from 1997 to 2000 in order to increase the 
number of childcare facilities at the local level. Nevertheless, the cover-
age for toddlers is still very low from a comparative perspective and there 
exists a substantial divide in coverage between rural areas and urban ag-
glomerations.
Even though some second order changes were implemented, the ba-
sic patterns of the welfare state remained intact in this phase. From the 
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mid-1990s onwards, the ÖVP and the employers ’ associations increas-
ingly advocated policies aimed at deregulation, flexibilization and the 
containment of non-wage labor costs to increase the competitiveness of 
the economy. Though the influence of the social partners declined with 
mounting economic problem pressures and the resulting diminished 
scope for (re)distribution, the interest organizations of labor remained 
powerful enough to block far-reaching retrenchment . Tensions between 
the social partners spilled over to the coalition parties which became 
increasingly obstructive – something the general public viewed as pro-
ducing a ‘reform jam’. Along with the benefit cutbacks imposed in the 
second half of the 1990s this contributed to the rise of right-wing popu-
list Jörg Haider . The general elections of 1999 brought painful losses for 
the coalition parties, while Haider ’s FPÖ gained almost 27 percent of the 
vote. Although his party only ranked third in the 1999 general election, 
ÖVP chairman Wolfgang Schüssel exploited this window of opportunity 
and formed a coalition with the Freedom Party. Accompanied by fierce 
national and international protests, a center-Right government came to 
power for the first time since 1945.
Towards Institutional Reforms : The 2000s
The turning point in social policy occurred in 2000 when the ÖVP/FPÖ 
coalition entered government . The lesson learnt by the ÖVP in the 1990s 
was that a major social policy change could only be implemented against 
but not together with the Social Democrats. For leading representatives 
of the ÖVP (cf. Khol 2001) it was the veto power of the unions that im-
peded far-reaching reforms in the past. Given that diagnosis, the center-
Right government launched institutional reforms in order to bypass the 
informal veto powers held by the unions within the system of social part-
nership. Hence, the government changed the traditional rules of the game 
in order to realize a shift in the balance of power. Labor’s former quasi-
institutional role in the decision-making process ceased and the coali-
tion utilized majority rule to pursue its neoliberal agenda. Based on the 
slogan ‘speed kills’ coined by the ÖVP party whip Andreas Khol , reforms 
were literally pushed through so that the opposition and the unions were 
repeatedly confronted with a series of faits accomplis. As a consequence, 
consociational democracy and corporatism virtually came to an end at 
the turn of the new millennium (Tálos 2005b; Karlhofer and Tálos 2006; 
Obinger and Tàlos 2006). The ‘meta-reforms’ adopted to realize the en-
visaged policy change also involved the removal of Social Democrats from 
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power positions and attempts to increase the government ’s influence on 
the self-administered social insurance bodies.
Th e overriding goal of the center-Right coalition was to realize a par-
adigm shift in economic and social policy. Th e ÖVP/FPÖ government 
stepped into the arena with a program aimed at a fundamental reform in 
economic and social policy in order to ‘halt a misunderstood Keynesian-
ism , presented as Austro-Keynesianism, that had served as a smokescreen 
for soaring debt, and to free the nation of debt altogether’ (Government 
Program 2000). Strong emphasis was put on a largely expenditure-based 
restructuring of state ﬁ nances with a balanced budget as the prime objec-
tive. ‘A good day begins with a balanced budget’, a slogan coined by ﬁ nance 
minister Karl-Heinz Grasser , became the government ’s new leitmotif in 
ﬁ scal policy. With a view to taking a new approach in social policy (labeled 
as Sozialpolitik neu), which was mainly committed to improved targeting 
and to combat the misuse of social beneﬁ ts, the coalition announced far-
reaching welfare state changes (see Obinger and Tálos 2006: 25-34). In 
order to improve the competitiveness of the Austrian economy, the gov-
ernment announced a freeze in non-wage labor costs and planned various 
measures aiming at deregulation and ﬂ exibilization (Fink and Tálos 2004).
Pensions
Pensions were a main target of reform in the government program. Like in 
other Continental countries (cf. Bonoli and Palier 2007), the government 
envisaged the transformation of the pension system into a multi-pillar 
system and announced the abolition of existing early retirement pro-
grams. Several factors were used by the government to justify this radical 
turnaround in pension policy. The most important was the need for a 
strict austerity course in order to achieve a balanced budget. Pension re-
form was also motivated by efforts to make the system sustainable in light 
of prospective demographic changes and to improve the fairness within 
the system (i.e. to level out the differences resulting from occupational 
fragmentation) as well as between generations (i.e. to reduce the financial 
burdens on the economically active generation).
In the beginning, the government abolished early old-age pensions 
based on disability , reduced the replacement rate of widows ’ pensions and 
increased deductions in case of early retirement . The envisaged restruc-
turing of the pension system was finally realized from 2003 onwards and 
occurred in three steps.
The first step was the so-called ‘Pension Reform Act 2003’. This reform 
abolished the various categories of early retirement benefits in a series 
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of stages, while the annual pension deductions imposed for those taking 
early retirement were raised to 4.2 percent of the gross pension. From 
2004 on, the assessment base was to be gradually lengthened from 15 to 
40 years, implying that pensions would henceforth be calculated on the 
basis of a life-time work record. Moreover, the increment factor was re-
duced from 2 to 1.78 percent and the number of years required to qualify 
for the maximum pension was extended from 40 to 45 years. In addition, 
the first benefit indexation will now only take place after two years of 
retirement . This reform led to massive and, at least for Austria, atypical 
protests. Since even the government was divided on this reform, the co-
alition watered down the proposed changes to some extent by imposing 
a cap on the losses resulting from the reform. A further compensatory 
measure was to credit 24 instead of 18 months devoted to child raising as 
contribution periods (with an upgraded rate). Finally, a special fund was 
established to provide assistance in case of hardship, while workers in 
heavy industries were exempted from some of the restrictive measures.
The second step in redesigning the pension system was the harmoni-
zation of the different occupational pension schemes. The General Pen-
sion Act of 2005 included the following measures: with the exception of 
civil servants employed by the Länder and municipalities, the new unified 
pension law applies to all employees born 1954 or later. An individual pen-
sion account was established for every insured person showing the con-
tribution record and the accumulated claims. In contrast to initial plans 
proposed by the government , a benefit-defined rather than contribution-
defined pension account was established. To address the foreseeable gray-
ing of society, a so-called demographic factor was adopted. Deviations 
from the forecasted increase in life expectancy will automatically affect 
the contribution rate, the retirement age, benefit indexation and the fed-
eral grant. Retirement will be possible within a ‘corridor’ at an age be-
tween 62 and 68. Pension benefits are reduced by 4.2 percent per annum 
if a person retires before the statutory retirement age of 65. The bonus 
for delayed retirement is calculated accordingly. For insured persons who 
have already earned contribution periods, a so-called ‘parallel calculation’ 
will be made. More specifically, the benefits will be calculated on the basis 
of the legal situation before and after the harmonization of the pension 
system. The pension is then calculated as a weighted average of the en-
titlements earned under both schemes.
The third step taken to overhaul the pension system will lead to a multi-
pillar system in the long run. Even though the government did not intro-
duce a formal ‘Three-Pillar System’ as originally proposed, two reforms 
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launched by the center-Right coalition nevertheless have, de facto, paved 
the way for a move in this direction. Irrespective of partisan conflicts, 
the National Council unanimously adopted the Federal Act on Corpo-
rate Staff Provision in 2002. The main idea of this bill was to adapt the 
traditional severance pay scheme to modern worklife circumstances and 
to convert severance pay into supplementary private pensions (‘Abferti-
gung neu’) that, in the long run, should serve as a sort of second pillar. A 
similar conversion of severance pay into occupational pensions took place 
in Italy (cf. Jessoula and Alti, this volume). Employers pay 1.53 percent 
of the monthly salary to special funds in charge of program administra-
tion. All private sector employees (including apprentices and employees 
with marginal jobs) are covered under this program from the first working 
day onwards. The benefit is due after the termination of the employment 
contract. Individuals either can draw a lump-sum payment equivalent to 
the accumulated capital or claim a pension. The latter option, however, is 
more appealing since no taxes are levied.
The third pillar of the future pension system will consist of subsidized 
individual savings (Prämiengeförderte Zukunftsvorsorge). This pillar is 
based on public subsidies paid to private forms of saving such as life insur-
ance. Contracts must have a policy period of at least 10 years and cannot 
be signed by a person aged 62 and over. In a manner similar to the pen-
sions derived from the second pillar, the accumulated capital is tax free 
unless the capital is claimed before the 10-year period. The take-up of this 
program is high. In 2007, already more than 1 million contracts (equiva-
lent to about 30 percent of the economically active population) have been 
closed. The succeeding SPÖ/ÖVP government , which came to office in 
2007, made no major efforts to undo the overhaul of the pension system.
Unemployment Insurance
The changes implemented in the realm of unemployment insurance were 
also far-reaching as the ÖVP/FPÖ government has further intensified re-
trenchment of cash benefits and increasingly relied on the activation of 
the unemployed. These changes in labor market policy have been increas-
ingly shaped by European employment policies. The goals spelled out in 
the Lisbon agenda, such as activation, employability and a higher labor 
market participation of women and older persons, have certainly influ-
enced the recent reform trajectory , with the OMC serving as major trans-
mission mechanism. In its government program, the coalition repeatedly 
heralded measures to eliminate fraud and to combat the misuse of unem-
ployment benefits (see Government Program 2000: 19, 33, 24). Closely 
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connected to this approach was the announcement of the intention to 
improve the targeting of social benefits: ‘Targeting of benefits is low and 
has to be subject to a permanent audit’ (ibid.: 17, 23). Already in 2000, the 
previous settlement in unemployment insurance was modified in several 
respects: the surcharge for families was reduced by more than one third, 
the replacement rate was lowered once more, the qualifying period was 
extended and sanctions were tightened. The government also increased 
the pressure on the unemployed to accept a job. Regulations concerning 
suitable job offers and a reasonable time span to commute to and from 
work were tightened. The so-called job protection clause (Berufsschutz), 
a provision preventing individuals being required to accept a job falling 
short of his or her skills, was limited to 100 days and supplemented by a 
system aiming to preserve previous salary levels (Entgeltschutz). In addi-
tion, unemployed individuals have to provide evidence of active engage-
ment in job search. At the end of its office term, however, the government , 
in part, shied away from retrenchment in this area, as a supplementary 
allowance was established to top up the unemployment benefit for low-
income groups.
Since the labor market participation of the elderly labor force is tradi-
tionally very low, and given the fact that the ÖVP/FPÖ government has 
radically curtailed early retirement , the government has enacted some 
measures to enhance the employment opportunities for this group. Th e 
main approach has been to reduce non-wage labor costs for the elderly , 
with females aged 56+ and males aged 58+ henceforth exempt from un-
employment insurance contributions, which are covered by general funds 
devoted to labor market policy . Moreover, the ÖVP/FPÖ government has 
also increased (in nominal terms) expenditure devoted to active labor mar-
ket policies . Special emphasis has been put on education and training mea-
sures to improve the skills of women and to combat youth unemployment .
Given the tighter eligibility to unemployment benefits and a stronger 
reliance on activation policies, the government increased efforts to create 
employment opportunities for the unskilled labor force in order to keep 
the number of unemployed down. With its Job Promotion Act passed in 
2005, the government has made an attempt to create new jobs in the low-
wage sector. The coalition has introduced a so-called service check to 
create (legal) jobs in private households and to provide minimum social 
security for the home help. The service check can be bought at the tobac-
conist or post office. The remuneration must not exceed the maximum of 
456 euros per month. So far, however, the take-up rate was low. Finally, 
the government has paved the way for in-work benefits, albeit on an ex-
 WELFARE REFORMS IN AUSTRIA SINCE THE 1970S
perimental basis only. The program adopted consists of wage subsidies 
(Kombi-Lohn) paid to younger and elderly long-term unemployed who 
may receive half of their previous unemployment assistance as a subsidy 
in a new job up to a maximum of 1,000 euros per month.
By and large, but with some notable exceptions, this policy course was 
continued by the Grand Coalition between 2007 and 2008. In strong con-
trast to the center-right coalition, however, the social partners were in-
volved in the decision-making process (Tálos 2008; Obinger 2009). Un-
employment insurance was revised in two important ways. Employees 
with earnings up to 1,100 euros per month were exempted from unem-
ployment contribution payments (the resulting revenue shortage is cov-
ered by the federal budget). Quasi-freelancers (freie Dienstnehmer) were 
incorporated into unemployment insurance, whereas some categories of 
self-employed were included on a voluntary basis. Moreover, the peak 
associations of the social partners agreed to establish a (gross) minimum 
wage of 1,000 euros per month for full-time employees.
Health Care 
Cost containment was once again the major impetus for the reforms that 
have taken place in the health care system. Out-of-pocket payments in 
case of hospitalization and prescription charges were raised and the ÖVP/
FPÖ government replaced the sickness insurance certificate by an e-card 
for which patients have to pay a so-called service fee of 10 euros per year. 
As a result of ever-increasing co-payments, the share of private health 
expenditure as percentage of total health expenditure has increased con-
tinuously and is now one of the highest in Europe.
The ÖVP/FPÖ coalition also intended to harmonize the contribution 
rates of blue- and white-collar workers . To achieve the latter goal, how-
ever, the contribution rate for white-collar workers was raised. Moreover, 
and in accordance with policies previously realized by the Grand Coali-
tion, the contribution rate for old-age pensioners was raised. Finally, a 
new surcharge on health insurance was imposed for all insured to cope 
with the rising costs resulting from non-occupational injuries.
Some funding measures imposed by the ÖVP/FPÖ government led to a 
slight path departure in health insurance. Free co-insurance for childless 
couples was abolished and the government deviated from the traditional 
principle that health insurance contributions are paid in equal parts by 
employers and employees. In an effort to reduce non-wage labor costs , 
the contribution rate for employers related to health insurance of blue-
collar workers was reduced.
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Hospital funding was again a major site of reform activities. A new 
state treaty adopted in 2004 set the basis for the Health Care Reform Act 
of 2005 (Hofmarcher 2006). At its center stood an organizational reform 
(involving the establishment of a Health Care Agency plus a Health Care 
Commission at the federal level and the establishment of nine Health 
Care Boards plus nine Health Care Platforms at the Länder level), the 
extension of performance-oriented remuneration to the outpatient sec-
tor (at least in the long run), the integration of all health sectors into an 
integrated system of medical planning, efforts to reallocate the supply of 
medical services from the hospitals to the outpatient sector, quality man-
agement and an electronic modernization of the health system. Moreover, 
the federal and the Länder governments agreed upon cost-containment 
measures and revenue increases (e.g. higher taxes on tobacco) equiva-
lent to 300 million euros in each case. Enhancement of benefits has re-
mained rare throughout this period. For example, the ÖVP/FPÖ coalition 
improved the social security of caregivers (e.g. pension insurance) and 
strengthened efforts support medical prevention in the wake of the 2005 
Health Care Reform Act.
The succeeding Grand Coalition achieved some improvements in 
terms of long-term care . Since households often had illegally employed 
(cheap) nursing staff from Eastern Europe, the Grand Coalition created 
the basis for the legal employment of qualified nursing staff in order to 
ensure round the clock (24 hours) care of severely handicapped persons 
in private households. By contrast, a comprehensive reform of the health 
care system failed. This reform failure contributed to the collapse of the 
Grand Coalition in July 2008.
Family Policy 
The change of government in 2000 was also paralleled by a Conservative 
turnaround in family policy. The most important measure in this respect 
has been the replacement of the parental leave allowance by a univer-
sal child care benefit in 2002. Compared to the insurance-based parental 
leave allowance, entitlement is detached from labor market participation 
and the maximum duration of entitlement has been increased by one year 
to 30 months where only one parent draws the benefit. If both parents 
take care of the children, the maximum duration is three years. The new 
benefit offers a lump sum payment of 436 euros per month and can be 
combined with earnings up to a particular ceiling. Given the lack of child-
care facilities for the under-threes, the child care benefit was designed to 
bridge the gap caused by the lack of formal provision for this age cohort. 
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The government ’s frequent emphasis of freedom of choice for families 
(cf. Morel, 2007) has been more a rhetorical exercise than a reality, as the 
center-Right coalition has not made any major effort to increase the num-
ber of child care facilities.
During its second term of office, however, the government did enact 
some reforms to reconcile work and family life with measures aimed at 
making workplace arrangements more flexible . In 2004, the coalition 
launched a bill that introduced a right to part-time work for parents 
up to the seventh birthday of the child. Yet, the legal right to part-time 
work was restricted to parents with an employment record of three 
years in companies with at least 20 employees. In 2002, a so-called 
family hospice leave was introduced which allows wage earners to quit 
their job up to six months in order to nurse a severely sick or dying 
relative. However, this leave is neither remunerated6 nor are those in 
homosexual partnerships entitled to take hospice leave. Though the op-
position criticized these provisions, the bill was passed unanimously by 
Parliament .
Overall, the center-Right cabinet has further strengthened the clas-
sic male breadwinner model. With the exception of a right to part-time 
work for parents, the measures adopted were mainly based on tradi-
tional population policies encouraging women to leave the labor force. 
It therefore comes as no surprise that the Grand Coalition agreed upon 
an adaptation of the childcare benefit in 2007. In addition to the exist-
ing (maximum) entitlement of 36 months it is now possible to receive a 
higher childcare benefit for a shorter period. For example, the benefit 
amounts to 798 euros per month if the benefit is claimed for 18 months 
only. Moreover, the Länder and the federal government will provide 60 
million euros each to increase the number of childcare facilities until 
2010.
4.4 Bismarck is Dead. Long Live Bismarck 
In retrospect, social policy development since the late 1970s can be sepa-
rated into three phases. What distinguishes these three phases from each 
other is the scope and intensity of the reforms implemented, the under-
lying mode of decision-making and the ways in which socio-economic 
problems were perceived and addressed (Table 4.1).
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Table 4.1 The four phases of social policy development in Austria, 1970-2008
Phase Context Diagnosis and 
solutions
Politics Content of 
economic and 
social policy
Consequences
Before 
retrench-
ment 
1970-86
Social Demo-
crat single 
party govern-
ment and SPÖ/
FPÖ coalition, 
relative eco-
nomic success 
despite oil 
crisis
Social benefi ts 
can help the 
victims of the 
crisis, welfare 
state as auto-
matic stabilizer 
Negotiation-
based
Austro-Key-
nesianism , ex-
pansion of the 
welfare state, 
labor shed-
ding , higher 
social security 
contributions 
Low unem-
ployment but 
mounting 
public debt, 
labor markets 
problems 
were masked 
and shifted to 
the pension 
system 
Towards 
retrench-
ment 
1987-99
Rising public 
debt and 
unemploy-
ment , de 
facto collapse 
of state-run 
industry, EU -
membership 
and EMU for-
mation, Grand 
Coalition
Modernizing 
and adapting 
the welfare 
state to a new 
environment, 
cost contain-
ment to meet 
convergence 
criteria (since 
mid-1990s)
Negotiation-
based with 
declining role 
of corporatism 
in the 1990s
Moderate sup-
ply-side orien-
ted course 
in economic 
policy, benefi t-
contribution 
nexus was 
tightened, 
co-payments 
(health care ), 
long-term care 
allowance, 
benefi t cut-
backs since EU 
accession
Mounting 
public debt, 
far-reaching 
structural 
reform failed 
because of 
confl icts within 
Grand Coali-
tion and social 
partners 
Path-
breaking 
changes
2000-2006
Center-Right 
government 
committed 
to neoliberal 
agenda and 
debt contain-
ment, EMU 
and European 
single market, 
EU eastern 
enlargement
Structural re-
forms to make 
the welfare 
state viable 
in a more 
competitive 
environment: 
containment 
of non-wage 
labor costs , 
better targe-
ting of benefi ts 
needed, dere-
gulation and 
fl exibilization 
Majority rule 
to bypass 
veto power of 
unions , big-
bang strategy 
(‘speed kills’)
Pronounced 
supply-
side oriented 
course, multi-
pillarization 
and harmo-
nization of 
pension, 
activation of 
unemployed, 
neo-Conser-
vative family 
policy 
Pronounced 
supply-side 
orientation, 
dualization 
between in-
siders and 
outsiders , 
recommodifi -
cation, higher 
inequality in 
the long run
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Table 4.1 The four phases of social policy development in Austria, 1970-2008
Phase Context Diagnosis and 
solutions
Politics Content of 
economic and 
social policy
Consequences
2007-08 Grand Coali-
tion, economic 
boom but high 
infl ation
Increased 
eff orts to 
compensate 
the losers of 
previous social 
policy reform, 
compensa-
tion for price 
infl ation
Negotiation-
based
Some measu-
res to cope 
with poverty 
and new social 
risks (e.g. mi-
nimum wage), 
continuation 
of supply-side 
oriented 
economic and 
labor market 
policy (‘fl exicu-
rity ’)
Funding of 
health care sy-
stem unsolved 
due to failure 
of health care 
reform
While the 1970s were characterized by an expansion of social benefits 
under a Left single-party government , welfare state expansion came to 
an end with the short-lived SPÖ/FPÖ government (1983-1986), which si-
multaneously marked the crossover to the second phase in which welfare 
state retrenchment began to exert a real influence in Austria.
This second period was shaped by a renewed Grand Coalition and last-
ed from 1987 until 1999. Framed by mounting economic problems, deep 
changes in the international political economy (Scharpf 2000) and EU -
accession in 1995, the Grand Coalition bid farewell to Austro-Keynesian-
ism and adopted a moderate supply-side-oriented course in economic 
policy. Nevertheless, the incumbency of the SPÖ/ÖVP government can 
be divided into two sub-periods with EU accession as the major water-
shed. Until the mid-1990s, mostly balanced reforms were legislated. Ex-
pansion measures such as the introduction of long-term care allowance 
and enhanced family cash benefits even outweighed benefit cuts, albeit 
at the expense of soaring public debt. The imperative of budget stabiliza-
tion in the shadow of the Maastricht Treaty led to progressively larger 
benefit cuts in the second half of the 1990s. Despite their restrictive im-
pact on beneficiaries, the reforms enacted in this sub-period were highly 
path-dependent and can be classified as first and second order changes 
(Hall 1993). This outcome was also a result of corporatism . Though the 
Austrian Sozialpartnerschaft showed symptoms of decline during the 
second period, corporatism nevertheless remained basically intact in the 
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1990s and the trade unions remained strong enough to block more radical 
reforms.
The advent of the third period coincides with the take-over of govern-
ment by a center-Right coalition in 2000. In an effort to realize a para-
digm shift in economic policy towards a pronounced supply-side strat-
egy, social policy was subordinated to labor market flexibility , structural 
competitiveness, and debt containment. In order to achieve these goals, 
however, the government had to change the politics of welfare reform. 
Hence the negotiation-based adjustment path characterizing previous 
periods was abandoned. Instead, the ÖVP/FPÖ coalition increasingly 
relied on majority decisions and deviated from corporatist policy-mak-
ing in order to bypass the informal veto power held by the trade unions 
under this setting. Based on a big-bang strategy (Starke 2007) with the 
slogan ‘speed kills’ as basic leitmotif of policy change, the ÖVP/FPÖ gov-
ernment quickly launched a series of far-reaching reforms that for the 
first time included third order changes in particular sectors of the wel-
fare state.
The ‘reform sequence hypothesis’ (Palier 2006) emphasized in this 
volume is corroborated by the social policy reforms enacted by the 
Grand Coalition that governed between 2007 and 2008 (Obinger 2009). 
Even though it is impossible to speak of a new phase in social policy, 
given the cabinet’s short term in office, this period witnessed (with some 
exceptions) the end of retrenchment and the return of corporatism in 
particular welfare state areas. Policy change was motivated by attempts 
to cushion the consequences of some reforms adopted by the preceding 
center-Right government . Further stimulated by socio-economic prob-
lems such as inflation and demographics, the measures adopted mainly 
focused on long-term care and poverty alleviation. However, some of 
the proposed measures, such as the harmonization of the territorially 
fragmented social assistance benefits offered by the Länder, could not 
be realized as a consequence of the breakdown of the coalition. The sup-
ply-side oriented policy course in economic and labor market policy re-
mained unchanged, however.
If we compare the contemporary welfare system with the welfare 
settlement in the early 1980s (Tables 4.2 to 4.5), we can see that so-
cial policy development over the past three decades is characterized by 
Janus-faced reforms which have strengthened some aspects of the Bis-
marckian legacy enshrined in the Austrian welfare state, but have also 
weakened others.
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Table 4.2 Institutional changes in old-age income security (changes in italics)
ca. 1980 2008
Eligibility Employment, invalidity and co-insu-
rance of spouses (females only) and 
children; statutory retirement age: 65 
(men ) and 60 (women ) 
Employment, invalidity , child raising, 
co-insurance of spouses (gender neu-
tral) and children,
stepwise harmonization of retirement 
age until 2033 (65 years)
Benefi t 
structure
Predominance of public pensions, 
status preservation, strong occupa-
tional fragmentation (benefi ts and 
contributions)
Multi-pillarization of pension system:
First tier: tighter contribution-benefi t 
nexus, pension harmonization (federal 
civil servants ), cutbacks of survivors’ 
benefi ts, rollback of early retirement 
Second tier: Conversion of severance 
payment into occupational pensions
Third tier: publicly subsidized individual 
saving plans
Financing Contributions, taxes First tier: (higher) contribution rates, 
taxes 
Second tier: contributions
Third tier: tax breaks
Manage-
ment
Employers, employees, state supervi-
sion
Employers, employees, state super-
vision (fi rst tier), employee income 
provision funds (second tier), private 
companies/insurances (third tier)
Table 4.3 Institutional changes in health care policy (changes in italics)
  ca. 1980 2008
Eligibility Employment, co-insurance of spouses 
and children, almost universal co-
verage
Employment, co-insurance of spouses 
and children (but not for childless cou-
ples), de facto universal coverage 
Benefi t 
structure
In-kind benefi ts and (occupationally 
fragmented) cash benefi ts.
In-kind benefi ts and cash benefi ts 
(diff erences between professions were 
almost leveled out), Long-term care 
allowance
Financing Contributions, taxes (hospitals), co-
payments for particular professions 
only (civil servants , farmers)
Higher contribution rates, taxes (hos-
pitals, long-term care ), higher co-pay-
ments and deductibles for all insured
Manage-
ment
Employers, employees, federal govern-
ment and Länder governments
Employers, employees, federal govern-
ment and Länder governments, public 
control over the health care system was 
strengthened over time
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Table 4.4 Institutional changes in unemployment insurance (changes in italics)
ca. 1980 2008
Eligibility Mandatory insurance for employees, 
unemployment assistance for citizens 
only
Mandatory insurance; tightened eligibi-
lity criteria, inclusion of quasi-freelancers 
(mandatory) and self-employed (on a 
voluntary basis) unemployment as-
sistance: incorporation of foreigners 
Benefi t 
structure
Unemployment compensation: re-
placement rate based on wages scales;
means-tested unemployment as-
sistance
Unemployment compensation: 
uniform but lower net replacement rate, 
activation (tighter regulations in terms of 
suitable work, stricter sanctions ), eff orts 
to create a low wage sector (e.g. subsidi-
zed employment, service check);
means-tested unemployment as-
sistance, minimum wage
Financing Contributions  (Higher) contribution rates and taxes 
(low-income groups and older unem-
ployed are exempted from contribution 
payments)
Manage-
ment
Ministry of Social Aff airs Decentralization, tripartite manage-
ment (AMS), private job placement 
fi rms
Table 4.5 Institutional changes in family policy (changes in italics)
ca.1980 2008
Eligibility Universal coverage (family allowance)
employment: parental leave allowance 
(females only), employment (tax breaks)
Further universalization of benefi ts (child-
care benefi t), incentives for both parents 
to share family work (via enhanced benefi t 
duration)
Employment (tax breaks)
Benefi t 
structure
Generous cash benefi ts, shortcomings 
with regard to social services (especially 
for the under-3s)
(Higher) family allowances, expansion of 
family-related tax breaks, childcare benefi t 
(lump sum), increase in the number of 
childcare facilities but still low coverage 
(under-3s). 
Financing Employer’s contributions, taxes , user 
fees (childcare facilities)
Employer’s contributions, taxes , user fees 
(childcare facilities) 
Manage-
ment
Federal government : cash benefi ts
Länder and municipalities: social 
services 
Federal government : cash benefi ts
Länder and municipalities: social 
services 
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A first example of a path departure refers to the occupational fragmenta-
tion of the social welfare system which has to considerable extent been 
diminished. The prime example is the introduction of a unified pension 
system in 2005 which now includes (federal) civil servants . A similar de-
velopment took place in health insurance , where differences between the 
blue- and white-collar workers in terms of cash benefits and contribution 
rates have been to a large extent removed. Other health care related re-
forms such as the introduction of long-term care allowance can be seen 
as more ambiguously related to the question of whether or not the Bis-
marckian legacy was reinforced. On the one hand, this benefit is univer-
sal and financed from the general budget, seemingly indicative of a clear 
departure from the traditional welfare state set-up. On the other hand, 
this program reinforces the role of the family in social provision, since its 
main objective is to compensate for (additional) care-related costs and to 
remunerate the efforts of caregivers, i.e. women .
The shift towards a multi-pillar pension system unambiguously marks 
a further path departure from the traditional way of doing things. This 
policy shift towards a multi-pillar system can best be described as layer-
ing (Streeck and Thelen 2005b). Two aspects are of particular relevance. 
One is a shift in the public private mix towards private and therefore less 
redistributive forms of benefit provision (Castles and Obinger 2007); the 
other results from the de facto departure from the idea that public pen-
sions should secure previously achieved standards of living. Even though 
the statutory pension system guarantees about 80 percent of the average 
income earned over a 45 years period, a high replacement rate in com-
parative perspective (OECD 2007), it is clear that future pensions can no 
longer guarantee status preservation for people with atypical work ca-
reers. Pensions, for example, are henceforth calculated on the basis of 
an individual’s lifetime contribution record, whereas benefit calculation 
in the early 1980s was based on the average income during the five years 
before retirement . The more actuarial calculation of pensions will con-
tribute to a dualization between the insiders (i.e. the full-time employed 
labor force) and the outsiders (i.e. atypical workers and the long-term 
unemployed). Between 2000 and 2006, the number of quasi-freelancers 
and persons holding a marginal job increased by some 20 percent. In ad-
dition, the ratio of part-time workers went up from 14.7 percent in 1997 to 
21.1 percent in 2006. The segmentation between the core labor force and 
the outsiders will increase in the future because the latter are neither in a 
position to accumulate major private savings nor to benefit from gener-
ous occupational pensions.
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Recommodification by strengthening the principle of equivalence is 
also a major trend in labor market policy . In a manner similar to many 
other Western countries, and not least because of European Union stim-
uli, activation and active labor market policies have been strengthened, 
whereas passive benefits have been subject to cutbacks.
Regardless of these examples, there is also evidence that the Bismarck-
ian roots of the Austrian welfare state have in other respects been pre-
served or even reinforced (Unger and Heitzmann 2003). Family policy is 
still very much attuned to the assumptions of the classic male breadwin-
ner model even if the contemporary social regulations are much more 
gender neutral due to societal modernization and Constitutional Court 
rulings (e.g. uniform retirement age, widower’s pension). Despite an in-
crease in the number of childcare facilities, family policy is more than 
ever based on a combination of long spells of leave periods with very gen-
erous cash benefits.
Health insurance is, by and large, a further example of path depen-
dence . Unlike Germany , there is neither the possibility for the better-off 
to take out private insurance nor any competition between different sick-
ness funds. The insured are free to choose physicians, but cannot select 
their insurance carrier. The strong occupational fragmentation in terms 
of cash benefits has been removed over time, however.
Th e Bismarckian legacy has also been preserved in terms of welfare state 
ﬁ nancing. Th e three phases of social policy development distinguished in 
this paper are also mirrored in welfare state ﬁ nancing. As outlined above, 
government responded to the mounting economic and labor market prob-
lems by raising social security contributions until the mid-1990s. As a re-
sult, both the share of social security contributions as a percentage of total 
tax revenues and the contribution/GDP ratio reached an all-time high in 
1995. Against the backdrop of the supply-side oriented turn in economic 
policy and EU accession, the stabilization of non-wage labor costs gained 
growing importance in the political debate. Since the mid-1990s, the rela-
tive weight of social security contributions in the tax structure has de-
clined. Despite notable changes in the very recent past (e.g. the exemption 
of low-income groups and older employees from unemployment insurance 
contributions), social security contributions continue to represent by far 
the most important pillar in welfare state ﬁ nancing.
The strengthening of the equivalence principle makes clear that the 
losers of past welfare state reforms are employees whose employment re-
cord deviates from the standard employment relationship . These groups 
consist mainly of women , immigrants and low-skilled workers . As a con-
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sequence of the dualization between insiders (the full-time employed la-
bor force) and the new social risk groups, a higher share of the population 
will be doomed to rely on means-tested benefits. For example, the num-
ber of recipients of social assistance benefits increased by 105 percent 
between 1996 and 2008 (Pratscher 2008: 598). However, this dualization 
is less pronounced compared with other Continental countries since Aus-
tria’s economic performance was and still is better than in many other 
Bismarckian welfare states.
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5 Continental Welfare at a Crossroads:
 The Choice between Activation and Minimum Income 
Protection in Belgium and the Netherlands 
Anton Hemerijck and Ive Marx
5.1 Introduction
Belgium and the Netherlands represent excellent prima facie cases for 
a comparative study of social policy reform and redirection in Conti-
nental welfare systems and this is for several reasons (Hemerijck, Unger 
and Visser 2000). First, Belgium and the Netherlands are small, open 
economies that share a tradition of social partnership in the areas of 
wage bargaining and social insurance administration. Employers and 
workers are well organized, especially among large and medium-sized 
firms, and collective bargaining occurs predominantly at the sectoral 
level. At the same time, however, the two countries are distinct in 
terms of the institutional frameworks of the political system within 
which their welfare states and industrial-relations systems are em-
bedded, suggesting possible explanatory variables for divergent poli-
cy outcomes. Compared to the Netherlands, Belgian federalism and 
linguistic regionalism have decisively constrained the scope of gov-
ernment intervention not only in wage bargaining but also in a host 
of other social and economic policy areas. Also social partnership is 
more fragmented, making it difficult to establish and enact broad cor-
poratist social pacts. As a result, the mechanisms through which Bel-
gian governments have pushed for social policy reform have tended to 
be more informal and subtle than in the Netherlands, although recent 
Belgian governments have been far from passive observers of social 
and economic change. During the past fifteen years, the Dutch and 
Belgian governments have been instrumental in promoting social re-
form and compensating for the policy failures of Continental policy 
legacies and corporatist institutions, as we shall see below. The nation-
ally distinct trajectories of reform provide clear support for the central 
 CONTINENTAL WELFARE AT A CROSSROADS: BELGIUM AND THE NETHERLANDS
argument of our contribution to this volume. They demonstrate that 
Continental welfare systems are dynamic and evolving entities, rather 
than fixed institutions with a unique policy legacy producing stable 
and predictable path-dependent, regime-specific policy reform trajec-
tories, even in a period of fiscal austerity, economic internationaliza-
tion, slowed economic growth, demographic aging, and revolutionary 
family change.
In our chapter, we compare sequences of reforms in core areas of the 
Dutch and Belgian welfare systems, focusing on wage policy, social se-
curity ‘active’ and ‘passive ’ labor market policy and pensions. We are un-
able to cover health insurance because of the limits with respect to the 
chapter length of our two country comparison. By exploring these key, 
functionally interdependent, policy areas, we hope to shed light on how 
national social policy legacies and political institutional particularities 
shape both the options available to state and non-state policy actors to 
reconfigure Continental welfare arrangements. In sections 5.2 and 5.3 
respectively we present a detailed analysis of recent reforms in the Neth-
erlands and Belgium, focusing upon the contingent dynamics and multi-
farious character of reform initiatives. We thus compare two trajectories 
of how difficult it was and still is to make a U-turn from the cul-de-sac 
of ‘welfare without work ’ (Esping-Andersen 1996a) towards a more ac-
tivating welfare state without suspending minimum income protection 
in Belgium and the Netherlands, from both the angle of the policy sub-
stance of the Bismarckian heritage and the angle of institutional capaci-
ties, beginning with the Dutch experience.
Whereas the Netherlands (Section 5.2) is often singled out by many 
as a successful example of a Continental welfare state in enacting the 
transition of a passive to an activating welfare state, Belgium (Section 
5.3) appears to be the archetypal frozen Continental welfare state which 
seems to have trapped itself in a vicious circle of higher social spending, 
higher taxation , labor shedding , increasing public debt and deficits. This, 
as we will reveal below, is a misunderstanding. Also, the Belgians have 
experienced profound change over the past decades. Most strikingly, and 
in contrast to the Dutch success at ‘activation’, is that the Belgian social 
insurance state has been transformed from a traditional Bismarckian sys-
tem into one with a overriding emphasis on minimum income protection 
and universal coverage. Moreover, in terms of its temporal dynamic, the 
self-transformation of the Belgian social insurance system, due to the 
particular institutional make-up of the Belgian polity, proceeded gradu-
ally, cumulatively and effectively by stealth, whereas the Dutch turn to-
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wards activation, has been far more ‘disjointed’ and ‘punctuated’ by more 
radical policy responses to successive recessions in the 1970s and 1980s 
and the impending disability pension crisis in the Netherlands in the 
1990s. We end with assessing each country’s reform experiences (Section 
5.4) and the lessons that they offer about the dynamics of welfare reform 
in Continental welfare states (Section 5.5)
5.2 The Dutch Miracle Revisited
Until the early 2000s slowdown in the world economy, the Dutch econ-
omy had prospered almost uninterruptedly for two decades. With un-
precedented job creation, sustained economic growth and low inflation 
concurred without sharp increases in wage dispersion and incomes, the 
‘Dutch model’ became a catchphrase for progressive European politicians 
pondering the possibilities of a new model of ‘third way’ capitalism with 
a human face (Visser and Hemerijck 1997; Hartog 1999). But behind the 
façade of the effective ‘competitive corporatism ’ lies a far more difficult 
and not nearly as successful attempt by Dutch policy-makers in bringing 
down the overall volume of social security claimants through structural 
social security reform in the 1990s.
In Dutch politics, coalition governments and corporatism delineate 
the institutional capacities of social and economic policy-making. The 
Dutch political economy is furnished with a firmly established apparatus 
of bi- and tripartite boards for nationwide social and economic policy-
making, like the bipartite Foundation of Labor (STAR, Stichting van de 
Arbeid), the central meeting place of the social partners , and the tripar-
tite Social-Economic Council (Sociaal-Economische Raad, SER), one of 
the most prestigious advisory councils of Dutch government in the area 
of social and economic policy-making. As the key financiers to the sys-
tem (through premiums and contributions), the social partners have until 
the mid-1990s also been strongly involved in the management, admin-
istration, and implementation of social security provisions (Visser and 
Hemerijck 1997).
It is important at the outset to emphasize that the social security sys-
tem of the Netherlands has a mixed Beveridgean cum Bismarckian design 
structure (Hemerijck 2003). The Bismarckian component is made up of 
occupational social insurance provisions, providing earnings-related ben-
efits to workers and employees, financed through earmarked employers ’ 
and employees’ contributions, insuring employees against sickness (ZW 
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– Sickness Benefits Act), disability (WAO – Disability Benefits Act) and 
unemployment (WW – Unemployment Insurance Act), set originally at 
80 percent of last earned wages. The Beveridgean component pertains 
to universal people’s insurance, which consists of a number of general 
tax-funded schemes, geared towards supporting non-working citizens, 
providing benefits at a uniform subsistence level for all residents. In the 
late 1950s, the General Old-age pension Act (AOW), providing univer-
sal benefits for persons over 65, was implemented. In the mid-1960s, the 
Public Assistance Act (ABW) replaced the former poor law (from 1854) 
and improved the general safety net for residents with insufficient means. 
Local authorities (the municipalities) administer social assistance . Over 
the course of the post-war period, the mixed Dutch pension system has 
come to deviate significantly from most other Continental European pen-
sion systems because of its evolving ‘three-pillar’ architecture. The first 
pillar comprises the Beveridgean basic public pension. This is a PAYG-fi-
nanced lump sum benefit for all individuals, linked to the minimum wage. 
The second pillar includes obligatory occupational pension schemes, or-
ganized by employers and employees at the company or at the industry 
level. These schemes are funded and largely defined benefit. The third 
pillar features strictly individual retirement provisions with a favorable 
tax treatment.
Wage Moderation and the Disability Crisis
The depth of the 1981-82 recession in the wake of the oil crises of the 
1970s catalyzed path-breaking social policy change, beginning with a 
government -led suspension of wage indexation, a squeezing of the 
minimum wage and a lowering of social benefits. The elections in 1982 
brought to power an austerity coalition of the CDA (the Christen De-
mocratisch Appel) and the Liberal VVD (the Volkspartij voor Vrijheid 
en Democratie), led by the Christian Democrat Ruud Lubbers . Surpris-
ingly, after a decade of failed tripartite encounters based on Keynesian 
premises, the Dutch social partners crowned the new austerity coali-
tion’s entry into office with a bipartite social pact on 24 November 1982, 
known as the ‘Wassenaar Agreement’, named after the suburb of The 
Hague where the agreement was prepared. The agreement ushered in a 
period of vibrant corporatism and negotiated social reform in the 1980s 
and early 1990s (Visser and Hemerijck 1997). The unions accepted pro-
tracted real wage restraint in exchange for a so-called ‘cost-neutral’ re-
duction of working hours and job sharing. This new Dutch corporatism 
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of the 1980s proved fairly robust, although it was certainly not free of 
conflict.
Although the social partners repaired the wage-setting system and 
introduced some flexibility into the labor market, they nevertheless ex-
ternalized the costs of economic adjustment onto the social security sys-
tem. This eventually resulted in uncontrolled growth in the volume of 
social security claimants. In response, the second Lubbers coalition of 
Christian Democrats and Conservative Liberals, in office between 1986 
and 1989, enacted a package of cost-containment measures, including a 
reduction of the replacement rate of social security benefits from 80 to 
70 percent of previous wages. Despite these cuts, the number of people 
receiving disability benefits continued to rise. As the number of dis-
ability claimants neared the politically sensitive figure of one million in 
1989, out of an adult population of seven million, prime minister Lubbers 
publicly dramatized the issue by proclaiming that the country was ‘sick’ 
and required ‘tough medication’. The Prime Minister recognized that he 
needed the Social Democrats (the PvdA), led by ex-union leader and 
Wassenaar negotiator Wim Kok , in the government to share responsibil-
ity for the unfinished business of welfare reform. The PvdA re-entered 
the government in 1989 as a partner in Lubbers ’ third cabinet. The new 
government shifted from a ‘price’ to a ‘volume’ policy, aimed to reduce 
the number of benefit recipients. After a great deal of agonizing, the 
government decided to restrict disability programs (WAO) and close 
off other routes to a labor market exit. The legal requirement that par-
tially disabled WAO benefit recipients accept alternative employment 
was strengthened and eligibility criteria for the WAO scheme were tight-
ened, including a reduction of replacement rates for workers under the 
age of 50. This episode had far-reaching political consequences, leading 
the unions to organize their largest post-war protest, with nearly one 
million participants, in The Hague, generating a profound crisis within 
the PvdA, nearly leading to Kok ’s resignation as party leader in the fall 
of 1991.
Hard won social security reform slowly but surely concurred with a 
shift in the problem definition of the alleged crisis of the Dutch welfare 
system. In the early 1990s policy-makers came to realize that the low 
level of labor market participation was the Achilles heel of the extensive 
but passive welfare system of the Netherlands. In 1990, the Netherlands’ 
Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR), an academic advisory 
board with a mandate to carry out future studies in areas it sees fit, pro-
posed to break with the past and advocated a policy maximizing the rate 
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of labor market participation as the single most important policy goal of 
any sustainable welfare state (WRR 1990).
In 1992, the Public Audit Office (Algemene Rekenkamer) published a 
report, suggested that the sluggish pace of social insurance reform in 
the Netherlands was in no small part due to the social partners ’ admin-
istrative authorities within the social security system. In response, Par-
liament decided to use its biggest weapon, an all-party parliamentary 
inquiry, involving testimony gathered by numerous legal authorities. 
In September 1993, the Buurmeijer report revealed that social security 
was being ‘misused’ by the social partners for the purpose of industrial 
restructuring and advocated a fundamental recasting of bipartite gov-
ernance in Dutch social security administration. What is fundamental 
in the diagnosis of the Buurmeijer Parliamentary Inquiry is that the dis-
ability crisis was conceived of as primarily an institutional problem of 
failing social security administration by the social partners (Veen and 
Trommel 1999).
The 1994 elections took place in the shadow of popular discontent 
over welfare reform, and the Lubbers -Kok coalition was voted out of 
power. Despite being stripped of 12 of its 49 seats, the PvdA became the 
largest party. The progressive Liberals (the Democrats 66) persuaded the 
PvdA and the Conservative-Liberal VVD to form a coalition, resulting in 
the first government since 1917 without a confessional party. This new, 
so-called ‘Purple’ coalition placed ‘jobs, jobs, jobs’ at the center of its 
social- and economic-policy agenda. The PvdA, however, stipulated a 
non-negotiable condition for its cooperation, namely, that the level and 
duration of social benefits remain untouched. In substantive terms, the 
restructuring of the Dutch social security system by two successive ‘Pur-
ple’ governments under Wim Kok (1994-2002) entailed a partial priva-
tization of social risks, placing a heavier financial burden for covering 
sickness and disability risks on employers , so as to create incentives for 
them to limit sickness- and disability -related absences (Hemerijck 2003). 
With respect to Beveridgean tier of Dutch social security, in 1996, the 
new National Assistance Act (nABW) was individualized. Single persons 
were to receive 50 percent of the minimum wage; single parent house-
holds were granted 70 percent of the minimum wage; married and co-
habiting couples get 100 percent of the minimum wage. Participation in 
activation programs became obligatory for all recipients. Exemption was 
only granted to parents with children under the age of five.
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Towards a More Robust Pension System and Activation
In May 1998, the Kok administration was re-elected, rewarded by the vot-
ers for its excellent employment record and tough stance on social secu-
rity reform. The economy grew by 2.9 percent per year in the 1990s, and 
the rate of unemployment fell to 3 percent, the lowest in the EU after Lux-
embourg . With 1.4 million new jobs, labor-force participation rose from 
59 percent to 67 percent of the adult population. In 2000, a budget surplus 
of 0.3 percent of GDP was achieved, and the public debt was reduced from 
80 percent of GDP in 1994 to 54 percent in 2001.
The Purple coalition also committed itself to preserve the basic pub-
lic pension (AOW) (van Riel, Hemerijck and Visser 2003). Expected 
increases in the public financing burden resulting from demographic 
aging were to be dealt with by a number of measures, including efforts 
to increase labor-force participation (especially by limiting early-retire-
ment schemes), lowering interest payments through public-debt reduc-
tion, the establishment of a public pension-savings fund; and broaden-
ing the financing of the AOW. The latter goal would be achieved by 
fixing pension premiums at their 1997 level of 18.25 percent. Anxious 
to defend their authority over supplementary pensions, the social part-
ners within the bipartite Foundation of Labor strongly opposed a forced 
change in the basis of benefit calculation from final salaries to average 
wages. They did agree, however, to increase coverage of supplementary 
pensions and modernize benefit rules in order to increase flexibility and 
individual choice. This agreement in turn led to a ‘covenant’ between the 
social partners and government at the end of 1997, which, like the 1982 
wage accord, was concluded under a strong ‘shadow of hierarchy.’ The 
‘covenant’ was a compromise in which the government promised not 
to reduce the tax deductibility of pension premiums, while the social 
partners agreed to modernize pension schemes by incrementally shift-
ing the calculation of defined benefits from last-earned wages to average 
earning.
Like most Continental welfare states, the Dutch welfare state did 
not deploy active labor market policies until the early 1990s. After long 
preparation, in 1991, a tripartite employment service was created. As the 
tripartite demonopolization of placement failed to live up to political 
expectations, the ambitious Social Democratic minister of Social Affairs 
and Employment, Ad Melkert introduced special ‘activation’ programs, 
so-called ‘Melkert jobs,’ for low-skilled workers , women , younger work-
ers , foreign nationals , and the long-term unemployed. Other efforts 
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included: the introduction in 1997 of cuts in employers ’ social security 
contributions – or payroll subsidies – for the long-term unemployed and 
low pay workers . With the introduction of the Jobseekers Employment 
Act (WIW) in 1998, each new unemployment benefit claimant has to 
undergo an assessment interview, which is officially the responsibility of 
the municipalities. In this interview, a person’s chances for employment 
or further education are assessed, after which an individual route to ei-
ther work or social activation is sought. Participation is obligatory for the 
unemployed and a refusal can result in the withdrawal of benefits (Spies 
and Berkel 2000).
Since the mid-1990s, labor market flexibility has become an integral 
part of the new Dutch labor market policy mix. With an estimated 2.5 
percent share of total volume of employment, in the EU second only 
to the UK, temporary agency work is a relatively widespread phenom-
enon in the Netherlands. In 1995 unions and employers signed the 
first collective agreement for temporary workers , which introduced a 
right of continued employment and pension insurance after four con-
secutive contracts or 24 months of employment. This novel collective 
agreement for temporary work prepared the ground for the 1996 agree-
ment on ‘Flexibility and Security’ which in turn paved the way for a 
new Working Hours (Adjustment) Act in 2000, which gave part-time 
workers an explicit right to equal treatment in all areas negotiated by 
the social partners , including wages, basic social security, training and 
education, subsidized care provision, holiday pay and second tier pen-
sions rights.
Dual earner family policy was finally recognized as of crucial impor-
tance for expanding female employment beyond part-time work . In the 
course of the 1990s, the Netherlands expanded parental leave at a 100 
percent replacement rate from 12 to 16 weeks and introduced an optional 
leave right for up to 24 weeks. With respect to childcare the Netherlands 
remained a laggard in comparison to other Continental welfare states. 
This has improved, but even today many day care centers and schools of-
fer places only on a part-time basis, requiring one or both parents to work 
part-time or flexible hours.
In late 1998, also the basic institutional architecture of the newly inte-
grated organizational structure of Dutch social insurance administration 
was presented, based on the notion that social insurance organizations 
and employment boards should join forces in so-called Centers for Work 
and Income (CWIs). The new ‘Work and Income (Implementation Struc-
ture) Act’, which came into force on 1 January 2002, reduced the role of 
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the social partners in this area and granted more responsibility to the 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment. The Work and Income Board 
(RWI), with representatives from employers , employees and local author-
ities, was set up to help formulate overall policy directions in the areas 
of work and income, but lacked any real executive authority (Hemerijck 
2003).
The Resurgence of the Politics of Austerity
After the stock market’s downward spiral and the terrorist attacks in the 
United States on 11 September 2001, a right-populist, Islamophobic politi-
cian, Pim Fortuyn proved able to mobilize a number of hidden anxieties 
and frustrations with the Purple government . When, nine days before the 
elections, Fortuyn was murdered by a radical environmental activist, the 
elections of 15 May assumed an extremely emotional character, ultimately 
leading to a landslide victory of the List Pim Fortuyn (LPF). In July 2002, 
the VVD agreed to partake in a right-wing coalition with the CDA and 
the LPF, led by the Christian Democrat Jan-Peter Balkenende . In office for 
only 87 days, the government fell as a result of a tussle within the populist 
LPF. After new elections, a reconstructed Balkenende coalition, with D’66 
taking the place of the LPF, was very resolved to enact an austerity reform 
program.
Having spent the previous eight years in opposition, the Christian 
Democrats were especially anxious to mark a clear break with the Purple 
coalition’s active labor market policy heritage by stopping or reducing the 
active employment programs initiated by minister Ad Melkert in the pre-
ceding years. The new government focused more narrowly on removing 
unemployment traps by lowering benefits and raising sanctions for those 
failing to engage in job searching. The duration of unemployment insur-
ance benefits was cut from five years to three years and two months (after 
an employment record of 38 years). With the new Work and Social Assis-
tance Act (2004), municipal authorities have been given more leeway and 
financial responsibility to deliver tailor-made solutions for getting social 
assistance clients back to work. The new Act gives municipalities their 
own budgets, from which they can make savings if they successfully move 
claimants of social assistance into jobs. The criterion of ‘suitable jobs’, 
i.e. a job with similar qualification and pay levels, has also been watered 
down.
As from 2004, employers are liable to pay sick leave for two years in-
stead of one. This extension of the obligation to pay sick leave was a pre-
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cursor to the new Labor Capacity Act, the WIA, which came into effect 
in 2006, to replace the old Disability Insurance Act. The act makes a clear 
distinction between people with a complete or long-term occupational 
disability and people who are still partially capable of doing paid work. 
People who are genuinely no longer capable to work will receive a per-
manent allowance of 75 percent of their last earnings. The new act also 
encourages employers to hire workers with a partial disability with lower 
social security premiums and contributions towards sick leave expenses if 
workers become ill (again).
To discourage workers from stopping work before their 65th birth-
day, Social Affairs minister Aart-Jan de Geus , a former Christian trade 
unionist, firmly committed to no longer providing tax support for collec-
tive early retirement schemes. The new life course policy (levensloopre-
geling), developed by the Christian Democrats during their years in op-
position, would offer workers the opportunity to save funds, supported 
by tax breaks, to finance periods of leave for various purposes, such as 
long-term care , parental leave (with extra fiscal advantages), or educa-
tion. The union vehemently opposed the new life course arrangement. 
In November 2004, after a half year of social unrest, triggered also by 
the confrontational style of the center-Right Balkenende governments, 
minister De Geus signed the Museum Square Pact in 2004, named af-
ter the square where the unions organized their second biggest dem-
onstration against any post-war government . The pact combined wage 
restraint together with a compromise facilitating life course savings for 
early retirement up to three years. The tripartite SER, Social and Eco-
nomic Council, however, failed to reach a consensus with respect to dis-
missal protection and employability, so as to inspire a shift in policy em-
phasis away from job security to work security. The proposal ultimately 
fell through in the face of tough opposition from the trade union and the 
Social Democrats, which returned to office in 2007, joining the Chris-
tian Democrats and a small social Christian party, again under the helm 
of Jan Peter Balkenende .
After a number of years of sluggish growth, the Dutch economy has 
again prospered. It thus seemed that the Balkenende politics of retrench-
ment paid off. In 2006 the average growth rate was 3 percent compared 
to 2.4 percent in the Euro zone. Employment also was growing at a fast-
er pace then elsewhere in the Euro zone. In 2006, just after Denmark 
(3.8 percent), at 3.9 percent the rate unemployment in the Netherlands 
was the lowest in the Euro zone (8.2 percent). For the first time in ten 
years the number of people depending on social security was going down 
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across the board. In addition, labor market participation of older workers 
(55-64 years) had caught up rapidly, from 29 percent in 1994 to 51 percent 
in 2007.
5.3 Belgium’s Reluctant and Erratic Path towards Activation
The roots of the Belgian system go back to voluntary initiatives in the con-
text of mutual societies organized along ideological lines (Deleeck 2001). 
A long phase of incremental , though at times still erratic expansion of 
various, mostly occupationally segregated social security schemes culmi-
nated in the ‘Social Pact’ of 1944. Born in the exceptional atmosphere of 
solidarity and consensualism of the final war days, it marked a consolida-
tion of the welfare system. While extending compulsory social security 
coverage, the pact confirmed the subsidiary principle in that non-govern-
ment organizations (i.e. unions and mutual societies) remained respon-
sible for the administration of benefits.
While firmly Bismarckian in terms of its governance, financing and 
general operating principles, the equivalence principle was never as strong 
in the Belgian system as it was for instance in Germany . Unemployment 
insurance, for example, for a long time provided flat-rate benefits differ-
entiated according to criteria unrelated to previous wages or contribution 
record. It was only at a relatively late stage that the system became truly 
Bismarckian and even then it was confined by a relatively small spread 
between minimum and maximum benefits.
Belgium’s social protection system came to maturity just before the 
economic crisis struck. With the main social security pillars in place, by 
and large in the Bismarckian mold, all that remained was to deploy the 
final safety net as a statutory right ensured by law. This happened through 
three laws enacted in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
It was just after these final pieces had been put in place that Belgium’s 
social protection system was challenged in a most profound way, due to 
a combination of economic, socio-demographic, political and budgetary 
pressures. In response, the Belgian welfare system underwent substan-
tial change, contradicting its apparent corporatist immobilism. But unlike 
in the Netherlands, this change happened in a very gradual and almost 
‘stealthy’ way. Yet it amounted to a fundamental transformation of Bel-
gium’s social welfare system, as we will show below.
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The Crisis Years: The Initial Shift towards Minimum Income Protection
As an early industrializer, Belgium’s economy was particularly hard hit by 
the oil price shocks and the subsequent economic downturn of the 1970s 
and 1980s. As elsewhere throughout the continent, Belgium resorted to an 
expansion of early exit routes in order to drain off excess supply and to al-
leviate the social consequences of structural economic adjustment and mas-
sive job shedding (Esping-Andersen 1996a).
Th e main exit scheme that was implemented around the late 1970s to 
shelter the casualties of industrial decline was an early retirement scheme 
consisting of unemployment insurance beneﬁ ts, supplemented by an addi-
tional beneﬁ t paid out by an industry or sectoral fund. Although instituted 
during the late 1970s, the scheme saw its biggest expansion during the 1980s. 
Th is had a number of beneﬁ cial eﬀ ects at the time (Marx 2007a). It provided 
adequate income protection to those (often sole breadwinners) who lost 
their jobs during a time when re-employment chances were extremely low. 
At the same time, the scheme facilitated industrial restructuring allowing 
Belgium to embark on a high productivity path.
In addition, there was a heavy influx into unemployment insurance. As 
elsewhere this had been instituted to protect against frictional unemploy-
ment in a full employment environment, at least as far as the male bread-
winner was concerned. And as elsewhere, the system was confronted with 
a dramatic change not only in the magnitude but also in the nature of the 
unemployment risk: frictional unemployment increasingly became struc-
tural unemployment . In addition, socio-demographic change affected 
the redistributive efficiency of the system; benefits originally intended to 
protect sole breadwinners and their families against poverty increasingly 
ended up with laid-off second earners.
In response to these multiple dysfunctions, Belgium’s unemployment 
insurance system started to undergo a radical transformation, evolving 
from a social insurance system in the classic Bismarckian mold into a 
minimum income protection system, with the financing and governance 
dimension of the system remaining distinctively ‘Bismarckian ’. That is 
to say, benefit levels became far more of a function of assumed need 
rather than past wages and contributions, but contributions remained 
proportionally tied to wages. This transformation happened gradually 
through piecemeal reforms, but the accumulated effect amounted to a 
fundamental transformation nonetheless, as is documented in greater 
detail in the literature (Andries 1996; De Lathouwer 1997; Clegg 2007; 
Marx 2007a).
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The initial policy response in the wake of the 1970s recession was rela-
tively successful in what it sought to achieve: providing adequate mini-
mum income protection to those who were then still regarded as the ‘vic-
tims’ of the economic crisis (Marx 2007b). The alterations did not only 
help to alleviate poverty among the unemployed, they also served to con-
tain the cost consequences.
What is remarkable and probably rather unique, is that in Belgium the 
Bismarckian insurance and equivalence principles gradually became sub-
ordinate to the need principle, and this essentially for the sake of cost con-
tainment and poverty relief. Trade unions (especially the socialist union) 
did at various points in time demand a restrengthening of the insurance 
function but they never really pushed the issue. There were plenty of oth-
er issues relating to unemployment insurance (the unlimited time dura-
tion of benefits for example) where trade unions were more ferocious in 
having their demands met (Kuipers 2006). In the wider political sphere, 
the decline of the insurance function also remained a non-issue.
It is unclear who actually initiated the shift away from insurance but 
the move appeared to be very much consensual at the level of the so-
cial partners and the governments of the time, which were Christian-
Democrat dominated coalition governments, partnering either with the 
socialist or Liberal parties. But why did the unions go along? Perhaps 
part of the reason is that the unemployed and the early retired were and 
remain as much part of the core constituency of trade unions as workers . 
This is because the majority of trade union members get their unemploy-
ment benefit through their union. In addition, unions provide additional 
services, such as (advice in) dealing with the administration. Such ser-
vices provide a powerful incentive to become and remain a loyal union 
member.
Unions, therefore, have always had a strong incentive to keep benefits, 
above all, widely available rather than to insist on the maintenance of the 
equivalence principle, which after all was less historically entrenched in 
the system than in other Bismarckian systems. At the same time, they had 
to face the reality of an out and out cost explosion of the system after the 
mid-1970s. The scale, severity and suddenness of the labor market crisis 
created inescapable pressures for change. Unions had in effect no choice 
but to accept the almost complete abandonment of the equivalence prin-
ciple. The alternative, however, would have been a virtual bankruptcy of 
the UI system, which would have necessitated government intervention 
(i.e. third party funding) and hence more government involvement in the 
running of the system. Clearly, the social partners – not only the unions 
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– wanted to maintain their autonomy from government in the domain 
of collective bargaining and governance of the social security system. In 
short, the unions had to strike a balance between keeping the system af-
fordable, hence maintaining their autonomy, and keeping a loyal and de-
pendent clientele within the system.
Towards ‘Activation’
The shift towards more adequate minimum income protection started to 
run into systemic limits during the 1980s when the turnaround in mac-
roeconomic policy remained elusive. The strong shift towards more ad-
equate minimum income protection grinded to a halt after the mid-1980s. 
Real benefit levels (i.e. adjusted for inflation) became largely stagnant, 
though some segments like single parents continued to experience some 
improvements (Cantillon et al. 2004). In addition, the late 1980s were an 
era of strong real wage growth, and as a consequence benefits dropped 
rapidly relative to wages and overall living standards.
Adding poignancy at the time was the dire state of Belgium’s public 
finances. By the late 1980s Belgium had the highest public debt rate in 
the industrialized world. In an attempt first to maintain a hard curren-
cy (deemed essential for Belgium as an exporting country and also to 
maintain a good credit rating) and then to qualify for EMU membership, 
expenditure control became a major preoccupation. Also marking this 
turnaround was the introduction, in 1996 under the Dehaene govern-
ment , of the so-called Competitiveness Law. This marked a turning point 
in that this was the first successful government initiative to structurally 
limit the bargaining freedom of the social partners in an ex ante way. Past 
state interventions had only occurred after wage growth had derailed. 
Specifically, the law requires wage rises to remain within the limits of 
wage growth in Belgium’s main competitors: the Netherlands, France 
and Germany .
The late 1990s, then, mark a more radical shift in emphasis. The talk 
all across Europe became of The Third Way, the Activating Welfare State, 
and Belgium followed suit (Vandenbroucke 2001). The political context 
also changed dramatically around that time. The Verhofstadt-headed 1999 
‘Purple’ coalition of Liberals, Socialists and Greens ended four decades of 
almost interrupted Christian Democrat domination.
Much effort was directed at employers in an effort to boost demand for 
unemployed and less skilled workers . This mainly took the form of size-
able reductions in employers ’ social security contributions. To compen-
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sate for lost social security contributions some alternative financing was 
introduced, mainly in the form of earmarked VAT levies.
Efforts at the demand side were matched, to some extent, by measures 
at the supply side. In 2000, a social security contribution reduction for 
low paid employees was introduced which increased net pay and which, 
consequently, made work at or around minimum wage (marginally) more 
attractive. The ‘work bonus’ of 2005 was a further expansion. In addition, 
there was the so-called ‘activation of benefits’. People on unemployment 
benefits were allowed and even stimulated to take up certain activities 
like gardening, house cleaning and other types of personal services – jobs 
deemed to have been priced out of the regular labor market.
Yet the increased emphasis on active labor market policies has not as 
yet gone accompanied with the kind of social security reform needed to 
create a real pay-off. Government eﬀ ort to boost work willingness has re-
lied on ‘carrot’ rather than ‘stick’ type of measures. It has proved rather 
more difficult to introduce more stringency on the benefit side in a more 
purposeful way. Unemployment insurance beneﬁ ts in Belgium remain un-
limited in time as a matter of principle. Only certain categories are liable to 
have their beneﬁ t terminated after an ‘abnormally’ long spell of unemploy-
ment . During the 1990s, there was a wave of beneﬁ t suspensions but average 
beneﬁ t duration in Belgium nevertheless remains much higher than in other 
countries. Most recently, however, there have been new waves of beneﬁ t 
suspensions over reporting irregularities or failure to show up for job coun-
seling or training.
The failure to scale back benefit dependency is nowhere more evi-
dent than if one looks at early retirement . At less than 40 percent, the 
employment rate for older workers is at one of the lowest levels in Europe. 
As already explained, the principal early retirement scheme in Belgium 
was formally instituted as an extension of the unemployment insurance 
system. But as the name implies, the so-called ‘bridge pension’ was con-
ceived from the start as a retirement scheme and not as an unemployment 
scheme. It was also perceived as such. By the time that economic condi-
tions had improved (the 1990s), a powerful coalition had formed around 
the main early retirement scheme. Early retirement remained after all 
a cheap and low-resistance way for companies to make less productive 
workers redundant. And many workers had come to expect to get what 
many of their former co-workers had obtained: the chance to leave the 
labor market early with an attractive financial package.
In 2005, the government tried to build a consensus around the so-called 
Generation Pact. The main objective of this pact was to increase the ef-
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fective age of retirement ; the early retirement age was increased from 
58 to 60. The social partners achieved an agreement of sort but the Pact 
encountered strong resistance from the union base. The Generation Pact 
triggered a lot of posturing by the powerful sectoral organizations, outdo-
ing each other as the ‘true defenders’ of acquired rights (i.e. the right to 
early retirement ) effectively, to the embarrassment of senior trade union 
figures at the central level who (initially) defended the Generation Pact. 
Add to that the lukewarm enthusiasm for a radical scale back among em-
ployers . Despite calls for drastic reform by the representative organiza-
tions, employers remained happy users of the bridge pension as a vehicle 
for facilitating restructurings. As a result of all this, the Generation Pact 
was finally adopted in a watered down version, which went into effect in 
2008.
Pensions
In line with its Bismarckian design, the first pillar system for employ-
ees is funded through social contributions and co-governed by the social 
partners . Pensions are also, in principle, related to past contributions and 
past wages. But as in other sectors of Belgium’s social security system, 
there has been a marked shift from income insurance to minimum in-
come provision. Maximum pension entitlements have become an increas-
ingly smaller fraction of real past earnings for people with above average 
earnings. At the same time, more and more people have come to gain 
entitlements on the basis of activities that are deemed ‘equivalent’ to be-
ing an employee who actually pays for social security contributions or for 
whom such contributions are made by the employer. Spells in unemploy-
ment , for example, count as equivalent. Time spent in career interruption 
schemes do too. It has been calculated that about a third of pension en-
titlements are gained on other grounds than paid work and past contribu-
tions (Peeters and Larmuseau 2005).
At the same time, the withering of the equivalence principle is feed-
ing a creeping privatization . Public pensions, as provided through social 
security, have become so low that average to high earners have come 
to rely on occupational and private schemes to obtain a pension com-
mensurate with their past earnings. Here, a duality has emerged between 
people with access to such schemes and those without. The 2003 ‘Van-
denbroucke’ Law on supplementary pensions aims to contain this divide 
and to generalize access to such provisions but it remains to be seen what 
effect it is having.
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Shifts in the Work/Family Balance: Belgium’s Optional Famialism
Belgium has been labeled a ‘Conservative welfare system’ in which the 
Christian Democratic ‘subsidiarity principle’ has institutionalized fa-
milialism . It is true that the labor market and welfare system remain 
geared somewhat towards male breadwinners in the sense that de-
rived social security rights remain extensive and that some elements 
of the tax system still support the sole breadwinner model. At the 
same time, however, childcare provisions for working parents have 
become extensive, especially in the Flemish part, making Belgium a 
case in point of what has been called ‘optional familialism ’ (Leitner 
2005). That is to say, the caring family is supported but at the same 
time families are also given the option of being (at least partially) un-
burdened from care responsibilities. And while the sole breadwinner 
household is fiscally supported, the dual earner household is clearly 
even more supported.
Belgium has extensive childcare provisions both in the form of in-
stitutionalized day care centers as in the form of subsidized ‘substitute 
mothers ’. Gross fees are strongly income related as well as partially tax 
deductible rendering childcare close to costless for those with the low-
est incomes. Belgium’s maternal employment rate is around 70 per-
cent, which, at the level of Denmark , Sweden and Norway, is among the 
highest in Europe. Important bottlenecks remain. The main problem 
is localized scarcity of available childcare places. Waiting lists remain 
long and this seems to be a particular problem in larger cities. In addi-
tion, parents find it difficult to find institutionalized childcare outside 
of regular hours – that is to say for evenings, weekends, holidays etc. 
This is posing a particular barrier to less skilled parents taking up jobs 
in the services sector where hours are often irregular (Marx and Verbist 
2008).
5.4 Path-Dependent Policy Divergence across Small Continental 
Welfare Regimes 
The Continental welfare regime is historically organized around the 
axial principle of (male breadwinner ) employment. This is often seen 
as a weakness, especially in combination with social insurance welfare 
financing. Under conditions of macroeconomic austerity, raising social 
contributions runs into constraints at a time when firms are particularly 
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sensitive to increases in gross labor costs. It then becomes necessary to 
either reduce employment-related benefits at a time when people be-
come more dependent on them, or to stimulate employment growth by 
more daring social and economic policy reforms. These two alternatives 
sum up the policy choices made in recent decades in Belgium and the 
Netherlands.
Continental welfare states may be slow reformers, but they are not im-
mobile. For both Belgium and the Netherlands the era of permanent aus-
terity was also a period of permanent reform and adjustment. Inferring 
from the comparative country experiences above, it is possible to paint a 
broad picture of welfare self-transformation in the Netherlands and Bel-
gium in terms of a sequence of policy changes across a number of policy 
dimensions. In both Belgium and the Netherlands a successive series of 
incremental policy changes and more daring reforms across a number of 
interrelated policy areas reveal fundamental system changes in the make-
up in the two neighboring welfare states. It goes almost without saying 
that the general direction of change can only be observed in a longer term 
perspective.
During the past thirty years, the transformation of the Dutch welfare 
state from having a heavy reliance on income maintenance towards 
adopting an overriding focus on maximizing labor market participa-
tion proceeded in rather ‘disjointed’ fashion, captured by episodic suc-
cesses, like the ‘Wassenaar Accord’ and politically charged policy fail-
ures, like the disability pension crisis, together with the more recent 
overhaul of early retirement and the introduction of the new life course 
savings scheme. Belgian welfare state change, in contrast to the Dutch 
case, revolved around a transformation in social insurance from a sys-
tem in the Bismarckian tradition of status maintenance into one with 
an overriding emphasis on minimum income protection and univer-
sal coverage. Moreover, the pace of Belgian social and economic pol-
icy change proceeded more gradually, cumulatively and effectively by 
‘stealth’.
Disjointed Social Policy Transformation in the Netherlands
The Dutch welfare state has certainly experienced the greatest transfor-
mation and shown considerable capacity for reform and policy innova-
tion, marking a paradigm shift from fighting unemployment through 
labor supply reduction in the 1970s and 1980s, the typical Continen-
tal welfare state’s response to industrial restructuring, to a deliberate 
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policy of raising employment levels for both men and women from the 
1990s onwards. The Dutch welfare transformation process was based 
on a sequence of four fundamental and cumulative policy reorienta-
tions, which ultimately allowed the Dutch to reverse the vicious cir-
cle of ‘welfare without work ’. In the first place, retrenchment and cost 
containment measures principally dominated the reforms in the 1980s. 
Levels of insurance benefits were reduced slightly and the benefit dura-
tion was shortened. In the second place, the success of sustained wage 
restraint, after serving to boost competitiveness in the exposed sector, 
helped to create more jobs in domestic services. This in turn slowed 
down and eventually even lowered the number of people dependent on 
social benefits. The reduced social wage component, subsequently, al-
lowed Dutch governments to use improved public finances to lower the 
tax and contribution wedge and to expand active labor market policies 
in the 1990s. Third, the Dutch social reform momentum of the 1990s 
can be characterized by an increased emphasis on curtailing easy exit, 
activating labor market policies and flexicure labor markets, together 
with a fundamental overhaul in the administrative and incentive struc-
tures of social security. And finally since the mid-1990s, labor market 
flexibility has become an integral part of the new policy mix of labor 
market regulation and has enjoyed significant support from the social 
partners . Together with the incremental individualization of the tax 
system, ‘flexicurity ’ legislation has contributed to the ‘normalization’ of 
part-time employment, which now encompasses nearly one-third of the 
workforce.
Today paid work is seen by all the relevant policy actors in the Dutch 
political economy as the key route for attaining personal welfare and 
social cohesion as well as contributing to the sustainability of a gen-
erous welfare state. The growing emphasis on the importance of paid 
work in promoting social inclusion was accompanied by introducing 
more market-oriented approaches in the management of the social se-
curity system. In the domain of social security reform, the Dutch state 
adopted a fairly aggressive posture, both privatizing and nationalizing 
portions of the welfare state, in particular the regulation of the intake 
of new claimants, in order to secure reforms that limit expenditures 
and the number of beneficiaries. The reforms in the 2000s to unem-
ployment and social assistance programs as well as the introduction of 
the new disability benefit program (WIA) have profoundly reinforced 
the activation requirement in the Dutch welfare system. The overall 
trend was towards increased employment conditionality, increased ac-
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tivation, more stringent targeting and reduced generosity. The Conti-
nental insurance principle has on the one hand been fortified in un-
employment insurance and disability benefits, with stricter coverage, 
increased importance of relative work history, and the linking of ben-
efit duration to work history, considerably strengthened the insurance 
principle. This, in turn, resulted in a greater inflow in social assistance , 
which, in the meantime, was reorganized around the principle of acti-
vation. Beyond the shift from calculating defined benefits on the basis 
of last-earned wages to average earnings, the Dutch old-age pensions 
have remained robust and stable with broad coverage in the second pil-
lar of occupational pension and its basic income floor for all residents 
in the first pillar.
Belgian Welfare State (Self-)Transformation by Stealth
Relative to the Netherlands, trade unions , employers and the govern-
ment remained stuck in a state of corporatist quasi-immobilism. Until 
the mid-1990s, Belgian trade unions did not accept that wage restraint 
was necessary for economic recovery and job growth. In part, this re-
flects the continued strength of the Belgian unions compared to their 
Dutch counterparts. The Belgian government ultimately had to impose 
wage restraint from above. This not only sacrificed micro-flexibility for 
the purpose of macro-adjustment, it also made any form of productive 
issue-linkage between different areas of social and economic regulation 
difficult to achieve. In sharp contrast to the Dutch experience, the Belgian 
welfare state proved unable to reverse the cycle of ‘welfare without work ’. 
Instead, Belgian policy-makers and other social actors ultimately found 
each other on a course towards an overriding emphasis on minimum in-
come protection.
Strikingly, the changes to the system did not benefit the ‘insiders ’ – 
i.e. the traditional core constituency of the Bismarckian welfare state. 
Instead, many of the reforms have been aimed at improving the mini-
mum income protection effectiveness of the system hence catering to 
what are usually considered ‘outsiders ’ within the Bismarckian frame-
work, for example women , youngsters and the long-term unemployed. 
In this respect, Belgium has proved to be all but the archetypal ‘frozen’ 
welfare state. But the changes that have happened have also been mostly 
defensive, in order to cope with the inescapable pressures imposed by 
external circumstances: first massive job loss, then the need for budget-
ary restraint (EMU ).
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The social partners have sought and largely succeeded to maintain 
their autonomy from government in the domains of collective bargaining 
and governance of the social security system. The social partners , frag-
mented as they are along sectoral, ideological and, increasingly, linguis-
tic lines, and hence unable to escape the multiple negotiators dilemmas 
they were and remain trapped in, have time and time again sought to 
maximize short-term gains and minimize short-term losses on the issues 
of most importance to them. Successive governments, from their side, 
have remained reluctant to challenge the autonomy of the social partners 
in any real way, especially in the domains in which the social partners 
have sought to maintain their autonomy most ardently in: collective bar-
gaining over wages and social security. On the contrary, governments 
have mostly accommodated and compensated whatever settlements the 
social partners reached – mostly in the name of social peace – widely 
seen as an essential precondition to Belgium’s economic prosperity if 
not its endurance as a political entity. This is not to say that the govern-
ment has been a passive actor. For example, Belgian governments have 
at various times stepped in, suspended autonomic wage bargaining and 
imposed wage moderation. But each time the goal has been to maintain 
or to restore the status quo , to keep things from worsening, but never 
actually to achieve positive goals like job growth. In reality, the fact that 
the government stepped in at various times actually accommodated the 
social partners in that it helped them to save face whenever they failed to 
reach an agreement. Suspensions of autonomous wage bargaining have 
arguably always happened with some degree of tacit agreement on the 
side of the social partners , although not always all of them. Wage moder-
ation, therefore, has also never gone further than maintaining the status 
quo . Achieving redistributive outcomes through job growth has never 
been pursued.
One could even argue that seemingly ‘offensive’ initiatives on the part 
of the government have in fact turned out to be measures of compensa-
tion. For example, a lot of budgetary resources have been put into em-
ployers ’ social security reductions, ostensibly to encourage job growth. 
Evidence that this has happened in any real way remains elusive but the 
reductions have clearly accommodated wage increases and contributed to 
the maintenance of automatic wage indexation.
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Table 5.1 Summary of reform trajectory : Belgium
Types of change Context Diagnosis
Augmentation and 
incremental expansion 
(1970s)
– economic downturn;
– mass job loss in industry;
– baby boom cohort and 
women entering labor market;
– massive labor market 
imbalance 
– social benefi ts should help 
the victims of the crisis
Selective augmentation as 
well as retrenchment : the shift 
towards minimum income 
protection (mid-1980s)
– continuing imbalance in 
the labor market between 
demand and supply
 – social benefi ts should help 
the victims of the crisis, BUT 
cost should be contained
Selective retrenchment 
(1990s) 
– economic conditions 
improve but demand/supply 
imbalance remains
– public fi nance situation 
dismal
– EMU requirements
– further cost containment 
essential in view of public 
fi nances and cost of labor 
A hesitant shift towards 
activation (mid-1990s) up to 
the late 2000s?
– economic conditions more 
favorable
 – activation imperative
Table 5.2 Summary of reform trajectory : Netherlands
Types of change Context Diagnosis
Crisis management with a 
benign expansion of early exit 
(1978-89)
– oil crisis and economic 
recession with mass job 
loss in industry and fi rm 
bankruptcies 
– Dutch disease: expensive 
exports with high infl ation: 
need for wage moderation
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Content of the policy Politics of the reforms Consequences
– sharp increase in the 
generosity of the benefi ts
– new benefi t schemes, 
especially early retirement 
– incremental expansion
– corporatist consensus
– mass infl ow in benefi t 
dependency
– sharp rise in social 
expenditure
– growing fi nancial imbalance
– more categorical targeting 
according to assumed 
need, insurance principle 
abandoned
– gradual reform bit by bit 
(layering )
– corporatist consensus, with 
mainly token resistance from 
unions against increased 
targeting
– continued infl ow in benefi t 
dependency
– stabilization of social 
expenditure, but still shrinking 
contribution base
– welfare without work at 
peak, i.e. high dependency, 
low poverty 
– still more categorical 
targeting
– benefi t levels stagnate
– eff orts to reduce chronic 
benefi t dependency
– more government activism 
in areas of wage setting and 
benefi ts
– increased tension 
between social partners and 
government 
– failure to achieve social pact 
consensually
– benefi t dependency drops 
slightly but remains high
– poverty rises
– legitimacy of the system 
suff ers
– cautious eff orts to reduce 
benefi t dependency, 
especially early retirement 
– increased spending on 
active labor market policies 
– continued failure to achieve 
a real change in direction 
consensually
– increased confl ict and 
fragmentation in the political 
as well as the industrial 
relations fi eld
– Belgium now mediocre 
performer in terms of 
employment and poverty 
outcomes
– stalemate 
Content of the policy Politics of the reforms Consequences
– Wassenaar accord: wage 
moderation in exchange 
for fl exible labor time 
reduction with state-led mild 
retrenchment 
– broad consensus strongly 
supported by the social 
partners (except for 
retrenchment )
– improved competitiveness
– job creation
– due to inactivity trap, mass 
infl ow in benefi t dependency
– sharp rise in social 
expenditure
– growing fi nancial imbalance 
social insurance
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5.5 Explaining within Regime Policy Divergence
Why is it that these two neighboring Continental welfare states embarked 
on such different trajectories of social policy (self-)transformation, given 
that there have been more convergent tendencies during the last decade? 
One might distinguish broadly between two explanatory categories, one 
emphasizing the importance of broad material and substantive differ-
ences and policy contingencies, the other underlining the importance of 
political institutional differences between the Belgian and Dutch political 
economies.
From a material perspective, the Belgian economy was arguably harder 
hit by the oil price shocks and the subsequent economic downturn of the 
1970s and 1980s. It must also be noted that Belgium never had the gas rev-
enues which provided much needed budgetary relief in the Netherlands 
during the 1970s and 1980s. The inflow into benefit dependency (espe-
cially disability ) never affected Dutch public finances in the way it did 
in Belgium, where, as indicated, things were much exacerbated by costly 
settlements of interregional conflict.
Table 5.2 Summary of reform trajectory : Netherlands
Types of change Context Diagnosis
From a price- to a volume 
policy through institutional 
change
(1989-95)
– improved economy, but 
post-German unifi cation crisis 
seen as a driver of continued 
austerity
– disability crisis and social 
partners misuse of social 
insurance administration BUT 
benefi t levels are contained
Towards activation and 
fl exicurity 
(1995-2001)
– economic conditions 
improve
– stable public fi nances
– but low employment
– redefi nition of crisis of the 
welfare state: from fi ghting 
unemployment to raising 
participation in the labor 
market 
Resurgence of the politics of 
retrenchment 
(2001-7)
– end to wage moderation
– falling competitiveness
– low growth also due to 
procyclical boom and bust 
macro policy
– retrenchment and 
modernization with an eye on 
prolonging working life 
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Content of the policy Politics of the reforms Consequences
– selective retrenchment 
(eligibility and targeting)
– institutional overhaul;
– managed competition 
in sickness and disability 
insurance
– broad and strong political 
consensus, with token 
resistance from unions against 
selective retrenchment and 
institutional change.
-improved cost containment 
on social expenditures;
– inactivity problems remain 
in passive social insurance
– activation in social insurance 
and social assistance 
– active labor market policy 
– (female ) part-time 
revolution
– pension modernization 
– fl exicurity agreement and 
legislation
– broad political consensus 
with token support of the 
social partners 
(employers more responsible 
with tougher activation for 
workers )
– Dutch miracle of 
unprecedented job creation, 
sustained economic growth, 
low infl ation without large 
increases in incomes and 
wage inequality
– new conditions for disability ,
– cuts in unemployment 
insurance;
– phasing out pre-retirement ;
life course policy
– after serious confrontation 
between trade unions and the 
government ,
– two social pacts (2003;2004)
– strained relations social 
partners 
– successful recovery in terms 
of growth, jobs and public 
fi nances
– stalemate over dismissal 
protection
In the Dutch case, when path-breaking reforms were undertaken, the 
premise was that there had to be ‘light at the end of the tunnel’ for rea-
sons of political legitimacy. This was vital to the ‘jobs, jobs and more 
jobs’ strategy. The promise of these jobs had to be realistic when social 
insurance programs and employment protection regulation were dras-
tically recast and curtailed. The Wassenaar Agreement, in retrospect, 
generated a benevolent positive feedback dynamic of enhanced trust 
and policy learning , which over time allowed for more path-breaking 
social policy innovation and experimentation. Due to the depth of the 
initial crisis and failed policy responses in encouraging wage restraint, 
positive feedback effects remained absent in Belgium. Hence, one could 
argue that the Belgian context was an unlikely one for a Wassenaar-
style pact ever to emerge. And in effect, in Belgium the social partners 
never came close to such a pact. It was left to the government to take up 
responsibility for restoring economic competitiveness which it did by 
resorting to a major currency devaluation in 1981. Whereas wage mod-
eration required sustained discipline on the part of the social partners , 
the devaluation effectively offered a bail-out to the social partners to 
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continue in their old ways, i.e. seeking short-term (wage) gains for their 
membership.
Institutionally, beyond the general image of Belgium and the Nether-
lands as coalition polities and corporatist political economies, Belgium 
and the Netherlands are worlds apart. Belgium, unlike the Netherlands, 
is characterized by major and deep-cutting internal divisions along eth-
nic/linguistic and religious/ideological lines. These multiple, intersecting 
divisions have resulted in a far more fragmented, complex and conflict-
ridden political system than the Netherlands. Linguistic conflict took up 
and effectively depleted political time and energy in Belgium at a time 
when economic and social policy took center stage in the Netherlands. 
The unions have remained unitary in name, but in reality major divisions 
have always existed between the Flemish and French-speaking wings. 
Whereas successive social conflicts in the Netherlands have brought the 
secular and Christian trade union movements more together, the Belgian 
generation pact, for example, have left the unions more divided than ever, 
also internally.
A second important institutional difference between the two neigh-
boring polities concerns the role of the state. In the Netherlands, where 
the state is unitary but decentralized rather than federal, authorities have 
at times been able to intervene more directly than their Belgian coun-
terparts. That said, both Belgium and the Netherlands have witnessed 
greater assertiveness on the part of state actors relative to earlier periods. 
In the Netherlands, the government has had the power to secure moder-
ate wage agreements, increase labor market flexibility , curtail moral haz-
ard in the social security system, redirect pension modernization , by way 
of a ‘shadow of hierarchy’, involving the state’s implicit or explicit threats 
to intervene in the event of the social partners ’ failure to act. While the 
Dutch story reflects possibilities for corporatist renewal, then, it also 
demonstrates that such an outcome can, and often is, dependent upon a 
significant degree of state intervention within the policy-making process. 
The initiative for welfare and labor market reform in the 1990s in the 
Netherlands was political. It is not insignificant that in the past twenty 
years all major political parties, from Left to Right, in various grand co-
alitions, have participated in welfare retrenchment , often involving sig-
nificant departures from the traditional paradigms of policy-making. Bel-
gian policy-makers, by contrast, have had to work within an institutional 
context marked by both a less capacious state and greater institutional, 
legal and political impediments to unilateral state action due to their fed-
eral, regional and linguistic, institutional structure. With federalization, 
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successive governments were not in a strong position to legislate path-
breaking social policy reforms. The lack of a broad political compromise 
on domestic social and economic policy, thwarted by a federal division 
of authority, also negatively affect the construction of an imperative for 
change in Belgian political and policy discourse. In the Dutch context, 
important reports of the tripartite Social Economic Council, and other 
expert committees like the Buurmeijer Parliamentary Inquiry and ‘think 
tanks’ like the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR), have 
since the mid-1980s prepared the mindset for the radical reorientation in 
social and economic policy in the Netherlands.
While the Dutch social partners have seen their involvement in social 
insurance administration being severely restricted, the trade unions in 
Belgium continue to co-administer unemployment benefits and get sub-
stantial finances for doing so. As we argued in section 5.3 this has created 
specific incentives , which probably account in some measure for why Bel-
gium’s social security system evolved the way it did, most notably why the 
equivalence principle was abandoned for minimum protection and wid-
ened access to benefits. That said, the fact that the equivalence principle 
was historically not as strongly entrenched probably also accounts for this 
peculiarity of the Belgian trajectory.
Based on the welfare reform experience over the past three decades 
in Belgium and the Netherlands highlighted in this chapter, the image 
of Continental welfare inertia and political immobilism surely cannot be 
corroborated. The precise policy mixes that have ensued from these re-
form experiences have not only been critically shaped by past policy lega-
cies and institutional structures of decision-making, but also and more in 
particular by policy-makers’ capacity for innovation, intelligently using 
the institutional constraints and policy resources at their disposal in the 
face of new external and internal challenges.
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6 Italy : An Uncompleted Departure from Bismarck 
Matteo Jessoula and Tiziana Alti1
6.1 Introduction
The Italian welfare system emerged under two different political regimes: 
the competitive, Liberal regime from the country unification (1861) to 
1922, and the Fascist regime (1922-1943). The profound variation of the 
political background, however, did not have a decisive impact on the 
institutional traits of social protection schemes that from its inception 
displayed a Bismarckian imprint. They were in fact built along occupa-
tional lines – aiming to protect dependent workers primarily – and fi-
nanced through social contributions paid by employers and employees 
(though the state contributed with a share of the total cost, i.e. tripartite 
financing); benefits were broadly contributions related and differentiated 
among occupational groups and categories (private/public employees, 
blue/white collars).
After World War II the bulk of the system was managed by a public 
institution2 – the national institute for social insurance Inps (Istituto na-
zionale della previdenza sociale) – which was structured on several funds 
(casse or fondi) for different risks (old-age , survivors, disability , unem-
ployment , family and sickness) and professional categories – i.e. initially 
dependent workers in the private sector as the self-employed were cov-
ered in the 1950s-1960s (see below). Inps was originally administered by 
civil servants , while the social partners would be formally involved in the 
management at the end of the 1960s. This change was important because 
it granted the social partners (especially the unions ) formal legitimacy to 
participate in the social protection policy-making, but it should not be 
overestimated. In fact, on the one hand the unions had until then relied 
on a more direct channel for interest representation, as the parliamentary 
groups of the major parties – the Christian Democrats (DC), the Commu-
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nist Party (PCI) and the Socialist Party (PSI) – had a ‘union component’ 
which included some unions ’ leaders. On the other hand, major decisions 
in the field of welfare policies were in the hands of political and institu-
tional actors, such as the government and the Parliament .
Section 2 briefly sketches the development of the Italian welfare system 
during the so-called golden age (1945-1975). Section 3 constitutes the core 
of our analysis, dealing with four different sequences of welfare reform: 
a) the ambivalent interventions of the 1980s; b) the first retrenchment 
reforms in the period of fiscal emergency (1992-93); c) the path-breaking 
reforms of the mid- to late 1990s; d) the growing tension between these 
modernizing interventions and more conservative measures in the recent 
years (2000-2008). Finally, in section 4 we propose an evaluation of the 
trajectory of reform of the Italian welfare system.
Against this background, in the following paragraphs we do not pre-
tend to provide an encompassing analysis of welfare and labor market 
developments in Italy.3 We rather aim to interpret the trajectory of devel-
opment and reform of the Italian social protection system by focusing on 
four different factors. First, sequencing, as we argue that major departures 
from the institutional path have been triggered by a stepwise process of 
reform. Second, we analyze how Bismarckian institutions have contrib-
uted to mold both the policy-making and the outcomes of reform. Third, 
we evaluate the influence of Europe on the reform trajectory, also aiming 
(fourth) to shed a light on likely processes of (policy and social) learning 
that might facilitate change.
6.2 A Bismarckian Route... With a First Departure
A System of Social Solidarity for Workers and their Families
After World War II and the foundation of the Republican regime the 
Italian welfare system underwent three decades of major expansion. As 
occurred in other Continental European countries in the same period, 
a ‘system of social solidarity for workers and their family’ (CRPS 1948) 
was set up in order to achieve (quasi)Beveridgean goals – i.e. to free all 
citizens from need, alleviate poverty and protect against major social 
risks – through Bismarckian means. This meant extending coverage to 
those professional categories not yet protected and to workers ’ depen-
dents, therefore confirming the original Bismarckian (and fragmented) 
institutional design of the system. In fact, during the 1950s and the 1960s 
piecemeal reforms repeatedly extended compulsory sickness insurance , 
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family allowances were introduced also for public sector employees, the 
retirees and the unemployed, while the self-employed were compulsorily 
insured against old age and disability with the creation of three new funds 
within Inps (farmers 1957, artisans 1959, merchants/shopkeepers 1966). 
Moreover, in the field of pensions the ‘typical’ PAYG earnings-related sys-
tem was adopted (1968-69) and eligibility conditions were loosened with 
the introduction of seniority pensions in the public (1956) and the private 
sector (1965). Public employees were thus allowed to retire after only 20 
years of regular work (reduced to 15 for married women and mothers ), 
while private employees and the self-employed were required to have 35 
years of contributions.
After these reforms, the public pension system covered roughly 100 
percent of those in employment through a number of occupational 
schemes and started to provide generous benefits – often with loose eligi-
bility conditions – also presenting some schemes which were ‘structurally 
underfinanced’. In fact, since the establishment of the new schemes for 
the self-employed (see above), the contribution rates for these categories 
were set at a very low level and the equilibrium between revenues and 
expenditure was guaranteed by the transfers either from other funds (es-
pecially dependent workers ’) or the public budget. This structural deficit 
together with the extremely favorable rules for seniority pensions would 
become critical issues in the 1980s-1990s (see below).
The Italian welfare system was thus built upon the assumption that 
(quasi-)universal coverage could be achieved through work-based social 
insurance schemes in a condition of high economic growth and full-em-
ployment, at least for the (typically) male employed family member – the 
well-known ‘male breadwinner model’. Sustained growth and full (male ) 
employment were thus both preconditions for effective social protec-
tion and the major aims of the governments in the phase of Keynesian 
welfare capitalism . Therefore, between the end of World War II and the 
early 1990s the state was deeply involved in the economy – not only as 
a regulator, but also through controlled enterprises – and in the labor 
market. Employment grew in the public sector as well as in publicly-
controlled firms; the public monopoly of employment services was in-
troduced (1949) and the possibility of individual firing was drastically 
limited in 1966 and 1970.4 The strong protection of those in employment 
(job-security) and the low investment in ALMPs generated a rigid labor 
market, with a high level of job stability on the one hand, and already in 
the 1970s a high share of long-term unemployed (especially the young 
and women ) on the other hand.
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Such a profound gap between the ‘insiders ’ (i.e. people that had access 
to employment and, through this, to social insurance) and the ‘outsid-
ers ’ was also reinforced by the peculiar features of the unemployment 
protection system, social assistance and family policies. As to the pro-
tection of unemployment , the system was based on ‘first pillar’ contribu-
tory schemes which displayed a great variation in coverage and benefits 
generosity along occupational lines. In fact, the protection was generally 
stronger in the industrial sector and in medium and large-sized firms, 
where employees were not only entitled to ordinary unemployment ben-
efits but also to very generous programs for wage replacement in case of 
(partial or total) working-time reduction without definitive dismissal. 
By contrast workers employed in micro and small firms had access to 
ordinary benefits only, which were not related to previous wages and 
of a very modest amount. Any other pillar – unemployment assistance 
or a last resort safety net for those not employed – was lacking (Ferrera 
2006; Alti 2003). The absence of a tax-financed , non-contributory mini-
mum income scheme for all the people in need was in fact one of the 
peculiar features of the underdeveloped Italian social assistance , which 
was also characterized by the lack of a national regulatory framework 
and, as a consequence, by a high territorial variation in terms of ben-
efits, beneficiaries and generosity. Family policies also lagged behind and 
displayed some peculiarities: first, they mostly relied on cash transfers, 
with very few in-kind benefits ; second, most benefits were contributory 
and only workers were entitled. In particular family allowances were not 
conceived as universalistic, tax-financed benefits related to children, be-
ing considered rather as wage supplements, financed through social con-
tributions , for (employed, unemployed and retired) dependent workers 
only.
Yet, during the ‘golden age ’ these gaps in coverage and risks protec-
tion did not generate intense political debate, and they were mostly 
compensated by: a) the persistence of the traditional family patterns 
– that guaranteed access to welfare benefits through the secure job 
of the male breadwinner and operated as a redistributive agency for 
its members; b) the distortion and abuses in the provision of certain 
benefits – e.g. disability pensions – that especially in southern regions 
performed social assistance functions as unemployment subsidies in 
disguise. 
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A Partial Hybridization of the Model
If, as illustrated, the Bismarckian institutional design of income mainte-
nance schemes (pensions, unemployment insurance, family allowances) 
was repeatedly confirmed in the post-war decades, this did not rule out 
the introduction of alternative goals, principles and instruments that 
partly hybridized the Italian welfare state. The major change was the tran-
sition from an insurance-based to a universal health care system with the 
establishment of the National Health System in 1978.5 This represented a 
clear path-shift in the field of health care and also led to the replacement 
of contributory financing with tax financing.
But old-age protection schemes were also somewhat ‘contaminated’. If 
the bulk of the system remained fully Bismarckian , the goal of poverty 
prevention was introduced next to the traditional income maintenance 
one: a social assistance supplement for contributory pensions under a 
certain threshold (minimum pension) and, above all, a social pension – i.e. 
a tax-financed means-tested flat-rate benefit – for all the people in need 
over 65 were introduced in 1952 and 1969 respectively.
6.3 Departing from the Bismarckian Compromise: A Stepwise Process 
of Reform
The Early Creaks in the Welfare Edifi ce and Contradictory Reforms (1975-
1990)
The first oil shock of 1973-74, which is usually considered a turning point 
in the studies on welfare state development, had only a limited effect on 
the Italian economy (apart from spiraling inflation rates).
Things worsened after the second oil shock (1979), when the national 
economy entered a prolonged phase of stagflation: four years of recession 
coupled with very high inflation rates (around 20 percent in 1980-81) and 
the continuous growth of unemployment (7.6 percent in 1980, 10.4 per-
cent in 1985, OECD) – due to the progression of the deindustrialization 
process. Furthermore, public finance presented annual deficits around 10 
percent.
Nevertheless, in the early 1980s, financial issues were not at the top 
of the political agenda, nor was the impact of social expenditure on the 
public budget. The period was in fact characterized by the first attempts 
to move from Keynesianism to liberalism , though these attempts were 
often timid and, above all, encountered harsh opposition by the unions 
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and the Communist Party. Even if some measures were taken in order to 
introduce a greater discipline in the parliamentary budget session, the 
priorities were the reduction of inflation and the struggle against unem-
ployment .
In spite of some analyses that pointed at the burden posed by the wel-
fare system on public finances (Ferrera 1984) and field specific studies 
about future fiscal and economic compatibilities with particular refer-
ence to old-age6 and health care expenditure, the welfare state continued 
to be (generally) considered a useful, effective and efficient institution. 
Moreover, politicians did not have enough incentives to embark on re-
trenchment policies. Two factors, in particular, hampered the shift from 
the distributive, ‘credit claiming’ (Weaver and Pierson 1993) policies of 
the golden age to cost containment interventions. On the one hand, such 
interventions were very risky in political terms as the Bismarckian im-
print of income maintenance schemes induced the perception of social 
benefits as ‘quasi-property rights’ (Myles and Pierson 2001) and legiti-
mized union actions in defense of the status quo . On the other hand, the 
peculiar features of the Italian political system – a ‘polarized’ (Sartori 
1966) democracy characterized by a high cabinet instability and a low 
autonomy of the latter from both political parties and a ‘turbulent’ Par-
liament – made it very difficult for the various governments to adopt 
retrenchment measures. The clash between the alarming projections en-
visaging future problems of financial and economic sustainability and 
the ‘short-term horizon’ of policy-makers (Pierson 1997) was then re-
solved in favor of the latter.
Therefore during the 1980s the governments followed a strategy based 
on four cornerstones. First, fighting against unemployment by undertak-
ing the well-known ‘labor reduction route’. Thus, labor shedding strat-
egies were pursued and the traditional reliance on passive policies was 
reinforced by introducing the possibility of early retirement (1981), ex-
ploiting pre-existing rules for seniority pensions (see previous section) 
and increasing the (still very low) ordinary unemployment benefits (1988). 
Second, pressure from (micro)categories forced governments to adopt 
some further incremental expansionary measures – i.e. increase of ben-
efits – especially in old-age insurance schemes. Third, such interventions 
were counterbalanced by raising social contributions (five times between 
1980 and 1990, from 23.9 percent to 25.9 percent), and in order to offset 
the consequent increase of labor cost – that might have a negative effect 
on the economic competitiveness of the country – the national currency 
was frequently devaluated (twice in 1981 and once in 1982, 1983 and 1985).
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In contrast with these expansionary interventions aimed at strength-
ening social protection, the fourth strategy consisted of the adoption of 
a few cost containment measures and the revision labor market rules. 
The frauds, waste and inefficiencies in the management of certain welfare 
programs were tackled by both introducing a means-test to get entitled 
to minimum pensions (1983), and tightening eligibility conditions and re-
inforcing control mechanisms in the schemes for contributory disability 
pensions.7 As for labor policy, the priority goals of the period – i.e. in-
flation control and unemployment reduction – were pursued. In 1983, a 
‘tripartite social pact’ led to a revision of the automatic indexation mecha-
nism for wages, making it less generous in order to put a brake on spiral-
ing inflation, and a similar measure was adopted by decree one year later, 
in a situation of harsh social conflict between the leftist union (Cgil) and 
the government /employers . These interventions were somewhat ‘com-
pensated’ (in 1984 and 1986-7) by the introduction of a few innovative 
‘activation’ measures aimed at fostering employment growth.
At the end of the 1980s the Italian welfare system was still strongly 
Bismarckian – apart from, as already noted, the health care sector – and 
much geared towards the protection of the so-called ‘insiders ’. Moreover, 
the implementation of the new ‘active’ labor market policies was often 
not effectively pursued and these measures did not prove very successful 
in tackling unemployment and creating new jobs. The employment rate 
was 1.9 point below the level of the early 1980s and, even more important, 
long-term unemployment (i.e. one year and over) had grown significantly, 
from 51.2 percent of total unemployment in 1980 to 70.4 percent in 1989 
(OECD 1991).
In the early 1990s, two further interventions confirmed the ambiva-
lent nature – partly expansionary, partly cost containment – of the Ital-
ian social policy since the late 1970s. In the field of old-age protection, 
despite increasing expenditure (around 12 percent of GDP) and growing 
transfers from the public budget to fill the gap between contributions and 
revenues, the earnings-related system was extended to the self-employed 
(1990), also setting the contribution rate for this category at a very low 
level (ca. 12 percent in contrast with ca. 26 percent for private employees). 
This represented an expansionary change which dramatically worsened 
the financial situation of the three schemes affected by the reform (Franco 
2002) and increased the unfairness of the system – as the return on con-
tributions for the self-employed was higher than for private employees. 
As we shall see, both these factors would play a role in the reform of old-
age pensions in the following years. Secondly, in order to tackle mount-
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ing unemployment (11.5 percent in 1990, OECD) a new unemployment 
protection scheme was set up – so-called ‘mobility allowance’ (1991) – 
providing generous benefits (replacement rate: 80 percent) for 12 months, 
with a possible extension to 48 months with a lower replacement rate. 
This measure reinforced the traditional reliance on passive policies and 
aimed to reduce the job offer on the labor market as the new scheme 
was often employed as an instrument for early retirement (Geroldi 2005). 
Moreover, as the mobility allowance was only introduced for workers of 
big firms mainly in the industrial sector (coverage was in fact limited to 
ca. 32 percent of dependent workers ) it further increased the segmenta-
tion of the unemployment protection system.
To conclude, we may say that the modest interventions adopted in the 
first sequence of reforms, though introducing some innovative measures 
(mainly in employment policy), did not alter the nature of Italian social 
protection schemes, which were still mostly directed to workers , earn-
ings-related and contributory -financed (social contributions represented 
roughly 70 percent of social protection receipts in 1990, Eurostat ), and 
they presented problems of fairness that resulted from the high hetero-
geneity of rules. The policy-making had in fact remained insulated from 
external pressures and domestic actors did not have enough incentives to 
radically modify both the existing welfare architecture and the underlying 
(re)distributive compromises.
Pressures from ‘Beyond’: Path-Dependent Change in Emergency (1992-
1993)
By the early 1990s, Italy had mostly closed the gap with most Continental 
countries in terms of ‘welfare effort’ and expenditure for social protec-
tion (23.7 percent of GDP in 1980) was just slightly below the EU15 aver-
age (24.4 percent, Eurostat ). Furthermore, the expansionary reforms of 
the golden age and the maturation of some social protection schemes 
– namely, pension schemes – had entailed a realignment of goals and 
means: the post-war objective of poverty alleviation had in fact been re-
placed by the goal of income maintenance , which was pursued through 
typically Bismarckian , contributory schemes providing earnings-related 
benefits.
The social and economic background differed slightly from the previ-
ous decade, as most problems were still on the ground though with vary-
ing intensity. Inflation was still rather high but more under control (6.4 
percent in 1990, 5 percent two years later, IMF ), while the increase of 
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unemployment (11.7 percent in 1992, OECD) and the alarming decrease 
of the employment rate (from 52.6 percent to 51.5 percent between 1990 
and 1994, OECD) were signs of an acute ‘welfare without work ’ syndrome. 
Meanwhile, the good economic performance of the late 1980s had come to 
an end and financial problems had become extremely acute – the public 
debt reaching ca. 100 percent of GDP and annual deficits over 10 percent.
1992 represented the turning point for both government priorities and 
the content of public discourse: attention and actions rapidly turned from 
the struggle against inflation to financial recovery. Pressures from the in-
ternational and supranational (i.e. EU ) arena were crucial for this u-turn 
of the Italian macroeconomic policy, that soon affected welfare institu-
tions too.
In July 1992 – in the midst of the political turmoil provoked by the 
corruption scandal that would soon remove all traditional parties from 
the political stage (Tangentopoli, i.e. bribe-city) – the partly technocratic 
cabinet led by the socialist Amato revived the season of tripartite agree-
ments (Regini and Regalia 1997) signing an important social pact on labor 
cost: the automatic indexation of wages to prices was eliminated, and this 
represented an important step that would contribute to reduce inflation 
rates in the following years (from 5 percent to 1.9 percent between 1992 
and 1997). This agreement was also decisive as it allowed the government 
to focus on fiscal recovery and consolidation that, after the inclusion of 
the convergence criteria in the Maastricht Treaty and the definition of 
the path towards the monetary union, could no longer be avoided. In or-
der to reduce public deficits – the priority goal at that time – a decrease 
of interest rates was vital, though it seemed to be out of reach when 
speculative attacks on the Lira were launched in September 1992. The 
Italian government thus faced a tremendous challenge stemming from 
the interplay between the process of European integration and financial 
markets. On the one hand, in order to prove their commitment to the 
construction of the monetary union, Italian policy-makers could not re-
sort to the ‘same old route’ of currency devaluation, on the other hand, 
persistent speculative attacks pushed the Bank of Italy to raise interest 
rates (Barucci 1995). In the end, a few days before the French referendum 
the Lira was devalued – and pulled out the EMS – but the government 
opted to accompany this intervention with a plan (presented by mid-
September) aimed at improving public finances. This plan included a 
pension reform that was much more incisive than the interventions pro-
posed in the early summer, and some guidelines for the revision of the 
National health care system.
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But, why precisely did external pressures induce the government to 
reform pension as the first, and most important step, of the process of 
fiscal consolidation? Considering that Bismarckian schemes are financed 
through social contributions , the link between pension reform and finan-
cial consolidation is not that straightforward, and it requires closer inves-
tigation. Indeed there were at least three reasons that pushed the Italian 
government to adopt a pension reform in order to ‘restore-to-health’ the 
public finance. First, both pensions and contributions for public employ-
ees and civil servants were paid directly from the Treasury Ministry, thus 
contributing to the general state outlay (just as the wages of public em-
ployees). Second, the likely gaps between revenues and expenditures for 
contributory pensions were to be filled, ultimately, by the state budget. 
Though estimates vary (due to the fuzzy accounting relationship between 
Inps and the state budget), the deficit for private sector schemes (depen-
dent and self-employed workers ) was around 2 percent of GDP in 1988 
(Castellino 1988), and increases were forecast for the future. Third, it is 
necessary to consider a sort of ‘demonstrative effect’ of pension reforms: 
in a nutshell, pension reforms may reassure financial markets – as they 
are taken as evidences of the commitment to financial rigor – and this 
facilitates the reduction of interest rates and, finally, the decrease of both 
debt service and deficit.
The Amato pension reform relied on two components: the revision 
of the public PAYG pillar and the introduction of a regulatory frame-
work for supplementary DC (defined contributions) funded pensions, 
which were to be financed primarily via the voluntary transfer of the 
Tfr.8 Though the second component represented the first step for the 
structural transformation of the pension system into a multi-pillar mod-
el, the reform mostly entailed a path-dependent, incremental change. 
Some cost containment measures were introduced, but the first PAYG 
pillar maintained its primary role and the earnings-related method for 
benefits calculation was preserved together with its traditional income 
maintenance function.
Even path-dependent changes and marginal cuts, however, might have 
been risky in political terms and, due to the traditional involvement of 
workers organization in pension policy-making, (at least) the acquies-
cence of the unions was a fundamental precondition for a successful re-
form (Bonoli and Palier 2007). Therefore the Amato cabinet followed two 
strategies. On the one hand, long transition periods and key exemptions 
were introduced in order to protect the core members of the trade unions , 
i.e. older workers and pensioners . On the other hand, the Bismarckian 
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connotation of the system – characterized by a high institutional frag-
mentation and regulatory variation along professional lines – and its un-
justified redistributive consequences were exploited by pushing the lever 
of fairness in order to introduce cost containment measures that might 
have triggered the reaction by the unions (Levy 1999).
Therefore, if the joint pressures from the international arena were cru-
cial to push policy-makers on the retrenchment path, the resistance to 
change that had appeared during the 1980s was overcome by a) the use 
of ‘tactical devices’ in the design of the reform and, b) the exploitation of 
the fragmented institutional architecture of the Italian pension system. 
Though carefully calibrated and gradually implemented, however, the re-
form not only contributed to tackle some typical problems of Bismarckian 
schemes – namely, the above mentioned welfare-without-work syndrome 
– but it also ‘lightened’ the fragmentation of the system by reducing the 
great variation of rules between professional categories.
The Path-Breaking Reforms under European Infl uence (1995-2000)
In the mid-1990s the run-up to EMU continued in a climate of financial 
emergency and there was a large consensus among the Italian decision-
makers on the need for a second pension reform in order to reduce public 
expenditure and deficit. The Amato reform had in fact left some prob-
lems on the ground. First, the comparatively short minimum contribu-
tory period to be entitled to seniority pensions (35 years), which was the 
major cause of the low average age of exit from the labor market (58.4 
years); second, if the rules had been thoroughly harmonized between 
public and private employees, the favorable treatment for the self-em-
ployed persisted; finally, further massive increases of both contribution 
rates and transfers from the public budget would be necessary in the near 
future in order to keep the balance between revenues and expenditure 
(Inps 1993).
The Watershed Pension Reform: Beyond Income Maintenance through 
Public Benefi ts
The years 1994-5 were crucial for the evolution of the national pension 
system. In September 1994 the center-Right cabinet led by Berlusconi 
presented a plan to reform pensions, which mostly pursued financial sus-
tainability in the short term through some interventions on seniority pen-
sions, the reference earnings and the indexation mechanism. The unions 
harshly reacted because these measures would affect the pension entitle-
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ment of their core constituencies. A vast national demonstration and a 
general strike were organized, and a further strike was planned for early 
December when the government had to retreat and the original proposal 
was drastically watered down.9
The failure in the field of pensions contributed to the resignation of the 
Berlusconi government (December 1994), which was followed by the tech-
nocratic Dini cabinet. This was expected to remain in place for a limited 
time in order to implement a few crucial reforms that might contribute 
to tackle the fiscal crises and smoothen external pressures coming from 
financial markets (cfr. Ferrera and Gualmini 2004). As Treasury Minister 
of the former Berlusconi government , Dini had been a major actor in the 
policy-making on pension reform and, consequently, he had ‘learned’ that 
unions ’ consent was a fundamental prerequisite for successful reforms. 
The social partners were thus involved in a concerted effort to draft the 
new reform proposal. The final agreement (May 1995) – which was not 
signed by employers ’ representative (Confindustria) – was transposed 
into law 335/1995 that represented a critical watershed for the Italian pen-
sion system.
The Dini reform was in fact based on two cornerstones. The first was 
the replacement of the earnings-related system in the first pillar with a 
‘notional defined contribution’ system (NDC) – where benefits are no 
longer linked to previous earnings – but depend on the amount of contri-
butions actually paid, the age of retirement as well as economic and de-
mographic trends. The second consisted of more generous tax incentives 
and a more effective exploitation of the Tfr in order to support the take-
off of supplementary funded pensions based on voluntary membership.
Such developments testify a greater reliance on individualized insur-
ance and market mechanisms that represents at least a partial (as schemes 
are still occupational and contributory financed) ‘retreat from Bismarck ’. 
Moreover, the reform included some provisions aimed to tackle some typ-
ical problems of Bismarckian systems: the low age of retirement and the 
‘welfare without work ’ syndrome. In fact, the implementation of the NDC 
system with a new flexible retirement age (57-65 years) would provide 
strong incentives to postpone retirement because of the links between 
retirement age and pension value, while the gradual increase of the con-
tributory requirement for seniority pensions (from 35 to 40 years) would 
pose a brake on early retirement .
What is worthy to note is that – as in 1992 – the departure from the 
traditional Bismarckian route was accomplished by exploiting two typical 
features of Bismarckian welfare systems: fragmentation and the earnings-
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related method to calculate pensions. In fact, the final agreement on the 
introduction of the NDC system for all categories (private/public employ-
ees and the self-employed ) was found because, on the one hand, it would 
improve financial sustainability – which pleased the cabinet – and, on the 
other, it phased-out the favorable treatment for both the self-employed 
and those workers with the most dynamic careers (namely, medium-high 
income workers ), thus matching unions ’ requests for greater harmoniza-
tion and (actuarial) fairness (Jessoula 2009).
However, such a concerted reform protected the pension rights of the 
unions core constituencies to an even greater extent than the Amato re-
form: extremely long transition periods10 for the implementation of the 
new NDC system – that fully applies to new entrants in the labor market 
after 1996 only – and for the phasing-in of the new contributions require-
ment for seniority pensions were introduced in order to safeguard the ‘ac-
quired rights’ of older workers , and retirees were not aﬀ ected. Once again, 
key exemptions were provided in order to forestall union opposition.
Learning from Europe to Go Beyond Bismarck 
After the adoption of the Dini reform, and the 1996 elections that regis-
tered the victory of the center-Left coalition led by Romano Prodi , eco-
nomic recovery and (relative) political stability slightly allayed financial 
worries, thus allowing a partial reorientation of both the public discourse 
and the policy-making on welfare reform. Arguments about fiscal rigor 
were still present – especially because of the 1998 deadline for the veri-
fication of the convergence process across EC member states – and they 
would stimulate a further incremental revision of the pension system in 
1997 (Prodi reform), mostly directed at achieving (modest) cost reduc-
tions in the short run. Nevertheless, a wider debate on the shortcomings 
of the national system of social protection and the need of a deep ‘re-
calibration ’ (Ferrera and Hemerijck 2003) aroused. An experts commis-
sion – so called Commissione Onofri, also including the leading scholar 
in welfare studies Maurizio Ferrera – pointed at the weaknesses of the 
national welfare system by stressing its very acute ‘double distortion’. The 
first (‘functional distortion’) was related to the overprotection of old age 
at the expenses of other risks/sectors like unemployment , family and so-
cial exclusion /assistance; the second (‘distributive’) had to do with the 
wide security gap between the insiders and the outsiders and, as such, it 
was due to the interaction between the Bismarckian imprint of the welfare 
system – according to which eligibility to social benefits is based on work 
and employment – and the rigidity of labor market rules.
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This diagnosis and the policy solutions proposed by the commission 
were deeply influenced by the inputs coming from the supranational, Eu-
ropean arena, which channeled innovative ideas into the national debate, 
thus reorienting the attention of domestic actors towards the so-called 
‘new social risks ’ – e.g. lone parenthood, longer life expectancy, need for 
care activities, interrupted careers and precarious jobs. Such issues – that 
posed a serious challenge to the national Bismarckian welfare edifice and 
the underlying ‘male breadwinner model’ – came to the top of the govern-
ment ’s agenda in the late 1990s. This happened especially with the Prodi 
cabinet, which aimed to represent a modernizing coalition committed to 
bring Italy – with all its vices and few virtues – closer to Europe and its 
social model.
Privatization, Flexibilization and Activation in the Labor Market
In the field of labor policy, the persistent problems of low employment 
and high unemployment were tackled by acknowledging the shortcom-
ings of the strongly regulated labor market and prompting a radical, ‘para-
digmatic ’ change.
Building on the social pacts of the early 1990s, the 1997 ‘Treu reform’ 
(from the name of the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection) triggered 
a shift towards a more flexible and deregulated labor market. The public 
monopoly on placement services was abolished and so called ‘atypical’, 
flexible job contracts, like temporary and part-time jobs were either in-
troduced or relaunched after the failure of the late 1980s. Moreover the 
traditional predominance of passive policies was limited, moving towards 
a more equilibrated ‘policy mix’ (Graziano 2007) with the development 
of ALMPs to facilitate insertion, especially for the most disadvantaged 
groups (younger and older workers , women ).
For the adoption of these measures, supranational influence was in-
deed crucial, as the strengthened competition in an open Continental 
economy made the long-lasting shortcomings of the Italian labor market 
no longer tolerable. But EC influence was also more straightforward. On 
the one hand, the then-in-the-making European Employment Strategy 
channeled into the domestic policy arena detailed principles (i.e. adapt-
ability, employability, modernization of the labor market) and guidelines 
for employment policy reform that induced a learning process by national 
actors. On the other hand, the liberalization of employment services was 
implemented under the pressure of an impending sentence by the ECJ 
which was about to sanction Italy for the public monopoly of placement 
services.
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As illustrated in details by Graziano (2004) these developments facili-
tated the emergence of a pro-reform ‘advocacy coalition’ (Sabatier 1998) 
that acted to modernize , and to a certain extent ‘europeanize’, the Ital-
ian labor market. Such a coalition, which managed to overcome (at least 
partly) the traditional policy network oriented at the maintenance of the 
status quo , was formed by a part of the trade unions movement (especially 
the moderate unions , Cisl and Uil), some members of the government 
(above all, the Ministry for Labor and Social Protection) and a portion of 
the central bureaucracy. Within this new coalition a prominent role was 
played by some experts (especially those involved in the Onofri commis-
sion) and by the external advisers of the Ministry that aimed to reshape 
national policies in accordance with the goals, the principles and the pol-
icy instruments elaborated at the European level.
It is worthy to note, however, that labor market flexibilization was not 
accompanied by adequate investments on the security side: in fact, the 
reform of unemployment insurance was not included in such a major re-
vision of Italian employment policy.
Bridging the Insiders /Outsiders Divide
A similar and, to some extent, interconnected process unfolded in the 
fields of social assistance and family policies that – as noted above – were 
both underdeveloped and (especially the latter) geared towards the pro-
tection of the insiders due to work-based eligibility.
Since the beginning of the 1990s community institutions – e.g. the 
European Observatory on National Policies for Combating Social Exclu-
sion – had addressed the issue of social exclusion and in 1992 the Council 
Recommendation 92/441/EEC had stressed the relevance of anti-poverty 
policies for both the integration process and the construction of the Euro-
pean citizenship. Finally in 1997 the fight against poverty and social exclu-
sion had been included in the Treaty of Amsterdam. This attention to the 
issue of social exclusion /inclusion went in parallel with the proliferation 
of field specific technical committees such as the European Anti-Poverty 
Network. These contributed to the formation of supranational ‘epistemic 
communities’ that socialized national experts and bureaucrats on the sub-
ject, thus stimulating a process of policy learning and diffusion in a two-
level policy and political arena (Alti 2003).
The transposition of ideas emerged at the community level into the 
Italian policy-making on the reform of social assistance was mainly ac-
complished by two groups of experts: the committee on poverty and so-
cial exclusion (Commissione di indagine sulla povertà e l’esclusione so-
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ciale) and the above mentioned Commissione Onofri appointed in 1997. 
Both committees played a crucial role in the formulation of the major 
reform proposals in line with the EC approach, which aimed to reinforce 
social assistance and family policies, but also to overcome the traditional 
work-based approach through much more inclusive and comprehensive 
universalistic programs. This matched the modernizing aspirations of the 
Prodi cabinet (and subsequent center-Left governments) which prompted 
a recalibration of the national welfare system in order to bridge the insid-
ers /outsiders gap. A number of measures were therefore adopted in the 
period 1998-2000 that mostly relied on the innovative principle of selec-
tive universalism (Ferrera 1998), according to which eligibility to social 
assistance benefits had to be conditional on citizenship and need only. In 
other words, the introduction of new policy instruments for all people 
(universalism ) in need (selectivity) was considered to be crucial in order 
to strengthen social assistance and overcome the traditional work-based 
approach in family policies.
The budget law adopted in 1998 set up a ‘Fund for social policies’, re-
inforced means-testing through the implementation of an ‘indicator of 
socio-economic conditions’ for those applying for social benefits/services 
and introduced three innovative, non-contributory , means-tested ben-
efits aimed at alleviating poverty . These benefits were: 1) the allowance to 
families with more than three children, 2) the maternity allowance and, 
above all, 3) a ‘Minimum insertion income’ (Mii) pilot scheme, which was 
designed as a non-categorical, means-tested, tax-financed measure, ad-
dressed to all the people under a predefined poverty threshold. The inno-
vative character of the latter was also related to its ‘activation’ component, 
since the monetary transfer was accompanied by integration programs in 
order to tackle social exclusion and stimulate recipients’ autonomy. The 
establishment of a last resort safety net, as well as its characteristics, were 
perfectly in line with the indications of the European Commission, that in 
the communication COM(98)774 strongly advocated the reinforcement 
and, eventually, the harmonization of minimum income schemes across 
member states.
The budget law for 2000 provided for a two-year extension of the 
experimentation of the ‘Mii’, and in the same year the Italian social as-
sistance seemed to take another big step forward with the approval of 
a national regulatory framework. Law 328/00 established that social as-
sistance would be based on an integrated system of services and benefits, 
with the reinforcement of the former in order to reduce the Bismarckian 
‘cash-transfer bias’.
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If fully accomplished, the plan could have led the Italian welfare state 
and labor market clearly beyond Bismarck . However the early 2000s saw 
contradictory developments.
Steps Back and Forth between Modernization and Conservatism (2000-
2008)
In the early years of the new millennium Italy entered a four year reces-
sion – with GDP growth between 0 percent and 1.1 percent in 2001-05 
(IMF ), that is much lower than most Western countries – and, above all, a 
continuous loss of competitiveness of the national economy during a de-
cade. By contrast, the public finances gradually improved, with low defi-
cits (generally below 3 percent of GDP) and a (slowly) declining public 
debt. Therefore, if during the previous decade the ‘keyword’ in the public 
discourse had been fiscal consolidation, in the early 2000s it turned to be 
‘competitiveness’ (Radaelli 2002).
The debate on welfare reform was affected by the new context and 
framed by the effects of the reforms adopted in the 1990s, but it also reg-
istered the change of government majorities: the center-Left cabinets of 
the late 1990s were followed by the new center-Right government led by 
Berlusconi (2001-2006), while the coalition led by Prodi won the 2006 
elections before Berlusconi came back to power in 2008.
The discourse therefore focused on four issues. First, in the field 
of pensions the issue of benefits adequacy (especially for younger co-
horts) became more relevant next to ‘traditional’ arguments on eco-
nomic and financial sustainability. This was the result of the ‘gen-
erational break’ provoked by the Dini reform, as the long-transition 
period for the implementation of the NDC system and the increase of 
contribution rates (33 percent of gross wages since 1995) overburdened 
younger generations, who will bear most of the costs of reforming pen-
sions and fiscal recovery. Second, the interplay between the cost of so-
cial protection (especially pension) and labor market performance be-
came a major concern in light of the above mentioned competitiveness 
deficit of the country. Third, in the short-medium term the compatibil-
ity between public expenditure for welfare programs and the equilib-
rium of public finance was at risk, particularly in light of the projected 
tax cuts that represented a top priority for the Berlusconi government . 
Fourth, the latter’s vision of the welfare system stressed the role of the 
family more as a redistributive/caring agency than a recipient of social 
provisions.
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Against this background, the early steps of the new cabinet aimed to 
find a way out from employment, economic and fiscal problems that still 
affected the country and two proposals for reforming pensions and the 
labor market were prepared in 2001.
Doing and Undoing in the Field of Pension
Th e ﬁ rst draft of the plan to reform public pension had two major goals: 1) 
containing pension deﬁ cits in the short-medium term and, 2) supporting 
employment via an increase of the actual average age of retirement and a 
reduction of labor cost. Th e ﬁ rst objective was pursued through stricter 
requirements for seniority pensions – which might also contribute to raise 
the average retirement age – while a cut of contributions for workers hired 
with open-ended, permanent contracts was directed to promote employ-
ment. Next to these interventions, the reform plan also contained a provi-
sion for the deﬁ nitive transition to a multi-pillar system: the compulsory 
transfer of the Tfr to supplementary pension funds – a measure that would 
have made available for funded schemes roughly 13 billion euros per year 
(around 1 percent of GDP). Th e reconﬁ guration of the system on diﬀ erent 
pillars was justiﬁ ed by the projected sharp reduction of replacement rates 
for ﬁ rst pillar pensions – ca. 55 percent of last wage around 2030 according 
to the Ministry of Welfare (Ministero del Welfare 2002). But the transition 
was also ‘pulled’ by ﬁ nancial actors (bank, insurance companies), that had 
entered the pension policy arena after the reforms of the 1990s and then 
met the benevolent attitude of the center-Right cabinet (Jessoula 2009, 
2010). Th e unions strongly opposed the reform and mobilized their mem-
bers against the government proposal. Th is time, however, the government 
– learning from the 1994 defeat on pension reform (Natali and Rhodes 
2005) – adopted a wiser tactic aimed to smoothen the unions ’ protest. A 
few times, the policy-making was suspended, various rounds of negotia-
tions with the social partners followed and, ﬁ nally, the cabinet withdrew 
the most controversial measures from the plan – i.e. the reduction of con-
tributions and the compulsory transfer of the Tfr.
The final version of the reform was adopted in 2004. A compromise was 
found for supplementary pensions with the introduction of the so-called 
‘silent-consent’ formula for the transfer of the Tfr to pension funds.11 As 
for the first pillar, the interventions mostly followed the EU recommenda-
tions on the promotion of employment of older workers : a) incentives for 
later retirement in the period 2004-2007 were introduced and, b) the age 
requirements for seniority pensions were tightened (three-year increase 
by January 2008). On the other hand Law 243/04 replaced a key element 
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of modernization introduced by the Dini reform – the flexible age of re-
tirement – reintroducing a rigid (and differentiated according to gender ) 
retirement age (65 for men , 60 for women ).
It is worthy to note, however, that the three-year increase of the age re-
quirement to be entitled to seniority pensions was repealed by the center-
Left government (2007), which introduced a more gradual tightening of 
eligibility conditions, together with other incremental adjustments.
Flexibility without Security
As for employment policy, the learning process that had started during 
the 1990s continued in the early 2000s, regardless of the political ori-
entation of the cabinets. Once again, experts played a major role in the 
elaboration of both the diagnosis and reform proposals, and the White 
Book (Ministero del Welfare 2001) inspired by Marco Biagi suggested a 
move towards a more ‘flexible and secure’ labor market in accordance 
with EU recommendations (especially from the EES). The government in-
terpreted these guidelines in the light of its policy and political priorities 
and drafted a reform proposal which for the first time included a measure 
that, if adopted, would undermine the long lasting pattern of job security 
for the insiders . In fact the government ’s bill aimed to modify Article 18 
of the Workers’ Statute on the compulsory reintegration of workers in 
case of unmotivated dismissal, by allowing employers to choose between 
reintegration and monetary compensation. In contrast to what happened 
in the field of pensions, however, in this case the unions front split, and 
only the major workers organization (Cgil) strongly opposed the reform 
– in particular the intervention on Article 18 which was seen as a deliber-
ate attack to workers . Once again the rank and files were mobilized and 
a vast demonstration was organized in March 2002. Despite such strong 
resistance, in the following months a pro-reform coalition emerged and 
a new social pact was signed (Pact for Italy) by the government , the em-
ployers ’ association and two unions (Cisl and Uil), while Cgil continued 
its opposition. The agreement drew the guidelines for the following 2003 
employment policy reform.
Law 30/03 contained measures which were much more tuned towards 
flexibility than security, though the revision of Article 18 was ultimate-
ly withdrawn. Flexibilization was relaunched with the introduction of a 
number of new ‘atypical’ contracts, mainly directed at those entering the 
labor market, and placement services were strengthened. However, the 
comprehensive reconfiguration of the unemployment protection system 
was not included in the reform. This absence is particularly striking for 
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at least two reasons. First, because the Pact for Italy had already pointed 
at the need to increase the replacement rate of ordinary unemployment 
benefits (from 40 percent to 60 percent, more in line with European stan-
dards). Second, and even more important, as the growing share of ‘atypi-
cal workers ’ on total employment (16.2 percent in 2003 from 9.3 percent 
10 years before) and the spread of flexible contracts amongst the new en-
trants the labor market indicated that: a) at least for the younger gen-
erations the traditional pattern of job security had been abandoned, and 
consequently, b) the system to tackle unemployment should be radically 
revised in order to protect atypical workers that could hardly get entitled 
to ordinary unemployment benefits.
Moreover, the missed reform of unemployment compensation went 
parallel to the developments in the social assistance sector where the 
minimum income safety net – aimed to protect from lack/loss of income 
– was all but reinforced. Privileging a welfare model based on family and 
community networks (Ministero del Welfare 2003), the center-Right gov-
ernment drastically cut the fund for social policies and put an end to the 
experimentation of the Minimum insertion income.
More recent developments have not modified the situation either. In 
the short period of the center-Left Prodi cabinet (2006-8) the issue of set-
ting up a safety net for those in need has disappeared from both the politi-
cal agenda and the public discourse, while the plan to expand childcare 
services had just been started when the government resigned. By contrast, 
resources have been directed to strengthen ordinary unemployment ben-
efit – by extending duration to eight months and increasing replacement 
rate to 60 percent for the first six months: as employees on open-ended 
contracts in small/medium firms mostly benefit from this improvement, it 
represents another case in which available resources have been ‘captured’ 
by the insiders at the expenses of both the atypical, temporary workers 
and the outsiders . As a consequence, even taking into account the whole 
range of ordinary and special benefits, ca. 69 percent of the unemployed 
was not covered in case of unemployment at the end of 2006.
Finally, the measures aiming to tackle poverty which have been adopt-
ed during the early months of the new Berlusconi government seem too 
timid (if not completely inadequate). A lump sum benefit for low-income 
households (‘family bonus’) and a so called ‘social card’ – i.e. an income-
tested benefit targeted to persons over 65 and to families with children 
below three years old – have been introduced, but they are extremely low: 
between 200 euros (single person) and 1,000 euros (family with three 
children) the former, 40 euros/month the latter.
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6.4 Towards the End of the Bismarckian Compromise
Over the last three decades the fundamental components of the ‘Bis-
marckian compromise’ aimed at securing income protection both in em-
ployment and retirement for workers and their families have been sub-
stantially modified. The major changes have been adopted in the fields of 
employment policy and old-age protection.
Firstly, though a high level of job protection (and stability) has been 
maintained for the ‘insiders ’ – due to the strong resistance by the major 
union on this issue – the pattern of employment based on full-time per-
manent contracts has been overcome, at least for the new entrants in the 
labor market, and flexibilization has rapidly increased.
As for pensions, first, incremental adjustments have managed to 
tackle some shortcomings of the Bismarckian model by pursuing a 
thorough harmonization of pension rules across the major occupa-
tional categories and foreclosing the gateways to early retirement; sec-
ond, structural reforms have entailed a major shift from the typical 
Bismarckian configuration, characterized by the predominance of first 
pillar, public, compulsory insurance schemes providing earnings-relat-
ed benefits to a multi-pillar model. This is based on the combination 
of public Notional Defined Contribution and supplementary Defined 
Contribution schemes, which implies a deep modification of the Italian 
model of old-age protection, and particularly of its underlying logic. In 
fact, if the NDC system will be decisive for containing old-age expen-
diture and reducing deficits in future decades, fiscal and economic sus-
tainability is likely to be attained by abandoning the traditional goal of 
income maintenance through public pensions. The new system is built 
on the idea that in the future income maintenance after retirement will 
have to be achieved via a much more complex interplay between man-
datory and voluntary insurance, first and second/third pillar schemes, 
state and market, PAYG and funding. Within this new arrangement the 
income maintenance function is not guaranteed as, first, it depends on 
workers ’ voluntary affiliation to supplementary funds (members are 
currently 5 million out of 23 million employed) and, second, it is not 
an explicit objective of both NDC and DC schemes. In fact, these are 
informed by the principles of ‘individual saving’ and actuarial fairness 
and, consequently, they do not provide any predetermined level of ben-
efits – as only the contribution rates are fixed and pensions vary ac-
cording to different parameters – thus shifting on insured workers the 
risk associated with old-age insurance.
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In the late 1990s, these far-reaching changes seemed likely to be ac-
companied by the introduction of innovative goals (poverty prevention), 
principles (selective universalism ) and policy instruments (minimum 
insertion income, means-tested family benefits, development of social 
services ) that, if fully institutionalized, might have helped to bridge the 
traditional insiders /outsiders gap. However, more recently a growing ten-
sion between these modernizing developments and more conservative 
measures has been registered. Attempts to overcome the traditional work 
based approach – or, in other words, to go ‘beyond Bismarck ’ – in the 
fields of unemployment protection and family policies have been rare, the 
path towards the institutionalization of the new goal of combating pov-
erty /social exclusion has been barred – thus letting Italy without a mini-
mum income safety net – the provision of in-kind benefits (e.g. childcare 
facilities) has not caught up with European standards, and a comprehen-
sive income protection system for the growing share of atypical workers 
is still a far prospect.
In the previous sections we have illustrated how innovative reforms 
have been propelled by external pressures. EU budget constraints, the road 
to EMU and financial markets stimuli have jointly represented indirect 
pressures for the adoption of retrenchment measures in pension and em-
ployment policy, whereas labor market, social assistance and family pol-
icy reforms were directly influenced by the ideas and the policy solutions 
elaborated within supranational and cross-national ‘epistemic communi-
ties.’ However, the close investigation of both adopted and failed reforms 
and the recent cases of policy reversal suggests that European influence 
has been mediated by: a) the domestic institutional (policy) settings and 
their links with interest groups, b) the political priorities and strategies 
of national actors. On the one hand, retrenchment interventions – espe-
cially in the pension sector – have in fact been successful when govern-
ments have been willing (and able) to exploit the fragmented Bismarckian 
institutional structure (and regulatory variation) and craft package deals 
that were acceptable by the unions (the actual veto players in this field). 
On the other hand, the ‘politics matter’ argument holds particularly true 
when looking at the path-breaking , and mostly expansionary, reforms in 
the field of unemployment protection, social assistance and family policy , 
but also at the more recent policy reversal. In fact the learning process has 
fully occurred when the innovative policy recipes from the European level 
have matched the political and policy priorities of the center-Left Prodi 
government – that aimed to represent a modernizing coalition open to 
Europe and its social model – thus empowering the pro-reform national 
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coalition. By contrast, the center-Right Berlusconi cabinet has referred to 
Europe in order to adopt retrenchment measures while mostly disregard-
ing the stances in favor of the consolidation/expansion of innovative wel-
fare programs like the ‘Mii’ (selective learning ). Finally the (indeed very 
weak) center-Left Prodi government has been more committed to repeal 
some of the measures introduced by the previous cabinet than to signifi-
cantly modify the longstanding pattern of relations between the welfare 
system, the family and the individuals/workers .
6.5 Conclusions
What are therefore the prospects for the Italian welfare system after the 
partial departure from the Bismarckian arrangement illustrated above? 
In order to answer this question two final considerations should be put 
forward.
Firstly, it must be acknowledged that the peculiar mix of moderniz-
ing interventions and conservatism has led to the accomplishment of the 
retrenchment component of the reform process whereas the introduc-
tion of innovative instruments that should constitute the compensatory 
component has lagged behind. The consequence is that the Italian welfare 
state currently adds to the traditional gaps in terms of protected risks 
and social groups, new gaps – which mostly affect younger generations – 
stemming from the end of the ‘Bismarckian compromise’ in employment 
and pension policies. There is, thus, urgent need for a further revision of 
the welfare architecture in order to make it more respondent to the new 
risk profiles. This would very likely require a greater reliance on new prin-
ciples and policy instruments , such as citizenship/need-based programs 
and the loosening of the equivalence principle in contributory schemes.
And here comes the second consideration. Is this revision of welfare 
arrangements probable, or possible, in the near future? The analysis of 
the trajectory of reform has shown that Italy has long been unable to re-
vise the national welfare system endogenously and, in accordance with 
neo-institutionalist arguments about the relevance of exogenous shocks 
for policy change, innovative reforms have been adopted due to external 
pressures/influences. The current financial and economic crisis seems 
therefore to be a good testing ground to see if national policy-makers will 
be willing to exploit once more exogenous shocks in order to complete the 
departure from Bismarck .
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Table 6.1 – Summary of reform trajectory : Italy
Sequence Contest Diagnosis
Contradictory reforms in the 
1980s
– Stagfl ation;
– Slower economic growth;
– Budget defi cits
Priorities: fi ght infl ation and 
unemployment 
– Welfare still a useful 
institution;
– Welfare laggard: expansion 
needed;
– Waste/frauds and 
ineffi  ciencies in some welfare 
sectors
1992-93: First retrenchment 
measures in emergency
– Soaring public debt/defi cits;
– Employment crisis;
– External constraints on the 
public budget and speculative 
attacks on national currency 
Priorities:
Fiscal /economic/ 
employment crisis – Pension 
system not unsustainable and 
unfair
(Health care expenditure)
1995-2000
The path-breaking reforms 
under European infl uence
– Still employment crisis; high 
public debt/defi cits;
– Slight economic recovery;
– Run-up to EMU jointly with 
fi nancial speculative attacks, 
though less intense after 1995
Priorities:
– Fiscal and employment 
crisis;
– Cut pension expenditure;
– Overcome the double 
distortion of national welfare 
system
2000-08:
Steps back and forth 
between modernization and 
conservatism
– Recession;
– Rising defi cits but looser 
budget constraints;
– Loss of competitiveness
Priorities:
– Tax cuts;
– Welfare cause of loss of 
competitiveness and labor 
market distortions;
– Pension adequacy problem
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Content of the policy Politics Consequences
Ambivalent:
– Labor reduction route;
– New benefi ts/ more 
generosity;
– Higher contribution rates;
– A few cost containment 
measures: more targeting 
– Still ‘insulated’ domestic 
policy-making: higher 
contributions and transfer for 
public budget allowed;
– Resistance to retrenchment : 
unions struggle to maintain 
status quo ;
– ‘Short-term horizon’ of 
policy-makers prevails
– More welfare expenditure: 
closing the gap with Europe;
– More intercategorical 
unfairness;
– Acute welfare without work 
syndrome 
– Moderate retrenchment ;
– Pension reform: path-
dependent, incremental 
change;
– Higher contribution;
– Framework for 
supplementary funded 
pensions
– Domestic policy-making 
porous to external pressures: 
indirect EU infl uence;
– Short-term and long-term 
interests merge: policy-
makers forced to take actions;
– Social pacts: technocratic 
cabinets and social partners 
– Cost containment and 
(partial) harmonization in the 
fi eld of pensions
(and health care );
– Measures to reduce labor 
cost
– Deep retrenchment ;
– Path-breaking reforms: new 
principles and goals (market, 
poverty alleviation, selective 
universalism , actuarial 
fairness);
– New policy instruments ;
– Higher contributions
– Domestic policy-making 
porous to external pressures: 
direct & indirect EU infl uence;
– Corporatist concertation to 
overcome veto players ;
– Social pacts;
– Policy learning 
– Fiscal consolidation;
– Pension sustainable and 
actuarially fair;
– Retirement income depends 
on the combination of public 
and supplementary schemes;
– Labor market: fl exibilization , 
privatization and activation;
– Safety net and activation for 
the outsiders 
– Pensions: contradictory 
incremental reforms; fostering 
multi-pillarization;
– Labor Market: more 
fl exibility and activation;
– Conservative familialism 
– Confrontation with political 
learning ;
– Social pacts: center-Right 
cabinet;
– Concertation: center-Left 
and unions ;
– Selective learning 
– More fl exibility ; 
– New security gaps;
– Intergenerational issues
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7 Defrosting the Spanish Welfare State: 
 The Weight of Conservative Components
Ana Guillén
7.1 Introduction
The transformation of the Spanish political system as well as the Spanish 
economy and welfare state has been dramatic since the advent of democ-
racy 30 years ago. Because of the process of democratization, changes in 
the political domain have been the most salient.
Spain has been a parliamentary monarchy for the last 30 years. This is 
the longest historical experience of consolidated democracy. Since 1982, 
the party system is dominated by two major parties: the Social Demo-
cratic PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Español) and the Conservative PP 
(Partido Popular, called Alianza Popular before 1989). As Chulià (2006) 
notes, due to the key roles of the government and the Congress in the 
Spanish political system, during the periods in which a party enjoys an 
absolute majority, both institutions emerge as one and the same veto play-
er; hence there is no veto to government proposals. Conversely, minority 
governments are very vulnerable to the veto power of the minor parties 
supporting them. Supporting parties to the central government have usu-
ally been ‘nationalist’ ones, that is, regional parties.
Since 1978, Spain has become a strongly decentralized country. Th e ter-
ritory is split in 17 autonomous regions enjoying political and administra-
tive powers. Th erefore Spain has three levels of government , namely cen-
tral, regional and local. Th e relations between the regions and the central 
state depend on the identities of the parties in power. Spanish autonomous 
regions enjoy responsibility over many social policies including education, 
health care , social services and social assistance . Autonomous regions 
spend one third of total public expenditure nowadays and around 60 per-
cent of their budget on health care , social care services and education. Th e 
income-maintenance system remains in the hands of the central state.
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The social partners enjoy high levels of representativeness in Spain. As 
regards unions , two big confederations, namely the socialist UGT (Unión 
General de Trabajadores), and the communist CCOO (Comisiones Ob-
reras) have come to represent the interests of virtually all workers . Al-
though unions have not reached high levels of affiliation (15 percent of 
salaried workers ), this dual repartition of representation was consolidated 
through the results of elections of workers ’ committees.1 Employers have 
gathered around one single organization, CEOE (Confederación Española 
de Organizaciones Empresariales), integrating the firms of all territories 
and economic sectors. The CEOE later incorporated the association of 
medium size and small firms (CEPYME).
Like France , Spain is not a veto-heavy political system. Vetoes can and 
have been exercised by unions through strikes and demonstrations, and 
employers ’ associations are also very capable of exercising pressure. Ob-
viously, regions have become very salient political actors, especially re-
garding the negotiation of financial flows from the central state. Political 
pressure can be exercised much less intensely by consumers’ associations, 
some professional associations (medical doctors’ associations do not en-
joy much power in comparison to the situation in other countries), and by 
the Catholic Church, the latter regarding issues dealing with the teaching 
of religion in primary and secondary education and ethical issues (abor-
tion, homosexual rights, genetic engineering).2
For its part, the Spanish economy has experienced a deep transforma-
tion in the last three decades, and it has done so in at least three aspects, 
namely the relative share of productive sectors, the degree of openness of 
the economy and the activity of the public sector.
Regarding the first aspect, the relative share of productive sectors has 
varied, as in many other advanced economies, towards a reduction of 
the primary and secondary sectors and an intense growth of the tertiary 
one. From 1980 to 2000, the primary sector was reduced to half its size, 
while the secondary sector lost 5 percentage points and the tertiary sector 
gained 10 points. In 2000, the split was of 3.63 percent for the primary 
sector, 30.52 percent for the secondary sector, and 65.85 percent for the 
services sector (Fundación BBVA 2005). This split has remained stable 
until the present.
In the second place, the Spanish economy has undergone a deep pro-
cess of opening. Trade ﬂ uxes, i.e. exports plus imports, hardly reaching 
31 percent of GDP in 1985, went up to 43 percent in 2003. Th is constitutes 
an openness coeﬃ  cient which is comparable, and even superior, to that of 
other European countries of similar size. If we take into account that the 
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point of departure was of much more severe economic isolation, these data 
reﬂ ect an intense eﬀ ort of international projection (Alonso 2005: 481).
The third salient transformation of the Spanish economy was experi-
enced by the public sector. Fiscal reform was carried out starting in 1979 
and has led to the modernization of the Spanish fiscal system on the one 
hand, and to a significant growth of fiscal pressure on the other. Fiscal 
pressure has increased from 25.7 percent in 1980 to 35.6 percent in 2005, 
with a maximum of 36.8 percent in 1992.3 The composition of state rev-
enues has changed as well. While the percentage of social contributions 
over GDP at current prices has remained fairly stable, direct and indirect 
taxes have almost doubled their rates, but growth of indirect taxation has 
been more intense. As a result, in 2005, state revenues amounted to 13.1 
percent of GDP collected through social contributions , 12.1 percent col-
lected through indirect taxes and 10.4 percent through direct taxes .4
Finally, the entrance of Spain into the EC (1986) and then the EMU have 
also significantly conditioned the activities of the public administration 
in a twofold way. In the first place, social expenditure growth in the 1980s 
was also possible thanks to the arrival of structural and cohesion funds, 
which served the purpose of financing productive investments. In the sec-
ond place, the requirements to join the EMU have deeply conditioned 
budgetary policies from 1996 onwards, by obliging the state to contain 
public expenditure in order to maintain deficits at the levels required by 
the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability Pact.
7.2 The Point of Departure: The Spanish Welfare State in the Late 1970s
When Franco died in 1975 and Spain began its transition to democracy, a 
social protection system was already in place. Many Spanish scholars refuse 
to refer to social policy under the dictatorship as the building of a ‘wel-
fare state’, given the non-democratic context in which it was constructed 
and also its underdevelopment in comparative terms with other European 
countries.5 However, whatever social policy existed (and it can hardly be la-
beled as either ‘residual’ à la Titmuss or ‘rudimentary’ à la Leibfried ) it was 
clearly organized mirroring the Bismarckian tradition. Franco ’s admiration 
for Nazi Germany and fascist Italy explains the emulation of the Bismarck-
ian model when the social protection system started to be built in the 1940s.
Th e principles on which the authoritarian welfare system was based are 
not easy to spell out, for Franco and his ministers did not have a clear-cut 
ideology. However, one can easily deduct from the declaration of motives 
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preceding legal texts (especially the Basic Law of Social Security of 1963), 
and also from outcomes, that the Spanish welfare system did not share all 
the main normative/ideational elements common to all Bismarckian wel-
fare systems. Th e Spanish Seguridad Social did share the emphasis on se-
curity, i.e. job and income security for male workers . Th e social protection 
system was in charge of income maintenance and one of the most rigid la-
bor markets in West Europe was responsible for job security. It also shared 
the importance of professional identities: curiously enough Spaniards paid 
social contributions according to their professional sector and the amount 
of social contributions was quite detached from the amount of their sal-
ary. Furthermore, the orientation towards the support of traditional family 
roles was crystal clear even in the public discourse. Th e Spanish welfare sys-
tem also favored subsidiarity . But it is here where shared principles come to 
an end. Collectively negotiated rights were impossible in the absence of free 
unions . Proportionality does not apply when social contributions (and, de-
rived from it, beneﬁ ts) are not proportional to salaries. By 1980, these two 
latter principles had been included in the system, the ﬁ rst thanks to democ-
ratization and legalization of the unions and the second thanks to the legal 
reform of social security in 1975 and the outstanding ﬁ scal reform of 1979.
Institutional arrangements meant that social protection policies were 
aimed at workers and their dependants. The rest of the population was 
either referred to Poor Relief (Beneficencia) if their income was very low 
or to the private market if their income was high. The Basic Law estab-
lishing social security had been passed in 1963 and implemented from 
1967 onwards. In 1975, the Seguridad Social comprised a general scheme 
for salaried workers and a good number of special regimes for other cat-
egories of workers (Velarde Fuertes 1990). The so-called mutualidades 
laborales (social protection associations rooted in big firms or industrial/
services branches) remained in place with the 1963 reform, but withered 
away in subsequent years.
Benefits came to be earnings-related by 1980. The system was financed 
entirely by social contributions paid by workers and employers ; the pro-
portion of state revenues was negligible. Franco ’s dislike for taxes was 
notorious, despite the insistence of his finance ministers on the need to 
introduce a broader and progressive tax on income. The mid-1970s were 
still a time of large surpluses in social accounts but they were not to last, 
as soon as the economic crises struck the Spanish economy.
Management and administration were centralized, both from a politi-
cal and economic point of view. As a consequence the Spanish system was 
not split in social funds (Kassen , caisses, etc) right from its establishment. 
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It should also be recalled that the role played by unions and employers ’ 
associations in the management and administration of the system was 
non-existent under an authoritarian regime.
In 1975, the Spanish social protection system was comparatively less 
developed than other Bismarckian systems. Nonetheless, it comprised 
several public programs: income maintenance (retirement , unemploy-
ment and sickness allowances ), health care , social care services, family 
policies, housing policies and education, having attained different levels 
of development. Especially family and care policies for children, the dis-
abled and the elderly were underdeveloped since the authoritarian regime 
deeply believed in the different social roles of men and women , the latter 
having to stay at home and provide care. The Francoist regime always 
made intense propaganda about its pro-natalist family policies, but by the 
mid-1970s the amount of family transfers had become very modest.
Retirement pensions were organized along professional lines. As already 
noted, a general regime for salaried workers existed and several others, but 
ﬁ nancing, management and administration were centralized in a single in-
stitution, i.e. the Seguridad Social. Since the advent of democracy, though, 
the vocation expressed in the legal texts was to reduce the number of profes-
sional regimes gradually and equalize the conditions of access and beneﬁ ts. 
Retired workers could all count on a pension. A small program for those 
people having failed to gather contributory pension rights was also in place, 
namely that of pensiones asistenciales. Even at this early stage some internal 
redistribution within the social security system could be ascertained; the 
agrarian regime always suﬀ ered from deﬁ cits, so transfers from the general 
regime were done in order to be able to pay for agrarian pensions.
Health care services were grouped under the Asistencia Sanitaria de la 
Seguridad Social (ASSS) also created by the Basic Law of 1963. Th e ASSS 
was in charge of providing health services for all insured workers and their 
dependants. Th e proportion of the population covered by the ASSS in 1975 
was of 80.9 percent (Fundación FOESSA 1983: 809). Th e ASSS owned its 
own network of public health institutions, consisting mainly of primary 
and specialized care providers (ambulatorios) and hospitals (residencias 
sanitarias de la Seguridad Social). However, other public networks of 
health institutions existed, as for example, health care services for the mili-
tary or the network established before social insurance began, which was 
administered and managed by the Home Oﬃ  ce and owned the so-called 
‘provincial hospitals’ (one in the capital of each province). Doctors were 
salaried employees beginning with the establishment of health care insur-
ance in 1943, a condition that was maintained by the Basic Law of Social 
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Security in 1963. Furthermore, the system was organized so that primary 
doctors acted as the doorkeepers, referring patients to higher levels of care.
Unemployment protection had a very limited scope in the mid-1970s, 
A program started in 1963. However, male full employment was the norm 
at that point in time and only a few workers benefited from it before the 
impact of the crises of the 1970s was felt in the economy. Two peculiari-
ties of Spain should be noted in this respect. First, full employment was 
attained under the dictatorship not only by insertion in the Spanish labor 
market but also by emigration to other more developed European coun-
tries. Second, the Spanish labor market under Franco ’s regime was one of 
the most rigid and overprotected in Europe with very costly firings and 
stringent legislation on permanent contracts.
The Spanish social protection system was deeply predicated on the 
principles of the breadwinner model. Because on the one hand, women 
were expected to stay home and look after children, the disabled and the 
elderly and, on the other hand, female access to education and the labor 
market lagged well behind other European countries, social care services 
remained very underdeveloped in the mid-1970s.
In sum, the Spanish welfare state of the mid- to late 1970s was an un-
derdeveloped version of the Bismarckian model. In 1980, roughly half of 
the ﬁ nancing was done out of social contributions (12.6 percent of GDP), 
and the other half was split on similar proportions between direct taxes 
(6.7 percent) and indirect taxes (6.4 percent).6 Public expenditure on so-
cial protection amounted to 17.1 percent of GDP, while the average for the 
EU15 was of 21.9 percent (OECD, several years). As already noted, man-
agement was centralized in a single institution and in the hands of public 
authorities. Finally, population coverage was broad (around 80-85 percent 
for pensions and health) but not universal . Family and care policies were 
severely underdeveloped, while voluntary associations played a prominent 
role regarding the protection of the poor and socially excluded.
But there is another way of assessing the character of a Bismarckian 
system. According to the re-examination of welfare regimes carried out 
by Esping-Andersen (1999: 81), ‘the essence of a Conservative regime lies 
in its blend of status segmentation and familialism ’. The Spanish system 
of the mid-1970s was Bismarckian but not quite. It was markedly based 
on ‘Conservative familialist’ principles, that is, a biased male breadwinner 
model where the family becomes central as a caregiver and responsible 
for the welfare of its members. Still, some of the corporatist institutional 
arrangements were missing, especially those related to the existence of 
independent professional funds and those concerned with the manage-
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ment and administration of the system and the role played by the social 
partners . As a working hypothesis, it is my contention that it is precisely 
this lack of intense corporatist traits that eased the way for the paradig-
matic reforms of the 1980s and the recalibration of the 1990s. Conversely, 
the ‘Conservative familialist’ character of the Spanish welfare state has 
proved more difficult to overcome.
7.3 Reforming Social Protection in the Last Three Decades
Transition to Democracy: Expansion without Institutional Change 
(1975-1982)
As I have argued elsewhere (Guillén 1996), expansion in terms of coverage 
and expenditure rather than structural reform took place from the beginning 
of the transition to democracy in 1975 to the victory of the Socialist Party 
(PSOE) in 1982. In fact, expenditure on social protection was one and a half 
times higher in 1982 than in 1975, due especially to the increasing role of taxa-
tion in the ﬁ nancing of social protection. Th e reasons for expansion without 
organizational change in the social protection system previous to 1982 were 
related to the need to stabilize the new political regime, the concurrence of 
the economic shocks of the 1970s and the pressures to alleviate social needs 
caused by massive unemployment and inﬂ ation. In a few words, two goals had 
to be reached in parallel. Th e ﬁ rst goal consisted of meeting the population’s 
needs and aspirations. Th e second goal was to achieve broad consensus for 
political reform. In this context, the reform of social protection institutions 
was postponed, the stabilization of the new democratic political institutions 
was much more pressing. Th is is in sharp contrast with the Portuguese tran-
sition to democracy, which was more of a ‘rupture’ in character, and more 
similar to the Greek one, which also chose a ‘reformist’ and consensual path 
to transition to democracy (Maravall 1995).
But deep reform after 1982 was also possible thanks to certain develop-
ments taking place in the first few years of the transition to democracy. 
These developments eased the way for paradigmatic changes thereafter. 
Among them are:
a) The separation of health services from the Ministry of Labor and So-
cial Security and the creation of an independent Ministry of Health.
b) The approval of a democratic constitution, allowing for devolution of 
powers to the regions.
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c) The general trend towards increased democratization and participa-
tion of social partners in the decision-making process, in particular 
within the social security governing bodies.
d) Full development of public preferences in favor of both enlarging so-
cial protection and of basing entitlements to welfare services (not to 
income maintenance transfers) on citizenship rights.
Towards Universal Coverage (1982-1992)
The problem to be dealt with in this sequence of reforms was bringing the 
Spanish social protection system closer to that of its European counter-
parts. Upgrading of protection and closing protection gaps was the land-
mark in both the public discourse and public preferences, which shared 
an acute conscience of backwardness. The absolute majority of the So-
cialist Party in the 1982 elections raised big hopes among the population. 
However, the poor state of the economy and the need to restructure in-
dustry delayed reforms. Things began to change rapidly and deeply in the 
second half of the 1980s, thanks to the positive economic cycle on the one 
side and to pressures exercised by the unions on the other.
Growth in expenditure and coverage was spectacular from 1982 to 1992 
(Rodríguez Cabrero 1994). Social contributions became insufficient to fi-
nance the system and the state had to start using more resources from 
general taxation . Unemployment protection was expanded in 1983/4 and 
health care provision in 1984/1986 and 1999. Contrarily, public retirement 
pensions were reformed in 1985 in a restrictive way.
Pensions: Rationalization
The pension reform of 1985 initiated a series of rationalizing measures 
that were to be continued during the 1990s. In 1985, the minimum con-
tributory period was enlarged from 10 to 15 years, while the formula to 
calculate the benefits came to include the salaries of the last eight years 
instead of the two previously required. It is important to highlight that 
cost-control reforms were not introduced in most other Bismarckian wel-
fare states until much later. Still, retirement pensions remained in the 
hands of the central state and organized along professional lines.
The 1985 reform was imposed by the socialist government , even at 
the cost of breaking their historical brotherhood with the socialist union 
(UGT), because of clear domestic reasons. At that point Spain was under-
going severe economic difficulties and previous reforms enacted under 
the late authoritarian regime had rendered the cost of pensions unbear-
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able. Conversely, after the successful 1988 general strike, unions were able 
to press the socialist government into expansionary measures, such as 
the creation of a non-contributory pension scheme and the indexation of 
pensions to past inflation. The introduction of non-contributory pensions 
can be considered a major shift in the trajectory of pension provision.
Th e creation of ﬂ at-rate non-contributory pensions for the elderly and 
the disabled in 1991 meant that all citizens and not only workers were en-
titled to pensions; it resulted in a universal coverage in terms of income 
maintenance for all people over 65. Another salient departure from the path 
also took place in 1989, when private pension plans were allowed for the ﬁ rst 
time. Th e creation of private plans was fostered by the introduction of ﬁ scal 
exemptions. Both reforms were in line with EC recommendations to lower 
poverty among the elderly and to complement public pension systems.
Furthermore, the restrictive reform of 1985 did not impede the internal 
redistributory measures initiated in the early 1980s, namely the conti-
nuity of the so-called minimum pension supplements (complementos a 
mínimos). The Spanish system counts on a minimum and a maximum 
retirement pension. The minimum pension is granted to all beneficiaries 
(having contributed for a minimum period) irrespective of whether their 
contributory career allows them to reach the minimum pension or not. 
This measure became more and more costly over the 1980s and 1990s. 
Furthermore, a strategy was also initiated in order to narrow the gap be-
tween the average retirement pension and the minimum salary. This was 
done by raising the minimum pension, by indexing pensions to the cost of 
living, and also by ameliorating the lowest pensions, mainly those of sur-
vivors. The objective of equalizing the average pension to the minimum 
salary was attained in 1995 (Guillén 1999).
Employment Policies: A Typical Bismarckian Trajectory
Early retirement and disability pensions were used broadly in the early 
1980s with the aim of covering situations of need among the unemployed. 
The situation began to be reversed towards the end of the decade through 
the fight against fraud and abuses.
Passive unemployment protection was reduced in 1980 because of the 
poor condition of the economy and expanded in 1984. Coverage rates grew 
from 43.4 percent in 1986 to a peak of 80.3 percent of the unemployed 
in 1992, when they reached the maximum during the democratic period 
(Cruz Roche 1994). However, the number of contributory beneﬁ ciaries 
lost ground and that of non-contributory ones kept increasing, a measure 
clearly in favor of the long-term unemployed but also meaning an assisten-
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tialization of the system. Investment in active measures began to take oﬀ  
in the second half of the 1980s (Toharia 1997; Gutiérrez and Guillén 2000).
Also in 1984, the first wave of labor market liberalization took place. It 
introduced fixed-term contracts while leaving the ordinary framework of 
contracting untouched. This move had a decisive influence on the config-
uration of the Spanish labor market. Temporary contracts facilitated the 
adaptation of staffing to cyclical conditions and stimulated the creation of 
employment. Still, fixed-term contracts quickly reached 30 percent of all 
salaried workers (the highest rate in the EU up to the present), produced a 
dualization of the labor market structure and were not able to drastically 
reduce unemployment (15 percent at the end of the 1980s).
Health Care : Universalization
Health care suﬀ ered the most dramatic change towards universalization, 
which has of course to be considered a paradigmatic change. Th e very im-
portant reform of primary care in 1984 and the General Health Law of 1986 
constituted a major departure point from the Bismarckian path. A public 
national health system (Sistema Nacional de Salud) was created comprising 
all pre-existing public networks of providers. At the same time the new leg-
islation allowed for the devolution of powers over health care to the auton-
omous regions, as already sanctioned by the 1978 democratic constitution. 
Th e reform was carried out gradually. Devolution took place in several stag-
es, each autonomous region negotiating individually with the central state. 
Th e process of decentralization began in 1982 in Spain with the devolution 
of health care powers to Catalonia and was only completed in December 
2002, 20 years later. In Spain, there were no health funds, so they did not 
have to be suppressed. Coverage of the population was already almost uni-
versal (over 90 percent), a circumstance that was possible, on the one hand, 
because of the previous inclusion of more and more categories of workers 
into the system of social security and, on the other, by the loosening of the 
rules on access for dependants (Guillén 2002).7 Th us, the economic eﬀ ort to 
turn a social insurance health system into a national health service covering 
100 percent of the population was not too demanding. It was not until 1989 
that a royal decree allowed for the incorporation of previous beneﬁ ciaries 
of poor relief into the Spanish NHS. However, access to the system was not 
turned into a citizenship right and the professional principle (with several 
corrections to allow for universal coverage) has remained in place.8 Hence 
universalization in Spain could be said to have happened de facto rather 
than de jure. Th e composition of ﬁ nancing was gradually modiﬁ ed to be-
come increasingly dependant on general revenues.
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The shift from health care insurance to a national health service was 
possible thanks to the formation of a broad coalition in support of such 
a change. The coalition included the central government , leftist parties, 
regional governments and the unions . Public opinion was also very clearly 
in favor of it. The Conservative Party in the opposition, employers asso-
ciations and medical associations were not able to impede it.
Family Policies : Nothing Much New Under the Sun
Family policies remained untouched until 1990 when a universal means-
tested scheme substituted the almost negligible economic transfers inher-
ited from the previous regime. Transfers were ameliorated for those fami-
lies with disabled kin, but the amount of the economic support remained 
low (Cruz Roche 1994). The postponement of the reform of family policies 
can be explained, among other reasons, by the reluctance of the socialist 
governments (1982-1994) to be identified with the natalist orientation of 
the Francoist dictatorship (see Valiente 1995 for a detailed analysis). Care 
policies were expanded and ameliorated, especially for children between 
three and five years of age, for whom places at pre-schooling were pro-
vided. Expansion of care policies for the disabled and the elderly was also 
notorious and the creation of a Ministry of Social Services in 1988 helped 
to improve this area (Ministerio de Asuntos Sociales 1993). Nonetheless, 
these policies departed from extremely low levels of provision and the in-
tense ageing of the population did not help. Thus, at the beginning of the 
1990s, care was still massively in the hands of families.
Social care services were devolved to the autonomous regions in the late 
1980s and early 1990s. Given the small development of this policy and its 
low economic weight, it was easy for the central government to please the 
regions by devolving responsibility to them. Th is move enhanced the intro-
duction of innovative solutions, but provision started to show geographical 
heterogeneity not only among regions but even between diﬀ erent localities.
Social Assistance: Introducing Minimum Income Schemes
Social assistance made an important move ahead as well in the late 1980s. 
Faced with a refusal on the part of the central state, the unions began 
bargaining with regional governments in order to introduce minimum in-
come schemes. By the early 1990s, all Spanish autonomous regions used 
either social salaries or social insertion salaries. In this way, Spain was the 
first Southern European country to introduce minimum income policies. 
Their generosity also varies with the region and, in general, the intensity 
of protection is modest (Aguilar et al. 1994; Arriba 2001).
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In sum, the 1980s witnessed major changes in Spain. As a consequence 
of those changes a new, mixed way of understanding welfare provision 
was born: corporatist in income maintenance and social-democratic as 
regards health (and education), overriding the Bismarckian path clearly 
in the latter case. Furthermore, what is peculiar of the Spanish case is 
the early rationalizing reform (1985) of the pension system comparatively 
with other Bismarckian welfare states. In addition, some moves can be 
ascertained in the direction of narrowing protection gaps in the realms of 
family and care policies, protection of the disabled and non-contributory 
income maintenance policies. The introduction of minimum income poli-
cies at the regional level also meant a substantial departure from the path. 
The expansionary and path-deviant trend lasted until 1992-1993, when a 
significantly different sequence of reforms started.
In Search of Effi  ciency (1992-2004)
The early 1990s, and especially the 1992 Maastricht Treaty initiated a to-
tally different context from that of the 1980s for all EU member states. The 
problem now became how to rationalize expenditure and gain efficiency. 
In Spain, austerity challenges became even more acute because of the eco-
nomic recession and the public economic effort undertaken to finance 
the Universal Exhibition of Seville and the Olympic Games in Barcelona. 
As already noted, public expenditure peaked in 1993 (47.6 percent).9 It is 
hardly news that Spain did its homework properly and was able to put in 
place a smooth and well organized process of convergence to access the 
EMU , especially after 1996. However, cost-control and austerity measures 
left a clear mark on social policy developments.
Unemployment Protection: Drastic Cuts
Unemployment protection policies were the first to be reformed in 1992, 
this time in a restrictive way. The minimum period of contribution re-
quired for access was expanded from 6 to 12 months. The payment pe-
riod was reduced from one half of the period contributed to one third. 
Replacement rates of previous salaries also decreased. Coverage rates fell 
dramatically from 80.3 percent in 1992 to 50.7 percent in 1995 (Ministerio 
de Trabajo 1996: 803). The reasons for this move were as much the need to 
reach the convergence criteria imposed externally as internal politics. As 
noted above, the introduction of fixed-term contracts by the 1983/84 la-
bor reform resulted in a share of over one third of all contracts being tem-
porary in the Spanish labor market. Such a situation meant continuous 
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entries to and exits from the labor market and peaking costs in terms of 
passive unemployment protection. As a consequence, the National Insti-
tute for Unemployment (INEM) went almost bankrupt and retrenchment 
was necessary. Expenditure growth on activation policies also slowed 
down for the rest of the decade (Gutiérrez and Guillén 2000). In 2000, an 
active integration subsidy was created for aged long-term unemployed. 
Two years later, a softened version of a most controversial reform was 
passed, aiming at enhancing geographical mobility of workers and avoid-
ing rejection of jobs (CES 2001 and 2003).
The 1990s also witnessed two further waves of labor market flexibili-
zation . The first took place in 1993-1994. Among other measures, these 
reforms included promoting job creation through new tax and social 
contribution exemptions for employers contracting young people, the 
long-term unemployed, people aged 45 and over, and the disabled . The 
measures also fostered work-experience and job-training contracts and 
the reduction of barriers for certain kinds of redundancies. On this occa-
sion, and in contrast to the 1984 reform, part-time contracts were more 
vigorously promoted by providing them with more public subsidies (CES 
1994). The 1993 reform also included the legalization of non-profit private 
employment agencies; thus, the National Institute of Employment lost its 
monopoly as a job placement agency. The unions agreed on this reform 
because they were weakened by corruption scandals and because they 
were compensated mainly in terms of union electoral regulations and in 
the devolution of the historical patrimony lost during the dictatorship.
The second reform of the labor market of the 1990s took place in 1996, 
under the recently elected government of the Partido Popular (PP, of 
Conservative orientation). It was the first consensual reform, achieved 
through a social pact, in comparison to the previous ones which had been 
imposed on the social partners . The 1996 reform promoted the creation of 
open-ended contracts, modified part-time contracts and reduced the cost 
of redundancies. In this case, the social agreement was reached because 
the unions feared the possibility of the Popular Party reforming by decree 
without consulting them. All in all, after three flexibilizing reforms, the 
rigid labor market of Francoist times had become only a vague memory at 
the end of the 1990s.
Pensions: Rationalization and Redistribution
Retirement pensions also underwent cost-control reforms. In 1994, pen-
sions were indexed to the estimated inflation rate for the next year, instead 
of remaining tied to past inflation as had been the norm from 1989. By 
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the mid-1990s, worries about future sustainability of the public pension 
system in a context of austerity and rapid population ageing had grown 
so much that a parliamentary commission was appointed. After a year 
of activity, the commission decided that the existing system, based on 
intergenerational solidarity, should be kept but forwarded 15 recommen-
dations for reform in order to secure future viability. This commission 
came to be known as the 1995 Toledo Pact, to which both the unions and 
employers ’ associations quickly adhered. The Toledo Pact has guided the 
reform of pensions until the present, since it was renewed and readapted 
to the socio-economic context in 2003.
The second major reform of the pension system was agreed on in 1996 
via social pact and turned into law in 1997. Once again, the rule of the 
Conservative Party raised fears of privatization and unions ‘swallowed’ 
another restrictive reform in order to ensure future viability of the public 
pension system. The main reforms of this law followed part of the To-
ledo Pact recommendations. Among many other measures, the rules to 
calculate contributory pensions were tightened again so the last 15 sala-
ried years were to be included incrementally in the formula to calculate 
the initial pension. As a counterpart, widows ’ and orphan’s pensions were 
ameliorated (Chulià 2006). Furthermore, short and/or discontinued con-
tributory careers were allowed to have a non-proportional positive impact 
in the calculation of the initial pension, a measure favoring workers with a 
high record of temporary contracts. What we can see here is a reduction 
of core workers ’ rights and a (modest) amelioration of the conditions for 
non-core ones.
More recent reform in the realm of pensions has followed the same strat-
egy. In 1999, the ‘Agreement on the Amelioration of Pensions’ dealt with 
contributory pension increases. In 2001, the ‘Agreement for the Ameliora-
tion and Development of the Social Security System’ insisted again on an 
increase of widows ’ pensions, longer protection periods for orphans, and 
the convergence among the diﬀ erent social security professional schemes 
in terms of access and the calculation of beneﬁ ts (in this latter case, atten-
tion was focused on autonomous workers ) (CES 2000 and 2002).
Last but not least, the recommendations of the Toledo Pact included 
the split of financing sources so that contributory benefits were to be fi-
nanced out of social contributions and taxes were to be used to finance 
non-contributory transfers and welfare services. Reform in this direction 
was initiated in 1998.
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Protecting Labor Market Outsiders 
Other social pacts have resulted in increased protection of non-core la-
bor workers in the late 1990s. First, the ‘Agreement on Employment and 
Social Protection of Agrarian Workers’ of 1996 meant a step forward in 
the conditions of protection of peasants of southern Spanish regions, by 
including previous unemployment subsidies into the general scheme of 
social security (enacted in 2000). The ‘Interconfederal Agreement for 
Stability in Employment’ of 1997 also fostered improvements in the pro-
tection of non-core workers , namely part-time and temporary workers . A 
specific agreement on part-time workers was reached in 1998, resulting in 
the passing of two royal decrees in the same year. In particular, conditions 
for access to social security were conflated with those of core-workers in 
terms of the relation between time worked and benefits, and in terms of 
sickness allowances and maternity benefits. As regards fixed-term work-
ers , employers ’ social contributions for unemployment were raised by a 
royal decree in 1998 both for fulltime and part-time temporary workers , 
with the aim of increasing their unemployment subsidies. A law on the 
amelioration of social protection of autonomous workers was also passed.
Health Care : In Search for Enhanced Effi  ciency without Compromising 
Equality
Health care services were also affected by rationalization. Worries about 
increasing expenditure were also present already from the late 1980s (we 
should note that expenditure on health care in Spain grew most among 
EU members in the second half of the 1980s). Such worries were condu-
cive to the establishment of a parliamentary commission (Abril Commit-
tee AC) in charge of producing recommendations for rationalization of 
health care expenditure and the introduction of cost control measures. 
The AC did produce a whole set of reform proposals but it was frontally 
rejected by the unions and the population. Thus rationalization had to be 
put in place in a low-visibility way (Cabiedes and Guillén 2001). Reform 
can be summarized by saying that rationalizing measures affected the 
supply side rather than the demand side, thus not affecting the existing 
level of equity so much as if the contrary had occurred.
The process of health care decentralization came to an end in late 2001, 
so that all 17 Spanish autonomous regions enjoy their own health care sys-
tem today. This was coupled with a new agreement on regional financing 
and a new statute for health professionals. In 2003, a law on Cohesion and 
Quality was passed aiming at securing territorial equity and quality levels 
in the provision of health care.
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Family Policies : Towards Reconciliation
Family care policies did not undergo major change during the 1990s, but 
rather modest expansion. Two exceptions should be mentioned, though, 
that of the amelioration of income maintenance for maternal leave in 1995 
and the approval of a law on reconciliation of work and family life in 1999 
(Flaquer 2000). Also, the number of offspring necessary to gain access to 
large families discounts was first reduced to four kids and later to three 
kids. Monoparental, separated or divorced families enjoy large families 
protection since 2005 (the law was passed in 2003).
To sum up, the 1990s were a period revolving around contention, ratio-
nalization and cost-control needed in order to join the EMU . The Popular 
Party government even passed a law on zero public deficit in 2000. Still, 
some redistributive or even expansionary measures may be signaled in 
almost all policy areas.
Recent Developments: Enhancing Equity and Protecting Dependency 
(2004 onwards)
As soon as the socialist party (PSOE) gained office in 2004, expansionary 
social protection reforms intensified. Two laws have been passed in the 
realm of family policies. The first allows marriages and the adoption of 
children by gay people with the same rights as any other marriage. The 
second deals with enhanced protection for battered women (passed in 
2005). Furthermore, in January 2006, paternity leave was introduced for 
workers of the central public administration and some regions have since 
done the same for their employees.
A new major reform of the labor market has been agreed on with the 
social partners in May 2006 and turned into law in June 2006. The main 
aim of the reform is to reduce temporality in the labor market and to 
gain in ‘flexicurity ’. The reform has already rendered positive results in 
the reduction of fixed-term contracts. Also in 2006, another significant 
social pact has been reached on the reform of pensions, focused on an 
amelioration of both contributory and non-contributory benefits. The re-
form includes an expansion from 13 to 15 years of the minimum period of 
contribution to gain access to the system. Also, it introduces incentives 
to continue work after the legal retirement age and measures oriented at 
further equalization of special (professional ) schemes.
Last but not least, other legal reforms are of importance. The 2007 Law 
on Gender Equality follows EU legislation and aims at establishing public 
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and private equality measures for women in the employment and social 
security spheres, and in access to goods and services. Nonetheless, per-
haps the most salient achievement of the recent phase of social dialogue 
has been the tripartite Agreement on Protection of Dependent People 
of late 2005, turned into law in December 2006. The aim of the law on 
dependency is the creation of a National System of Dependency of public 
character and of universal coverage for all people in need of care, financed 
out of public funds and of the user’s out-of-pocket payments (these latter 
dependent on income). It will affect 1.1 million people, the majority being 
the elderly . The reform started to be implemented in the Spring of 2007 
and should be fully developed by 2014. It is of the utmost importance for 
the evolution of the Spanish welfare state from the point of view of estab-
lishing the third pillar (clearly non-Bismarckian ) of any well developed 
social protection system at the national level.
Main Traits of the Reform Trajectory in Spain
All in all, the Spanish welfare state has undergone major expansion and 
change. Such change is clear in the realm of health care , provided its de-
parture from the health insurance model and its conversion into a nation-
al health service. It can be added that the process of devolution of health 
care has been completed. It is also clear in the introduction of new social 
programs, such as minimum income schemes, non-contributory pensions 
for the elderly and the disabled , and reconciliation of family and working 
life (even if modest). Private pension plans introduced in the late 1980s 
have also grown steadily. The recent creation of a National System of De-
pendency means another significant turning point in the realm of social 
care. The Spanish labor market has also become much more flexible and 
active labor market policies have been introduced.
Th e change may not be so apparent in the ﬁ eld of pensions. Most inter-
national organizations reports issued by the OECD , the IMF or even the 
EU on the evolution of pensions in Spain talk about mere path dependency 
with cost-control adjustments. Yet, the present Spanish pension system 
can hardly be compared to the one existing in the late 1970s. As shown 
above, changes aimed at lowering the amount of the initial pension have 
indeed taken place on two occasions; important changes have also oc-
curred through the introduction of non-contributory pensions and private 
pension plans. Th e lowering of the replacement rate has not impeded an 
amelioration of the amounts of pensions compared to the minimum salary. 
In 1995 the average retirement pension had surpassed the level of the mini-
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Table 7.1 Summary of reform trajectory : Spain
Types of change Context Diagnosis
Expansion without departure 
from the path
1975-1982
– economic downturn
(mid-1970’s onwards)
– rise in unemployment and 
infl ation
– social benefi ts should 
help the victims of the crisis, 
provided democracy is 
superior to dictatorship
Paradigmatic changes
1982-1992
– positive economic cycle 
(mid-1980s onwards)
– peaking unemployment still 
present
– Spanish welfare state is 
underdeveloped
– gaps in social protection 
have to be closed
– universal access to health 
care should be provided
In search of effi  ciency
(1992-2003)
– economic recession (early 
1990s), then quick and intense 
recovery
– single market
– preparation of the single 
currency
– the system has to be 
consolidated, but effi  ciency 
is a must in order to join the 
EMU 
Rounding up
2004-
– employment grows steadily
– immigration comes to the 
rescue
 – search for enhanced gender 
equity and better protection 
of dependent people 
mum salary; nowadays, it is the minimum pension which has reached the 
level of the minimum salary. Furthermore, reforms initiated in the 1980s 
and continued to the present clearly show a vocation of internal redistribu-
tion within the system. An amelioration of widows ’ and orphans’ pensions 
and those of workers with short-contributory careers has taken place. In 
2004, 28.34 percent of all pensioners enjoyed supplements in order to 
reach the minimum pension (CES 1995). Almost half a million pension-
ers received a non-contributory pension. Also, the Reserve Fund of the 
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Content of the policy Politics of the reforms Consequences
– raise in taxes 
– increase in the generosity 
of the benefi ts, with the 
exception of unemployment 
– welfare without work 
– broad consensus – no big changes of the 
welfare state institutions, but 
expansion of existing policies
– change of model in 
welfare services, towards 
universalization of health care 
and education
– rationalizing pensions and 
expanding unemployment 
protection
– broad coalitions
– strikes by unions 
– regional governments take 
the lead
– huge expansion in 
expenditure and coverage
– creation of an NHS
– minimum income schemes 
introduced at regional level
– non-contributory policies 
initiated (fi nanced through 
taxes and means-tested: 
non-contributory pensions for 
the elderly and the disabled , 
family allowances, minimum 
income schemes)
– rationalizing, fi ght against 
fraud and abuses
– tax fi nancing of all non-
contributory policies (Toledo 
Pact)
– ‘quid pro quo’ 
– negotiated on the bases of 
social pacts aimed at ensuring 
future viability
– negotiation involves an 
exchange where the state 
accepts to pay for non-
contributory benefi ts and 
upgrading of the lowest 
pensions in exchange of the 
social partners accepting 
some cuts in social insurances
– greater effi  ciency 
in expenditure and 
management
– slow down of social 
protection expenditure 
growth
– enhancing gender equity 
and paying attention to 
dependants outside the 
family
– social pacts still base of 
reform
– developing care policies at 
last?
– but the family remains 
severely underprotected
pension system amounted to 40,334 million euros in March 2007, which 
is equivalent to the cost of pensions over a period of eight months.10 More-
over, another trend was initiated in the mid-1990s towards enhancing the 
protection of non-core workers . Th is trend, even if incipient, should not be 
overlooked. Last but not least, the private pillar has expanded signiﬁ cantly 
so that 40 percent of all workers counted on a private pension plan in 2006 
and 10 percent counted on an occupational pension (CES 2006: 611). Big 
reforms may be attained through piecemeal partial ones.
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7.4 Explaining the Spanish Trajectory of Reform
The previous analysis has shown that Spain hardly looked like a frozen 
landscape in social protection reform during the last 30 years. When ex-
plaining the Spanish case, the coincidence in time of a process of transi-
tion to democracy, deep political decentralization, and joining the Euro-
pean Community becomes crucial. One could easily argue that windows 
for reform were opened precisely due to such overarching political and 
social transformations, which tended to foster the diffusion of ideas and 
learning processes. Indeed, Spain has tried to behave as a deserving (and 
always very enthusiastic) member of the EU and to comply with any rec-
ommendations or policy orientations of the European Social Model.11 De-
centralization has brought about an intense process of innovation in so-
cial protection. Novelties introduced in one region have quickly expanded 
to other regions in a sort of domino mechanism, so that very frequently 
the central state has had to deal with situations in which innovations had 
become a fact for the whole territory and act accordingly.
Comparative immaturity of the social protection system at the point 
of departure of the present analysis may have also helped the ‘defrost-
ing’ process, for the legitimization of the system was not as entrenched 
as in other national cases. There is little doubt also that other aspects of 
domestic politics, such as the permanence in office of the Socialist Party 
for 14 years, have helped reform in a social-democratic direction (health 
care and education, expansion of social care and social assistance ). None-
theless, in my view, and without denying the salience of such factors, the 
peculiar inherited Bismarckian institutional design of the Spanish social 
protection system can provide part of the explanation for the present mix-
ture of principles in social provision, that is, why income maintenance 
has remained corporatist , health care (and education) has become Social 
Democratic , and social services and social assistance have become Lib-
eral /means-tested.
The reform of the pension system shows a good number of parallels 
with other Bismarckian systems (Bonoli and Palier 2007), such as reduc-
tions in the replacement rate through changes in the formula to calculate 
the initial pension and the fostering of second and third pillar pensions. 
In general, one could claim that the Spanish pension system has been 
changed as a result of internal politics and, in some instances, of external 
influences. Regional governments were not a relevant actor in this do-
main for pensions remained centralized. The reason for this has been that 
devolution would make crystal clear which regions contribute more than 
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they spend or vice versa, which would surely become a source of conflict, 
given deep regionalist feelings. Unions were very relevant actors. The at-
tainment of the Toledo Pact and a great number of social pacts since the 
mid-1990s had both guided and eased reform. EU recommendations in 
the late 1980s in the direction of reducing poverty rates among the el-
derly had a positive impact on the introduction of non-contributory pen-
sions in 1990. Also, the blame-avoidance opportunities provided by the 
Maastricht criteria and the need to comply with the conditions to enter 
the EMU eased restrictive reforms. There are also possible explanations 
related to the institutional design of the Spanish pension system and the 
role played by the unions within it. In short, one could say that Spanish 
unions , as is well known, are weak in terms of direct representation (15 
percent of affiliation at present) but strong in terms of representative-
ness (the main unions , UGT and CCOO represent all workers in tripartite 
and collective agreements). Thus, they follow an inclusive (in favor of all 
workers and the unemployed) rather than exclusive (in favor of special 
categories of workers ) strategy. If we add that to the fact that there have 
never been social funds run by the social partners and the state, it be-
comes clear that their opportunities to fight for the interests of particular 
productive sectors or categories of workers are diminished. Under such 
conditions, it is easier for the central state to negotiate encompassing re-
forms, even if it remains true that the bases of affiliation of the unions still 
lie mainly in large and public enterprises.
A similar argument could be put forth in the case of unemployment 
protection, which has followed a pendulum trajectory in the Spanish case. 
The 1983-84 reform was expansionary and led to significant increases in 
unemployment coverage. In this case, the unions were successful in their 
claims but only in exchange for agreeing on the first wave of labor market 
flexibilization , introducing fixed-term contracts. The 1992 restrictive re-
form was triggered precisely by the costs impinged on the unemployment 
system by the growth of fixed-term contracts and the continuous entries 
to and exits from the labor market. Obviously Maastricht , on one side, 
and the new emphasis on activation policies on the other, also eased re-
form. In this latter case, the unions were undergoing a period of weakness 
due to corruption scandals and other factors, but their inclusive strategy 
did not allow them to fight for the main clients of unemployment passive 
protection: the industrial and hard core services. Instead, the compensa-
tion for their agreement was the amelioration of non-contributory unem-
ployment schemes and the creation of job-experience and job-training 
contracts.
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In the domain of health care services, changes in the Spanish case have 
comprised a jump from health insurance to the establishment of a (de-
centralized) national health service in the 1980s and the introduction of 
rationalizing and cost-control policies in the 1990s. Explanations of such 
policy changes in terms of internal politics and processes of learning and 
diffusion among regions have been analyzed in depth (Rico 1997). How-
ever, what we are looking for here are institutional constraints, challenges 
and opportunities. From this latter point of view, the creation of a na-
tional health service was eased in Spain because of the existence of several 
institutional features, namely the fact that the health care system was not 
split in independent funds right from its creation and was managed and 
administered by a centralized institution. It also helped greatly that doc-
tors were salaried employees from the beginning and doorkeepers of the 
system. When doctors are paid on a fee-for-service basis and users can 
access higher levels of care at wish, doctors have a much more powerful 
position vis-à-vis public decision-makers and administrators. Thus, it be-
comes much more complicated to negotiate with them the change of role 
needed to create a national health service. The administrative separation 
of income maintenance from health care in two different ministerial bod-
ies was also important, for it allowed health care to be detached from the 
occupational principle of access to the system. Centralized financing also 
helped in making the shift from a financing system based on social contri-
butions to one based on taxes . This is not to deny the centrality of other 
explanations related to internal politics, such as the formation of a broad 
and strong coalition reform, the salience of the devolution process and 
the diffusion of new policies it entailed, or the formation of clear public 
preferences in favor of the change towards universalism . However, it can 
also be argued that the peculiar institutional design of the Spanish health 
care system also had something to do with policy developments.
In the 1990s, the Spanish health care service reacted as most other na-
tional health services by introducing cost-control measures based on the 
managed competition paradigm (see Cabiedes and Guillén 2001). The 
Spanish state was more able to rationalize the system because a central 
budget was in place. This was due to a clear reluctance of the population 
to admit new measures challenging or reducing the only recently acquired 
high level of equity of the system.
The explanation for the less intense development of family, social care, 
social assistance and inclusion policies and their Liberal /means-tested 
design lies first in the fact of their major comparative underdevelopment 
at the point of departure of this analysis (mid-late 1970s). Spain had to 
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wait until rapid and intense incorporation of women to the labor market 
took place and until dramatically low fertility rates led to a most adverse 
demographic situation to start changing wide socially shared values about 
the excellence of the family as the preferred carer. It is no news that social 
values are hard to change, even when a society becomes as secular as the 
Spanish one.
7.5 Conclusions
The result of the Spanish trajectory of reform constitutes a very interest-
ing mix of traditional models à la Esping-Andersen . The principles and 
normative/ideational elements of the Spanish welfare state have changed 
accordingly. In the realm of income maintenance , ‘job and income securi-
ty for male workers ’ has lost its central importance as has the orientation 
towards the support of traditional family roles. Conversely, collectively 
negotiated rights for all workers (not only hard core ones) on the one 
hand, and enhanced proportionality of benefits to contributions, on the 
other, have been adopted as principles. The Social Democratic principle 
of universal access as a citizenship right reigns now in the health care and 
education domains and will do so in the social care area when the legal 
reforms of 2006 become fully implemented.
Access also follows, at present, the three-fold nature of the Spanish 
welfare state: workers ’ rights, citizens’ rights, and low income, depending 
on the policy area. Benefits are earnings-related in pensions and unem-
ployment , and flat-rate in social assistance (with corrections depending 
on the family situation). A homogeneous and broad package of health 
care services is common for all Spaniards and legal immigrants, and also 
for illegal immigrants under 18 years and pregnant women . Means-test-
ed programs, such as family allowances and social assistance economic 
transfers, have very limited access because of the existence of a very low-
income threshold to enter the programs. In the social care services do-
main, again the income threshold is very low.
Financing mechanisms tend to be used also according to the principles 
of the policy area. Such a move was agreed in the Toledo Pact of 1995. 
Pensions and unemployment remain financed out of social contributions 
and so is the new Pension Fund. All non-contributory and social assis-
tance benefits, together with the main bulk of health care services are 
financed out of taxes (the transformation for health care is still under way 
but almost completed). As was the case in other Bismarckian countries, 
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this was part of the negotiation, political exchange between government 
and social partners (particularly unions ). In general, the reliance on taxes 
for the financing of social protection has grown dramatically from the 
late 1970s. However, the growth of indirect taxation as a proportion of 
total financing is hardly good news, for it implies regressive effects on 
equity. The major shift in management and administrative structures has 
been brought about by political devolution, which has endorsed the social 
partners and civil associations with new opportunities to participate in 
the policy-making process.
In sum, if we compare the four dimensions characterizing the Spanish 
welfare state today with that of the late 1970s, the difference is stunning. 
Expenditure over GDP has not grown dramatically but it has kept its level 
despite the EMU (around 20 percent of GDP, see Eurostat , SEESPROS). 
Population coverage has expanded significantly to reach universal cov-
erage in pensions and health care , and many protection gaps have been 
closed. Efficiency gains in management can also be ascertained. Most 
unfortunately, one cannot say some crucial policy areas have undergone 
major change. The expenditure levels of Spain on family, housing and in-
clusion policies are still very low and have not shown any tendency to 
grow significantly in the past decades (see again Eurostat , SEESPROS). 
Furthermore, the deep fragmentation of the Spanish labor market, the 
still soaring proportion of fixed-term jobs , and the fact that it is young 
people and women who are the losers is hardly a reason for rejoicing. 
Hence, the changes in the system of social protection have both assets and 
liabilities. The system is successful in dealing with pensions and health 
care problems. Social security balances and dependency ratios have ame-
liorated significantly from 2000 thanks to massive immigration and out-
standing employment growth up to 2007. Although advancements have 
taken place in the rest of social policy domains and there is room for 
hope, the rapid and acute ageing of the Spanish society and a still too high 
reliance on family provision may be the cause of severe difficulties in the 
near future. Finally, despite insistent government declarations reassur-
ing Spaniards that social protection will not suffer from the economic 
negative cycle started in 2008, it is yet to be seen how hard the crisis will 
strike the Spanish economy and how it will affect the evolution of social 
protection policies.
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8 Reform Opportunities in a Bismarckian Latecomer: 
 Restructuring the Swiss Welfare State
Silja Häusermann
8.1 Introduction
With the transition to post-industrialism and financial austerity, most 
Bismarckian welfare systems have started to face similar structural chal-
lenges for reforms since the 1970s: budgetary pressures for retrenchment 
contrast sharply with new demands for social protection, resulting from 
the failure of both labor markets and traditional family structures (Esp-
ing-Andersen 1999). Hence, welfare policies have shifted from a dynamic 
of steady growth to a period of restructuring and redefinition of social 
rights. Even though the precise content and timing of the reforms varies 
across countries, similarities in the new politics and social policies of Bis-
marckian welfare systems are striking: retrenchment of existing benefits, 
increasingly means-tested benefit entitlements and a stronger emphasis 
on activation and social investment , notably with regard to former welfare 
state outsiders .
Accounting for similarities and differences in this common trend is, 
however, all but obvious, since a plurality of factors may have influenced 
the content and timing of this process of restructuring. While many stud-
ies refer to the explanatory power of the macroinstitutional context of 
decision-making, notably the number of veto points in an electoral sys-
tem (Immergut 1992; Swank 2002), more recent studies also point to the 
micro-institutions of the Bismarckian welfare system as variables shaping 
the dynamics of reform endogenously (Bonoli and Palier 2000). These 
micro-institutions comprise mainly the rules of eligibility and the type 
of benefits and financing, as well as the actual organization of policy-
management. In addition, business cycles and/or the color of the party in 
government are supposed to influence the dynamics of reform or stabil-
ity (Huber and Stephens 2001; Korpi and Palme 2003); and last but not 
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least, the emergence of the EMU may have triggered common dynamics 
of reform, as well (Palier and Manning 2003; Ferrera and Gualmini 2004).
In testing how this plurality of ‘usual suspects’ explains Bismarckian 
welfare system reforms across countries, Switzerland is particularly prom-
ising for at least two reasons. Firstly, the oversized Swiss coalition govern-
ment has been composed of the same major four political parties for over 
ﬁ fty years. National elections may shift the power balance in the national 
Parliament to some extent, but overall, it remains stable. All parties have to 
negotiate constantly over reform and there are no sharp ideological chang-
es in power relations or business cycle eﬀ ects. Th e color of the government 
as an independent variable is therefore constant: this allows us to exclude 
party competition and power relations as explanations of similarities in 
the pace and content of the Swiss reform trajectory with reforms in other 
Bismarckian welfare systems. Secondly, Switzerland is not a member of 
the EU . Th erefore, it provides a rare and interesting comparative test case 
for the direct impact of binding EU and EMU regulations on welfare state 
development. Given these two characteristics, the Swiss case is beneﬁ cial 
for the comparison, because it raises the variance on two crucial indepen-
dent variables: electoral dynamics and the EU . Cross-nationally, similari-
ties between the Swiss and other cases should be attributed to common 
structural and institutional features, rather than power resources or the 
EU . In addition, with electoral dynamics being constant, Switzerland is 
also particularly well suited for a longitudinal study of the interplay of mi-
cro- and macroinstitutional factors in reform dynamics.
The main arguments of this chapter are as follows: the macro-institu-
tions of federalism and direct democracy led to a very slow and incremen-
tal development of the Swiss welfare system in the industrial era. Social 
protection in Switzerland was never the result of a ‘Bismarckian master 
plan’, but grew incrementally out of and alongside pre-existing, private 
or sub-national policies. Hence, at the end of the 1970s, the Swiss welfare 
system, even though increasingly Bismarckian in its overall structure, was 
still of a rather modest size and consisted of a pragmatic bricolage of jux-
taposed insurance and protection schemes.
In line with the overall argument of this book, I will show in this chap-
ter that this micro-institutional structure of the Swiss welfare system itself 
became an important explanatory variable for the content of the subse-
quent reforms after the 1970s in two ways. On the one hand, the Swiss 
welfare system displayed the typical social protection loopholes of a Bis-
marckian male breadwinner regime in a post-industrial structural con-
text. Therefore, new social needs and demands of labor market outsiders 
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became prominent on the reform agenda, creating leeway for modern-
izing reforms. On the other hand, the multi-layered structure of the most 
developed parts of the welfare system has become important for subse-
quent reforms, because it serves as a blueprint for pragmatic restructur-
ing in various other social policies.
Hence, the interaction of structural developments and the micro-insti-
tutional welfare state arrangements prove to be the most important vari-
ables to explain the content of post-industrial reform policies. By contrast, 
the dynamics of the post-industrial reform politics cannot be explained 
by micro-institutional factors alone. The consensual macroinstitutional 
framework and the looming threat of direct democratic referenda large-
ly account for the fact that negotiation and compensation remained the 
main mechanisms of reform.
A last argument concerns the question of regime change, i.e. the is-
sue whether the recent reforms change the Bismarckian characteristics 
and if yes, in what direction. The Swiss welfare system has rightly been 
described as a ‘latecomer’ (Obinger 1998; Armingeon 2001). This is why 
it entered the era of austerity at a somehow less developed stage than 
most other Bismarckian welfare systems. Therefore, financial consolida-
tion and retrenchment of the Swiss welfare system has indeed taken place 
since the 1970s, but it has remained more of a gradual and continuous first 
and second order adaptation, than a radical third order paradigm shift 
(Hall 1993). Hence, the restrictive reforms have certainly not changed the 
overall Bismarckian regime characteristics of the Swiss welfare system, 
i.e. insider orientation and an accent on stratification. More systemic 
changes, however, can be observed since the late 1980s in modernizing 
reforms that tend to drive the Swiss welfare system away from a typi-
cal male breadwinner Bismarckian model, towards a pragmatic hybrid of 
typically Bismarckian , targeted and universalistic policies. Social insur-
ance schemes have become more gender egalitarian, focused on activa-
tion rather than income compensation, and the minimum income protec-
tion has gradually been expanded in pension, health and unemployment 
insurance. In Switzerland, these modernizing reforms tend to benefit the 
former ‘losers’ of Bismarckian welfare systems, i.e. labor market outsid-
ers , atypically employed and women .
By introducing both restrictive reforms in terms of insurance eligibil-
ity, and expansive reforms in terms of a new means- and income-tested 
basic benefit level, the Swiss welfare system has both become more egali-
tarian at the bottom of the income distribution and remained equally or 
even more stratifying for the middle and higher income-classes.
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The chapter is structured as follows. In a first part, I will review the de-
velopment of the Swiss welfare system in the ‘golden age ’ of European 
capitalism until the 1970s and assess its characterization in regime-terms. 
I will then lay out the way in which the micro-institutions of the Swiss 
welfare system endogenously shaped the challenges to the welfare system, 
before turning to an account and interpretation of the two main strands 
of policy reform since the 1980s, i.e. retrenchment and modernization . A 
final section assesses the explanatory power of structural, institutional 
and actor-specific variables that drive the development of the Swiss wel-
fare system and points to the importance of negotiation and learning as 
mechanisms of change.
8.2 Welfare State Growth in a Context of Institutional Power 
Fragmentation
In Switzerland, welfare state growth was heavily influenced by the mac-
roinstitutional context of power fragmentation, i.e. direct democracy, 
federalism, the grand coalition and corporatism . Many authors, such as 
Immergut (1992), Obinger (1998) and Armingeon (2001) have presented 
striking evidence that these institutions have slowed down the growth of 
the welfare system by several mechanisms: first of all, the federal govern-
ment can only legislate on a social policy once the authority to do so is 
transferred from the sub-national to the federal level by a popular vote.1 
Once this popular vote legally attributes the legislative competence to the 
national government , the actual decision-making process can start. How-
ever, the new nation-wide legislation must then take into account not only 
the pre-existing cantonal (or private) policies, but also the main interests 
of all major parties, labor and capital, because any bill proposal can sub-
sequently again be challenged in a popular vote, if an actor succeeds to 
collect 50,000 signatures against the bill.
The legislative authority for most social policies was transferred in the 
late 19th or early to mid-20th century, but in some fields, such as unem-
ployment insurance or occupational pensions, this happened only in the 
1970s, because the social problems were already at least partly addressed 
by voluntary, private and cantonal laws. The time lag, which often oc-
curred between the constitutional amendment and the adoption of a na-
tional bill is even more impressive (see table 8.1 below). In most cases, it 
results from lengthy negotiations and failures in popular referenda.
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Table 8.1 The slow growth of the Swiss welfare state
Policy fi eld Constitutional 
amendment
Coming into eff ect 
of the national law
Time lag (years)
Health insurance 1890 1914 24
Mandatory health insurance 1890 1996 106
Accident insurance 1890 1918 28
Old-age insurance 1925 1948 23
Disability insurance 1925 1960 35
Family benefi ts 1945 1953* 8
Maternity insurance 1945 2005 60
Occupational pensions 1972 1985 13
Mandatory unemployment 
insurance
1976 1984 8
* only in agriculture (most family allowances remain cantonal) 
Source: adapted from Bonoli 2006, Armingeon 2001
This institutionally induced delay in welfare state growth had two main 
consequences: Firstly, the welfare system was still of a rather modest 
size in the late 1970s, when the economic context began to turn from 
prosperous to financially constraining. Pension levels were still below 
the level prescribed in the constitution, no maternity insurance existed, 
health insurance was voluntary and in 1975, only 22 percent of the people 
were insured against unemployment (Armingeon 2001). It was widely ac-
knowledged that several social problems, such as mandatory health, un-
employment insurance or maternity protection, were still unsolved and 
that some expansive reforms needed to remain on the agenda, despite the 
financial difficulties. Therefore, the context of austerity after the 1970s 
did not trigger overall radical retrenchment , but slower growth, selective 
cost containment and a targeted, often means-tested expansion instead of 
overall growth.
The second consequence of the institutionally hampered growth was 
that the welfare system developed in an incremental and layered (Streeck 
and Thelen 2005a) fashion. When strong cantonal and private regimes 
existed, they were (at first) often only harmonized or complemented 
with a national policy that alleviated the most important shortcomings 
of the pre-existing policies. The multi-pillar old-age protection scheme 
illustrates this most clearly: The universal basic pension scheme of 1948 
provides only flat-rate ‘Beveridgean ’ benefits, which remain below the 
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target level required by the Constitution. As a temporary solution to old-
age poverty , means-tested and tax-financed supplementary benefits were 
therefore introduced in 1972. In addition, private occupational pension 
funds had been flourishing notably in high-skill sectors since the early 
20th century and voluntary private savings plans became fiscally encour-
aged in the 1970s. Hence, when occupational pensions became manda-
tory in the early 1980s, they built on a strong pre-existing structure of 
highly diversified private funds . Therefore, Swiss old-age security, even 
though Bismarckian in its overall organization and effect, relies on a set 
of very diversely structured social policy schemes (Nova and Häuser-
mann 2005; BSV 1995). A similar diversity of welfare providers and poli-
cies can be observed in other fields such as health care and family policy , 
where various cantonal, national and private providers and regulations 
coexist.
This ‘layered’ micro-institutional structure had an important effect 
on the subsequent reform trajectory after the 1980s: In Switzerland, as 
compared to other countries, there was always little fundamental and cat-
egorical opposition to any specific type of welfare policy design. Whereas 
in countries such as France , the introduction of capitalized pension funds 
or means-testing as such became a huge political controversy in itself, the 
policy repertoire in Switzerland was always large and reforms rather prag-
matic. Hence, for the early period of policy development in Switzerland, 
it is important to note that the macroinstitutional context influenced the 
pace and design of micro-institutions, which in turn influenced the policy 
and politics of reform further down the road.
Given the fragmented and underdeveloped character of the Swiss wel-
fare state, its classification in terms of regimes has been difficult and 
highly debated until recently. The comparatively modest level of benefits 
made some authors classify it as a Liberal regime until the 1970s (Esping-
Andersen 1990) or advocate a separate classification of each policy field 
instead of the whole national regime (Obinger 1998). Today, however, a 
consensus has emerged that the Swiss regime is mostly Bismarckian or 
Conservative , with some Liberal traits (Armingeon 2001; Bonoli et al. 
2005; Bonoli 2006). An assessment of Swiss social policies of the early 
1980s in terms of the main Bismarckian characteristics confirms this 
 verdict:
– Bismarckian welfare schemes typically implement work-based eligibil-
ity to benefits. This rule applied in Swiss unemployment and accident 
insurance, mandatory occupational pension funds, family allowances, 
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and disability pensions at the beginning of the 1980s. In some of these 
schemes, the work-related characteristics were particularly strong, 
such as for occupational pensions, which only include employees with 
an income over a certain threshold (of about 16,000 euros per year in 
1982). Exceptions from the rule of work-based eligibility are the basic 
pension scheme (AHV) and health insurance (voluntary until 1994 
and universal from then onwards), as well as – of course – social as-
sistance .
– Benefits in Bismarckian welfare systems tend to be earnings-related , 
because the main goal of these welfare systems is not redistribution, 
but status protection and income replacement. This characteristic 
applies most clearly in the Swiss case. A recent study financed by 
the National Science Foundation and based on data from the 1990s 
comes to the striking conclusion that the Swiss welfare system is par-
ticularly status-preserving (Künzi and Schärrer 2004): if you com-
pare what different income strata of the society pay to social policy 
schemes in terms of contributions and premiums, and what they re-
ceive on average from the welfare system, there is hardly any redis-
tributive effect (except for pensioners who benefit markedly from 
the welfare system). Overall, the Gini-coefficient across the whole 
income distribution remains constant before and after taxes and 
transfers.2 This is because some social policy schemes are strictly 
contribution related, such as unemployment , accident, disability 
and – more recently – maternity insurance. Other schemes, mostly 
occupational and private pensions , as well as health insurance are 
even degressive in character, i.e. they benefit over-proportionally to 
higher income classes, because high incomes have better insurance 
conditions (in pensions) and because some premiums and contribu-
tions (in pensions and health insurance ) can be deducted from tax-
es , which results in higher tax savings, the higher the tax rate. This 
anti-redistributive character of the Swiss welfare system was prob-
ably somewhat weaker at the beginning of the 1980s, because the 
degressive health insurance and occupational pension schemes were 
less developed, but structurally, the system was then equally axed on 
stratification as it is today.
– The typical Bismarckian mechanism of financing is through contribu-
tions, rather than taxes . This also applies to a large extent to the Swiss 
case. In 1980, about 77 percent of the revenues of the welfare system 
 RESTRUCTURING THE SWISS WELFARE STATE
came from contribution-payments (BSV 2003). Basic pensions, occu-
pational pensions, unemployment insurance, accident insurance and 
family allowances are mostly or almost exclusively financed through 
payroll-taxes , which are shared equally between employers and em-
ployees (except for family allowances, which are financed exclusively 
by employer-contributions). The most redistributive parts of social 
policy, however, i.e. supplementary pension benefits and social assis-
tance , are tax-financed .
– The fourth main characteristic of Bismarckianism, i.e. devolved and 
decentralized policy management, has always been almost exempli-
fied by the Swiss case. Trade unions and business organizations par-
ticipate in the legislation and management of basic and occupational 
pensions, unemployment , accident and disability insurance. Power 
fragmentation, however, goes even further. Social assistance is en-
tirely regulated at the sub-state level, and even private welfare plays a 
powerful role in the fields of health care and occupational pensions. 
Basic health insurance is mandatory, but the insurance plans are pro-
vided by around 100 private insurance companies, which define both 
contributions and benefits. The law states that everybody is entitled 
to basic insurance, irrespective of age and health status, but addition-
al services and benefits must be purchased on a private basis. In the 
field of occupational pensions, the importance and variety of private 
providers is even bigger. Several hundred private and semi-private 
insurance companies and foundations provide second pillar pension 
plans for employers . Regulation and control of these pension funds is 
relatively strong – and has become stronger in the last years after a 
series of problems of regulatory capture – but the pension funds still 
differ strongly in terms of their insurance conditions, additional ben-
efits and their investment strategies. The large variety of actors in the 
Swiss welfare regime is both a determinant and a consequence of its 
decentralized structure.
Finally, the Swiss welfare system as it had developed until the early 1980s 
also shares the typical characteristic of Bismarckian welfare systems to be 
strongly gendered, i.e. a male breadwinner system. Maternity insurance, 
maternal leave and care infrastructure were non-existent at that time. En-
titlements being heavily employment and contribution-related, women 
received much lower benefits throughout the pension, unemployment , 
accident and disability insurances. The occupational pension scheme was 
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particularly exclusionary for women , since it was accessible only for em-
ployees with a certain minimum income per year, excluding de facto most 
women for whom discontinuous part-time work is the standard form of 
employment in Switzerland (Wanner and Ferrari 2001).
Tables 8.2 to 8.5 below (section 8.4) summarize the micro-institutional 
characteristics of the main policy schemes of the Swiss welfare system in 
the early 1980s. This Swiss welfare system became confronted with finan-
cial austerity and societal modernization from the 1970s onwards, which 
led to both exogenous and endogenous challenges for reform.
8.3 Endogenous and Exogenous Challenges to the Swiss Welfare 
System
This section singles out the factors supposed to explain the restructuring 
of the Swiss welfare system since the 1980s.
Structurally, the changes confronting the Swiss welfare system are sim-
ilar to those challenging its Bismarckian neighbors: a) a context of auster-
ity triggering claims for financial consolidation and b) post-industrializa-
tion, i.e. new social risks . In both cases, the clash of exogenous structural 
change with the existing welfare architecture fosters an endogenous need 
for reform.
With regard to the first pressure, Switzerland is no exception among 
the Continental countries: a downturn in economic growth and produc-
tivity since the 1970s and looming demographic changes tend to under-
mine the financial stability of public households, because they lead to 
both rising demands for welfare benefits and lower contributions. It is 
true that the ‘welfare without work ’-problem (Esping-Andersen 1996b) 
has always been less severe in Switzerland than in other countries. Be-
cause of a very flexible labor market and selective immigration policies, 
Switzerland had secured nearly full employment until the 1990s. Still 
now, the unemployment rate has remained below 5 percent and labor 
market participation rates are high. However, between 1990 and 1997, 
the number of unemployed people grew from 18,000 to 190,000, i.e. 
from 0.5 percent to more than 5 percent (see figure 8.1).3 Even though 
these numbers might seem low in international comparison, the sud-
den appearance of (long-term) unemployment came as a major shock in 
Switzerland.
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Figure 8.1 Development of unemployment rates in Switzerland and in its Continental 
neighbor countries over time
Figure 8.2 Development of economic growth rates in Switzerland and its Continental 
neighbor countries over time
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Figure 8.3 Development of average fertility rates in Switzerland and its Continental 
neighbor countries over time
In addition, growth has been almost absent for the last decade (see figure 
8.2), productivity is low and the rates of long-term unemployment , dis-
ability benefits and social assistance dependencies4 tend to rise. Together 
with the negative demographic developments – see the comparatively 
very low fertility rate in figure 8.3 – this creates a context of austerity.
Hence, political demands for cost containment became increasingly 
prominent on the reform agenda, already in the early 1980s, when major 
social insurance schemes were not even fully developed. Retrenchment 
claims grew constantly, and in the mid-1990s, the government appoint-
ed a commission of experts, representatives from labor and capital and 
civil servants , who developed an encompassing overview of the financial 
threats and problems of social insurance in Switzerland (IDA Fiso I 1996; 
IDA Fiso II 1997). Hence, a debate on cost containment and policy pri-
orities started even before the welfare system had reached its full devel-
opment. Therefore, the pressure for retrenchment was present, but less 
severe than in other countries.
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unstable work relations, changing skill requirements on the labor market, 
rising divorce rates and the massive entry of women into paid employ-
ment have changed the social risk structure in the Continental welfare 
systems and created new challenges to these industrial male breadwinner 
regimes (Bonoli et al. 2005; Bonoli 2005; Bonoli 2006). As with austerity, 
the new social risks are not an entirely exogenous pressure for change, 
but they result also from the institutional characteristics of Continental 
regimes: being concerned primarily with the protection of standard, male 
industrial employment, trade unions and employers had over time cre-
ated a male breadwinner model, which presented many loopholes with 
regard to the coverage of the above mentioned new social needs and de-
mands. Hence, this structure of the welfare system reflected the primary 
concerns of the constituencies of trade unions and employers organiza-
tions. Labor market outsiders and women never belonged to labor and 
capital’s core constituency. Hence, the post-industrial loopholes in social 
insurance protection are to some extent also a rather direct consequence 
of Bismarckian insider -focus. These loopholes in social protection be-
came increasingly visible from the 1970s onwards. As a consequence, 
some agreement mainly across Left and value-libertarian political parties 
emerged with regard to the need for modernization of policies such as 
maternity protection, women ’s pension rights and the protection of atypi-
cal employment (Bonoli 2006: 7; Häusermann 2006, 2010b; Häusermann 
et al. 2004). Hence, the very structure of the Bismarckian welfare system 
produced insider -outsider conflicts, some leeway for expansive reforms 
and an opportunity for new actors, mainly the political parties instead of 
trade unions , to play a decisive role in welfare system restructuring.
8.4 Reform Dynamics since the 1980s along Two Dimensions
The reforms restructuring the Swiss welfare system since the 1980s can 
be divided into two categories: Firstly, path-dependent changes aimed at 
cost containment . None of the reforms in this category entailed funda-
mental cutbacks of the existing welfare system. Rather, they consisted in 
a gradual scaling back of eligibility conditions, contribution- and benefit 
levels in the fields of unemployment benefits, the basic and second pillar 
pension schemes and disability pensions. In terms of Hall ’s categoriza-
tion of change (1993), these reforms must thus be seen as first and second 
order changes . The losers of these reforms are the formerly privileged in-
siders , i.e. the standard insured whose benefit rights have been somewhat 
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lowered. However, none of these reforms modified the overall goal of the 
existing regime, which is to provide encompassing income replacement to 
standard insured workers . Eligibility remained work-related, benefit lev-
els contribution-related and the whole schemes contribution-financed.
The second type of changes, however, is systemic and more far-reach-
ing, because these reforms tend to reorient the Swiss welfare system away 
from its Bismarckian profile in two directions. Firstly, these recent re-
forms have started to shift the focus of the policies from standard insider 
workers , male breadwinners and families, to individuals and less privi-
leged groups. Thereby, they opened insurance benefits to former outsid-
ers and improved the minimum-coverage of low-income groups (e.g. by 
introducing maternity insurance, by opening occupational pensions for 
part-time workers , by improving the level of supplementary means-tested 
basic pension benefits and by reinforcing public subsidies for health care 
insurance). Secondly, the focus of social security on income replacement 
is being replaced by a focus on activation (e.g. by active labor market poli-
cies and by the improvement of external childcare facilities). These two 
sets of changes must be seen as more structural second and third order 
changes . Both categories of reforms entail new beneficiaries among the 
labor market outsiders and both can be subsumed in the category of mod-
ernizing reforms.
Retrenchment and Financial Consolidation
Attempts at financial consolidation started as early as the late 1970s. The 
economic crisis of this decade abruptly interrupted the linear process of 
growth, and raised concerns about cost containment . The widespread 
new perception – mostly held within right-wing parties and employers ’ 
organizations – was that expenditure levels needed to be limited in order 
to preserve the viability of the welfare system. The relatively low levels of 
consumption taxes (7.6 percent VAT) and non-wage labor costs 5 (below 
20 percent, except for the oldest age group of labor market participants) 
in the Swiss system were viewed as a comparative advantage of the Swiss 
economy that had to be preserved. In spite of these concerns, consid-
erable expansion of the Swiss welfare system continued, since many so-
cial insurance schemes remained clearly underdeveloped in the 1970s. 
However, the further expansion became more modest, means-tested and 
overshadowed by the concerns for cost containment . In addition, several 
schemes actually did undergo retrenchment. The following sections pro-
vide an overview of these reforms.
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In pension policy, the restrictive dynamic started already in 1976, almost 
two decades before the basic pension scheme (ﬁ rst pillar AHV) actually 
entered a structural ﬁ nancial deﬁ cit. In this early reform, the contribution 
levels of self-employed were raised and the indexation of pensions was 
limited. Financial consolidation continued in the 1990s with the increase 
of women ’s retirement age from 62 to 64 and the rise of an additional per-
centage-point of the value added tax on consumption. Indeed, since the 
VAT level in Switzerland is still only at about 7.6 percent, consolidation 
through shifts to this consumption tax are an important issue. However, 
the most recent attempt at retrenchment was rejected in a popular vote in 
2003. In this reform, the Parliament had not only decided retrenchment of 
widows ’ pensions, a further rise in women ’s age of retirement and – again – 
an additional percentage-point of VAT for pension insurance, but had also 
denied any ﬁ nancial support for the ﬂ exibilization of the retirement age.6 
In the mandatory occupational pension scheme (second pillar BVG), how-
ever, cost containing reform were successfully adopted by the Parliament 
in 2003, when the level of beneﬁ ts was lowered, women ’s age of retirement 
was raised to 65 and the legally required level of interest rate on individual 
pension savings was lowered. In addition, and somewhat paradoxically, the 
rise of the level of means-tested supplementary pension beneﬁ ts in 1985 
and 1996 also contributed to ﬁ nancial consolidation in the basic universal 
pension scheme.7 Indeed, the Swiss Constitution states that basic pensions 
must be high enough to allow for a decent existence. However, pension lev-
els still have not and probably will never reach this goal (BSV 1995). Hence, 
the strengthening of supplementary pensions contributes to legitimize the 
low level of ﬁ rst pillar pensions (Nova and Häusermann 2005). Th e heavier 
accent on means-tested supplementary pensions also implies a shift of ﬁ -
nancing mechanisms from contributions to general taxes .
Cost containment also became an important issue in the mandatory 
unemployment insurance only a decade after its introduction in 1982. 
With the economic downturn in the beginning of the 1990s, massive un-
employment appeared in Switzerland for the first time. Therefore, the 
government by decree extended the benefit period to a maximum of two 
years and temporarily lowered the replacement rate from 80 to 70 percent 
in 1993. This lowering of the level of benefits was then permanently con-
firmed in 1995. In addition, the 2002 reform enacted a longer minimum 
contribution period and cut back the duration of benefit entitlements 
from two years to one (Berclaz and Füglister 2003).
Similar cutbacks have been adopted with regard to disability insurance. 
With the appearance of unemployment , more and more labor was shed 
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into disability insurance. Therefore, this scheme accumulated a huge defi-
cit of almost a billion Swiss francs per year by the end of the 1990s (Künzi 
and Schärer 2004: 44). As a consequence, various cost containing mea-
sures were adopted in 2007: access to disability benefits was restricted, 
the definition of ‘reasonable’ work enlarged and a waiting period for ben-
efits was introduced.
Finally, costs have most dramatically risen in health care . Basic health 
care insurance became mandatory in 1994 only, but this scheme had to 
deal with cost containment right from the start. Since health care is fi-
nanced mainly (by about 2/3) through individual premiums, which are 
not set by law, but by private insurance companies, the disastrous fi-
nancial development manifests itself so far mainly through premium 
increases of 5-10 percent year after year. The average basic insurance 
premium for an individual person has been no less than between 150 
and 250 euros per month since the early 2000s. In addition, all insured 
have an annual franchise of between 200 and 1500 Euros. Given these 
very high costs (which do not depend on income-levels, at all), the finan-
cial burden health care imposes especially on middle class families, who 
are not eligible for income-tested premium subsidies, is very heavy and 
continues to rise each year. Thus, the reform initiated in the early 2000s 
was concerned with limiting costs by – among others – lowering the 
catalogue of treatments included in basic insurance and limiting the free 
choice of medical doctors for patients (European Observatory on Health 
Care Systems 2000). This reform was rejected in Parliament in 2003 and 
since then, several less encompassing reforms have been adopted, such 
as an increase in income-tested premium subsidies for families in 2005.8 
However, proponents and opponents of the main points of the reform 
(notably cutbacks and the limitation of free choice [‘Vertragsfreiheit’]) 
are very polarized and therefore, the reform process proceeds only very 
slowly.
In sum, consolidation and cost containment have been constant topics 
in Swiss welfare system reforms over the last twenty years. Benefits were 
lowered in the fields of unemployment insurance, basic and occupational 
old-age pensions and disability pensions. In addition, premiums and con-
tributions were raised in the field of health insurance and – by means 
of an increase of the VAT – old-age and disability insurance. However, 
retrenchment remains highly controversial in the policy-making arena. 
In pension policy, unemployment insurance or family policy , there is no 
agreement on the actual problem pressure facing the Swiss welfare system, 
because the assumptions on future economic and demographic develop-
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ment diverge considerably (Nova and Häusermann 2005). Given the mac-
roinstitutional context of welfare policy-making, cost-containing reform 
must be negotiated, and since the positions diverge so massively, they 
remain limited so far. Too drastic cuts in benefit levels can be challenged 
by a popular referendum and several attempts at cuts in pension and un-
employment insurance have been rejected in popular votes throughout 
the recent years. Therefore, retrenchment in Switzerland is limited and 
incremental (Bonoli et al. 2005).
Recalibrating the Swiss Welfare System
The second strand of reforms is a more substantial change in system-
ic terms, because it tackles the inherent weaknesses of the Bismarckian 
welfare system. These reforms can be described as recalibration (Pierson 
2001a) or modernization (Bonoli 2005; Häusermann 2010a) of the welfare 
system, because they adapt it to specific post-industrial social needs and 
demands of mostly labor market outsiders and women . In analyzing these 
reforms, one needs to distinguish between a set of second order reforms , 
which open the access to existing insurance schemes for former outsiders , 
and a set of third order changes shifting the goal of income compensation 
to activation, social investment and tax-financed minimum protection.
The main thrust of the first set of modernizing reforms consists in 
granting benefit entitlements to categories of the population who had 
none before. The proportion of systemic outsiders grew from the 1970s 
onwards, because more and more people did not correspond to the profile 
of the standard insured anymore (Wanner and Ferrari 2001). By 2000, the 
proportion of part-time employees in the Swiss labor market had reached 
30 percent, almost 80 percent of which being female . About 5 percent of 
the workforce holds employment contracts of less than two years duration 
and self-employment has increased over the 1990s from about 15 to al-
most 20 percent (Rechsteiner 2002). Hence, when labor markets became 
more precarious, gender roles changed and divorce rates rose after the 
1970s, new social needs and demands of these former welfare ‘losers’ ap-
peared more prominently on the reform agenda. Parties of the new Left, 
the Greens and women ’s organizations were the most important advo-
cates of these new social needs and demands. A series of reforms started 
to address them from the late 1980s onwards.
Most prominently, in the field of pensions, the 1995 reform introduced 
equal splitting of contributions and benefits between spouses and pen-
sion credits for mothers . Both changes drastically improved the pension 
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rights for non-working women (Nova and Häusermann 2005; CONSOC 
2003). Similarly, the second pillar occupational pensions were extended 
to more low-income earners in 2003 (by means of a lowering of the ac-
cess threshold). Even though this expansion remained clearly below the 
demands of the Left and of women ’s organizations, it was an important 
signal for the recognition of part-time work (Häusermann 2002). Still in 
the field of occupational pensions, the law on ‘free movement’ of 1994 
enacted the rights of workers to job mobility. Furthermore, the reforms 
of the unemployment insurance in the 1990s extended the benefit period 
and thus improved coverage of long-term unemployed. All these reforms 
were recalibrating, insofar as they extended Bismarckian income protec-
tion to people who are not in standard employment.
The second set of recalibrating changes is focused on enhancing stan-
dard employment through activation policies. These reforms are again 
more important for outsiders who struggle to ‘earn’ sufficient social rights 
through labor market participation . This new trend is most visible with 
regard to the active labor market policies , which were introduced in 1995 
for the first time. This reform forced the cantons to create 25,000 places 
of training for unemployed and these measures were continuously rein-
forced over the following years (Berclaz and Füglister 2000). Within a 
decade, the expenditures for active labor market policies in Switzerland 
have been multiplied by six (Bonoli et al. 2005).9 The 2007 reform of dis-
ability insurance shows a rather similar thrust, with a strengthened com-
mitment to the reintegration of disabled and the early detection of em-
ployees at risk.
Recent developments in family and care policy also go in the direction 
of enhancing labor market participation : maternity insurance for work-
ing mothers was introduced in 2004 and in 2003, the national Parliament 
voted a four-year credit of 200 million Swiss francs encouraging the de-
velopment of a – so far almost completely lacking – infrastructure for ex-
ternal childcare . The most important developments in the reconciliation 
of work and care, however, are currently taking place at the level of the 
cantons and communes (Bonoli et al. 2005; Dafflon 2003). Several can-
tons are implementing financial care infrastructure, in order to improve 
the possibilities for the reconciliation of work and care.
This account of activation policies should not obscure the fact that 
the modernization of the Swiss welfare system has remained rather lim-
ited and far below the criteria that characterize a ‘social investment state’ 
(Lister 2004). A social investment state focuses on investment in human 
capital in order to create opportunities for people to earn their own living. 
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The above reforms do indeed go in this direction, but important problems 
of care infrastructure scarcity or inefficient active labor market policies 
still persist, and the adoption of these reforms often depends on a series 
of conjunctural conditions (Bonoli et al. 2005). It can be hypothesized 
that in this specific field of reform, EU membership would indeed have 
contributed to a more rapid and comprehensive reorientation of policies 
(Daly 2004; Bonoli et al. 2005; Morel 2007).
A third and last set of modernizing reforms concerns the increasing 
importance of tax-financed minimum protection schemes in various 
fields of social policy-making. The supplementary means-tested pen-
sion benefits, which are granted to particularly underprivileged pension-
ers , have been expanded continuously since the 1980s. This scheme also 
serves as a functional equivalent to long-term care insurance, because 
most pensioners in homes and care centers rely on these supplementary 
benefits. Similarly, the tax-financed subsidies for low-income earners in 
health care insurance have also been expanded several times. Today, no 
less than a third of the population receives such subsidies for health insur-
ance premiums (Künzi and Schärrer 2004). Finally, the contributions of 
the central governments to the basic pension scheme, to the unemploy-
ment insurance and to the disability insurance have also increased over 
time, strengthening the proportion of tax financing of the welfare system 
as compared to contribution financing (see tables 8.2 to 8.5 for a summary 
of these changes).
The modernization of the Swiss welfare system as I have described it 
in the above sections, should, however, not be considered as a radical up-
heaval. Rather, in a pragmatic and incremental fashion, new recalibrating 
elements were either added to the existing Bismarckian insurance policies 
or these latter insurance policies were used to cover new risk profiles.
New Winners, New Losers
In section 8.1 of this chapter, I have shown that the micro-institutions of 
the Swiss welfare system were indeed Bismarckian at the beginning of the 
1980s (see table 8.2). After discussing the record of reforms of the last 20 
years in the above two sections, we can now assess the extent of change 
and the winners and losers of this restructuring.
Tables 8.2 to 8.5 summarize the main changes for the four major social 
policy fields, i.e. pensions, health care , unemployment and family policy .10
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Table 8.2 Institutional changes in old-age income security (changes in italics)
Early 1980s Mid-2000s
Eligibility Universal access to basic pensions 
(fi rst tier); selective access to private 
occupational pensions 
Universal and individualized basic 
pension insurance for men and women ; 
mandatory occupational pension 
insurance (extended to lower income-
earners and part-time workers in 2003); 
increased fi scal privileges for private 
pension savings
Benefi t 
structure
Flat-rate benefi ts (fi rst tier); moderate 
supplementary pensions
Flat-rate benefi ts (fi rst tier); increased 
supplementary pension benefi ts; 
earnings-related occupational pensions;
Financing Contributions and taxes (fi rst tier); 
supplementary pensions are entirely 
tax-fi nanced ; private occupational 
pensions are entirely contribution-
fi nanced
Contributions (70%), VAT and taxes 
(26%) (fi rst tier); taxes (supplementary 
pensions); contributions (60%) and 
interests in capital (36%) (occupational 
pensions)
Manage-
ment
Tripartite (fi rst tier), central govern-
ment and substate entities (supple-
mentary benefi ts); private companies 
(occupational pensions)
Tripartite (fi rst tier), central govern-
ment and substate entities (supple-
mentary pensions); central government 
and private companies (occupational 
pensions)
Table 8.3 Institutional changes in health care policy (changes in italics)
  Early 1980s Mid-2000s
Eligibility Voluntary insurance; basic regulatory 
framework for insurance conditions
Mandatory universal basic insurance; 
voluntary supplementary insurance 
schemes
Benefi t 
structure
Depending on the benefi t-catalogue 
of the private insurance companies
Regulated catalogue of guaranteed 
basic treatments and benefi ts; 
Financing Private insurance contributions Premiums (not earnings-related ) (ca 
80%); private franchise and tax-subsi-
dies (ca 20%);
Manage-
ment
Private companies and weak central 
state control
Central government and private insu-
rance companies
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Table 8.4 Institutional changes in unemployment insurance (changes in italics)
Early 1980s Mid-2000s
Eligibility Mandatory insurance for employees 
from 1982 onwards
Mandatory insurance; tightened eligibi-
lity (longer contribution period)
Benefi t 
structure
Income replacement (about 80%) Lowered income replacement (about 
70%); activation policies
Financing Contribution payments (90%) and 
interests on capital (10%) 
Contribution payments (95%), tax-
fi nanced subsidies (6%)
Manage-
ment
Tripartite Tripartite; central government control 
on activation measures;
Table 8.5 Institutional changes in family policy (changes in italics)
Early 1980s Mid-2000s
Eligibility Family allowances for parents in 
standard employment (strong diff eren-
ces between cantons); voluntary ma-
ternity insurance in some companies
Universal family allowances (harmo-
nized across cantons); mandatory 
maternity insurance;
Benefi t 
structure
Financial transfers (family allowances); 
strong variation in benefi t-levels bet-
ween the cantons;
Harmonized fi nancial transfers (family 
allowances); maternity insurance be-
nefi ts (80% of the income for 12 weeks); 
state subsidies for external childcare 
infrastructure
Financing Employer contributions Contributions (family allowances 
and maternity insurance); taxes (care 
subsidies)
Manage-
ment
Cantons and employers Cantons, employers and central go-
vernment 
On each of the four micro-institutional characteristics, changes can be 
observed, even though none of them has become completely transformed. 
With regard to eligibility, social rights have generally been extended to 
new groups of beneficiaries (women and part-timers in pensions, univer-
sal access to health care , mandatory unemployment insurance, univer-
salization and harmonization of family allowances, mandatory maternity 
insurance). Hence, the scope of beneficiaries has become larger, which 
benefits most clearly those groups, who were excluded from the purely 
Bismarckian schemes.
The changes in benefit structures are more complex: on the one hand, 
the benefits for low-income groups and outsiders have been improved in 
pension insurance, health care and family policy . But on the other hand, 
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the general insurance conditions have even been tightened with regard 
to pension insurance rights in the first and second insurance tier, and in 
unemployment insurance. In addition, the degressive aspects of the Swiss 
welfare system, i.e. the occupational and private pension tiers and the pre-
mium-financed health insurance scheme, have even been reinforced over 
the last 10 years, strengthening the inegalitarian and anti-redistributive 
character of the Swiss welfare system. The bottom line of these changes 
is that the standard insured of the middle class tend to be the main los-
ers of the recent reforms, because they are clearly hit by retrenchment , 
but they are also ‘too well-off ’ to benefit from the expanded minimum 
protection. The lowest-income groups, however, tend to benefit from the 
recent expansion of the basic protection scheme. Finally, the most privi-
leged income strata have become even more privileged, since they benefit 
from fiscal subsidies for occupational and private pensions , and they have 
access to voluntary health insurance .
The structure of financing tends to shift away from contributions to 
other sources of revenue, such as general taxation , VAT and interests from 
capitalized savings. Overall, 77 percent of the Swiss welfare system was fi-
nanced through contributions in 1980, as compared to 70 percent in 1990 
and only 65 percent in 2002. By contrast, the proportion of tax-financing 
amounts to 14 percent in 2002 (as compared to 11 percent in 1990) and 16 
percent of the financing in 2002 came from interests on capitalized funds. 
Hence, the financing structure has become more diversified.
Finally, management remains largely decentralized, but – not least with 
the stronger role of general taxation – the central government has become 
more important, especially in unemployment insurance (where the cen-
tral government supervises the cantonal activation policies) and in family 
policy (harmonization of family allowances, national maternity insurance 
and subsidies for childcare infrastructure).
The changes are most marked with regard to eligibility criteria and 
benefit structures, with simultaneous trends of a) cost containment , and 
b) the expansion of minimum protection and private insurance. Now who 
are the winners and losers of this recent neo-Bismarckian restructuring 
in the Swiss welfare state? It seems like the distributional impact is highly 
differential. At the bottom of the income distribution, the welfare system 
is getting more universal : the recent reforms have introduced a range of 
means- or income-tested minimum subsidies and benefits that are not 
dependent on previous contribution-records or earnings. With regard to 
the middle class and the more privileged strata, however, the Swiss wel-
fare state tends to become even more stratifying, because benefits are 
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linked even more tightly to previous contribution-records and the partly 
private system reduces redistribution and accentuates income inequality. 
Overall, the old core constituency of the welfare system – namely male 
middle class labor market insiders – seem to be the main losers of the 
recent Swiss welfare system restructuring. For outsiders , by contrast, the 
expansion of universal minimum benefits has extended social rights. The 
extent to which the recent restructuring has improved benefits for outsid-
ers varies, however, from country to country. While this seems to be the 
case in Switzerland and the Netherlands , the welfare state remains more 
insider -focused in countries such as France or Italy (see the other country 
chapters in this volume).
In terms of the development of the Bismarckian welfare systems, this 
welfare state restructuring since the 1970s has also been marked by an 
interesting procedural change. Indeed, in the past, most reforms were 
designed in specialized extra-parliamentary committees composed of 
civil servants , trade union and business representatives, before they were 
handed over to Parliament , where they were hardly modified (Kriesi 1980; 
Sciarini 1999). Most of the recent modernizing reform elements, however, 
have not been introduced by trade unions and employer organizations, 
but only at a later stage of the reform process, i.e. by the political parties in 
Parliament . In virtually all the important reforms of the 1990s – the pen-
sion reforms of 1995 and 2003, the unemployment reform of 1995 and the 
current disability insurance reform – it was only in Parliament that the 
modernizing elements of reform were added (Bonoli 1999; Häusermann 
et al. 2004).
Among other reasons, this can be explained precisely by the changing 
configuration of winners and losers of welfare system reforms: recalibra-
tion benefits mainly outsiders – women , unemployed, young families, 
atypical workers – who do not belong to the main constituency of labor 
and capital (Häusermann et al. 2004). Hence, trade unions and employers 
proved unable to draw a compromise on these policies in the pre-parlia-
mentary arena. The political parties, by contrast, proved to be more sen-
sitive to the claims of the new risk groups, because of the higher propor-
tion of women in Parliament as compared to corporatist decision-making 
arenas (Bonoli 2006), and because political parties are more responsive to 
value issues such as gender equality (Häusermann et al 2004). Therefore, 
the political parties have become the main drivers of Swiss welfare system 
restructuring.
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8.5 Conclusion: The Politics Linking Modernization and Cost 
Containment 
For the sake of comparison and synthesis, the following table summarizes 
the three broad stages of Swiss welfare system development in a synthetic 
manner. The Swiss reform trajectory comprises an early period of expan-
sion and two parallel periods of restructuring – both restrictive and ex-
pansive – from the late 1980s and early 1990s onwards.
Table 8.6 Summary of reform trajectory : Switzerland
Type of 
change
Context and diag-
nosis
Content of policy 
changes
Politics and con-
fl ict lines
Reform output and 
consequences
Growth un-
til the late 
1980s
Full employment ; 
industrialism; eco-
nomic growth; Di-
agnosis: ‘The Swiss 
welfare system 
must be extended 
to provide suffi  -
cient insurance to 
all employees’ 
Development of 
mandatory insu-
rance schemes; 
increase of benefi t 
levels; develop-
ment of basic 
minimum benefi ts
Negotiated com-
promises between 
labor and capital; 
low level of class 
confl ict 
1st order changes : 
Slow develop-
ment of the Swiss 
welfare system as a 
bismarckian lateco-
mer; main winners: 
male labor market 
insiders and their 
families
Cost con-
tainment 
and consoli-
dation since 
the 1980s
Economic down-
turn; demographic 
changes; rising 
expenditure levels; 
Diagnosis: ‘Expen-
ditures need to 
be limited: cost 
containment and 
retrenchment ’
Selective retrench-
ment of benefi ts 
in pension and 
unemployment 
insurance; further 
welfare system 
expansion is only 
limited and incre-
asingly means-
tested
Highly contro-
versial negotia-
tions between 
capital, labor and 
political parties; no 
agreement on the 
diagnostic; Strong 
class-polarization 
1st order changes : 
parametric retren-
chment in the 
major insurance 
schemes; 2nd order 
changes : shift to 
increased tax-
fi nancing;
main losers: middle 
class insiders 
Moderniza-
tion since 
the 1990s
Postindustrialism; 
unstable labor 
markets and family 
structures; Diagno-
sis: ‘The welfare 
system needs to 
be adapted to 
new risk profi les; 
activation is more 
economical than 
income compen-
sation’
Inclusion of 
welfare system 
outsiders in the 
insurance sche-
mes; Activation of 
unemployed, disa-
bled and mothers ; 
minimum support 
for low-income 
classes
Negotiated com-
promises between 
political parties 
(less so labor and 
capital); insider -
outsider confl icts; 
value-confl icts on 
gender equality
2nd order changes : 
coverage of new 
risk groups by 
existing insurance 
schemes; 3rd order 
change : shift of 
policy goals from 
compensation to 
activation;
main winners: out-
siders and women ;
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It is important to note the striking parallels between the mechanisms of 
welfare system retrenchment and modernization in Switzerland and in 
many other Bismarckian countries. Cost containment in pensions and un-
employment insurance has occurred in most of these countries in a very 
similar fashion (see the other country chapters in this volume). Similarly, 
almost all of these countries have simultaneously reinforced tax-financed 
minimum protection schemes, and they have all developed a stronger 
focus on activation, family policy and female labor market participation 
during the recent years (except for Austria , which still seems to pursue a 
Conservative family policy ; see Obinger and Tálos, this volume).
How can we explain these changes? It appears clearly that we need to 
attribute them to factors that are equally similar across these countries: 
structural pressure and the common micro-institutional characteristics 
of the Bismarckian welfare systems.
Indeed, in Switzerland as in all the other countries, the Bismarckian 
micro-institutions have clashed with the structural developments of aus-
terity and post-industrialism. This clash has led to a redefinition of the 
reform agenda. The actual reform output in each and every country does, 
however, depend on national factors.
In this respect, the macroinstitutional context has definitely been the 
single most important factor explaining the mechanisms and pace of re-
forms. The fragmented institutional structure of the Swiss consensus de-
mocracy accounts for the fact that the Swiss welfare system developed so 
slowly and in a very modest and fragmented manner, combining different 
logics of welfare system policy (insurance, capitalization, means-testing, 
private health care etc.) from the very start. This macroinstitutional con-
text also continued to shape the reform trajectory later on in both an in-
direct and a direct way: indirectly, the micro-institutional diversity of the 
Swiss welfare system widened the repertoire of available ‘policy instru-
ments ’, thereby facilitating the pragmatic ‘modernization ’ of the typically 
Bismarckian weaknesses after the 1980s.
But the Swiss reform pragmatism is also linked more directly to the 
macroinstitutional context: political decision-making power is spread 
across a wide range of actors. Not only are all relevant actors involved in 
decision making, but every reform in Switzerland can be challenged in a 
popular referendum. Hence, reforms must be carefully balanced in order 
to gather sufficient support. Therefore, negotiation is the main mecha-
nism of reform in Switzerland. I would even go further and argue that 
the simultaneous emergence of cost containment and modernization on 
the Swiss reform agenda since the 1980s enabled precisely the required 
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compromise. Hence, the modernizing reforms often benefit from rather 
unexpected cross-class coalitions between leftist and socially Liberal ac-
tors, because they combine retrenchment of existing benefits with ex-
pansive elements in favor of former outsiders . This pattern of reform 
could for example be observed in the 1995 pension reform and the 1995 
unemployment insurance reform (Bonoli 1999; Häusermann et al. 2004; 
Häusermann 2010b), but also in the 2003 reform of occupational pensions 
(Häusermann 2002).
Finally, layering has also become an important mechanism of reform. 
As I have outlined at the beginning of the chapter, the Swiss welfare sys-
tem grew in a layered fashion. Slowly growing insurance schemes were 
gradually complemented by additional policies, designed to alleviate the 
most important loopholes. The system of old-age protection exemplifies 
this logic, since it relies on a ‘multi-pillar’ logic, which has incrementally 
developed over time: flat-rate universal PAYG-pensions are complement-
ed by means-tested and tax-financed supplementary benefits, capitalized 
occupational pensions and voluntary, fiscally encouraged private pension 
savings plans. This system, combining different logics of benefits and fi-
nancing, proves to be more resilient to structural and demographic chal-
lenges than purely Bismarckian regimes and has recently become a model 
for reform in other policy fields. Recent reform propositions (e.g. Bauer 
et al. 2004) call for the emulation of this design in the fields of family and 
health policy. Hence, the micro-institutional design of the existing wel-
fare system itself feeds back into the dynamics of reform.
In conclusion, let me come back to the regime classification of the 
Swiss welfare system? Is it still Bismarckian ? In this chapter, I have shown 
that the Swiss welfare system tends to become both less Bismarckian at 
the bottom of the income distribution (means-tested minima, outsiders 
policies, universal health care etc.) and more Bismarckian – i.e. stratifying 
and inegalitarian – with regard to the middle and higher income classes. 
Hence, it is crucial to acknowledge that the ‘modernized’ Swiss welfare 
system is neither becoming universalistic (i.e. Scandinavian ), nor residual 
or Liberal (i.e. Anglo-Saxon ). Rather we may be witnessing the start of 
a genuinely Continental ‘way out’ of the post-industrial challenges: the 
inegalitarian and insurance-related aspects are reinforced with the reduc-
tion of replacement rates, the lengthening of contribution periods and the 
inclusion of former outsiders in the insurance schemes. At the same time, 
however, a basic minimum protection allows for this reform-strategy by 
easing the most pressing poverty risks, and by providing the reforms with 
the necessary political legitimacy.
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9 The Politics of Social Security Reforms in the 
 Czech Republic , Hungary , Poland and Slovakia 
Alfi o Cerami
9.1 Introduction1
In 1989 Central and Eastern European policy-makers were suddenly con-
fronted with the diﬃ  cult task of restructuring a welfare system under a 
completely diﬀ erent economic and political system. Th e restructuring of 
welfare institutions accompanied the emergence of new and serious soci-
etal problems. More and more people were hit by unemployment and pov-
erty , the family pattern in force during communism had to be re-discussed, 
and also protection during old age and sickness had to be renegotiated. Re-
forms started immediately and involved important structural changes . Th e 
four Visegrad2 countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) 
raised retirement age and pension insurance contributions while reduc-
ing the pay-as-you-go principle, introduced health insurance while guar-
anteeing the access to health care through the obligation of the state to 
ensure unprotected citizens, implemented a German-like unemployment 
insurance consisting usually of three pillars (unemployment beneﬁ ts, un-
employment assistance and social assistance ), reduced the family beneﬁ ts 
heritage of the communist system while continuing to pursue pro-natalist 
policy and extensive childcare provisions (very often until the child is en-
rolled in university education), as well as establishing a basic safety net for 
those citizens at persistent risk of poverty (Cerami 2006).
Despite the fact that great attention has recently been given to the role 
played by institutions and path-dependent mechanisms in the develop-
ment of European welfare systems (see, for instance, Bonoli and Palier 
2000; Pierson 2004; Ebbinghaus 2005; Streeck and Thelen 2005b), the 
possible outcome of such institutional transformations is still the object 
of a controversial debate. Here, the main problem is to characterize the 
new internal configuration, which results from a continuous process of 
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structuring, destructuring and restructuring of existent welfare institu-
tions . The literature usually addresses Central and Eastern European wel-
fare systems as extremely diverse and doomed to follow, on a country 
basis, one of the Esping-Andersen’s (1990) three-fold typology. For Bob 
Deacon (1992), Poland should have become a good example of a ‘post-
communist Conservative corporatist ’ welfare state, Czechoslovakia of 
a Social Democratic model, while Hungary of a Liberal welfare regime . 
More recently, Zsuzsa Ferge (2001) and Erzsébet Szalai (E. Szalai 2005) 
have expressed their worries that Hungary might be on the move towards 
the Liberal welfare regime , whereas other political scientists have argued 
that a mixture of corporatism and liberalism (see J. Szalai 2005; Fuchs and 
Offe 2008; Gans-Morse and Orenstein 2006; Bohle and Greskovits 2007) 
or of corporatism and social democracy (Fenger 2007) was, in reality, the 
main characteristic of the new welfare state. Despite undisputable merits, 
these authors have paid only limited attention to the commonalities that 
the four Visegrad countries shared, even though it would have been in-
teresting to explore more in detail how Bismarckian institutions in force 
before Word War II were adapted to the universal communist principles 
and then eventually recombined in the new post-communist environment 
(for recent exceptions, see Bakken 2008; Sirovátka and Saxonberg 2008).
This chapter aims to further investigate this issue by asking how and to 
what extent Bismarckian institutions survived the communist and post-
communist social policy reorganization, as well as what the new inter-
nal structure of these welfare systems in transition is. Here, four distinct 
types of politics of social security reforms are identified and discussed: 
the politics of expansion for legitimization implemented during the com-
munist period of transformation, followed by the politics of expansion for 
compensation, politics of retrenchment through privatization and politics 
of recalibration in the post-communist transitions.
Contrary to common assumptions that look at the establishment of 
welfare institutions as being implemented by design or as the result of 
an aseptic policy transfer, this chapter will argue that the four Visegrad 
countries have built their contemporary welfare system on the ruins, and 
with the ruins, of the welfare institutions they had previously introduced 
in the pre-communist and communist period. Th e reason for the inclusion 
of these countries in the family of Bismarckian welfare systems lies, there-
fore, not only in the fact that they have a long tradition of Bismarckian 
social insurance and are usually considered the front-runners of reforms 
that might be implemented elsewhere, but also in the fact that Bismarckian 
institutions, established before World War II, lived, adapted and evolved 
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during the communist social policy reorganization from 1945 to 1989, and 
also succeeded in surviving the, perhaps, even more rapid structural trans-
formation following the dissolution of the central planned economy.
Compared to other contributions in this volume, this chapter goes back 
further in the history of social protection by including the soviet and pre-
soviet social policy organization. As will be shown, this analysis is crucial 
to understanding the real path of development in countries that have wit-
nessed several phases of economic, political and social transformation. 
In the conclusion, it will be affirmed that Central and Eastern European 
countries develop around a new welfare logic, which combines, in a path-
dependent and innovative way components of Bismarckian social insur-
ance, communist egalitarianism and Liberal market orientation (see also 
Cerami 2006). In short, it includes elements of each of the Esping-Ander-
sen ’s three-fold classification.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section One describes the system 
of social protection established in the period antecedent World War II, 
while Section Two provides an overview of communist social policy with 
the associated politics of social security reforms. Section Three then goes 
on describing the period 1989 onwards. It highlights the main welfare re-
form trajectories after communism, but also their main politics of social 
security reforms, as well as the role that international organizations have 
played in the transformation of post-communist welfare states.
9.2 The Period before 1945
Historical Background
As recently highlighted by Inglot (2003, 2008), Szikra (2004), Tom-
ka (2004a, 2004b), Cerami (2006), Haggard and Kaufman (2008), and 
Sirovátka and Saxonberg (2008) the four Visegrad countries have a long 
tradition of social insurance that dates back to the Austro-Hungarian Em-
pire. This can be seen if we look in turn to eligibility criteria, type of ben-
efits, financing and management of the early social protection schemes in 
these countries.
A brief overview of pre-communist pension systems shows, for exam-
ple, that these countries had already established some form of Bismarck -
style pension insurance, which linked access to benefits to professional 
status. This link was particularly strong in the Czech Republic and in the 
Slovak Republic , in Hungary and in Poland . In the years 1906 to 1933, the 
numerous funded pension schemes established were based on a corpo-
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ratist vision of social solidarity, primarily aiming to secure occupational 
standards. Health care was also provided on the basis of professional ac-
tivity and financed primarily through social insurance contributions. In 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia , the first health policy was introduced 
in 1918, when the Czech Lands declared their independence from the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire. The first fully functional health insurance sys-
tem, however, came into force in 1924 with the adoption of the Health 
Insurance Act, which provided coverage for employees, approximately 
one third of the total population. Hungary enacted the first act on public 
health in 1876 (Act XIV of 1876). According to the law, the eligible poor 
obtained free health care at special surgeries. Corporatist social insur-
ance was the foundation of the system. Health care was delivered through 
the private sector and in some state hospitals. Poland , which has a long 
tradition of Bismarckian social insurance, dates the first legislation back 
to 1918. This system provided, however, very limited coverage with only 7 
percent of the population insured.
Th e beneﬁ t structure also clearly reﬂ ected a Bismarckian orientation. As 
mentioned, pension and health care beneﬁ ts were associated with the em-
ployees’ insurance records and aimed at reproducing professional achieve-
ments. Pension beneﬁ ts were earnings-related , while the access to health 
care services, obtainable in public as well as in private practices, depended 
on the payment of health insurance premiums or, when not available, by 
payments in cash. Th is system was highly non-egalitarian and a signiﬁ cant 
segment of the population remained uninsured. As highlighted by Dorot-
tya Szikra (2004: Table 1, p. 267), while in 1900 approximately 9 percent 
of the total population was insured in the compulsory sickness insurance 
in Western Europe, this percentage was only 3.5 percent in Hungary . Forty 
years later, in 1940, the gap was even higher with 31 percent of total popula-
tion insured in Western Europe against 10 percent in Hungary .
The main financing mechanism was social insurance contributions, 
which aimed at covering individuals primarily against the risks associated 
with old age and health. There was a basic social safety net for the poor, 
sponsored by the state or by charity organizations; this net did not aim 
at guaranteeing minimum living standards, but rather aimed to alleviate 
extreme poverty temporarily.
Th e management of the social security system was fairly decentralized. 
Th e responsibility for old-age and health care protection was primarily given 
to local communities or workers’ associations, which had the duty to ensure 
a minimum level of subsistence (rather than a minimum living standard) for 
their members. State intervention in workers’ life was minimal and primar-
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ily relegated to resolve workers’ disputes. Th e increasing internal tensions, 
caused by the very low living standards of factory workers and agrarians 
associated with the possible spread of socialist ideals, lead the governments 
of these countries to adopt the strategy developed by Bismarck . Th e main-
tenance of social peace was then linked to the introduction of occupation-
ally based schemes, in which central authorities had only limited regulatory 
powers (primarily legislative rather than that of supervision).
9.3 The Period from 1945 to 1989
The Bismarckian Characteristics of the Communist Welfare System
Following the Soviet occupation after World War II, the dominant Bis-
marckian mode of access to benefits was not completely abolished by the 
communist regime, but rather it was expanded in order to bring it in line 
with the egalitarian aspirations of the Bolshevik revolution. Here, it is 
important to point out that the communist understanding of citizenship 
coincided with the idea of the perfect communist worker (such as Stakha-
nov). Every citizen had the right and obligation to work not only for the 
sustenance of his or her family, but also for the economic development of 
the country. As a consequence, welfare rights and entitlements continued 
to be based on professional activity, but the corporatist orientation was 
covered by egalitarian communist propaganda and by the fact that there 
was practically no unemployment . Clearly, things were different for those 
minorities, who were, for some reason, outside of the labor market (such 
as Roma, pensioners , handicapped). In this case, the universal and egal-
itarian aspirations of the communist regime faced a drastic slowdown. 
Poverty and what we would call social exclusion were associated with an 
implicit social stigma. In the eyes of the many citizens that regularly took 
part in the economic, social and political life, being the beneficiary of 
some form of social assistance benefit (in-kind or in-cash) was inevitably 
the result of a reactionary or, in the worst case, of counter-revolutionary 
behavior (Milanovic 1998; Cerami 2006).
With the introduction of the central planned economy, the benefit 
structure was equalized. Flat-rate rather than contributory benefits be-
came the new characteristics of the pension system, while universal and 
standardized treatments were the norm in public, state-run hospitals. 
Unfortunately, the egalitarian aspirations of the communist nomencla-
ture did not coincide with a positive performance of welfare institutions . 
A poor working life was usually followed by a poor retirement (Connor 
 SOCIAL SECURITY REFORMS IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC, HUNGARY, POLAND AND SLOVAKIA
1997), while health care services were highly inefficient and characterized 
by high morbidity rates (Deacon 2000).
Th e extremely diﬀ erentiated schemes established during the Bismarck-
ian period in Eastern Europe were put under the control of central authori-
ties, with social insurance revenues and expenditures becoming an inte-
gral part of the central planned economy. Social insurance contributions, 
which persisted in these countries even during the 1970s, were transferred 
to the state budget (or in funds within the state budget) and, subsequently, 
redistributed to the entire population. Th e management of the social pro-
tection system was highly hierarchical and based on a top-down approach. 
Th e Ministry of Social Aﬀ airs (or Health) planned the relative policies. 
Th ese were then implemented by local authorities on the basis of the deci-
sions and the national priorities taken at the central level, often with little 
or no knowledge of real local needs. Trade unions were also in charge of so-
cial insurance administration, but since only the oﬃ  cial communist trade 
union was allowed, the independence from state authority was extremely 
limited. Th e access to welfare beneﬁ ts, by contrast, followed a bottom-up 
direction and was characterized by a high degree of discretion of those of-
ﬁ cials who were responsible to grant the beneﬁ ts.
Although state participation in the financing of the communist wel-
fare system was greatly enlarged, social insurance contributions did not 
completely disappear from the scene. While in Czechoslovakia , social in-
surance premiums were automatically included in the state budget3, in 
Hungary and Poland they were still considered to be a separate part of 
social security receipts. As Table 9.1 shows, during the period from the 
1960s to the end of the 1980s, the receipts from employers ’ contributions 
in Hungary were equal or higher than state participation receipts, while 
the contributions paid by the insured corresponded to approximately 
one-fifth (slightly below 20 percent) of total social security revenues. In 
Poland, the largest part of total social security receipts was paid through 
employers ’ contributions, which remained constantly higher than the re-
ceipt coming from state participation, and that covered the low revenues 
of insured premiums.
As Manow (this volume) has demonstrated, the ways in which a welfare 
system expands may depend on the existing financing structure of wel-
fare institutions (tax vs. social insurance contributions), but also on the 
degree of freedom of the institutions responsible for monetary policies. 
In economies based on central planning, the main characteristic was an 
ambiguous, contributions-oriented system that equally redistributed the 
resources collected, while the institutions responsible for monetary poli-
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Table 9.1 Social security receipts: Percentage of contributions paid by insured person, 
employers and state intervention
CZECHOSLOVAKIA 
Year Insured Employers State intervention
1963 2 33 65
1966 0 35 65
1971 0 3 97
1974 0 3 97
1977 0 3 97
1980 0 4 96
1983 0 4 96
1986 0 4 96
1990 0 4 96
HUNGARY
Year Insured Employers State Intervention
1963 12 47 42
1966 14 40 46
1971 17 52 31
1974 17 43 40
1977 16 46 38
1980 14 40 46
1983 15 47 38
1986 21 79 0
1991 25* 75 0
POLAND
Year Insured Employers State intervention
1963 0 63 37
1966 1 61 38
1971 10 54 36
1974 4 59 37
1977 1 57 42*
1980 2 52 46
1986 3 61 36*
1989 2 70 28*
1990 3 68 29*
*Estimated
Source: ILO/MZES 2001. Author’s calculations.
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cies were fully subjected to state authority. It comes then as no surprise 
that rising contributions also coincided with an increase in an external 
debt as it happened in countries with a low degree of central bank inde-
pendence and Bismarckian welfare systems such as Belgium , France , Italy , 
Portugal and Spain . The increase in external debt could, however, not last 
forever, and ultimately it undermined the stability of the same system it 
was maintaining (see below).
Expansion for Legitimization
During the period of the communist social policy reorganization, govern-
ments increased beneﬁ ts in order to buy social peace and avoid political 
contestation. Th is divide and pacify strategy so brilliantly identiﬁ ed by Pi-
eter Vanhuysse (2006) for the ﬁ rst years of post-communist transforma-
tion took place, in reality, before the fall of communism. A politics of ex-
pansion for legitimization took place in the early 1960s accentuating, in the 
late 1970s and 1980s, the pressures on the communist economic system, 
ultimately unmasking the persistent economic and social crisis. Th e pro-
cess of modernization in Central and Eastern Europe, started, in fact, with 
the development of heavy industry in the second half of the 1950s, which 
resulted in an extraordinary increase in living standards. Th ese, however, 
were maintained artiﬁ cially high, for political and propaganda purposes, 
beyond the real possibilities of the central planned economy. Th e artiﬁ cial 
rise in living conditions through various state subsidies, coupled with a 
constant increase in military expenses, put the productive and distributive 
capacities of the central planned economy under great ﬁ nancial pressure. 
Constructing an always larger number of nuclear missiles, submarines, or 
engaging in the ‘space race’ with the United States were extremely expen-
sive political exercises that, in some way, had to be ﬁ nanced. Funds could 
only be raised at this point either from a reduction in expenditures for 
those policies indirectly aimed at subsidizing the economy and, hence, at 
raising living standards (such as price subsidies or subvention to modern-
ize the ﬁ rms) or, as last resort, from an increase in external debt. Th e latter 
option was the one preferred by almost all countries. By 1989, for example, 
the gross convertible external debt reached 7.9 thousand million US dol-
lars in Czechoslovakia , 19.2 thousand million US dollars in Hungary and 
40.8 thousand million US dollars in Poland (E. Szalai 2005: 32).
During the 1970s and 1980s, social expenditures thus continuously ex-
panded4, financed through external debt, in order to ensure the social sta-
bility, especially after the attempts of revolt in Budapest in 1956, after the 
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Prague Spring in 1968 and in Poland in the early 1980s. In front of mass 
demonstrations, political leaders tried to consolidate their power through 
an expansion in welfare provisions (E. Szalai 2005). The establishment 
of an extensive welfare system was, thus, the compensation that Eastern 
European citizens received in exchange for their liberty. However, despite 
numerous attempts to increase the distributive possibilities of the central 
planned economy, by the end of the 1980s the welfare system had grown 
to its limits with external funding, and the dissatisfaction among citizens, 
already high, grew, leading to the collapse of the system on 9 November 
1989, the day of the fall of the Berlin Wall.
9.4 The Period from 1989 onwards
Welfare Reform Trajectories after Communism
At the beginning of the 1990s, structural reforms were implemented that 
remained under the dominant Bismarckian logic, that had been intro-
duced in the pre-soviet period and continued even during communism. 
Welfare benefits granted on the basis of professional activity and accord-
ing to the work record of individuals continued to be financed through 
the payment of social insurance contributions, which this time, however, 
were redistributed to a lesser extent among the population in the absence 
of a centrally planned economic mechanism. Professional diversity, dif-
ferentiation of provisions and privatization of schemes soon became 
the keywords of the new post-communist consensus. In short, three se-
quences of reforms can be identified since the collapse of communism: 1) 
compensation for the transition, 2) retrenchment through privatization ; 
and 3) rebalancing. These phases corresponded to a peculiar politics of 
social security reforms. Politics of expansion for compensation for the first 
phase, politics of retrenchment through privatization for the second phase 
and politics of recalibration for the third one.
Table 9.2 Parliamentary elections 1989-2007
Czech Republic Hungary 
1990: center-Right coalition (Czechoslovakia)
1992: center-Right coalition (Czechoslovakia)
1996: center-Right coalition
1998: center-Left coalition
2002: center-Left coalition
2006: center-Right coalition
1990: center-Right coalition
1994: center-Left coalition (ex-communists)
1998: center-Right coalition
2002: center-Left coalition
2006: center-Left coalition
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Table 9.2 Parliamentary elections 1989-2007
Poland Slovak Republic
1991: center-Right coalition
1993: center-Left coalition
1997: center-Right coalition
2001: center-Right coalition
2005: center-Right coalition
2007: center-Right coalition
1990: center-Right coalition (Czechoslovakia)
1992: center-Right coalition (Czechoslovakia)
1994: center-Left coalition
1998: center-Left coalition
2002: center-Right coalition
2006: center-Right coalition
Source: Cerami 2006, pp. 17-29; Parties and elections in Europe 2008
Compensating for the Transition
The first sequence coincided with the temporary growth of welfare provi-
sions called to aid the democratic transition of Eastern Europe. The new 
problem of mass unemployment resulting from the dismissal of workers 
of state-owned enterprises was first tackled by the introduction of ex-
tensive early retirement policies, followed by the establishment of rela-
tively far-reaching unemployment and social assistance programs, which 
should have had the important function of social pacification (Standing 
1996; Milanovic 1998; Vanhuysse 2006). Vanhuysse (2006) has defined 
this as a divide and pacify strategy aimed at reducing workers’ mobiliza-
tion capacity through access to relatively generous welfare benefits (gen-
erous if compared to the real possibilities of these transition economies). 
This phase is parallel to the ‘labor shedding ’ strategy (Esping-Andersen 
1996b) implemented earlier in Western Bismarckian welfare systems.
During this phase of compensation for the transition, not only tempo-
rary emergency policies were implemented (see Inglot 2008), but also 
the first steps for future, long-lasting reforms were taken (a politics of 
expansion for compensation). In pension, the governments of the Czech 
Republic , Hungary , Poland and Slovakia started the first attempts to move 
away from the old pay-as-go-system, by creating the basis for the future 
adoption of the three-pillar schemes (or private funds in the case of the 
Czech Republic ). This also included the reinforcement of principles based 
on pension insurance, as well as a slow raise in retirement and contribu-
tion rates, which remained set at an extremely low level during the entire 
communist period. In the health care sector, the main characteristics of 
reforms were the reintroduction of health insurance , a clearer separation 
in the management and ﬁ nancing the system (from taxation to contribu-
tions and from the state budget to separate funds), as well as the estab-
lishment of private practice. With unemployment and social assistance , 
this involved the introduction of unemployment insurance, as well as the 
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establishment of a basic social safety net. Finally, concerning family bene-
ﬁ ts, the temporary maintenance of extensive family policies had the aim of 
cushioning some of the costs of transition, since policy-makers in the re-
gion saw family protection as the most eﬀ ective way to target poor people.
Retrenchment through Privatization 
Of course, the early generosity soon became unsustainable, especially due 
to the escalating number of unemployed. In the second sequence of re-
forms, retrenchment through privatization, new policies were introduced 
in order to reduce the expansion of the welfare system. The measures, used 
to prevent such uncontrollable extension of rights and claims, involved 
the privatization of provisions, as sponsored by the most influential in-
ternational financial institutions, and also, perhaps more importantly, the 
reinforcement of principles based on professional diversity. A process of 
monetization5 and individualization of risks and responsibilities was then 
enclosed in a Bismarckian welfare logic, resulting in the (re-)establishment 
of insurance-related pension, health care and unemployment schemes. 
This politics of retrenchment through privatization seemed the best way 
to cut expenditures, while, at the same time, ensuring professional diver-
sity and market orientation. In Hungary, attempts at retrenchments were 
carried out by finance minister Lajos Bokros in 1995, who unsuccessfully 
tried to introduce a set of austerity measures (the so-called Bokros pack-
age) with the aim of making family allowance no longer universal and 
automatic, of conducting a shift from flat-rate to means-tested benefits, 
of reducing childcare assistance and of introducing the tuition fees for 
universities. In the Czech Republic, the Klaus governments pushed for 
a drastic reduction in protection against unemployment policies, espe-
cially during the second half of the 1990s. Fascinatingly, the policy dis-
course during these years reached a peak in neoliberal orientations with 
some Czech officials affirming that unemployment was something natu-
ral and beneficial for the country. If no unemployment  had existed, then 
something would have been wrong with the country (Consensus II 1999: 
Czech Republic, Part IV, p. 150). In the mid-1990s, a report called Security 
through Diversity also opened a tempestuous debate in Poland between 
the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Social Affairs on the incontro-
vertible necessity of drastic social security reforms. Similarly in Slovakia, 
violent discussions on the necessity of privatizing health and pensions 
also took place at about the same time. Most pension and health care re-
forms (notably the full introduction of the three-pillar scheme in Hungary 
and Poland , and the reinforcement of health insurance principles in Czech 
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and Slovak Republic ) took place towards the end of the 1990s. These were, 
undoubtedly, the years where endogenous and exogenous economic vul-
nerabilities became stronger and actions were addressed as urgent by the 
national, as well as by the international, community.
Interestingly, the Left/Right divide was not a determinant factor for par-
ty preferences towards neoliberal or Social Democratic reforms. Not only 
center-Right parties, like the ODS of Vaclav Klaus in Czech Republic , but 
also left-wing governments, like the MSZP of Gyula Horn in Hungary , or the 
catholic Solidarity coalitions in Poland , opted for welfare cuts. One plau-
sible explanation for the rather unusual behavior of left-wing parties is pro-
vided by Müller (2004), who sees such reform attempts as being driven by 
the necessity of Left governments, on the one hand, to increase their inter-
national legitimacy after 40 years of communism, while, on the other, to let 
the population digest more easily the absolutely necessary reforms. Right-
wing parties would not have had the same moral authority. Th e Nixon goes to 
China Syndrome (Müller 2004) seems, as a consequence, to have character-
ized the politics of social security reforms of the left-wing parties in these 
years of transition, even though this does not seem to be the case anymore.
Rebalancing: The Return to Bismarck ?
Owing to problems connected with the growing number of unprotected 
citizens attempting to claim from the already indebted social insurance 
funds , the excessively optimistic expectations for market-driven change 
did not survive its arrival. The third sequence of reforms characterized 
by a politics of recalibration , and by policy learning dynamics (see Pierson 
2001b; Hemerijck 2008), was that of rebalancing the neoliberal approach 
introduced by most Central and Eastern European governments. In the 
Czech Republic, numerous private health insurance funds deemed un-
able to provide minimum standards for their clients have been abolished, 
while in Hungary the compulsory affiliation with the second private pillar 
of pension, once mandatory for younger generations, has been eliminat-
ed. In Poland, unemployment benefits still financed by employers ’ con-
tributions are granted on a flat-rate rather than on an occupational basis 
so as to reduce the financial pressure caused by raising unemployment , 
whereas in Slovakia the full implementation of a strong market-oriented 
health insurance is facing increasing policy resistance because of the uni-
versal requirements expressed by the Slovak Constitution.
How can such a change in orientation be explained? Undoubtedly, blame 
avoidance (Weaver 1986; Pierson 2001b) and credit claiming (Mayhew 1974) 
strategies in these countries play a greater role now than in the past. Politi-
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cians are increasingly searching for ambiguous political and policy agree-
ments in order to see their economic and social policy goals implemented, 
while, at the same time, trying to ensure the continuation of their own politi-
cal career.6 Political leaders who stay in the government are also more often 
claiming responsibility for the ‘missed disaster’, which would have followed 
the non-implementation of reforms. Also parties in opposition aﬃ  rm with 
more determination responsibility for having avoided an even more painful 
economic transformation through their blockades in the Parliament.
Despite the importance of these actor-centered explanations, the politi-
cal behavior of citizens and politicians is still not suﬃ  cient to fully under-
stand the path of social security reforms in the Visegrad countries . Th e role 
played by already existing institutions must also be seriously taken into ac-
count. As the next paragraph will summarize, reforms in the mode of access, 
beneﬁ t structure, management and ﬁ nancing of the new welfare system 
were carried out according to two main principles, which were deeply root-
ed in the communist and pre-communist past. Th e ﬁ rst principle was driven 
by the experience of the excessive standardization of economic and social 
life caused by the regulatory mechanisms of the central planned economy, 
which produced the undesired eﬀ ects of limiting work performance in the 
absence of incentives , stagnation, and even regression of modernization . As 
a result, the aim of politicians and policy-makers was to provide a diﬀ erenti-
ated socio-economic system in which the personal aspirations of citizens 
could be better realized. In the areas of social policy, this coincided with 
the reintroduction of provisions based on occupational diversity, which also 
had a long tradition in these countries. At the same time, 40 years of com-
munism had produced a system of formal and informal norms that made an 
extremely reduced and diﬃ  cult access to welfare provisions not a viable po-
litical decision. Th e paternalist welfare system established during commu-
nism could not simply be dismantled overnight, especially in times where 
the costs of the economic transition would primarily lay with the poorer 
social classes. Th e reinforcement of Bismarckian institutions, never com-
pletely dismantled during communism, was then the most obvious option.
The Current State of Welfare Systems in Visegrad Countries 
In 2008, the mode of access to benefits in the four Visegrad countries is 
based on the Bismarckian model, but significant universal aspirations still 
exist (Cerami 2006; Bakken 2008; Sirovátka and Saxonberg 2008). In the 
Czech Republic , Hungary , Poland and Slovakia , the access to pensions is 
regulated by the payment of social insurance contributions, but a strong 
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link to social assistance provisions (the so-called fourth pillar) ensures 
coverage for those people who, otherwise, would remain uninsured (Wa-
gener 2002; Tomka 2004a; MISSOC 2008). The same applies with regards 
to health care protection. All these countries grant health services upon 
the payment of health insurance premiums, but the state is often called 
to cover the deficit of the newly established health funds and to ensure 
that numerous unprotected citizens, such as the unemployed, students, 
children, pensioners , and persons in need are covered.
Th ough primarily Bismarckian in its character (in the four Visegrad 
countries, welfare beneﬁ ts are: a) primarily ﬁ nanced by social insurance 
contributions; b) earnings-related ; and c) granted on the basis of the profes-
sional record), the beneﬁ t structure of current Central and Eastern Euro-
pean welfare institutions can be described as an ambiguous mix of diﬀ eren-
tiation and equalization of provisions. Just to quote a few examples, in the 
Czech Republic , pensions are ﬁ nanced by social insurance contributions 
and are calculated on the basis of two amounts: 1) a basic ﬂ at-rate based on 
citizenship and 2) an additional earnings-related component based on pro-
fessional status. Th e ﬂ at-rate component of pensions plays the role of equal-
ization at the expense of the middle and upper classes (Consensus Program 
II 1999; Tomeš 2003; MISSOC 2008). In Hungary, most health services are 
included in the mandatory health package, which is covered by the compul-
sory insurance scheme. As a consequence, there is little space for additional 
private health care services and because of this the majority of citizens have 
access to the same provisions (Gál et al. 2003: 78; MISSOC 2008). For Ko-
rnai (2001) the current Hungarian health care system still displays some 
characteristics of ‘market socialism’. In Poland, unemployment beneﬁ ts are 
ﬁ nanced by social insurance contributions, but their amount is granted 
on a ﬂ at-rate basis. A diﬀ erentiated welfare system also exists for farmers, 
who are insured by KRUS (Social Insurance Fund for Farmers) in contrast 
to ZUS (Social Insurance Institution), which is responsible for employees. 
Diﬀ erently from ZUS, in KRUS, pensions are still based on a ﬁ rst pay-as-
you-go component (1st pillar), while health insurance has higher univer-
sal aspirations. In Slovakia the aim of the new pension formula is clearly 
that of encouraging professional diversity, but the system, work-related in 
scope, still has universal aspirations. Article 39 of the Slovak Constitution 
aﬃ  rms the right to adequate material provisions for pensioners establishing 
a strong linkage with the minimum guaranteed income (MISSOC 2008).
In Central and Eastern Europe, decentralization and devolution of re-
sponsibilities to regional and local authorities and to funds has been the 
main characteristic of reforms, although some form of re-centralization is 
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observable. Devolution can be explained as a reaction to the communist 
over-centralization, which had neglected local requests in order to meet 
national priorities. As can be seen by the administrative organization, the 
system is far more differentiated. In the Czech Republic , Hungary , Poland 
and Slovakia , the Ministries of Labor and Social Affairs are responsible for 
planning policies and drawing up legislation for the overall social security 
system, with the exception of health care, which is, usually, under the 
control of the Ministry of Health. Distinct and autonomous bodies (such 
as the Czech Administration of Social Security, the Hungarian Central 
Administration of National Pension Insurance, KRUS and ZUS in Poland, 
or the Slovak Social Insurance Agency) administer the new social insur-
ance system and pay the benefits through their district and local offices.
Also the role of trade unions , usually addressed as the weakest link in 
the reforms process, has drastically increased. Despite common assump-
tions, tripartite consultations have played a crucial role in the ﬁ rst stage of 
reforms by helping the introduction of a new welfare system, in the second 
stage by facilitating the continuation of reforms mediating diﬀ erent inter-
ests and needs, and in the third stage of reforms, by calling attention to 
the necessity to include a social dimension of transformation (Ladó 2003: 
258). In this context, it can be aﬃ  rmed that not the absence of corporat-
ism , but rather a form of state-led corporatism , to use Schmidt ’s descrip-
tion (Schmidt 2006), is the main characteristic of the transition towards a 
market economy. If Ebbinghaus ’ classiﬁ cation is applied (Ebbinghaus, this 
volume), then state-led corporatism would come very close to the consul-
tation type as the state may consult the social partners but not seriously 
negotiate with them (in this case it would be concertation). Moreover, ac-
tors in the four Visegrad countries seem to lack the capacity of being true 
corporatist actors in both policy formation and implementation, since pri-
ority was very often given to macroeconomic stabilization measures.
Finally, as far as the ﬁ nancing mechanism is concerned, the general trend 
occurring in the four Visegrad countries seems to be a rapid devolution of 
state responsibility in ﬁ nancing the system of social protection through an 
increase in social insurance contributions and a gradual equalization of 
employers’ and employees’ participation rates. With respect to the impor-
tant issue of how, and how much, taxes are levied on citizens, while dur-
ing communism the system was distributive in scope, since 1989 taxation 
tends to produce a diversiﬁ ed impact on individuals. In Slovakia the rev-
enues from all taxes , as percentage of GDP, are the lowest (30.6 percent), 
followed by Poland (35.8 percent), the Czech Republic (36.2 percent) and 
Hungary (39.1 percent, which is the only country close to the EU15 average 
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of 40.6 percent). Looking at the structure of taxation it is clear that social 
insurance contributions, as a percentage of total taxation , in Hungary are 
equal to the contribution rates in the EU 15, but substantially higher in the 
Czech Republic , Poland and Slovakia . Th e structure of taxation in the four 
Visegrad countries is, for the most part, based on social insurance contri-
butions and indirect taxes , while direct taxes remain signiﬁ cantly below 
the EU15 average, both as a percentage of total taxation and as a percentage 
of GDP (see Table 9.3). Th is implies that taxation continues to have a dual 
orientation: an employment-related character due to the payment of social 
insurance contributions, and a collective character due to the revenues 
raised by indirect taxes , such as VAT and taxes on products, which tend to 
be accumulated more independently of individual’s own income.
Table 9.3 The structure of taxation (2003)
Total taxes 
% of
GDP
Indirect 
taxes % of
total taxa-
tion 
Direct 
taxes 
% of
total taxa-
tion 
Social 
security 
contributi-
ons % of
total taxa-
tions
Indirect 
taxes % of
GDP
Direct 
taxes % of
GDP
Social 
security 
contribu-
tions % of 
GDP
Czech
Republic 
36.2 31.4 27.1 41.5 11.4 9.8 15.0
Hungary 39.1 42.4 25.0 32.5 16.6 9.8 12.7
Poland 35.8 42.8 20.1 39.4 15.3 7.2 14.1
Slovakia 30.6 37.6 23.6 40.2 11.5 7.2 12.3
EU15 40.6 34.6 33.1 32.5 13.6 13.7 13.2
Source: Eurostat 2005
9.5 Policy Discourses and International Organizations
Numerous studies have often emphasized the crucial role played by interna-
tional organizations in inﬂ uencing the post-communist social policy reform 
process (Deacon et al. 1997; Cerami 2006; Deacon 2007; Orenstein 2008; 
Orenstein et al. 2008). Th e most common approach to welfare state trans-
formation in the region sees international organizations as being extremely 
successful in inﬂ uencing the policy direction through binding directives or 
through forms of moral suasion (see McBride and Williams 2001). Exam-
ples of binding directives can be found in the World Bank and the IMF ’s 
conditionality strategy for granting access to loans (or in the case of the Ac-
cession Agreements during the EU Enlargement process), while an example 
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of moral suasion can be found in the OECD ’s Economic Surveys (McBride 
and Williams 2001) or in the EU policy evaluation reviews with their at-
tempt to show governments what good policy-making should look like.
Policy discourses (see Schmidt 2002, 2008), promoted by international 
organizations have, undoubtedly, influenced national policy-making by 
increasing transnational communication and thus convergence to already 
identified policy priorities. In the case of the World Bank and the IMF , the 
policy discourse has primarily focused on the need for a market-oriented, 
financially stable and residual welfare state. The EU , on the other hand, 
has been influential not only in cognitive terms (Guillén and Palier 2004; 
Lendvai 2004), increasing, for example, transnational solidarity and mu-
tual learning , but it has also been a vital actor in facilitating the introduc-
tion of new social policy ideas , interests and institutions (Cerami 2008).
Here, it should be remembered, however, that even the most convincing 
discourses tend to be mediated in their acceptance by the individual’s own 
preferences. Transformation in Central and Eastern Europe has not been 
simply the result of a silent, or semi-silent, acceptance of prescriptions, 
through policy transfer or policy diﬀ usion respectively, but rather as a re-
sult of a recombinant policy implementation, in which existing institutional 
structures have constrained and/or fostered the full completion of reforms.
The introduction of a welfare system based on professional diversity 
and private arrangements was not only the most suitable scheme, if the 
historical background of these countries is taken into account, but it also 
corresponded to the functional necessity of occupational and market di-
versification, which stemmed from the excessive centralized and homog-
enized economic system in force during communism. In this context, it is 
not surprising that more than 10 years after the first attempts of the World 
Bank to see its policy prescriptions fully and successfully implemented, 
its Operations Evaluation Department (OED) desolately concluded that 
more attention to the existing institutional and administrative capabilities 
of the countries should have been given in order to ensure a more consis-
tent policy execution (World Bank OED 2004).
In attempting to assess their real impact on national policy-making, it 
must certainly be remembered that international organizations have been 
important facilitators (Inglot 2003: 242) in the social policy reform pro-
cess, but this is still not suﬃ  cient to address them as the only causes re-
sponsible for speciﬁ c outcomes. Th e presence of social insurance institu-
tions still based on professional activity, even though encapsulated in the 
central planned economy, inevitably inﬂ uenced the reform options of the 
Visegrad countries. As will be shown in the following sections, the rein-
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forcement of such schemes, based on the payment of contributions and on 
the professional record of workers, was the option of a system which previ-
ously worked on full-employment, as well as the establishment of social in-
surance funds being the natural option on the side of the management and 
ﬁ nancing mechanism, which, in reality, never disappeared from the scene 
but continued within the state budget. Once the communist state collapsed 
and with it, numerous enterprises, the organs responsible for managing 
the beneﬁ ts had to be replaced in order to ensure the survival of welfare 
institutions . Th e market was the only available option and with that the 
strengthening of independent social insurance funds became unavoidable.
In addition, despite strong pressures from international financial insti-
tutions, policy recommendations have tended to be mediated and negoti-
ated in the political arena, according to clear institutional rules, instead of 
having been implemented by design. Just to quote a few notable examples: 
the introduction of the three-pillar scheme in Poland , proposed by the 
minister of Finance Grzegorz Kołodko , was blocked for two years by the 
opposition from the minister of Labor and Social Policy Leszek Miller . 
The decision of Miller was reinforced by his commitment to the PAYG 
principle and by his personal rivalry with Kołodko (quoted in Nelson 
2001: 244). In Hungary and Slovakia , the introduction of the three-pillar 
scheme was also subjected to several discussions among politicians and 
social policy experts and only at the end of a difficult process of political 
bargaining was finally introduced. In the Czech Republic , by contrast, no 
agreement on the three-pillar scheme could be found, primarily as a result 
of the strong opposition by the trade unions (Fultz 2002).
9.6 Conclusion
If one looks at the reform trajectories prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall, 
similarities with the reform trajectories in other Bismarckian countries 
(such as France ) can be found. These similarities can partly be explained 
by similar external economic shocks that the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe were facing (such as the oil crisis of the 1970s), but also by 
the existence of similar Bismarck -oriented welfare institutions . A politics 
of expansion for legitimization characterized the 1960s, 1970s and early 
1980s and was largely associated with an increase in external debt and in 
social insurance contributions. Modifications in social policy remained 
under the dominant communist logic, but Bismarckian features, already 
present, became more preponderant. After a brief period, where a poli-
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tics of expansion for compensation resulted in an abnormal increase in 
welfare efforts called to amortize the costs of economic transition, at-
tempts towards welfare retrenchment characterized the policy trends in 
these countries in the 1990s. In comparison to other Western democra-
cies, the political discourse in these years focused on the necessity to en-
sure system and financial stability. In the Central and Eastern European 
case, a politics of retrenchment through privatization was also linked to 
the future consolidation of democratic institutions. More recently, al-
teration and amendments in the national legislation are taking place in 
almost all welfare system sectors, involving the reduction, but also, in 
some cases, the expansion of the level of benefits, as well as the introduc-
tion of new calculation rules and new kinds of entitlements and benefits. 
These changes tended to go beyond simple ‘retrenchment ’ policies, since 
they aimed to recalibrate the system to the new emerging social problems, 
which differed from the early days of post-communist transition. This last 
trend can be defined in terms of a politics of recalibration .
The role that the preparation for EU membership played in this process 
of welfare state restructuring has been far from limited, as common wis-
dom would suggest. As highlighted in the previous sections, the EU not 
only drew the attention of the candidate countries to the social dimen-
sion of reform (though rarely in an unambiguous manner), but it has also 
promoted through cognitive processes (see Guillén and Palier 2004) the 
introduction of new social policy ideas , interests and institutions (Cerami 
2008) fairly distant from the classical neoliberal values of the Washington 
Consensus promoted by the World Bank , IMF and OECD .
Central and Eastern European countries have, thus, developed a new 
welfare logic, which has both path-dependent and innovative compo-
nents. These have been identified in: a) the re-enforcement of Bismarck-
ian -oriented policies as a heritage of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (path-
dependent); b) the maintenance of egalitarian and universal aspirations 
as fostered during the communist period (path-dependent); and c) the 
introduction of market-friendly welfare provisions (innovative). If ana-
lyzed in their global context, the abovementioned characteristics are evi-
dence for a significant degree of cohesion among these welfare systems in 
transition and may allow for the emergence of a new and unique welfare 
regime (Cerami 2006), in which different worlds of welfare coexist and are 
recombined together. To use a definition recently provided by Lamping 
and Rüb (2004) for Germany , the welfare regime in Central and Eastern 
Europe can, therefore, be described in terms of a ‘recombinant welfare 
system’7, where Bismarckian features remain preponderant.
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Table 9.4 Summary of reform trajectories: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia
Types of change Context Diagnosis
Expansion for legitimization – Economic downturn
(1960s, 1970s and early 
1980s);
– Social budget defi cits
– Social benefi ts can help the 
system and (un)democratic 
stability
Compensating for the 
Transition
NOTE: Temporary and due to 
exceptional circumstances
– Economic collapse 
following the dissolution of 
communism;
– Introduction of market 
economy;
– Preparation to a new 
economic mechanism;
– Massive socio, political, 
economic and demographic 
changes
-The democratic transition has 
to be rescued, maintained and 
consolidated
Retrenchment through 
privatization 
– Severe economic 
deterioration;
– End of what remained of 
Keynesianism ;
-Neoliberal policy ideas and 
discourses promoted by 
international organizations
– Welfare systems are seen as 
partly the cause of the crisis: 
excessive state involvement 
reinforce social exclusion ; 
– Income maintenance is 
disincentive to work;
– State involvement damages 
competitivity and creates 
unemployment ;
– State management rules 
hinder reform capacities
Re-balancing: The return to 
Bismarck ?
– Global and European 
orientation/ coordination of 
economic and social policies;
– EU pre-accession and 
enlargement
– Welfare systems need a 
profound adaptation to the 
new EU based socio-economic 
context;
– Recombinant 
implementation of EU , 
OECD , World Bank and IMF 
ideas in the light of the EU 
enlargement
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Content of the policy Politics of the reforms Consequences
– Preservation of full 
employment ;
– Raise in social 
contribution;
– Change in the 
generosity of the benefi ts 
(upwards);
– Additional fi nancing 
necessary raised through 
external debt
Politics of expansion for 
legitimization
– Continuous welfare expansion 
beyond the possibility of the 
central planned economy;
– Increasing ineffi  ciencies of such 
policies (impossibility to cope with 
Western achievements in living 
standards);
– Re-enforcement of Bismarck 
features as existing before 
communism
– Increase in external debt
– Increase in the 
contributions to social 
insurance benefi ts;
– Introduction of 
generous early 
retirement , protection 
against unemployment 
and establishment of 
basic safety net
Politics of expansion for 
compensation
– From social to more individual 
insurance;
– Anomalies of the new system 
covered under state responsibility;
– Reinforcement of Bismarckian 
features;
– Negotiated, but based on TINA 
(There Is No Alternative)
– Increasing importance 
of targeted and market-
based benefi ts;
– Expansion of private 
provisions;
– New mode of 
management (private);
– Reinforcement of 
main international 
organizations’ policy ideas 
and discourses
Politics of retrenchment 
through privatization 
– Weakening of state 
responsibility, while increasing 
social insurances mechanisms and 
actors;
– Negotiated, but STRONGLY 
based on TINA
(There Is No Alternative)
-Reconsideration of 
neoliberal approach 
(private pillars in pension, 
and health insurance are 
recalibrated);
– Activation of 
unemployed;
– Competition in health;
– Emphasis on social 
inclusion due to Lisbon 
European Council
Politics of recalibration – Recalibration of previous 
reforms;
– Hybridization of the system;
– Negotiated, but based on a new, 
more socially-aware approach
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10 Reforming Bismarckian Corporatism : The Changing
 Role of Social Partnership in Continental Europe
Bernhard Ebbinghaus
10.1 Introduction
In most Continental European welfare systems the state ‘shares pub-
lic space’ (Crouch 1986) with the social partners , employers and trade 
unions , over such public policy areas as employment regulation and social 
protection. Corporatist participation of social interest groups in public 
policy-making has a long tradition in Continental Europe. Since the first 
Bismarckian reforms in response to the ‘workers question’ by mandating 
social insurance in the late 19th century, employers and workers received 
representation in the self-administration in return for their contributions 
to these parafiscal funds. The Bismarckian social insurance principle with 
strong reliance on co-financing through social contribution and bipartite 
self-administrative governance became also the dominant model for and 
distinct feature of Continental welfare systems. Esping-Andersen ’s typol-
ogy (1990) acknowledges this ‘corporatist ’ legacy of Conservative welfare 
(state) regimes.
Given participation in Bismarckian self-administration , the social 
partners can play an important role in coordinating policy initiatives and 
implementing welfare reforms. However, these organized interests can 
also provide obstacles to reform as they defend vested interests and block 
changes in the status quo (Ebbinghaus and Hassel 2000). Even when co-
operating and negotiating reforms, the social partners can still pursue 
rather narrow self-interests, externalizing the costs of their actions onto 
non-participating third parties or the public at large. However, unilateral 
action by the state without the social partners ’ consent often meets their 
resistance, which can lead to large-scale mobilization against government 
reforms. Despite long-term losses in union membership and estrange-
ment between unions and allied political parties (Ebbinghaus and Visser 
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2000), trade unions remain important political and social actors in most 
Continental European countries (Scarbrough 2000). In fact, public status 
through erga omnes extension of collective bargaining and self-admin-
istration of social insurance give an institutionalized role to the social 
partners .
When the state shares public space, it usually lacks the legitimacy, 
competencies, and implementation capacity to single-handedly carry out 
desired reforms of social and employment policy. Therefore, formal or in-
formal forums for tripartite social dialogue between the government and 
the social partners facilitate the development of a shared understanding 
of problems, the discussion of policy alternatives and their implications, 
and the negotiations of a consensual response (Ebbinghaus 2001). Con-
sensual reforms not only have the advantage of common political support 
and legitimacy, but also societal coordination may facilitate policy imple-
mentation. Involving the social partners in the day-to-day administra-
tion of social protection and employment services enhances not only the 
legitimation but also the in-depth knowledge of actors. However, much 
depends on how inclusive social partnerships are; that is, whether they 
include only the interests of the ‘insiders ’ or not. Continental European 
trade union movements tend to represent more the old than the new so-
cial risk groups, such as women , young jobseekers and the lower educated 
(Ebbinghaus 2006b). Increasingly, it is of relevance whether the social 
partners engage in social responsibility, i.e. whether they pursue public-
regarding and long-term perspectives instead of defending the status quo 
(Brugiavini et al. 2001).
To fully understand the roles of social partners in current reform pro-
cesses in Continental European welfare systems, we thus need to examine 
the historical modes of social governance and its evolution (Berger and 
Compston 2002). The industrial relations literature has tended to ignore 
the role social partners play in the social policy area, leaving the matter to 
their colleagues in comparative welfare analysis (Crouch 2001). The ‘new 
politics’ thesis has often either belittled the role of social partners (Pierson 
1996) or assumed institutional veto points for the social partners (Pierson 
2001b) without analyzing its real veto power. As shown in this chapter, we 
need to look at social governance more closely to ascertain such claims’ 
validity and reliability for Bismarckian welfare systems. Far from confirm-
ing path-dependent inertia, the recent developments show considerable 
changes despite potential veto power of social partners . These develop-
ments call into question the assumption of path dependence common to 
much of the new politics thesis.
THE ROLE OF SOCIAL PARTNERS IN WELFARE SYSTEM THEORIES
My comparative analysis will focus on the post-war development of 
social governance in four Continental European countries: Germany , the 
Netherlands , France and Italy . Not only the overall role of social partners 
in corporatist institutions will be reviewed, but also two specific policy 
fields, in particular old-age (and disability ) pensions and labor market 
policies (unemployment insurance and employment services). Both pol-
icy areas touch on fundamental interests of the social partners . Other 
policy areas, such as health care , long-term care and family also represent 
interesting cases to study the influence and impact of social partners on 
Bismarckian welfare systems, though such analysis is beyond the scope of 
this chapter (see Palier and Martin 2007b).
In this chapter, I first discuss the different approaches to studying the 
role of social partners from power resource theory to the new politics 
thesis and beyond. Second, I review the different governance modes that 
involve the social partners and the importance of consultative advisory 
bodies. Next, I look at the social partners ’ involvement – either through 
delegated self-administration or through self-regulation – and the actual 
impact of social partners , in particular trade unions , in pension policy 
(see Bonoli and Palier 2007). As the second policy field, the social gover-
nance and reform processes will be analyzed for unemployment insurance 
and public employment agencies (see also Clegg 2007). Finally, the recent 
changes in social governance and the reform dynamic will be discussed 
in the light of path dependency and path departure. Increasingly, govern-
ments and employers sought to alter long established social governance 
in order to instill more social responsibility and ‘reformability’ in social 
partnerships.
10.2 The Role of Social Partners in Welfare System Theories
Different theoretical approaches were advanced to explain the develop-
ment of welfare systems, in particular the origins and expansion of social 
security across Continental Europe. The role of social partners is central 
to the power resource theory, but in the case of Continental Europe also 
authoritarian state traditions and corporatist legacies have to be consid-
ered. Yet these past theories of the ‘old politics’ are seen as inappropriate 
to explain the new politics of current reform processes in times of per-
manent austerity and weakened labor movements. The new politics the-
sis stresses the path dependency of welfare state development, given the 
popularity of welfare states and the blame avoidance of politicians. But 
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social partners (and their political allies) still play a role in more recent 
reforms efforts, either by blocking or facilitating change. Some observers 
point to the veto power of social partners given their institutional involve-
ment, but this requires more in-depth empirical analysis.
The ‘Old’ Politics Thesis and the Corporatist Legacy
Comparative studies of welfare state development emphasize the impor-
tance of the power of organized labor, the state traditions and political 
economy factors. The power resource thesis postulates the importance 
of the labor movements’ strength, often measured by union membership 
and centralization as well as the electoral and governmental success of 
Left parties, especially those allied with trade unions (Esping-Andersen 
1990; Korpi 1983). While this approach can explain the rise of universalist 
welfare states in Scandinavia with the power of the labor movement, the 
electoral success of social democracy and the strong allied trade unions , 
it also claims that in countries with less powerful organized labor more 
residual welfare states would persist. However, the Continental European 
countries do not easily fit into such a monocausal view.
Esping-Andersen ’s threefold regime typology acknowledged that Con-
servative welfare states were neither residual nor universalist, but welfare 
regimes of their own type. Societies with social-Christian orientation and 
worker wings of Christian-Democratic parties provided a favorable po-
litical context for the expansion of social transfers (van Kersbergen 1995). 
Esping-Andersen and Korpi argued that the weaker and fragmented la-
bor movements in Continental Europe went together with Conservative 
occupationalist welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen and Korpi 1984), this 
legacy derived from a divide and rule strategy of authoritarian states.
State-centered approaches had stressed that the Conservative regimes 
have their origin in authoritarian state traditions and Conservative elite 
policies that introduced welfare ‘reforms from above’ to legitimate the 
national state (Flora and Alber 1981). Using a carrot-and-stick strategy, 
Bismarck enacted the ﬁ rst social insurances and the anti-socialist laws in 
order to integrate the working class into the paternalist nation-state, while 
unsuccessfully stemming the tide of the labor movement. However, as Bis-
marckian welfare systems granted workers self-administrative representa-
tion rights on social insurance boards, this allowed their organizations to 
receive indirect institutional and ﬁ nancial support (Manow 1997). Th ese 
authoritarian corporatist legacies survived the reform of Bismarckian wel-
fare systems in the post-war Liberal democracies of Continental Europe.
THE ROLE OF SOCIAL PARTNERS IN WELFARE SYSTEM THEORIES
Neo-corporatist theory saw the post-war expansion of Continental 
welfare systems as part of an implicit social pact: social protection was 
expanded in exchange for the acceptance of the uncertainties of social 
market economies (Crouch 1993). In export-oriented economies, social 
protection became an important buffer against the cyclical proclivity of 
the international market, thereby helping to maintain the social consen-
sus typical in corporatist, small European states such as Austria , the Neth-
erlands and Switzerland (Katzenstein 1985). More recently, the ‘varieties 
of capitalism ’ approach (Hall and Soskice 2001) linked the development 
of coordinated market economies in Germany and its neighbors to the 
emergence of social welfare institutions that were beneficial to maintain 
a skilled labor force (Estevez-Abe et al. 2001). Recent historical research 
rediscovered the role of employers in providing corporate welfare and 
suggests that it was not always against the interests of firms to support 
public social policies (Mares 2003).
The New Politics Thesis and Bismarckian Welfare Systems
Prominently, Paul Pierson (2001b) argued that the ‘new politics’ of welfare 
state reform under austerity conditions does not mirror the ‘old politics’ 
of welfare state expansion. Despite the weakening of trade unions and po-
litical shifts towards the right, Pierson observed that welfare state reforms 
under Reagan and Thatcher in the 1980s were not able to retrench as much 
as ideologically claimed (Pierson 1994). But he claims that this surprising 
inertia was not due to the traditional interest groups (such as the weak-
ened trade unions ) but the result of ‘path dependency’ (or policy feed-
back ). Past welfare policies led to vested interests among those profiting 
from these programs both the public in general and the welfare clientele 
in particular. The new politics thesis assumes that it was not organized 
interest groups but the blame avoidance of politicians who were afraid of 
electoral backlash that would maintain popular welfare programs. Studies 
on public attitudes to welfare states show widespread popularity of cur-
rent welfare systems (Bonoli 2000; Brooks and Manza 2007); indicating 
limited support for retrenchment and a majority in favor of the status quo .
However, in Bismarckian welfare systems the insured who paid into so-
cial insurance and are represented by trade unions in self-administrative 
bodies tend to defend the contributory earnings-related benefits as ‘de-
ferred wages’ and earned social rights (Myles 1989), this holds for contrib-
utory old-age and disability pensions as well as unemployment insurance 
benefits. ‘Unlike generic schemes for those in “need” or for “citizens”, each 
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individual has his or her own contract with the government with specific 
benefits attached to his or her specific work record, years of contribution, 
and earnings history’ (Myles and Pierson 2001: 321). Particularly in Con-
tinental Europe, given the shared public space, trade unions have been 
active in voicing protest and blocking reform.
The new politics thesis also assumes that politicians are ‘vote maximiz-
ers’, worried about the political costs of welfare retrenchment . Thus they 
are reluctant to retrench benefits in pay-as-you-go systems: ‘The poli-
tics of retrenchment is typically treacherous, because it imposes tangible 
losses on concentrated groups of voters in return for diffuse and uncer-
tain gains’ (Pierson 1996: 145). One political strategy has been to exempt 
current retirees or obfuscate through invisible technical changes (Myles 
and Pierson 2001). In Bismarckian pension systems, for example, reforms 
increased retirement age only slowly, if at all, affecting mainly younger 
cohorts, while current retirees are spared. These concessions are more 
palatable to trade unions that represent the more senior workers (Ebb-
inghaus 2006b). Or in the employment policy area the pressure on long-
term unemployed is increased in assistance schemes, while contributory 
unemployment insurance remains untouched. The policy case studies will 
show how reforms, particularly in France and Italy , have been influenced 
by trade unions defense of their core constituency.
The Veto Power Thesis Revisited
Bismarckian welfare systems are often seen as ‘frozen’ not only due to 
strong public support but also due to institutionalized veto points (Immer-
gut 1991) that provide particularistic interests groups, that is veto players 
(Tsebelis 2000) with potential ‘veto power’. However, we need to consider 
more carefully the veto points in the political decision-making process as 
well as in social policy implementation in Bismarckian welfare systems. 
Do the social partners , in particular trade unions , have an effective veto 
power? Continental European political systems provide numerous veto 
points for interest groups to influence policy-making, if not to block ma-
jor changes detrimental to their own interests. According to Ellen Im-
mergut and Karen Anderson , a veto can be of significance for two reasons: 
‘First, it indicates how difficult it is to pass legislation – and hence to in-
troduce policy change. Second, the more difficult it is to change existing 
policy, the more opportunities there are for interest groups opposed to 
particular legislation to demand concessions’ (2007: 7). Thus veto points 
provide an opportunity to veto players to block or negotiate changes.
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Particular institutional arrangements account for cross-national varia-
tions in the political capacity of governments to unilaterally intervene 
in welfare state arrangements. In Continental Europe, institutional veto 
points (Bonoli 2001) include the federalist second chambers (Germany , 
Switzerland ), presidential cohabitation (France ), coalition governments 
that rely on small parties opposed to a reform (Continental Europe), pop-
ular referenda (Switzerland ) and Constitutional Courts (Germany ). These 
political institutions allow interest groups that do not represent the ma-
jority (i.e. the median voter) to block reforms that affect their interests, 
provided that these veto points can be used in social policy-making either 
indirectly through political parties or directly by mobilizing or advocat-
ing for intervention on their behalf. Whether interest groups, here trade 
unions or employer organizations, actually use institutional veto points to 
pursue their interests depends on the strategy of these veto players vis-à-
vis their contenders but also on the particular opportunity structure in a 
given policy area.
In the non-political realm, it is more difficult to assess institutionalized 
veto points. This depends often on more informal channels of influence 
to political decision-making as well as the more occasional threat or use 
of protest power (political or economic strikes, mass scale demonstra-
tions). It was less union membership strength than the institutionalized 
role unions play in corporatist industrial relations and participatory so-
cial insurance that led to the expansion of Conservative welfare states in 
Continental Europe (Brugiavini et al. 2001). Moreover, today trade unions 
(and to a lesser degree employer associations) have lost membership com-
pared to the period of expansion, yet collective bargaining coverage and 
institutionalized corporatist participation has been less affected. Since 
it is often more assumed than shown that the social partners have ‘veto 
power’ through their self-administrative role in the governance of welfare 
systems, the subsequent sections will compare the influence social part-
ners have in two policy fields (pension policy, labor market policy ) and 
four selected countries (France , Germany , Italy and the Netherlands ).
10.3 Social Governance in Bismarckian Welfare Systems
Social Governance Forms
In Continental European countries, the social partners ’ involvement 
ranges from institutionalized consultation of interest groups by policy-
makers to ‘concertation’ between the government and social partners on 
economic and social policy goals . We should further distinguish whether 
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the state delegates’ self-administrative functions in a semi-public agency 
to the social groups affected or whether the social partners have assumed 
self-regulatory functions without state interference. In the case of self-
administration , legitimacy derives from delegation of public authority by 
the state to an agency, whereas in the case of self-regulation, the state 
abstains from intervening into the self-help of the social actors according 
to the principle of subsidiarity . One can thus distinguish four social gov-
ernance modes for sharing responsibilities between the state and social 
partners : institutionalized consultation, voluntary social concertation, 
delegated self-administration and autonomous self-regulation.
The state’s influence varies, often considerably, according to the mode 
of social governance. Consultation preserves the most authority for the 
state. The government (or Parliament) may wish to confer with the so-
cial partners or it may be legally obligated to consult an institutional-
ized advisory council, but the policy-makers are free to diverge from the 
given opinions and recommendations. In contrast, concertation entails 
an agreement (‘social pact’) between the government and the social part-
ners , involving some concessions by the government in order to reach a 
compromise. These social pacts also bind the state to the terms of the 
agreement unless they are renegotiated. While consultation is legally pre-
scribed or informal but routinely practiced, concertation occurs primarily 
on an ad hoc basis and depends on the voluntary agreement of all sides.
In the case of self-administration , the ‘principal’ delegates some (though 
not all) decision-making authority and implementation power to an ‘agent’ 
– an independent self-administered agency (Mabbett and Bolderson 1999). 
Depending on the authority delegated and resources provided, the self-
administrated agency may be more or less autonomous of the state. More-
over, the social partners ’ inﬂ uence depends on the rules of representation 
(nominated or elected), the composition (bipartite or tripartite ), and the 
decision-making rules (qualiﬁ ed or simple majority). We would expect 
their inﬂ uence to be small when self-administration is decentralized, rep-
resentatives are elected from open lists, composition is tripartite (with in-
dependent experts), and no minority veto exists. In contrast, the social 
partners ’ power would be highest when self-administration is centralized, 
social partners can nominate representatives, composition is bipartite 
(without state involvement), and each side has a veto right.
In contrast to delegated self-administration , self-regulation results 
from voluntary agreement between the collective bargaining partners 
without state interference. The state can only indirectly influence the out-
come of the ‘autonomous’ decision of the social partners by refusing erga 
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omnes extension of collective agreements, by making state subsidies or 
tax concessions conditional on particular policies, or by intervening as an 
exceptional measure (but thereby damaging the principle of subsidiaristic 
self-regulation). Although free collective bargaining is an example of such 
self-regulation, the social partners may also negotiate occupational wel-
fare outside the public welfare system.
Bismarckian Corporatism 
At the pinnacle of Bismarckian corporatism stand statutory advisory bod-
ies consulted in public policy-making either by legal mandate or informal 
convention. Dating back to pre-modern Ständestaat and feudal guild tra-
ditions (Crouch 1993), local chambers of commerce were installed at the 
end of the 19th century in Continental Europe, some of which assumed 
self-regulatory functions. Countries like the Netherlands ‘embodied 
complex and contrasting mixes of liberal and old-corporate institutions’ 
(Crouch 1993: 319). Following the discrediting experience of state-author-
itarian corporatism during the interwar and German occupation period, 
post-war consultative institutions were remodeled to bring them in line 
with Liberal parliamentary democracy.
The Netherlands has two post-war corporatist forums (Cox 1993): the 
Dutch Social and Economic Council (SER), a tripartite consultation forum 
on social and economic policies since 1950, and the Foundation of Labor 
(STAR), formed by social partners in 1945. As SER failed to facilitate re-
forms and was widely criticized in the 1990s (Visser and Hemerijck 1997), 
the Left-Liberal government abolished the obligation to consult SER in 
1994. While SER subsequently often became bypassed, STAR became a 
more important informal forum for social partner consensus-building 
(Hemerijck et al. 2000).
Despite its corporatist tradition, no general advisory body was estab-
lished in the post-war Federal Republic of Germany (Berger 2002), while 
in neighboring Austria a Social and Economic Council was established for 
policy-making consultation. Instead, ‘social partnership’ was institution-
alized throughout (West-)Germany ’s ‘social market’ economy through 
autonomous collective bargaining , co-determination by works councils 
and parity representation on supervisory board, consultative ministry 
councils and social self-administration . Efforts to tripartite concertation 
were undertaken in the economic crisis of the 1970s, the transition of 
Eastern Germany after unification in 1990, and in the late 1990s in the Al-
liance for Jobs, though remained rather limited instances.
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The dualism of polarized labor relations and institutionalized tripartite 
consultation remains a paradox of Latin Europe. The French Economic 
and Social Council (CES), set up after the war (1946) and reaffirmed with 
the Fifth Republic, suffers from heterogeneous interests, ranging from the 
‘most representative’ unions and employer associations to farmers and 
many other social groupings. Similarly, the Italian National and Economic 
Labor Council (CNEL, 1957) is a statutory advisory body that remained 
rather unimportant, while direct government negotiations with the social 
partners have become more important with the rise of social concertation 
in the 1990s (Haddock 2002).
Statutory consultative councils are not sufficient to provide enough 
‘veto power’ for the social partners because their advisory role remains 
rather limited and they are often consulted at a late stage in policy-mak-
ing. The French and Italian advisory councils remain rather symbolic but 
fragmented institutions, while governments seek either unilateral action 
or direct negotiations with the social partners . In the Netherlands , gov-
ernment initiative, bipartite consensus building, and ad hoc tripartite 
concertation increasingly substituted the institutionalized consultation 
via SER. In Germany , interparty consensus has often played a surrogate 
role for social consensus in a federalist system with coalition govern-
ments, though it often increased reform blockages (Lehmbruch 1999). In 
general, the traditional statutory advisory forums seem too cumbersome, 
whereas more informal institutions appear to be more flexible . The most 
important function of consultation institutions is to develop a shared 
understanding of policy problems and deliberate on joint solutions with 
long-term returns for all sides (Streeck 1999; Visser 2001).
10.4 Social Governance in Bismarckian Pension Systems
Self-Administration in Pension Insurance
The social partners may find more opportunities to influence pension 
policy through their role in the self-administration of social insurance 
(Reynaud 2000). In contrast to Beveridge -type basic pensions for all cit-
izens (Marshall 1950) in Britain or Scandinavia, which are financed by 
general (or payroll) taxes and publicly administered, Bismarckian old-age 
pension insurances are financed and self-administered by both the em-
ployer and the insured (Flora and Heidenheimer 1981; Palier and Bonoli 
1995). In addition, social partners perform self-regulatory functions in 
(private ) occupational pensions (Rein and Wadensjö 1997), involving not 
SOCIAL GOVERNANCE IN BISMARCKIAN PENSION SYSTEMS
only employers, but also unions through collective bargaining , most no-
tably in France and the Netherlands . Although these main differences in 
pension systems still hold, there have been some path departures under 
demographic and financial pressures (Bonoli and Palier 2007; Hinrichs 
2000; Korpi 2001; Schludi 2005).
Since Bismarck ’s pension reform in 1889, German trade union offi-
cials and employer representatives were elected into self-administration 
(Manow 1997), although the social insurance funds were fragmented along 
occupational lines until 2005. However, union and employer representa-
tives have rather limited influence since the main parameters (contribu-
tions, benefits and eligibility rules) are set by legislation. Until recently, 
additional occupational pensions have played a limited role because they 
were provided on employer initiative only (except for a collective agree-
ment in the public sector), with little say by unions and limited consulta-
tive rights for works councils. Nevertheless, the recent pension reforms 
of 2001 and 2004 introduced a new precedent of collectively negotiated 
pensions that provide unions the opportunity to develop a new self-regu-
latory role at the collective bargaining table (Schludi 2005).
Following the Bismarckian example, Italy introduced with consid-
erable delay pension insurance schemes for blue-collar workers (1919) 
and white-collar employees (1939), as well as separate schemes for self-
employed and public sector employees. The National Institute (INPS) is 
governed by a bipartite board including unions vis-à-vis employers (and 
the self-employed ) (Klammer 1997). However, the government uses par-
liamentary acts or administrative decrees to define and change pension 
policies, often after budget law negotiations with the trade unions . More 
recently, Italian unions and employers have begun to negotiate collective 
agreements on occupational pensions, which have first been limited to 
few sectors but ‘took off ’ since 1998 due to the transfer of end-of-service-
pay (Tfr, see Jessoula, this volume) at firm level into occupational pen-
sions (Ferrera and Jessoula 2007: 442).
In contrast, the French and Dutch social partners play a more direct 
role in social insurance – at least in their self-regulatory function outside 
the basic public schemes. French unions and employer representatives sit 
on hundreds of social insurance funds at different national, regional and 
local levels. Under supervision of the social affairs ministry, these self-
administered funds include health insurance funds, family allowances 
funds, disability insurance as well as the first tier public pension. A year 
after the contentious Juppé plan, a reform of the self-administration of 
sickness and pension funds occurred in 1996, introducing full parity of 
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social partners and state appointees, additional power to the state-nom-
inated directors, new supervisory councils, and parliamentary approval 
of the annual budget. In 1999, employers chose to leave these social in-
surance funds , provoking a consequential debate on the governance of 
social insurance in France, and making it an object of reforms which lead 
to the weakening role of social partners in the main sickness and old-age 
insurance funds (see Palier, chapter 3 in this volume). The French old-age 
insurance system includes two tiers: contributory public social security, 
providing basic state benefits (except for public employees), and manda-
tory complementary regimes run by the social partners (Palier 2005a). 
State influence is more limited in the second tier supplementary pension 
funds, set up by collective agreements and made compulsory in 1972, 
though the employers press for reforms. The introduction of voluntary 
private funded pensions has been only of minor importance thus far.
In the Netherlands, the post-war pension system is similarly divided 
into two tiers: tax-financed basic state pension and (quasi-)mandatory 
occupational pensions negotiated by the collective bargaining partners. 
Although the social partners are involved in the tripartite administration 
of the state pension, the second tier (private ) occupational pensions are 
either employer-led or industry-wide funds run by the social partners 
based on collective agreement that can be extended by the Labor Min-
istry. Following a public debate on the collusion of the social partners 
in using disability pensions for labor shedding  the bipartite self-admin-
istration of sector-wide insurance boards was radically remodeled in 
1995/1997 (Visser and Hemerijck 1997: 140-150). An independent public 
supervisory agency and the new National Institute for Social Insurance 
(LISV) were introduced to replace all bipartite sectoral funds. However, 
the occupational pension funds and early retirement schemes (VUT) 
that were set up by collective agreements are not affected, though there 
have been calls to reform these to funded defined contribution schemes 
(Ebbinghaus 2006a). Under pressure from the government to withdraw 
tax benefits, the social partners agreed on a ‘covenant’ to reform their 
occupational pension schemes by controlling costs, increase coverage 
and mobility, and reduce gender biases. A 2004 reform only changed the 
oversight body (pension chamber), while ‘the social partners have con-
siderable freedom to negotiate the details of their pension arrangements, 
and they are negotiated as part of collective agreements’ (Anderson 2007: 
728). Thus the social partners lost influence in public schemes but were 
able to maintain their self-regulatory leeway in the occupational pension 
funds.
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In Dutch and French pension insurance, the social partners have tra-
ditionally had the most say, particularly in the negotiated supplementary 
funds, while self-administration is more symbolic in Germany and Italy 
given government responsibility for setting ﬁ nancial and regulatory pa-
rameters. Following recent reforms that foster a ‘second pillar’ of private 
pensions , German and Italian unions could enhance their bargaining role in 
negotiating occupational pensions. Th e state can use regulatory power and 
‘incentives ’ through taxation policy to inﬂ uence private pensions and en-
croach into social partner self-regulation. Th us, while shared responsibili-
ties in the social policy arena have made reforms more diﬃ  cult, particularly 
in implementation, the state still has considerable authority over important 
parameters with respect to the public pension system, and it can inﬂ uence 
occupational pension development by using regulatory frameworks.
The Social Partners ’ Role in Pension Reforms
In Bismarckian pension systems, the social partners can play an impor-
tant role in pension reforms because of their role in self-administration of 
social insurance (in all four countries) and self-regulation in occupational 
pensions (particularly in France and the Netherlands ). The reform pres-
sures are particularly severe in Bismarckian systems with pay-as-you-go 
financing (Bonoli and Palier 2007): the German and Italian old-age and 
disability pensions, the French dual tier basic and supplementary pen-
sions, and the Dutch disability pension (not the public basic pension). At 
the same time, in these countries pension policy is traditionally shared 
between governments and social partners, therefore the government has 
very limited capacity to push through unilateral reforms against the op-
position of the social partners, in particular trade unions . Governments 
may therefore seek to engage in concertation with the social partners on 
pension reform to overcome reform blockage.
Traditionally, pension reform in Germany was consensual between the 
main political parties and social partners until the 1992 pension reform 
that phased out early retirement based on unemployment , occupation-
al disability , seniority, and career interruptions for women (Ebbinghaus 
2006a). Since unification in 1990, East Germans’ pension rights are being 
paid out of current contributions, putting additional pressure on pension 
sustainability. Facing increasing social costs and the Maastricht deficit 
criteria, the Conservative -Liberal government decided to phase in the 
planned measures more rapidly and introduce a ‘demographic factor’ that 
would cut benefits in line with increasing life expectancy. The new reform 
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was opposed by the social democrats, who undid it after winning the 1998 
election. But the new Red-Green government soon innovated with the 
Riester Reform (2001), introducing further cuts in public pensions com-
bined with a new voluntary privately funded pension (with tax incentives 
for lower income groups) to fill the future gap in old-age income. The 
unions ’ influence was rather limited, circumvented by an independent 
commission and only indirectly through left-wing back benchers in Par-
liament . Moreover, despite union protests, the incoming grand coalition 
passed a reform in 2007 to increase retirement age from 65 to 67 between 
2012 and 2029. With the exception of the new collective bargaining route 
for collectively negotiated occupational pensions, German trade unions 
have lost much of their influence in affecting pension policy-making, in-
creasingly circumvented by governments of all colors.
Despite the ‘polder model’ of concertation, the Dutch welfare reforms 
proved very diﬃ  cult given the social partners’ externalization of social 
costs (Hemerijck and Manow 2001). While tax-ﬁ nanced basic pension re-
mained less contentious, contributory early retirement and disability pen-
sion beneﬁ ts had become major pathways to facilitating the restructuring 
and reduction of the labor supply since the late 1970s. After some beneﬁ t 
cuts in the 1980s, the government pushed ahead further retrenchment in 
1991, despite massive protests by trade unions (and suﬀ ering severe elec-
toral losses in 1994) but without a substantial turnaround (Aarts and de 
Jong 1996). As long as the social partners were in control of the self-admin-
istration of social insurance and voluntary schemes, and counteracted the 
public-regarding intention of welfare reform policies by rent-seeking ex-
ternalization strategies, no solution to the crisis could be expected (Visser 
and Hemerijck 1997). Only after a report on mismanagement by the social 
partners , the new Left-Liberal government imposed a radical governance 
reform (1995/1997) in order to enforce public responsibility and faithful 
implementation. Instead of concertation, the government thus had used 
the reform of governance to achieve the needed policy reversal.
The most prominent example of social concertation is the Italian pen-
sion pact negotiated in 1995 by the center-Left government with the major 
three union confederations, but without employer participation (Regini 
and Regalia 1997). The Italian pensions were among the most expensive 
and generous in Europe, having contributed substantially to Italy’s huge 
public debt (Ferrera and Gualmini 2000). Facing the severe Maastricht 
criteria, the Italian government attempted to reform pensions in the early 
1990s. In 1994, welfare retrenchment plans by the Berlusconi govern-
ment led to widespread strikes called by the Italian unions (which also 
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had substantial membership among pensioners ), ultimately causing the 
Conservative coalition to break apart. The incoming center-Left govern-
ment was then willing to negotiate with the unions because it needed both 
political and social consensus on pension reform in 1995. The negotiated 
reform was a compromise that brought some limited immediate relief and 
phased-in long-term cuts and systemic changes. In the 1995 pension re-
form, the role of trade unions was considerable, while the social partners’ 
influence was also present in the 1997 pension reform. The Prodi govern-
ment and social partners signed a tripartite agreement on welfare, labor 
market and pension reforms in 2007, but the subsequent Berlusconi gov-
ernment has been more ambivalent between unilateral action and con-
sulting with the social partners.
Pension reforms in France have been a rather contentious issue, given 
the unions ’ stake in social administration and the tradition of political 
strike mobilization. However, the 1993 Balladur -Veil reform that extend-
ed the necessary contribution period for private sector pensions did not 
cause widespread protest. The Conservative government under Balladur 
had consulted the social partners informally and included quid pro quo 
concessions to the unions , guaranteeing their role in social administra-
tion (Bonoli 1997). In November 1995, when the Conservatives proposed 
the Juppé plan that applied similar changes in public sector pensions and 
a governance reform, the unions were largely opposed and led a wave 
of mass strikes, forcing the government to partially backtrack (Béland 
2001; Vail 1999). Moreover, the socialists won the next election and did 
not attempt a new reform despite recommendations by expert reports 
(Vail 1999). With the 2003 Raffarin Reform, the Conservatives were able 
to divide the union protest over pension reform for public employees, as 
it entered dialogue with two moderate unions (Conceição-Heldt 2007).
Concertation on pension reform in Bismarckian systems does not nec-
essarily follow corporatist traditions. In fact, concertation and social con-
flict have been present since the 1990s. The strikes against the pension 
reform in Italy 1994 and in France in 1995 indicate that at least in countries 
with contentious labor relations , unions remain able to muster a political 
strike. Mass protest depends on the seriousness of welfare retrenchment 
and the unions ’ mobilization capacity. In most cases, governments had 
good reasons to opt for consensual reform. Concerted reforms were un-
dertaken in Italy in 1995 and 1997, an all-party consensus led to the Ger-
man 1992 reform, and the Balladur government made concessions in 1993 
that prevented such mobilization. Bringing the trade unions into reform 
coalitions entails phased-in reforms and quid pro quo side-payments.
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However, if negotiated reforms were not possible due to protracted re-
form blockage by interest groups or if such reforms remained too slow 
and costly, governments decided to reform the conditions for reform, 
that is, to alter the social governance structure. In addition to cutting 
benefits and restricting eligibility, governments aimed at changing social 
governance, through limiting self-administration and by exerting pres-
sure through public financing. The Dutch government shifted from self-
administration to reliance on private actors. Similarly, the French govern-
ment increasingly assumed financial responsibility. The new governance 
in pension policy often includes not only cutting back benefits but also in-
creased state control over publicly financed (means-tested) benefits. But 
the trend towards privatization may increase social partners ’ self-regula-
tion, and indeed in France and the Netherlands , there is a long tradition 
of negotiated supplementary benefits. Similarly, when private pensions 
gain in importance, such as in Germany and Italy , the social partners may 
utilize the opportunity to negotiate private pension improvements in ex-
change for wage moderation. Hence, there is a double trend in Bismarck-
ian pension systems: governments weaken the role of the social partners 
in public self-administration , while potentially re-enforcing their role in 
self-regulation thereby bringing social policy issues into the collective 
bargaining game.
10.5 Social Governance in Bismarckian Labor Market Policies 
Self-Administration in Labor Market Policy 
Labor market policies affect the interests of both social partners more 
directly than in the case of old-age (and disability ) pensions. Unemploy-
ment benefits set the reservation wage (or ‘disincentive to work’), the lev-
el at which social benefits are more attractive than earnings from work. 
Conditions of eligibility and benefit duration also directly alter the will-
ingness of unemployed persons to accept jobs at market wages. Among 
the Continental European countries, France (1905) and the Netherlands 
(1916) were early in nationally subsidizing voluntary unemployment in-
surance like the Belgian Ghent-system. After Britain’s pioneering role in 
introducing a national unemployment insurance (1911), on the Continent, 
Germany (1927) and the Netherlands (1949) made unemployment insur-
ance mandatory much later, while the French scheme was negotiated by 
the social partners in 1958 (made compulsory in 1967) and Italy did not 
even develop a full unemployment insurance.
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In addition, employment services were introduced by the state or the so-
cial partners , often with different modes of governance. Since they match 
labor demand and supply, and administer active labor market policies, 
all three main actors have an interest in administering it. Trade unions 
sought to control the placement of jobseekers to prevent wage competi-
tion, while employers were concerned about collusion by labor. The cen-
tral state had an interest in controlling active labor market policies, and 
local governments sought it as relief for communal obligations to provide 
social assistance . Public employment offices exist in all Continental Euro-
pean countries, but they differ in functional scope – whether they include 
unemployment insurance or not, offer placement services and training, 
and whether they involve the social partners more or less directly (Mosley 
et al. 1998). The role of the social partners in Bismarckian unemployment 
insurance and employment services has been relatively well institutional-
ized in tripartite self-administration (or bipartite self-regulation).
German unemployment insurance is integrated with active labor mar-
ket policies in one tripartite federal employment agency (BA) since 1952. 
Self-administration remains limited since the government stipulates con-
tributions, sets benefit levels, and approves BA’s budget and the state sub-
sidy. Following a reporting scandal, the Hartz Commission recommended 
in 2002 a new BA governance structure with three directors nominated 
by the state, employers and unions , while self-administrative bodies have 
a more remote supervisory position. The Hartz reforms also integrated 
BA’s unemployment assistance and social assistance by the communes in 
a new means-tested scheme with activation measures (Ebbinghaus and 
Eichhorst 2007).
In the Netherlands, the central government assumed responsibility for 
the national employment service (CBA) and unemployment assistance in 
1944, while mandatory unemployment insurance (WW) was administered 
by bipartite sectoral insurance boards until the 1990s. Corporatist coun-
cils to coordinate ALMP at national and regional level were introduced 
in 1969, while the communes in charge of social assistance extended their 
own ALMP since the mid-1980s, partly circumventing CBA. In 1991, fol-
lowing the recommendation of SER, the government introduced tripartite 
self-administration and regionalization of public employment services to 
enhance coordination between social partners and communes (Mosley et 
al. 1998: 47). Increasingly, the social partners grew critical of the govern-
ment ’s interventions, while the unanimity requirement made decision-
making inefficient and particularistic. In 1994, the government imposed 
simple majority voting and appointed tripartite members in the ‘public 
 REFORMING BISMARCKIAN CORPORATISM
interest’, and decentralized and further privatized employment services. 
Several governance reforms in the mid-1990s ended the bipartite admin-
istration of unemployment benefits, the long-term unemployed (and dis-
ability benefit claimants) are now administered by new private agencies 
supervised by a tripartite institution. The Dutch social partners have lost 
in influence due to government driven governance reform in order to fa-
cilitate activation measures (Hemerijck and Manow 2001).
French employment policy is even more fragmented: an unemploy-
ment insurance run by the social partners (UNEDIC, 1958), a public em-
ployment agency (ANPE, 1967); and national public fund for labor market 
policy (FNE, 1963). Although the state has limited influence on UNEDIC, 
the government negotiated its subsidies with the social partners and in-
stalled a tripartite supervisory council. ANPE is a public agency under 
the Labor Ministry governed by tripartite boards at national, regional 
and local levels, but their decisions require ministerial approval (Mosley 
et al. 1998: 29-30). Similarly, the government controls ANPE’s budget as 
well as the public FNE fund. Despite the tripartite advisory council of 
ANPE, ‘most measures of active policy are decided by the French state 
without consultation with the social partners ’ (Mosley et al. 1998: 12). 
French employment policy thus oscillates between state imposed solu-
tions and negotiated deals. The employer-initiated ‘social refoundation’, 
which led to a bipartite agreement in 2000, did not alter the bipartite 
self-regulation of UNEDIC although it did introduce further steps to-
wards activation (Palier 2005a: 407). In 2008, the French government im-
posed the merger of both ANPE and UNEDIC into a single ‘pôle emploi’, 
to be implemented in 2010, which will most likely bring a loss of power 
for the social partners .
Italy’s labor market policies are less comprehensive and more fragment-
ed (Gualmini 1998). The bipartite INPS administers the comparatively low 
unemployment benefits and the wage-compensation fund (CIG), a wage 
subsidy for industrial workers threatened with redundancy. The public 
employment offices at national and lower levels have adjunct tripartite 
committees, separate from the benefit administration. Overall, the so-
cial partners exert considerable influence in the political realm since ‘they 
have often served to block the introduction of urgently required and fun-
damental reforms of labor market policy ’ (Höcker 1998: 202), in particular 
the highly regulated dismissal law is defended by unions for lack of suf-
ficient unemployment benefits.
In Continental Europe social partners traditionally are involved in 
unemployment insurance and employment services, either via tripar-
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tite public administration or bipartite self-regulation. Only Germany 
has fully integrated both active and passive labor market policies in one 
central organization; all others have divided these functions. Unemploy-
ment insurance is self-administered in Germany , France and Italy , while 
it has been curtailed in the Netherlands . The more the state subsidizes 
or exclusively finances unemployment insurance, the more influence it 
assumes. Although tripartite self-administration is common for pub-
lic employment services, here the state also assumes a more dominant 
role through its increased financial involvement and the shift from pas-
sive towards active labor market policies. With respect to governance 
structures, quite contradictory moves have occurred in Europe. In most 
countries, we see a trend towards decentralizing active labor market 
policy and its administration, seeking new cooperation between com-
munal assistance and employment services. In the Netherlands , after a 
short experiment in tripartism, and more recently in Germany , the social 
partners ’ involvement has been criticized and the government pushed 
through governance reforms. In France, the government has taken re-
sponsibility for active labor market policy , while the employers have 
pressed the unions to accept a reform of the costly unemployment insur-
ance scheme, while the flexibilization of Italian labor markets remains a 
contentious issue.
Social Partners and Labor Market Policy Reforms
Continental European labor market policy has been criticized for its pas-
sive orientation and rigid employment regulation. A policy shift towards 
activation and ﬂ exiblization had been advocated by international organi-
zations (OECD , EU ) as well as by national governments and policy experts 
(Casey 2004). However, labor market policy is a ﬁ eld in which responsibil-
ity tends to be shared in Bismarckian welfare systems. Although tripartite 
employment services provide a forum for exchange, substantial labor mar-
ket reforms are more likely to be negotiated by ad hoc concertation. Since 
labor market reforms, in particular introducing ﬂ exibility in employment 
regulation, depend partially on supporting collective bargaining practices, 
governments need to take the social partners on board. Coordination also 
involves lower levels, including local ‘partnerships’ between local govern-
ment, employers and workplace representatives. While we would expect 
social concertation to be more likely in countries with traditions of tri-
partite social governance, the veto power of the social partners in these 
organizations may also provide an obstacle to change. Nevertheless, we 
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can observe in Continental European countries considerable changes in 
labor market policies towards more activation and administrative reforms 
(Clegg 2007; see Hemerijck and Eichhorst, this volume).
In Germany, relative passive labor market policies were applied after 
unification as before, despite the severe employment problems in the East. 
As the BA pays for both passive benefits and active policies, while com-
munes were responsible for social assistance , the financial burden was 
shifted back and forth between contribution- and tax-financed benefits 
as well as between federal and local level (Widmaier and Blancke 1997). 
Moreover, active labor market policy created a secondary labor market, 
while unions aimed at working time reductions and early retirement to 
better ‘share’ employment, both increasing labor costs. The tripartite 
talks in an ‘Alliance for Jobs’ under the Conservative and later new red-
green government did not result in negotiated labor market reforms in 
the late 1990s, instead the main reform initiatives were largely advanced 
by the government (Bispinck and Schulten 2000). Following a scandal at 
BA, the independent Hartz commission proposed improvements in the 
employment service and several labor market reforms in 2002. These 
were implemented in four legislative packages (2003-2004) with only mi-
nor concessions to the unions and Left party fractions, although some 
adjustments (postponing reforms for older workers ) followed later. Most 
importantly these reforms merged tax-financed and means-tested unem-
ployment assistance with social assistance , making these benefits more 
conditional on activation policies.
The Dutch social partners played a more constructive role in employ-
ment policy, though the main activation policies came from government 
initiatives, including subsidized jobs (Hemerijck et al. 2000). The Dutch 
social partners assumed a more active role in negotiating flexibility , facili-
tating employment growth through temporary and part-time jobs . They 
negotiated a SAR agreement on ‘flexicurity ’ in 1996, enacted by Parlia-
ment without alteration, entailing a compromise between the ‘flexibil-
ity ’ interests of employers in minimizing regulation and the employment 
protection (‘security’) interest of atypical workers (Wilthagen 1998). Like-
wise, the social partners agreed on the inclusion of ethnic minorities and 
the enhanced ‘employability’ of less skilled workers , while implementa-
tion remains a matter for partnerships at company or local level.
Also in France, passive and active labor market policy measures were 
used to combat mass unemployment , yet in an uncoordinated manner. For 
financial reasons, unemployment benefits were cut back and made more 
stringent by a tripartite agreement in 1993, leading to a shift in the new 
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minimum income scheme (RMI since 1989) financed by the state (Malo 
et al. 2000: 257-258). Except for the Conservative Chirac government in 
1986, which abolished the authorization of redundancies and lowered en-
try wages for young workers , French governments have rarely pursued 
labor market deregulation. In order to boost employment, French gov-
ernments used special general taxes to finance social inclusion measures, 
such as reduced payroll taxes for low-wage workers . Labor market policy 
was largely government driven, causing opposition by the employers , and 
defense of the status quo by trade unions . Nevertheless, the government 
and the social partners needed to come to terms on pressing financial 
issues, leading to some ad hoc agreements between government and the 
unemployment funds. The shift in political power to the Conservatives in 
2002 added more weight to the employers ’ push to force harsher reinser-
tion measures on long-term and youth unemployed. In 2008, under the 
pressure of the government , the social partners signed a series of agree-
ments on new labor contracts increasing flexibility while increasing par-
tial security for redundant workers .
Italy’s labor market remains highly regulated, while unemployment 
benefits and active labor market policies are relatively underdeveloped. 
Reforms in the 1990s were often contradictory, retrenchment and ex-
pansion of CIG wage supplementation fund. The tripartite Pact for Em-
ployment (1996) and subsequent legislation liberalized fixed-term and 
part-time contracts. Yet, many issues remained contentious, such as re-
ducing working time. The December Pact of 1998 aimed to increase pub-
lic investment, foster training, and reduce labor costs to boost employ-
ment. Plans of the Berlusconi government to reform the Workers Statute 
of 1970, which would flexibilize the rigid employment protection law, 
caused major conflicts with the social partners . But Italian government 
and two union centers signed a ‘Pact for Italy’ in 2002, which led to the 
end the public monopoly in employment service and more flexiblization. 
Although social concertation occurred, the negotiations were often dif-
ficult and slow, the defense of employment protection remained impor-
tant to unions , leading them to call for large scale demonstrations such 
as against the removal of the article 18 of the labor code (see Jessoula, 
this volume). The 2007 tripartite agreement under the Prodi government 
engaged in concerted reforms to improve the social ‘shock absorbers’ in 
case of mass dismissal and to introduce flexicurity measures. However, 
the political change to the Berlusconi government made the social con-
certation road less likely, in particular in the contentious area of labor 
market deregulation.
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Developments in social concertation in the case of labor market re-
forms have been contradictory. Tripartite social pacts remain more lim-
ited than one would expect (only the Netherlands and to a lesser degree 
Italy show some positive results), given the necessity of coordinating 
labor market policies. By comparison with pension reform, the stakes 
are higher for labor market reform as it affects more immediately union 
members’ interests and unions ’ bargaining power, while employers sup-
port governments in retrenchment and activation policies. To the degree 
that the social partners represent the ‘insider ’ interests, the state, as the 
third partner, has to bring in the interest of the ‘outsiders ’. Indeed, the ef-
forts by governments to surpass established tripartite social governance, 
in particular the Dutch and German governance reforms have been im-
portant in facilitating subsequent government-driven reforms.
10.6 Conclusion: Towards Reforming Governance
In this chapter, I discussed the modes of social governance in Bismarck-
ian welfare systems that involve the social partners in pension and labor 
market policies . In most Continental European countries, instead of uni-
lateral state intervention against the social partners ’ will, the state shares 
public space with the social partners in these policy fields. Traditionally, 
these Bismarckian welfare systems have a high degree of institutional-
ized consultation, delegated self-administration and some scope for self-
regulation in pension and labor market policies . The influence of social 
partners in self-administration is lowest in Germany and Italy , while 
the self-regulatory role is considerable in France and the Netherlands . 
Concertation efforts have not had much impact in France and Germany , 
whereas particularly in Italy and partially in the Netherlands, concerted 
reforms have been negotiated. Moreover, the Dutch government and the 
French government and employers (with partial success) advanced ma-
jor governance reforms; similarly the German government reformed the 
employment agency. The rather unimportant Italian and German self-
administration of the pension systems remained unaltered but self-regu-
lation in occupational pension has gained in importance.
The comparative overview on institutional consultation and ad hoc 
concertation in both pension policy and labor market policy areas indi-
cates that social partners have had some influence in social policy-making 
when governments sought to circumvent reform blockage by negotiating 
with them. The success of social concertation was however dependent on 
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the credible threat of state intervention, compelling the social partners to 
find a common solution. When state intervention is unlikely, the social 
partners might not even be willing to enter a political exchange. Similarly 
in social policy matters, governments do not always have the means to in-
tervene, especially in the case of voluntary occupational welfare schemes. 
But frequent and substantial state intervention may also have negative 
effects on the social partners ’ capacity to develop consensual partnership 
in both the wage bargaining and social policy areas.
However, when governments were unable (or unwilling) to negotiate 
changes in consensual ways, they aimed at changing social governance to 
limit the influence of social partners to block reforms. Such significant 
state intervention into the procedural aspect of social governance, how-
ever, required enough political force and opportunity. This was provided 
in the German and Dutch cases through reports about mismanagement 
by self-administered agencies and a weakened influence of the social part-
ners . Hence, the past institutions seem not to be written in stone and 
there is scope for path departure from the ‘frozen landscape’ of Continen-
tal welfare systems described by Esping-Andersen  (1996a).
Three main developments have the potential to reshape social gover-
nance in the long run:
1) Continued privatization trends in pension policy increase opportuni-
ties for the social partners to assume a larger role in negotiating occu-
pational pensions. This has implications and promises repercussions 
for the linkages between wage and pension development as the social 
partners internalize portions of the social security costs into wage 
bargaining. The retreat of the state from its responsibility can lead 
to an increased scope for the two collective bargaining partners, pro-
vided they are willing to and capable of assuming such self-regulatory 
responsibility.
2) Further decentralization in labor market policy will also lead to chang-
es in social governance in this policy area, shifting power from tripar-
tite national institutions to new devolved public-private partnerships. 
Here it will be critical whether firms and workplace representatives 
can be convinced to cooperate in activation and social inclusion poli-
cies that take into account the plight of labor market outsiders . More-
over, in times of economic downturn, the workplace representatives 
will gain an important role in negotiating employment security and 
social plans.
3) Finally, social governance reforms, advanced by governments or em-
ployer organizations (as in the Netherlands and France , respectively) 
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will gain in importance in the future. These governance reforms seek 
to readjust social partnership in the social policy area to overcome 
reform blockages, limit the social partners ’ externalization strategies, 
and reinstill social responsibility.
In this respect, the most important transformation of current Bismarck-
ian welfare systems may very well be the reforms of governance struc-
tures: these alter the conditions under which the social partners will be 
able to influence future reforms and whether they will share responsibility 
for a new balance of welfare rights and employment goals. In this way, 
these institutional changes may lead to a long goodbye to traditional Bis-
marckian self-administration by the social partners and a renewed lease 
for the self-regulation via collective bargaining by the social partners .
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11 Trajectories of Fiscal Adjustment in Bismarckian 
 Welfare Systems
Philip Manow
11.1 Introduction1
The comparative literature which analyzes the fate of the welfare state 
in our economically ‘dire times’ started with the assumption that an in-
creasingly internationalized market will force the generous welfare states 
of the Western world in a common, downward direction. Yet, today it 
seems that the advanced OECD economies have maintained their ability 
to ‘tax and spend’ to a surprising degree. What is most remarkable from 
the viewpoint of the early pessimistic predictions is that the welfare state 
has basically survived (Kuhnle 2001) rather than outlived itself.
One of the most prominent explanations for the resilience of the wel-
fare state in our times of austerity has been put forward by Paul Pierson 
(Pierson 1994; 1998; 2001b). For Pierson , welfare states are by and large 
‘immovable objects’ due to electoral ‘short-termism’ combined with the 
political support that social spending programs generate among those 
that benefit from them – an argument that follows the Olsonian dif-
fuse costs/visible gains logic. If we were to follow Pierson ’s arguments, 
however, we would generally expect welfare retrenchment to be unlikely 
given that cuts in spending programs are always very unpopular. Yet, 
in the wake of the economic pressures and challenges of the 1980s and 
1990s we did observe instances of substantial welfare retrenchment that 
– from time to time – even saw impressive electoral approval (Häuser-
mann 2010b). To put it bluntly: while welfare retrenchment may be 
unpopular, the ever increasing tax- or debt-burdens caused by uncon-
trolled spending dynamics may be just as unpopular. It seems that we 
need much more fine grained ‘blame avoidance’ arguments if we want 
to account for the varying reform trajectories in the OECD since the 
mid-1970s.
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Since it is variance, not overall downward convergence or general iner-
tia, which calls for an explanation, I propose to look at different political 
opportunity structures that have made retrenchment in some places more 
likely than in others. This, as we will see, helps us to better understand 
the specific reform trajectory of Bismarckian welfare systems. I follow 
Paul Pierson in counting the welfare state itself among the dominant fea-
tures of advanced democracies and industrialized countries so that the 
‘new politics of the welfare state’ are strongly determined by the politi-
cal options that the welfare state itself provides. I will focus on welfare 
state finances, which is in my view one of the most important, yet most 
under-studied elements of this new political opportunity structure. In 
particular I claim that whether a welfare state is financed through taxes or 
through social insurance contributions had a crucial impact on how the 
welfare state adjusted to the dire economic environment since the end of 
the golden age in the mid-1970s. Welfare state finances were also key in 
triggering the reform of the Bismarckian welfare states, as the chapters in 
this volume demonstrate with rich detail.
My argument starts from simple assumptions. Governments essential-
ly could respond in three ways to the ﬁ scal stress caused by diminished 
growth combined with increased welfare spending demands: they could 
cut costs, run a higher debt, or increase revenue. I argue that these basic 
strategies were associated with varying political costs depending on how 
the welfare state is ﬁ nanced in a given country and depending on how easy 
it was to run a higher public debt, speciﬁ cally whether an independent 
central bank could make the ‘run a higher debt’-option less attractive via 
interest rate hikes (for the details of the argument see the subsequent sec-
tion). Given these varying costs, national adjustment strategies diﬀ ered. 
In this chapter I will focus in particular on Bismarckian welfare systems, 
characterized notably by the dominant role of social insurance contribu-
tions in ﬁ nancing social protection. I argue that for a variety of reasons it 
proved to be much easier to increase social insurance contributions than 
to increase taxes , which is why Bismarckian welfare systems for such a long 
time have followed the strategy of boosting revenue through contribution 
hikes rather than cutting beneﬁ ts or running a higher public debt – with all 
the problems associated with this raise-revenue strategy like ever higher 
non-wage labor costs , low employment rates, sluggish job growth espe-
cially in the less productive service sector and – therefore – high and per-
sistent unemployment . When the high level of social contributions became 
perceived as an economic problem in the new European context, it became 
one of the main reasons for reforming and restructuring welfare systems.
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The chapter is structured as follows: In section 11.2 I will briefly sketch 
my argument. In particular, I will highlight the political attractiveness of 
social insurance contributions as a means of welfare state funding and 
the adverse long-term effects of ever rising non-wage labor costs . In 
section 11.3 I will present empirical evidence in support of my hypoth-
esis that specific institutional combinations of modern welfare states go 
a long way in explaining their different reform trajectories. In section 
11.4, I will specifically focus on the French and German cases. These 
two countries are typical examples of Bismarckian welfare systems; for 
a long time they followed a similar path of steadily increasing social 
insurance contributions until they both recognized the detrimental ef-
fects of high non-wage labor costs . More recently, however, they have 
been variously successful in substituting taxation for social insurance 
contributions. In the conclusion I will discuss some of the implications 
of my argument.
11.2 Revenue, Debt, Expenditures
The starting assumption of my analysis is that politicians will reform 
the welfare state only in the case that this promises to be less damag-
ing for their re-election prospects than any other coping strategy would 
be. True, politicians will be reluctant to engage in profound welfare re-
trenchment (cf. Pierson 1994; 1996; 1998), given that cuts in social benefits 
do not make for a very popular policy. Yet, welfare retrenchment is only 
one among several political options. Politicians can react to economic 
slumps or to sustained periods of low growth by either cutting (social) 
spending, raising taxes (including increasing social insurance contribu-
tions), or by running a higher public debt. Since at least the late 1980s, 
simple legislative inactivity has no longer been an option since it would 
lead unavoidably to either higher taxes or higher debt. All of these mea-
sures are unpopular, so that simple ‘blame avoidance’ arguments (Weaver 
1986; 1988; Pierson 1994) are not very helpful analytically. Should we then 
expect that politicians would employ a random policy mix among more 
or less equally unattractive alternatives? I argue that different political 
opportunity structures have rendered the one or the other choice out of 
the basic option set (cut costs, raise taxes , run a higher debt) more or less 
costly in political (but sometimes also in economic) terms.
In this respect I first of all want to highlight the fiscal structure of the 
welfare state as a particularly crucial dimension of variation among the 
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OECD countries, which in my view has been – at least partially – respon-
sible for the marked differences in the response of these countries to-
wards the new situation of diminished growth and high unemployment . 
A basic distinction is whether the welfare state is financed predominant-
ly by contributions or by taxes .2 The welfare state’s fiscal dimension has 
as of yet failed to attract sufficient scholarly attention in the analyses of 
the OECD -countries’ economic response patterns since the ‘end of the 
golden age ’.3
The prominence of social insurance contribution in financing social 
expenditure is one of the specific traits that distinguish Continental Eu-
ropean welfare systems from their Nordic or Anglo-Saxon counterparts. 
Yet, it has attracted relatively little scholarly attention in studies of welfare 
state development and reform (see however Bonoli and Palier 2000). The 
studies gathered in this volume are the exception that proves the rule: 
they all highlight the centrality of social contribution in explaining the 
trajectory of Continental European, Bismarckian welfare regimes , both 
as a means to finance their labor shedding strategy, and, once they had 
become an economic problem in the new European context, as one of the 
main reasons for reforming and restructuring welfare systems.
In typical Bismarckian welfare systems, social contributions not only 
finance social protection, they also provide the insured with entitlements. 
Actually, social contributions play a role in connection with all four di-
mensions that characterize a Bismarckian welfare system (see Palier, 
chapter 1, this volume): eligibility, benefits, finance and governance. En-
titlements are conditioned upon the previous payment of social contribu-
tion and benefit levels and the ‘drawing period’ depends mainly on the 
previous contribution record (especially in old-age and unemployment 
insurance and sick pay). Finally, the role assigned to the social partners 
within the system (as members of the board of the Kassen , caisses etc.) 
is mainly justified by the fact that they represent those who pay social 
contributions , i.e. employers and employees. The role of social contri-
butions in Bismarckian regimes both as a fiscal instrument as well as a 
central concept that defines eligibility, benefits and governance contrasts 
with the minor role they play in the two other ‘worlds of welfare’ (Esping-
Andersen 1990).
What is the specific political attractiveness of social insurance contri-
butions? Basically I claim that the ‘increase revenue’-response in times of 
fiscal stress has been politically less problematic in contribution financed 
welfare states as compared to tax-financed regimes of either the generous 
or residual variant. There are several reasons for this. The first refers to 
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differences in political visibility. Most tax increases have to be legislated, 
while social insurance contributions often rise automatically whenever 
revenue falls short of expenses (‘automatic government’; Weaver 1988). 
Moreover, such automatic increases can be attributed to ‘secular’ trends 
like demographic aging or costly medical progress, which dilutes direct 
political responsibility for tax increases, and thus makes them much less 
attributable, and therefore less political dangerous. Increases in contribu-
tion rates can also be better legitimized due to their strong nexus with 
entitlements – more revenue promises higher expenses from which the 
contributing person himself expects to benefit (Hibbs and Madsen 1981: 
418-423). Harold Wilensky speaks of the ‘illusion that social security taxes 
(...) are paid for benefits duly and directly received, while an income tax is 
lost to the winds’ (Wilensky 1975: 61; see on fiscal illusion Oates 1991). As a 
consequence, contributors tend to defend social benefits as ‘deferred wag-
es’ and earned social rights. ‘Unlike generic schemes for those in “need” or 
for “citizens”, each individual [seems to have] his or her own contract with 
the government with specific benefits attached to his or her specific work 
record, years of contribution, and earnings history’ (Myles and Pierson 
2001: 321).
Yet, a much less often noted but at least as important difference in 
the political incentive structure provided by the welfare state’s funding 
mode pertains to the budget process. Financial questions in tax-financed 
welfare states are dealt with in the annual budget process, decided by the 
cabinet and with a more or less influential role of the minister of Finance 
(Hagen 2006; Hallerberg and Hagen 1999; Hallerberg, Strauch and Ha-
gen 2001; Hallerberg 2004). By contrast, in contribution-financed wel-
fare states, the minister of Finance usually not only has no formal right 
to be heard in questions concerning welfare state finance, but – more 
importantly – also has no immediate fiscal interest in the ‘social budget’. 
Earmarked social insurance contributions are not formally part of the 
government’s budget but go into the ‘parafiscal’ budgets of the social 
insurance schemes. But if the government budget is not directly affected, 
a finance Minister develops no political interest in preventing contribu-
tion hikes. Instead, most often a minister of Labor and/or Social Affairs 
is responsible – and (s)he is usually a minister with a pro-spending bias.4 
Moreover, fiscal autonomy secures political autonomy – another reason 
why a minister of Labor is often willing to disregard the unfavorable eco-
nomic consequences of high non-wage labor costs – and, if confronted 
with the choice, would be more likely to increase revenue than to cut 
costs.5
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In other words, a government’s political capacity to cut costs as well 
as its political interest to do so are generally much less developed in 
Bismarckian welfare states. The flipside of the politically important 
separation between the welfare state budget and the general budget 
in Bismarckian -type welfare states is that the government is also con-
tinuously tempted to shift spending out of the public budget (financed 
by taxes ) and into the special budgets of the social insurance schemes 
(financed by contributions). In other words, if the finance Minister in 
countries with Bismarckian welfare states should develop any interest in 
welfare state finance, it is one to increase (labor) taxes in order to bring 
fiscal relief to the government budget (see Trampusch 2003). The long-
lasting debates on ‘versicherungsfremde Leistungen’ in Germany (Hin-
richs, this volume) and on ‘charges indues’ in France (Palier, chapter 3, 
this volume), which revolve around expenditures with which politicians 
have inappropriately burdened the social insurance schemes, proves 
that separate budgets of the social insurance schemes present a strong 
temptation for any government under fiscal stress. In this context one 
would also need to mention the fact that German unification was largely 
paid out of the social insurance funds (cf. Manow and Seils 2000 and 
Hinrichs, this volume).
The fiscal temptation is even stronger if an independent central bank 
exerts strong pressures on a government to observe strict budget dis-
cipline. A central bank committed to a non-accommodating monetary 
policy responds to an increase in the public debt and to its inflationary 
impulse with retaliatory interest rate hikes. This makes the ‘debt-option’ 
as compared to the other two options – raise taxes or cut costs – more 
expensive (Masciandaro and Tabellini 1988; Eijffinger and de Haan 1996). 
It is therefore no surprise that the literature regularly finds a ‘fairly strong 
negative relationship of CBI to debt’ (Franzese 2002: 146-147). This also 
means that countries with a strong independent central bank cannot re-
spond flexibly with a loose fiscal or monetary policy to economic shocks. 
Because of these costs of ‘monetarist credibility’ (cf. Ball 1993; Jordan 
1997) the welfare state as an economic shock absorber grows in impor-
tance in these countries. But in Bismarckian welfare systems the costs 
of ‘social credibility’ complement those of monetarist credibility because 
contribution finance narrows the government’s room for maneuver in 
a crisis. If welfare state revenue comes from contributions rather than 
from taxes , expenditures are quasi-earmarked to honor the entitlements 
‘earned’ by these contributions. Such a welfare system is much less free 
to put its revenue to use and it is much less flexible to target its resources 
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according to need or criteria of maximal efficiency. Instead, the welfare 
system is far more inclined to follow a reactive, post-factum approach 
with a heavier reliance on compensation of income loss than, for instance, 
labor market activation policies and with a stronger emphasis on transfers 
than on welfare services (Scharpf 1997; Boix 1998; Garrett 1998; Huber 
and Stephens 2000; 2001). In times of crisis the necessity to honor the 
entitlements earned by previous contributions crowds out all measures 
(like active labor market policies ) that cannot legitimate themselves with 
a tight contribution-benefit nexus – despite the fact that these are often 
the very measures that would be particularly needed in times of econom-
ic shocks. Thus, the responses of Bismarckian welfare systems to eco-
nomic crises reveal a typical pattern: governments face systemic incen-
tives to cover the increasing revenue/spending gap in times of sluggish 
growth via contribution rate hikes, especially if an independent central 
bank prevents an increase in public debt. With increased contribution 
rates, the budgets of the social insurance schemes turn into surplus once 
the economy recovers. Now politicians have the incentive to use this ‘sur-
plus’-money to introduce new entitlements or expand existing ones. This 
results in a fiscal ratchet effect in Bismarckian welfare systems leading 
to higher levels of social insurance contributions with each economic 
crisis, while contribution rates are prevented from decreasing in the sub-
sequent boom.
From the above we can derive a few expectations about the paths of 
fiscal adjustment in Bismarckian welfare systems in the post-‘golden age ’ 
era. First of all, I expect to observe that the OECD countries headed into 
very different directions after they woke up from the ‘dream of permanent 
prosperity’ in the mid-1970s. More specifically, I expect those countries 
with welfare systems primarily financed by contributions (i.e. predomi-
nantly Bismarckian ones) to have covered their rising welfare bills mainly 
from increased contributions and, depending on the degree of central 
bank independence, also from the public debt. A second expectation 
pertains to the reform sequences of Bismarckian welfare reforms trajec-
tory (see Palier, chapter 1 and 13, this volume), since nothing suggests 
that their typical policy mix will remain stable over time. Given that each 
of the three basic responses to fiscal strain comes at increasing political 
costs, we would rather expect that over time the relative weights given 
to certain policies shift and that initially ‘dominant strategies’ may later 
become ‘dominated strategies’. It is therefore much more plausible that 
– in a longer perspective – countries do not differ so much with respect 
to their policy mix but with respect to the order in which they ruin their 
 TRAJECTORIES OF FISCAL ADJUSTMENT IN BISMARCKIAN WELFARE SYSTEMS
basic policy options. In this respect we would predict that the Bismarck-
ian welfare systems were those that followed the ‘raise revenue/increase 
social insurance contributions’-path first and for the longest before the 
adverse effects of this strategy forced them to switch.
In absolute terms, almost all OECD countries since 1970 have increased 
spending, debt and revenue at the same time (Franzese 2002). Welfare 
state regimes differed profoundly, however, with respect to the weights 
with which they employed these strategies. And we need to keep in mind 
that the long-term relationship between the three options is not simply 
one of substitution. In relative terms the basic policy options – while be-
ing substitutes for each other in the short run (e.g. if you can run a higher 
debt, you feel less pressured to raise taxes ) – are complements to each 
other in the long run (e.g. increasing the debt now may force you to raise 
revenue later in order to finance debt service). Finally, we have to take 
into account that countries may also change strategy because the institu-
tional matrix that attaches costs to different responses has not remained 
stable over time. In the time period under inspection central bank in-
dependence has significantly increased in almost all OECD -countries, 
in particular for countries joining the euro, which was associated with 
giving up sovereignty in monetary policy and also with accepting severe 
restrictions on fiscal policy autonomy – namely the Maastricht -criteria 
and their limits on deficits and debt. Yet, all this apparently has not led 
to one common ‘mixture of malaise’ in all European welfare states. Obvi-
ously, some sequences were more (economically and politically) advanta-
geous than others.
The following section will provide some empirical evidence in support 
of my argument. First, I give a descriptive overview of the development of 
revenue, expenditures and debt in the OECD in the three decades since 
the early 1970s. The chosen time period begins with the onset of the first 
oil crisis, which introduced the next thirty years of sluggish growth, and it 
ends with the latest available data around 2005. The period of investiga-
tion therefore also covers the effects of the establishment of the European 
Monetary Union , which quite profoundly altered the parameters of mon-
etary and fiscal policy for an important subset of the OECD -countries. 
Subsequently, I will ask whether the basic assumptions of my argument 
are corroborated by two brief case studies. I will focus on the sequence of 
fiscal policies in two prototypical Bismarckian welfare systems, i.e. where 
the expenses are mainly financed through social insurance contributions, 
namely France and Germany .
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11.3 Dilemmatic Policy Choices
Let us start with a brief descriptive overview of the development of 
government receipts and expenditures, debt and social insurance contri-
butions for 15 OECD countries over the last 30 to 35 post-‘golden age ’ 
years (see figures 11.1 to 11.3). I distinguish the three ‘classical’ welfare 
state regimes, but in addition analyze separately a Continental and south-
ern Bismarckian regime type according to the other important dimension 
of institutional variation that I have highlighted above, namely central 
bank independence. It is striking that the frequently made distinction be-
tween a Continental and a southern variant of the Conservative regime 
type (cf. Ferrera 1996; 1997) is fully congruent with my distinction be-
tween political economies with and without independent central banks. 
I therefore base my analysis on the following country clusters: Scandina-
vian regime – Sweden , Denmark , Finland , Norway; Liberal regime – US , 
UK and Ireland ; Conservative-Continental regime – Austria , Belgium , 
Germany , Netherlands ; southern Conservative regime – France , Italy , 
Spain , Portugal . The following figures show that these regimes do indeed 
stand for rather different ‘mixtures of malaise’ and display profoundly dif-
ferent patterns of adjustment and reform.
Figure 11.1 Debt as a percentage of GDP, 1970-2005
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Figure 11.2 Government receipts from taxes and social insurance contributions as a % of 
GDP, 1970 – 2005
Figure 11.3 Government expenditures as a % of GDP, 1980 – 2003
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Figures 11.2 and 11.3 clearly reveal that the Continental and southern vari-
ants of the Bismarckian model have become very similar in their revenue 
and spending patterns. That the southern welfare state has caught-up 
with the high tax-and-spend levels of the Continental welfare states only 
in the mid-1990s is due to the two late-comers, Spain and Portugal . The 
only – in the light of my argument non-surprising – difference between 
both the Continental and southern variants of ‘welfare Bismarckianism’ is 
in respect to public debt. Clearly, the southern welfare states Italy , Spain , 
France and Portugal were much less disciplined in their fiscal policy, and 
although both the disciplinary effects of the Stability and Growth Pact 
as well as the ‘windfall profits’ due to lower interest rates in the wake of 
the European Monetary Union are very visible in figure 11.1, the southern 
welfare states continue to run a much higher public debt. The Liberal 
and Scandinavian welfare states, however, show the well-known pattern 
of persistent lower and higher revenue- and spending levels, respectively. 
Since I could not collect data for enough countries to allow for a meaning-
ful comparison of social contribution levels between southern and Con-
tinental Bismarckian welfare states, Figure 11.4 reports social insurance 
Figure 11.4 Social Insurance Contributions as a % of GDP, 1970-2003
Source: Eurostat , various years
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contributions for the three main regime types only – Scandinavian (Den-
mark , Finland , Sweden ), Anglo-Saxon (Ireland and UK) and Continental 
regimes (Austria , Belgium , France , Germany , Netherlands , Italy ) – with 
no further ‘within-type’ differentiation for the Bismarckian regime.
Th e following ternary diagrams visualize the systematic variation among 
our group of welfare states with respect to their responses to the end of the 
golden age (see ﬁ gures 11.5 to 11.8). Th e diagrams portray the relative weight 
of either tax-, contribution- or debt-ﬁ nancing of public expenditures in the 
four diﬀ erent regime types. Th e ﬁ scal proﬁ les of the countries are reported 
against the background of the OECD -mean. In other words, a position in 
the ternary’s center would represent a welfare state’s ﬁ scal mixture of tax-, 
contribution- and debt ﬁ nancing exactly at the OECD -average. Any move-
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ment into one of the three corners indicates an above-average weight of the 
respective ﬁ scal source, taxes , public debt or social security contributions 
(SSC), respectively. Points represent country-years. Data come from the 
IMF ﬁ nancial yearbook statistics (IMF , various years), but due to limited 
data availability only cover the period 1970-1995.
From figures 11.5 to 11.8 it is obvious that Anglo-Saxon countries typi-
cally hold a very central position, indicating that their strategy mix is very 
close to the ‘average’ strategy mix in the OECD . However, while in 1973 
the USA was most central in this respect, in 1995 Sweden ’s strategy mix 
came closest to the OECD average. On the other side of the spectrum, 
Denmark maintained its position as the most atypical OECD country, 
with very few social security contributions and a small share of the public 
debt. The diagrams once more highlight the importance of debt financing 
for the Southern European welfare states.
However, a closer inspection of the fiscal profile of two proto-typical 
Bismarckian welfare systems, France and Germany , reveals a strikingly 
different success in reversing the trend towards ever increasing con-
tribution rates. As figure 11.9 shows, since the mid-1990s French gov-
ernments have succeeded in significantly reducing the revenue share 
of social insurance contributions. This trend reversal is primarily due 
to the introduction of a special earmarked tax, the contribution sociale 
généralisée (CSG), introduced in 1990 (after some experiments with a 
similar tax in the late 1980s). The CSG at first generated little revenue, 
but subsequent rate hikes from 1.1 percent (1990) to 2.4 percent (1993), 
then to 3.5 percent (1995) and finally to 7.5 percent of income (1998) 
turned the tax into a major revenue source for the French welfare state. 
In the 2000s the CSG has provided more than 20 percent of all social 
protection resources and covers around 35 percent of health care ex-
penditures (see Palier, chapter 3, this volume). Social contributions in 
France have remained at high levels, since the extra revenue generated 
by the contribution sociale généralisée has primarily been used to cover 
cost increases and thereby to avoid benefit cuts rather than to substi-
tute contributions with taxes . Still, the example of the CSG shows that 
a fiscal turnaround in Bismarckian welfare systems is possible under 
favorable conditions. What exactly these conditions might be and why 
the substitution of contributions by taxes has proved to be much more 
complicated in the German than in the French case will be addressed in 
the following section.
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Figure 11.9 Social insurance contributions as a percentage of total taxation in France and 
Germany , 1970-2004
Source: Eurostat , various years
11.4 Taxes versus Social Insurance Contributions – French and German 
Experiences
Th e following two brief case studies are meant to shed light ﬁ rst on the fact 
that both in France and in Germany over the course of the 1980s and 1990s, 
the important role played by social contribution has become perceived 
as a problem, and that both have tried to substitute parts of them with 
taxation. I will ask why the French and the German welfare state diﬀ er so 
much with respect to the extent with which taxes have been substituted for 
social insurance contributions. Why is it that several French governments 
were more successful in reversing the trend to ever higher social insurance 
contributions, whereas German governments, despite their oﬃ  cially pro-
nounced commitment, failed to bring substantial relief to German contri-
bution payers? I will start with a brief account of the French story.6
After long and protracted debates about mass unemployment and 
France’s loss of economic competitiveness, it was primarily employers 
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who spread the idea that French non-wage labor costs , i.e. social con-
tributions , were far too high. In 1982, Yvon Gattaz (then President of the 
CNPF – the French employers ’ organization) launched the ‘battle over 
contributions’ in order to reduce employers ’ fiscal burden. In France, con-
tributions levied from employees and employers financed a larger share 
of social expenditure than in other European countries. In 1992, social 
security contributions represented 79.9 percent of total revenue of the 
French social security budget, in contrast with 10.8 percent in Denmark , 
34.5 percent in Ireland , 41.9 percent in the United Kingdom , 52.3 per-
cent in Luxembourg , between 60 and 68 percent in the Netherlands , Italy , 
Portugal , Spain , Greece and Belgium , and 69.9 percent in Germany .7 The 
‘battle over contributions’ debate linked the French high non-wage labor 
costs with France ’s poor labor market performance. Between 1983 and 
1991, French job growth was only at 0.5 percent annually, whereas it rose 
by 1.7 percent within the European Community, by 1.3 percent in Japan 
and by 1.7 percent in the United States .
As shown in chapter 3, from the late 1980s, and even more so once the 
single market was put in place and intra-European competition intensi-
fied, one of the main employment policies in France was to reduce the cost 
of labor by exempting low wages from social contribution. This of course 
led to decreasing revenue and faced governments with a choice between 
cutting benefits, increasing the debt, or tapping into new fiscal resources 
other than social contributions . Increasing the role of taxation in financ-
ing social expenditure required overcoming serious political obstacles, in 
particular the resistance of the unions who did not wish to see their role 
within the social insurance system endangered by a change in the method 
of funding. But retrenchment was also politically problematic, since the 
French electorate preferred to pay higher contributions rather than see 
their level of social protection decline. Running a high public debt be-
came less and less attractive in a period in which France prepared for 
the single currency and aimed at meeting the Maastricht criteria. Things 
moved very slowly, and a political compromise to use taxation to offset 
the revenue loss due to reduced contributions aimed only at financing 
‘non-contributory ’ benefits (i.e. to finance the ‘undue charges’ weighting 
on social insurances). This compromise led to the increased use of new 
forms of taxation (in particular, consumption taxes levied on tobacco and 
alcohol), but above all to a new form of social deduction, the ‘generalized 
social contribution’ (Contribution sociale généralisée, CSG).
In 1983 a proportional contribution of 1 percent on all taxable earn-
ings was introduced; in 1985 it was abolished for earned income but was 
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retained for income from social insurances. It was re-imposed on earned 
income in 1986, but at a rate of 0.4 percent. In 1989 these two contribu-
tions accounted for 0.9 percent of the revenue of the main (general) so-
cial security scheme. Once the strategy of removing the income ceiling 
on social contributions was exhausted in 1989, the government had to 
seek alternatives. At the same time, the trade unions became less unani-
mous in their opposition to a special, earmarked social tax when one 
confederation, the CFDT, altered its stance and came out in favor of levy-
ing a contribution on all income. The ‘generalized social contribution’ 
was framed so that it promised to be advantageous for all the welfare 
state stake holders:
– a deduction levied on all sorts of income (equity included) promised to 
be fairer than social contributions (which are based solely on wages);
– levying the generalized social contribution on all households would 
make it much more efficient than the French income tax (from which 
almost 50 percent of households are exempt);
– its tax source would be a household’s (total) earnings and no longer 
wages only. As stated in 1987 by a Committee calling for new forms 
of revenue for the welfare system: ‘The new deductions which may 
prove necessary should be imposed on all individuals and all forms of 
income, without the business community having to foot an additional 
bill’8;
– the CSG promised to solve the problem of ‘non-contributory benefits’, 
since all the reports endorsed the argument advanced regularly since 
the 1950s about the need for consistency between the nature of fund-
ing and the purpose of a benefit: ‘the principle of solidarity across 
occupations must be matched by funding that is not occupationally 
related’ (Dupuis 1989: 29).
The new formula was attractive both to the Left (more fairness) and 
the Right (more efficiency). Nevertheless, due in particular to the trade 
unions ’ opposition, it was first implemented only on a small scale. The 
new source of revenue for social security saw the light of day at the end of 
1990, when on 3 October the Cabinet adopted the blueprint for the gen-
eralized social contribution. The tax applied to all French residents and 
covered earned income, inherited wealth or income from investments. 
The right-wing opposition, the Communist Party and most of the trade 
unions , except the CFDT, opposed these plans with varying degrees of in-
tensity. But the CSG was adopted in November 1990 and implemented in 
February 1991. At the outset the CSG was deducted at a rate of 1.1 percent.
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Subsequently, various governments used the new tax to bolster welfare 
resources. The CSG levied 65.5 billion francs in 1994, 94 billion in 1995 
and 97.4 billion in 1996. In the following year, the CSG brought in 148.3 
billion francs. After a further increase in 1998, (up to 7.5 percent of wage 
or equity income, and 6.6 percent of indirect income such as pension or 
unemployment allowance), CSG brought in 330 billion francs in 1998 and 
became the most important direct tax, given that the income tax yield 
was only a total of 290 billion in 1998. The resources collected through 
the CSG rose eleven-fold in only eight years. The sum for 1998 (330 billion 
francs) corresponds to almost 20 percent of social security revenue for 
that year (1,731 billion) and since then it has remained at this level.
The German reform trajectory is one in which we find multiple policy 
instruments applied, among them prominently welfare cutbacks as well 
as attempts to increase tax financing (see Hinrichs, this volume). Re-
trenchment has been continuously on the agenda since the second oil 
crisis, but has been particularly marked since the late 1990s. The health 
reform of 2003 alone introduced cutbacks of over 10 billion euros in the 
form of higher patient co-payments and the exclusion of certain ser-
vices and treatments. The various pension reforms since the mid-1990s 
realized significant reductions in pension benefits (Schulze and Jochem 
2007). At the same time, like in France , the insight that high non-wage 
labor costs may explain Germany’s sluggish job growth plus high struc-
tural unemployment gained ground in public debate. This motivated pol-
iticians to propose an increase of the tax-financed share of welfare state 
funding. Yet, the combined application of benefit cutbacks and tax trans-
fers earmarked for social spending remained insufficient to bring fiscal 
relief to contributions payers, both because of adverse economic circum-
stances and because of the continued political temptation to bring fiscal 
relief to the public budget by imposing additional costs on the specific 
budgets of social insurance schemes (see Trampusch 2003).
The tendency to burden the ‘contribution payer’ with expenses for 
which the ‘tax payer’ is responsible sheds light on the importance of the 
political opportunity structures inherent in Bismarckian parafiscalism 
(see above, Section 11.2): the automatic adjustment of contribution rates 
is politically attractive because it is a less visible mode of generating reve-
nue. Moreover, labor ministers are foremost spending ministers, whereas 
finance ministers gain their reputation by guarding fiscal discipline and 
by reducing taxes instead of increasing tax-transfers into the budgets of 
the social insurance schemes (cf. Schulze and Jochem 2007). Despite an 
overall increase in tax money funneled into the welfare budgets (see table 
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11.1 below), in 2005 the scientific council of the Ministry of Economics still 
estimated that the volume of all ‘undue charges’ not covered by tax-based 
transfers out of the public budget but financed by insurance contributions 
amounted to 65 billion euros (SVR 2005: 331). For instance, despite a pub-
lic transfer to the pension insurance of almost 54 billion euros in 2003, 
this still left ‘undue pension charges’ of almost 20 billion – to be covered 
by contributions. According to a projection from 2005, fully covering all 
expenses of the social insurance schemes that are not immediately risk- 
and insurance-related with tax payers’ money would allow a reduction of 
contribution rates by about 7 percent (4 percent in the health insurance , 
2 percent in the unemployment insurance and 0.7 in the pension insur-
ance; cf. SVR 2005: 378 and 387). This would significantly lower non-wage 
labor costs (which are at around 40 percent of gross wages). According to 
various studies, estimated employment effects range between -17,000 and 
+129,000 jobs per each percentage point reduction in social insurance 
contributions, with higher effects if social insurance contributions are 
reduced especially in the low-wage segments of the labor market. There-
fore, in the most optimistic scenario, paying all undue charges out of the 
public budget would reduce unemployment by almost one million.
It is important to stress that substituting social insurance contribu-
tions with taxes is fully cost-neutral; it would not add a single euro to 
total government expenditures but simply reallocate the welfare state’s 
fiscal burden from the insured only to all tax payers. Given its positive 
employment effects (whereas the effect strength remains debated), and in 
light of the French example, we might ask why we have not seen anything 
like the French CSG in Germany , where social insurance contributions 
continue to be high in spite of the fact that public debate has identified 
high non-wage labor costs as the most detrimental factor inhibiting em-
ployment growth and competitiveness. A look at the taxes that became 
earmarked to lower the burden on social insurance contributions helps 
explaining the German welfare state’s specific fiscal trajectory (see table 
11.1). This pattern is due to Germany’s multi veto-point polity. The gov-
ernment uses primarily those taxes for which it can legislate an increase 
without the agreement of the second chamber; that is, purely federal 
taxes like consumption taxes (e.g. tobacco tax or energy tax [Ökosteuer]; 
see table 11.1). In the frequent situation of a ‘divided government’ with 
the opposition in government in the majority of state governments and 
therefore commanding a majority in the second chamber, any govern-
ment proposal to increase joint taxes is vulnerable to an opposition veto 
– and the opposition will be very willing to exert its veto since tax in-
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creases are highly unpopular with voters. However, in Germany all major 
revenue generating taxes are joint taxes (in particular VAT, income and 
corporate tax) for which the government needs the consent of the second 
chamber, whereas consumption taxes generate only moderate revenue. 
Not surprisingly, it was not before a grand Christian and social Demo-
cratic coalition formed in 2005 that a significant VAT hike brought the 
government closer to its long declared goal of holding social insurance 
contributions below 40 percent of gross wages. But even under the favor-
able economic conditions of 2007 and 2008 and even with the broad ma-
jority over which the coalition between Social and Christian Democrats 
has command, the contributions rates could not be brought below this 
limit (see Hinrichs, this volume).
Table 11.1 Revenue transfer to the social insurance schemes in Germany
Year Eco tax plus VAT – 
transfer to the pension 
insurance
(billion euro)
Tobacco tax – transfer 
to the health insurance 
(billion euro)
VAT – transfer to the 
unemployment insurance
(billion euro)
1998 5.6
1999 9.1
2000 10.5
2001 14.0
2002 16.7
2003 20.3
2004 19.8 1.0
2005 19.9 2.5
2006 19.9 4.2
2007 20.5 1.5 6.5
2008 18.2 2.5 7.6
Source: SVR, various years
11.5 Conclusion
I proposed analyzing the economic adjustments of the OECD countries in 
response to the much more unfavorable economic environment since the 
mid-1970s in light of the three basic options that a government has when 
confronted with an increasing revenue/expenditure-gap: increase taxes , 
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cut spending or run a higher public debt. I have suggested that these basic 
options possess varying degrees of political attractiveness depending on 
the institutional context in which a government has to employ the one 
or the other policy. I have emphasized the importance of two variables 
– in particular, 1) the financing structure of the welfare state, and 2) the 
level of central bank independence. A political strategy that combines fis-
cal conservatism with passive welfare state policies is a ‘natural outcome’ 
within a setting comprising a welfare state financed by contributions in-
stead of taxes and an independent central bank – a combination classi-
cally represented by the German political economy and her ‘Continental /
Conservative ’ (but not southern) homologues. It is an institutional con-
stellation that has been prolonged in Europe under the independent Euro-
pean central bank. I finally showed that a reform of the fiscal basis of the 
Bismarckian welfare systems is possible, but depends on favorable politi-
cal conditions. Whereas the French case exemplifies a successful process 
of increasing the share of tax-finances in the welfare budget, the German 
case highlights the adverse effects of Germany ’s multi-veto point polity. 
With joint taxation but diverging political majorities, the opposition with 
its dominance in the Bundesrat can block tax increases that are meant to 
increase the tax-share in welfare state finance. German governments were 
therefore constrained in using those purely federal taxes for which they 
do not need consent of the second chamber. But this has proved insuffi-
cient to significantly lower the contribution payers’ burden.
In my view my argument has several merits. First, it allows going be-
yond the simple insight that welfare retrenchment might be unpopular. By 
analyzing welfare retrenchment in connection with the other basic policy 
options, we can formulate more precise, institutionally informed ‘blame 
avoidance’ arguments. In this respect I suggest not to base the analysis of 
welfare retrenchment exclusively on expenditure data, as many contribu-
tions to the literature still do. Instead, it seems more appropriate to look 
simultaneously at expenditure, tax and debt-data. Secondly, I suggested 
that the marked differences in distributive outcomes between the OECD -
countries are not primarily or only caused by differences in voters’ po-
litical preferences about these outcomes (Esping-Andersen 1990; Iversen 
and Wren 1998). Rather, I have argued that different political opportunity 
costs attached to different political strategies must be held responsible for 
the observable pattern of systematic variation within the OECD -world. 
This would explain why a measurable, political, partisan influence on 
welfare state development vanished in most of the econometric analyses 
over the 1980s and 1990s, whereas the countries largely remained on their 
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distinct adjustment paths. With governments of different colors pursuing 
similar, institutionally supported strategies, a discernible partisan-politi-
cal impact on welfare state development evaporated. This interpretation 
follows an important argument put forward by Herbert Kitschelt (1999). 
He proposed to treat parties’ positions and programs not as given, but to 
posit them in a political economy perspective, i.e. to view a party as itself 
influenced by the broader political economy of a country. I argued here 
that the institutional set-up of the welfare state is an important part of 
this political economy.
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12 Whatever Happened to the Bismarckian Welfare State? 
 From Labor Shedding to Employment-Friendly Reforms
Anton Hemerijck and Werner Eichhorst
12.1 The Adaptive Capacity of the Continental Welfare State
Is the welfare state ﬁ t for the 21st century? Th is question has haunted Eu-
ropean policy-makers and researchers for over a decade. Sluggish growth 
and weak job creation around the turn of the new millennium has not only 
given way to a ﬁ erce ideological battle between diﬀ erent socio-economic 
‘models’, triggering political strife and separating antagonistic advocacy 
coalitions – but also contributed to a strand of analytical literature point-
ing out the structural impediments to ‘modernize ’ Continental European 
and Mediterranean welfare states and make them both more employment 
friendly and sustainable (see e.g. Scharpf and Schmidt 2000). Th e Bis-
marckian version of the European social model was pitted against a false 
stereotype of the ‘Anglo-Saxon ’ model of capitalism , allegedly a ‘free market 
without a safety net’, producing high levels of poverty and inequality, but 
also against Scandinavian welfare states with universal beneﬁ ts and strong 
public services in education, childcare and active labor market policies .
Rather than extrapolating policy recipes from recent economic per-
formance, urging European OECD members to recast their social market 
economies along the lines of American capitalism , a more illuminating 
way to understand recent reform dynamics is to contextualize existing 
social policy repertoires and reform dynamics in the face of the chang-
ing economic and technological challenges and evolving social and de-
mographic structures. As shown in the various chapters of this book, the 
striking intensity and the comprehensive character of social and economic 
policy reform across the majority of the so-called Bismarckian welfare re-
gimes , including the six founding EU member states of Germany , France , 
Italy and the Benelux countries, together with the later entrants Spain 
and Austria as well as the Visegrad countries (the Czech Republic , Slova-
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kia , Hungary and Poland ) and Switzerland , since the mid-1990s, is very 
much at odds with a prevalent image of a ‘frozen welfare landscape’ in the 
academic literature. Most important, the substantive extent of welfare re-
direction across a large number of member states of the European Union 
(EU ) adds up to the momentum of substantive policy change and goes far 
beyond the popular concepts of ‘retrenchment ’ and ‘roll-back’. But to say 
that the Bismarckian welfare states, as compared to the Anglo-Irish and 
Scandinavian welfare regimes, are far from sclerotic is not to say that they 
are in good shape.
Today four sets of challenges confront policy-makers with the impera-
tive to redirect the welfare effort, to redesign institutions and to elaborate 
on new principles of social justice. From outside, in the first place, inter-
national competition is challenging the redistributive scope and decom-
modifying power of the national welfare state. Many academic observers 
believe that the increase in cross-border competition in the markets for 
money, goods and services has substantially reduced the room for ma-
neuver of national welfare states (Scharpf 1999). Economic internation-
alization constrains countercyclical macroeconomic management, while 
increased openness exposes generous welfare states to trade competition 
and permits capital to move to the lowest-cost producer countries. Fi-
nally, there is the danger that tax competition will result in the under-
provision of public goods.
Second, from within, ageing populations, declining birth rates, chang-
ing gender roles in households as a result of the mass entry of women to 
the labor market, the shift from an industrial to the service economy, new 
technologies in the organization of work, engender sub-optimal employ-
ment levels, new inequalities and human capital -biased patterns of social 
exclusion . Skill-biased technological change, the feminization of the labor 
market, and demographic ageing, as a result of rising life expectancy and 
rapidly falling birth rates, are the most important drivers of the new post-
industrial risk profile. While the boundaries between being ‘in’ and ‘out’ 
of work have been blurred by increases in atypical work, low-wages, sub-
sidized jobs, and training programs, one job is no longer enough to keep 
low-income families out of poverty . According to Gøsta Esping-Andersen 
et al. (2002), the most important reason why the existing systems of social 
care have become overstretched stems from the weakening of labor mar-
kets and family households as traditional providers of welfare. In addi-
tion, new sources of immigration and segregation, especially in the hous-
ing market in metropolitan areas, pose a challenge to social cohesion. The 
present economic crisis is likely to pose new forms of segmentation on 
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the labor markets to the detriment of the most vulnerable groups such as 
agency workers, fixed-term employees and the unemployed while labor 
market insiders have less to fear. Hence, risks and capacities to adapt are 
distributed unequally across the labor force.
And while policy-makers must find new ways to manage the adverse 
consequences of economic internationalization and post-industrial dif-
ferentiation, their endeavor to recast the welfare state is severely con-
strained by long-standing social policy commitments in the areas of un-
employment and pensions, which have ushered in a period of permanent 
austerity (Pierson 1998; 2001b). The maturation of welfare commitments, 
policies put in place to cater after the social risks associated with the post-
war industrial era now seem to crowd out and overload the available pol-
icy space for effective policy responses in especially public services under 
conditions of low economic growth. This specter of permanent austerity 
is likely to intensify in the face of population ageing. Although in the cur-
rent downturn many governments switch to public spending in order to 
reflate the economy, this may generate additional fiscal pressures in the 
foreseeable future.
Finally, as an intervening variable in the process, issues of work and wel-
fare have become ever more intertwined with processes of European po-
litical and economic integration since the 1980s. It is fair to say that in the 
EU we have entered an era of semi-sovereign welfare states (Leibfried and 
Pierson 2000). European economic integration has fundamentally recast 
the boundaries of national systems of employment regulation and social 
protection, by constraining autonomy for domestic policy options, but 
also by opening opportunities for EU -led social and employment coordi-
nation and agenda setting (Ferrera 2005; Zeitlin 2005). The introduction 
of the internal market and the introduction of the EMU , and Stability and 
Growth Pact, have added a new economic supranational layer to domestic 
social and economic policy repertoires of individual member states. Since 
the mid-1990s, the EU has taken on a far more pro-active role as a central 
social policy agenda setter. The European Employment Strategy, based on 
the new Employment Title of the Amsterdam Treaty, launched in 1997, 
is exemplary of the EU ’s new role of agenda-setting policy coordination, 
designed to catalyze rather than steer domestic social policy reform.
Although all European welfare states face the challenges of economic 
internationalization, post-industrial societal change and intensified Eu-
ropean integration under conditions of relative macroeconomic auster-
ity, comparative research reveals how internal and external challenges 
confront different clusters of welfare regimes with a distinct constella-
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tion of adjustment problems and reform agendas. It has often been argued 
that the institutional conﬁ guration of Continental welfare states, with 
their traditional Bismarckian labor market and social policy legacies, with 
its strong bias towards the protection of the steady employment of male 
breadwinners , are, in comparison to the Anglo-Saxon social model and 
the Scandinavian worlds of welfare, the most diﬃ  cult to reform. In spite of 
the obvious ‘irresistible forces’ urging for reform, the Continental welfare 
model has remained an ‘unmovable object’ (Pierson 1998). Especially the 
larger political economies of France , Germany and Italy , are often mocked 
for their ‘frozen fordism’, ‘inactivity traps’, ‘welfare without work ’ conun-
drum and ‘insider -outsider ’ segmentation , ‘perverse familialism ’ and ‘per-
manent pension crises’ (Palier and Martin 2007a). With the Bismarckian 
regime type covering a large majority of EU member states, this is all the 
more problematic for the EU aspiring to become – following the Lisbon 
agenda – the most competitive knowledge-based economy in the world.
As the series of fresh and detailed analyses of reforms implemented in 
Bismarckian welfare systems published in this volume show, the pace and 
scope of Continental welfare reform is more profound, even if incomplete, 
than is suggested in the literature on the ‘new politics of the welfare state’. 
To be sure, the Continental reform momentum is very rooted in the incon-
gruence between new economic and social contexts and institutional re-
silience of Bismarckian male-breadwinner social policy provisions, based 
on occupationally distinct, employment-related social insurance princi-
ples, underpinned by traditional (single-breadwinner) family values (Es-
ping-Andersen 1990; Ferrera 1998; Scharpf and Schmidt 2000;  Ferrera, 
Hemerijck and Rhodes 2000; Palier 2006). Catching up with the more 
employment and family-friendly Scandinavian and Anglo-Saxon welfare 
state has been particularly diﬃ  cult for Continental welfare states, as will 
be surveyed below. Th e slow but fundamental departure from the ‘welfare 
without work ’ strategy in Continental welfare systems since the mid-1990s 
is best understood as a profound transformative process of policy change 
across a number of intimately related policy domains. Th rough a more or 
less protracted sequence of reforms, Bismarckian welfare states shifted 
from labor shedding to policies that aim at mobilizing labor supply as well 
as labor demand. Employment-friendly policies replaced mainly social pol-
icy approaches to unemployment . By deliberately begging the question of 
Continental welfare inertia, this contribution focuses on the adaptive ca-
pacity of Europe’s Bismarckian welfare states to the challenges of econom-
ic internationalization and post-industrial diﬀ erentiation, and permanent 
austerity in the shadow of intensiﬁ ed European (economic) integration.
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Th e argument is constructed as follows. First, Section 2 renders an in-
ventory of comparative employment performance so as to highlight the 
particular weaknesses of the Bismarck -type welfare regime , together with 
its recent improvements, in comparison to other European welfare state 
families. Next, section 3 turns a diachronic qualitative analysis of the se-
quence and scope of employment-friendly reforms in diﬀ erent policy areas 
within and across diﬀ erent Bismarckian welfare systems. Th is overview 
will reveal how much the 1990s and early 2000s has been an epoch of in-
tense policy change in the make-up of Europe’s Bismarckian welfare states. 
To say that the Continental welfare state has been far from sclerotic is not 
to say that they are now ﬁ t for the 21st century. In conclusion, Section 4 
highlights, by employing a life course perspective, what we think is the 
unﬁ nished social reform agenda for most Continental welfare states today.
12.2 The Continental Employment Dilemma
Employment is the most important measure for judging the sustainability of 
the Continental welfare state and the success of social and economic policy 
reform. Th e reason for this is simple: beneﬁ ts and social services have to be 
paid by the taxes and social security contributions from those in work. Th e 
more working people there are, the broader this funding base is. In the event 
of long-term unemployment , incapacity to work and early retirement , spend-
ing on social security goes up while at the same time revenues fall. From a 
sociological perspective, having a job also beneﬁ ts people by giving them en-
hanced opportunities for self-actualization and self-esteem. Participating in 
the labor market today is the most important form of social interaction and, 
as such, is an indispensable element in achieving social cohesion.
The response of the Continental and Mediterranean welfare states to 
the process of economic restructuring in the 1970s and 1980s, but also the 
policy applied by the transition countries in the early 1990s was aimed at 
keeping open unemployment low by limiting labor supply. Most Conti-
nental welfare states began using disability pensions, early retirement and 
long-term unemployment schemes to remove older and less productive 
workers from the labor market. Luring people out of the labor market by 
facilitating early retirement , increasing beneﬁ ts for the long-term unem-
ployed, lifting the obligation of job search for older workers , discouraging 
mothers from job search, favoring long periods of leave, easing the access 
to disability pensions and reducing working hours, all contributed to the 
characteristically Continental ‘welfare without work ’ policy strategy that 
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became popular in the 1980s and for most of the 1990s (Esping-Andersen 
1996a). Growing demands on social security led to burgeoning costs to be 
borne by the labor market. From the middle of the 1980s onwards, em-
ployers in Continental welfare states increasingly began using labor-saving 
technology and shedding less productive employees via the social security 
system. Th is turned the Continental productivity squeeze into an inactivity 
trap. A vicious cycle arose of high gross wage costs, low net wages, the exit 
of less productive workers and rising social costs, creating a spiral of fall-
ing employment and rising economic inactivity . Th is also undermined the 
ﬁ nancial basis of the social security system. In addition, strict employment 
regulation, including minimum wages and hiring and ﬁ ring restrictions, 
protected the insiders in key industries, while harming the participation of 
outsiders , youngsters, women , older workers, low-skill groups and ethnic 
minorities (Hemerijck, van Kersbergen and Manow 2000).
From the 1990s onward the policy of labor supply reduction came to be 
brandished as a policy failure and, if continued uncorrected, as a threat 
to the survival of the welfare state. Towards the mid-1990s, the Conti-
nental or Bismarckian employment deficit triggered an important shift 
in the definition of the crisis of the Continental welfare state away from 
early exit adjustment strategies. Policy-makers came to realize that the 
low level of labor market participation was the Achilles heel of the Conti-
nental welfare state. This diagnosis initiated a series of reforms intended 
to overcome male-breadwinner policy provisions and to correct for past 
early exit policy mistakes in many areas of social and economic regula-
tion, including collective bargaining , social security, labor market policy 
and regulation, pensions and social services , including health and edu-
cation. To be sure, at times these reforms met with stiff resistance from 
the social partners , especially the trade unions , defending their privileged 
position in Bismarckian social insurance administration with its tradition 
of associational self-regulation by the social partners , as a corollary of the 
payroll financing of the Continental welfare state.
In part as a result of these reforms, since the mid-1990s, there has been 
a significant increase in employment across virtually all mature European 
welfare states over the last decade (Eichhorst and Hemerijck 2008). Figure 
12.1 shows the employment/population ratios among people in the work-
ing age population (15-64 years).1 What is striking is, first, the long-term 
increase in employment in most countries and, second, some persistent 
differences in the overall share of people in gainful employment across 
countries and families of welfare states. We can see substantial gains over 
the last decade, in particular in traditional low and medium employment 
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Figure 12.1 Employment/working-age population ratios 1997 and 2007
Source: Eurostat 
countries. Except for three transition countries, all Bismarckian welfare 
states experienced job growth. It was most pronounced in the Nether-
lands and Spain , but also Austria , France , Belgium , Italy and Hungary saw 
notable increases in the employment/population ratio so that employ-
ment rates across Europe converged to a certain extent. The Bismarckian 
cluster can no longer be described as a group of countries with a low em-
ployment level. In fact, Switzerland and the Netherlands join Sweden and 
Denmark as the group with the highest employment rates whereas Aus-
tria , the Czech Republic and Germany are above the EU -27 average and 
France , Belgium , Italy and Hungary approached this value considerably.
Mirroring the improvement in employment performance, standard-
ized unemployment rates declined in most European countries over the 
last decade as ﬁ gure 12.2 shows. Unemployment continued to decline in 
terms of annual data in 2008, but due to the current crisis the most recent 
months saw some increase in unemployment again. However, the employ-
ment performance is still much better than some years ago. What is most 
remarkable is the strong decline in unemployment in some Southern and 
Continental European countries such as Spain , France and Italy while Slo-
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vakia and Poland still suﬀ er the highest unemployment rates in the EU . Th e 
Netherlands , Switzerland , and Austria , continue to have very low levels 
of unemployment. In contrast to the 1970s and 1980s, however, decreases 
of open unemployment are no longer associated with declines of employ-
ment and inﬂ ows into inactivity , but mirror positive employment dynam-
ics. Nevertheless, open unemployment is still the highest in some Bis-
marckian countries such as Slovakia , Poland , Germany , Spain and France .
Figure 12.2 Standardized unemployment rates, 1997 and 2007
Source: Eurostat
It was not until the second half of the 1990s that there was a limited increase in 
the employment rate in the Mediterranean welfare states, which, in fact, have 
seen some of the biggest employment gains in the EU over the last decade. Th e 
Netherlands occupies a special place comparatively because it was the ﬁ rst 
Continental welfare state with a historically low female employment rate to 
improve its performance, trending towards Scandinavian levels. In the age 
group aged 25-54 years (prime age), a strong convergence can be observed 
since the middle of the 1990s (ﬁ gure 12.3). Over the last decade we can observe 
substantial recovery in the Scandinavian countries after the crisis in the early 
1990s, but also considerable improvement in the Netherlands, Spain and Italy.
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Figure 12.3 Prime age employment rate, both sexes (25-54), 1997 and 2007
Source: Eurostat 
There is much more regime-specific variation regarding the employ-
ment rates of older workers , women and the low-skilled . Differences in 
the extent to which these three groups are integrated into the labor mar-
ket basically determine differences in the overall employment rate. With 
respect to the 55-64 age cohort (see figure 12.4), one can clearly iden-
tify some legacy of early retirement policies in Continental and southern 
welfare states, but also in the transition countries. The Continental and 
Mediterranean welfare states and most of the new EU member states saw 
a dramatic fall of more than 30 percent in the employment rate of older 
workers from the 1980s due to early retirement , particularly among men . 
Since the end of the 1990s, the employment rate among older workers has 
been increasing strongly in Finland , but also in some Continental wel-
fare states, with the Netherlands taking the lead. Switzerland , which did 
not use early retirement massively, is close to Sweden in this dimension. 
Other Bismarckian countries are reversing historically low employment 
levels of older workers. Germany and the Netherlands are now above the 
50 percent EU target employment rate for older workers while the Czech 
Republic and Spain are approaching this value. Austria , France , the Slo-
vak Republic, Belgium , Italy and Hungary have also improved while Po-
land is lagging behind with less than 30 percent.
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Figure 12.4 Employment rates of older workers (55-64), 1997 and 2007
Source: Eurostat 
Looking at gender , we see some cross-country convergence in the em-
ployment rate of men between 70 and 80 percent with Switzerland and 
the Netherlands at the top. Male employment grew slightly in most EU 
countries. Again, there is a structural gap in male employment in three 
of the Visegrad countries and the western Bismarckian countries which 
relied most on early retirement (Belgium , France and Italy ).
Figure 12.5 Employment rate of men, 1997 and 2007
Source: Eurostat 
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THE CONTINENTAL EMPLOYMENT DILEMMA
The labor market entry of women is the most striking recent develop-
ment in European welfare states (see figure 12.6). In the early 1970s, the 
Netherlands had the lowest female employment rate in the OECD , at 29 
percent. This was lower than the figures in Ireland , Greece , Spain and 
Italy , where the rates were just above 30 percent. Since then the employ-
ment rate of women has grown strongly across all EU member states ex-
cept for some of the transformation countries. From 1997 until 2007, the 
rate in the Netherlands has increased by more than 12 percentage points 
to almost 70 percent and even stronger in Ireland and Spain , but Ger-
many , France , Belgium and other Bismarckian countries also experienced 
increases between 5 and 9 percentage points so that female employment 
rates in Austria and Germany are also around 64 percent nowadays while 
France reaches 60 percent. The female employment rate in the Nether-
lands is currently still lower than in the Scandinavian welfare states and 
Switzerland , but here as elsewhere younger cohorts are undergoing a no-
table convergence in the direction of stronger labor force participation. 
For younger cohorts, female employment in Southern and Continental 
Europe is rapidly catching up to Northern European averages.
Figure 12.6 Female employment, 1997 and 2007
Source: Eurostat 
In the Continental welfare states, the ability to work part-time has cre-
ated an important means of entry to the labor market for women , in par-
ticular in the Netherlands . In countries with a long-standing tradition 
of female employment, such as the Scandinavian countries, part-time 
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 WHATEVER HAPPENED TO THE BISMARCKIAN WELFARE STATE? 
employment is less common. This means that the significant increases 
in female employment counted per heads is related to persistent, but 
decreasing gaps in fulltime equivalent employment between the sexes 
as figure 12.7 shows. This gap is smaller than 10 or 15 percentage points 
in the Scandinavian countries and some of the new EU member states 
while the difference between men and women in terms of fulltime equiv-
alents is larger than 20 percentage points in Belgium , Germany and Aus-
tria and between 27 and 29 percentage points in Spain , Italy and the 
Netherlands .
Figure 12.7 Gap in fulltime equivalent employment rates between men and women , 2000 
and 2007
Source: Eurostat 
Employment rates by skill levels differ mostly for the labor force with less 
than upper secondary schooling or vocational training, less so for the 
high-skilled . Figure 12.8 shows marked differences in low-skill employ-
ment across countries and families of welfare states. The Netherlands , 
Switzerland and – notably – Spain are among the countries with the high-
est low-skilled employment rate. Particular deficits are found in the new 
member states, but also in some Continental European countries such 
as France , Italy , Germany and Belgium where only about half of the low 
skilled or even less are integrated into the labor market. Given the strong 
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RECONCILING WELFARE WITH WORK: A SEQUENCE OF INTENSE REFORMS
pressures of technological progress and globalization it is interesting to 
see that there is no general decline in the employment rates of the low-
skilled .
Figure 12.8 Employment rates of the low-skilled , 1997 and 2007
Source: Eurostat 
Summarizing the overview on employment performance, we can see, first 
and foremost, a significant improvement in employment performance and 
a significant decline in unemployment across most Bismarckian welfare 
systems over the last 10 years. However, in terms of labor market perfor-
mance, the Bismarckian countries do not form a consistent cluster. While 
Switzerland has always had a good labor market record and is now joined 
by the Netherlands , the other Continental European countries as well as 
the Mediterranean welfare states caught up significantly although there 
is still some gap in comparison to the Scandinavian and the Anglo-Saxon 
countries with respect to most of the labor market parameters.
12.3 Reconciling Welfare with Work: A Sequence of Intense Reforms
As this book shows, Bismarckian welfare states are not what they used to 
be – and they are now in a fundamentally different shape than in the late 
1990s when they were described as ‘frozen landscapes’. The Bismarckian 
countries have undergone a sequence of reforms that started in the 1970s 
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 WHATEVER HAPPENED TO THE BISMARCKIAN WELFARE STATE? 
which led to more institutional and structural changes in the following 
decades. Hence, the overall improvement in employment performance is 
related to groundbreaking social policy changes which were enacted in 
the majority of the European welfare states. Since the late 1970s, con-
secutive changes in the world economy, European politics (most spec-
tacularly the demise of communism in Eastern Europe), labor markets, 
and family structures, have disturbed the once sovereign and stable social 
and economic policy repertoires. As a consequence, all developed welfare 
states of the European Union have been recasting the basic policy mix 
upon which their national systems of social protection were built after 
1945. Below we render a stylized sketch of the employment-related reform 
agendas across Bismarckian welfare states since the 1970s by policy area 
and country cluster. If we interpret the welfare state more broadly than 
social protection narrowly understood, it is possible to paint a broad, cu-
mulatively transformative process of policy change across the majority of 
Continental welfare states in a number of intimately related policy areas 
so that in the end a turn towards employment-friendly reforms can be 
identified (Eichhorst and Hemerijck 2008).
With some stylization of national reform trajectories, we can identify 
four basic stages of welfare state and labor market reform in Bismarckian 
countries (see the introductory chapter by Palier):
1) the phase before retrenchment from the mid-1970s onwards until the 
late 1980s;
2) a first wave of retrenchment in the early 1990s;
3) more far-reaching institutional reforms in the second half of the 1990s;
4) a second wave of more path-breaking changes in the 2000s.
Of course, not all national reform trajectories fit perfectly in these four 
phases, but overall the broad transformation of Bismarckian welfare states 
can be analyzed in terms of a stepwise and increasingly fundamental, i.e. 
progressive modification of established social and labor market policies, 
in order to reconcile welfare and work and overcome the ‘welfare without 
work ’ syndrome.
The First Phase: The Good, Old Recipe of Labor Shedding 
The first stage of transforming Bismarckian welfare states set in with the 
economic shocks of the mid-1970s. The macroeconomic downturn in 
the aftermath of the steep increase in oil prices pushed unemployment 
to levels unknown in the after-war period in most European countries. 
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To counter what was first perceived as a cyclical crisis, most Bismarckian 
welfare states used unemployment benefits as an automatic stabilizer and 
implemented some Keynesian policies basically by allowing the public 
and the social budget to run into deficits. As part of the social approach 
to unemployment and to support the victims of the economic crisis, most 
Bismarckian countries opened up exit routes from the labor market, ac-
tually in particular for workers made redundant in manufacturing which 
was most severely hit by adverse economic conditions. In the labor mar-
ket, in the 1970s, most Bismarckian welfare states started using the social 
security system to remove older and less productive workers from the la-
bor market, through disability pensions, early retirement , and long-term 
unemployment schemes. Core groups of the Bismarckian welfare state 
and employment model, i.e. male breadwinners in standard employment 
relationships , got privileged access to more generous benefits which were 
seen as a short-time stabilization tool in order to prevent losses in human 
capital first but eventually turned into pathways to long-term inactivity . 
Though producing short-term gains, and backed by unions as a solution 
to unemployment among young people, this strategy would eventually 
entail considerable costs in terms of job creation and fiscal pressure on 
the welfare state. Generous early retirement or disability benefits, but also 
heavy reliance on regular unemployment benefits and active labor market 
policy schemes, in turn, had medium-run consequences in terms of high-
er social insurance contribution rates for both employers and employees. 
But at that point in time policy-makers preferred increasing contribu-
tion rates to cutting social insurance benefits although there were some 
marginal attempts at budgetary consolidation such as the introduction of 
higher user fees in health care and smaller changes in unemployment ben-
efits. Most notably, however, in particular the southern countries Spain 
(Guillén, this volume) and Italy (Jessoula and Alti, this volume) imple-
mented some consolidation programs in pension and disability already in 
the 1980s ahead of other Bismarckian countries.
Overall, the welfare state arrangement itself was hardly changed in the 
mature Bismarckian systems where there was tendency to apply ‘good old 
recipes’. Regarding employment, this was later seen as the root cause of 
the Bismarckian ‘welfare without work ’ syndrome associated with high 
non-wage labor costs and a heavy reliance on non-employment beneﬁ ts. 
In terms of welfare state change, initial responses to the crisis of the 1970s 
can be seen as a routine relying on existing beneﬁ t schemes and labor mar-
ket policies . Labor shedding indicated a regime consistent reaction to the 
economic shocks of the 1970s. Th e policy response came from within the 
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Bismarckian regime. Outside alternatives, following the Scandinavian ac-
tivation or Anglo-Saxon retrenchment , were not yet taken seriously. Labor 
supply reduction was seen as the only way to cope with rising unemploy-
ment . Th e regime was unchanged. To revive the Bismarckian regime, ad-
herence to labor supply reduction made sense to the relevant policy actors.
While the mature welfare states of that period have later been described 
as a ‘frozen’ welfare states landscape, there were some notable institution-
al changes – not only with respect to increasing the generosity of existing 
benefits but also in terms of some steps to reinforce minimum income 
protection. This can be illustrated by the Belgian minimum income poli-
cies (see Hemerijck and Marx, this volume), but also by the introduction 
of the French RMI in 1988 (see Palier, chapter 3 in this volume) and the 
more universal access to health care (see Italy , Spain and France ) as well 
as to family benefits and the creation of mandatory unemployment insur-
ance in Switzerland as late as in 1984 (Häusermann, this volume). These 
reforms were the first, albeit partial steps to establish a general minimum 
support framework, which had been absent in Bismarckian welfare states 
thus far. Hence, in many Bismarckian countries, the phase of defensive 
adjustment via passive social policies was also a phase of expansion of 
more universal social policy coverage – in particular in those countries 
with less mature policy arrangements and in those areas and for those 
target groups typically neglected in a Bismarckian setting. This was often 
associated with a purification of social insurance in terms of a more direct 
link between contributions and benefits and a removal of redistributional 
elements in social insurance. This gradual shift towards tax-funded social 
policies gained in importance over the years to come.
While employment security for labor market insiders remained un-
changed, most Bismarckian countries started liberalizing the use of more 
flexible jobs in the 1980s in order to allow for some additional job cre-
ation without endangering the core of the labor market. Fixed-term jobs, 
but also part-time employment became an increasingly prominent sec-
ondary segment in otherwise rather rigid labor markets (see the Spanish, 
the French or the Dutch experience). The Netherlands , however, was the 
first to adopt a more strategic approach to welfare state restructuring and 
employment creation with the renewal of corporatist negotiations in the 
shadow of hierarchy. In fact, the Netherlands combined wage restraint, 
cuts in social benefits and first steps towards activation with an expansion 
of flexible jobs, in particular part-time work while tolerating access to dis-
ability benefits as the Dutch exit route from the labor market (Hemerijck 
and Marx, this volume).
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The passive labor shedding approach to unemployment led to a sit-
uation of low employment and increasing non-wage labor costs in Bis-
marckian welfare states.
Second Phase: Cost Containment and Retrenchment in the Name of 
Competitiveness and Job Creation
A first wave of more stringent retrenchment began in the 1990s in order 
to stabilize public budgets, limit public debts and improve international 
competitiveness in a situation of accelerated international and European 
integration. Employers in Bismarckian countries increasingly complained 
about high non-wage labor costs which hampered their competitive po-
sition on world markets. Th erefore, cost containment on the side of so-
cial insurance contributions, which had been increased considerably in 
the past, and eventually welfare state retrenchment became high political 
priorities. However, it was only as a result of the constraints imposed by 
the Maastricht criteria that, in most Bismarckian countries, a change oc-
curred in the policies implemented: instead of increasing social contribu-
tions , governments started to try to reduce the level of social beneﬁ ts. Th e 
welfare state was not seen as a beneﬁ cial arrangement to help the victims 
of economic restructuring anymore, but was increasingly perceived as a 
potential source of problems and disincentives. To consolidate the social 
policy budget, most Bismarckian countries increased the contributive 
character of social insurance beneﬁ ts while giving a larger role to tax-fund-
ing of welfare state provisions, in particular non-contributory beneﬁ ts, i.e. 
universal and means-tested assistance schemes, but also cross-subsidizing 
social insurance. Th e stronger diﬀ erentiation between insurance and as-
sistance also meant a clearer dualization of welfare state programs. At the 
same time, however, stronger minimum income elements addressed new 
social risks such as poverty and exclusion that resulted from insuﬃ  cient 
access to insurance beneﬁ ts. Slowly but surely mature Bismarckian welfare 
systems started to converge on the mixed Dutch welfare system, combin-
ing Beveridgean social assistance and minimum state pensions with more 
traditional vestiges of Bismarckian social insurance for core workers .
The attempt to re-establish the Bismarckian regime through labor 
supply reduction created tensions within the regime when long-term in-
activity turned out to be permanent. Not only were the labor shedding 
strategies ineffective in mitigating the economic downturn; they almost 
killed the Bismarckian welfare state patient. The burden of labor shedding 
became too great to bear in the context of the mid-1990s. The Continen-
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tal model was saved, but the conditions that had sustained it before the 
onslaught of the 1980s recession no longer existed. The persistent ‘wel-
fare without work ’ syndrome generated a complex reform agenda aimed 
at rationalizing spending by curtailing pension commitments and ‘pas-
sive ’ benefits, improving family policy , introducing ‘active’ incentives into 
short-term cash benefits, reforming labor markets to overcome insider /
outsider cleavages, and reducing the incidence of social charges. These 
systems, though, are especially ‘veto-heavy’ and any reform must be ne-
gotiated with or around entrenched vested interests. The spur to reform 
in this group was the deep recession of European economies in the early 
1990s, which produced a sharp rise in unemployment and ballooning pub-
lic debt. From the early 1990s on, a new consensus on employment pro-
motion spread across these countries, though the extent of reform and 
success in promoting new employment creation has varied.
But at the same time many Bismarckian countries continued with ear-
ly retirement and disability schemes as major schemes to reduce labor 
supply (see the Austrian experience, Obinger and Tálos, this volume), 
whereas others tackled the issue of inactivity by restricting access to non-
employment benefits. In the Netherlands, from 1994 onwards, the govern-
ment , committed to a ‘jobs, jobs and more jobs’ strategy, sought greater 
efficiencies in social security, including partial re-privatization of social 
risks, managed liberalization of administration, reducing social partner 
involvement, and introduced and intensified activation obligations for the 
long-term unemployed.
Some countries such as Italy were the first to start building a second pil-
lar in pensions while consolidating the public first pillar pension regime 
(Amato and Dini reforms). Parallel to this, Bismarckian countries such 
as France or Switzerland streamlined the unemployment benefit system, 
further ‘purified’ the insurance schemes while strengthening assistance 
and minimum income protection. Activation policies were expanded 
and started to limit the realm of unconditional receipt of unemployment 
benefits more effectively. The tax share in social policy was increased to 
stabilize or reduce the burden of non-wage labor costs (see the CSG in 
France ). In contrast to more ambitious reform sequences, post-unifica-
tion Germany expanded its established repertoire of rising social insur-
ance contributions to fund heavy spending on passive non-employment 
benefits and labor market policies to accommodate the job losses in East-
ern Germany in a ‘smooth’ and ‘social’ way (Hinrichs, this volume). This, 
however, resulted in stronger concerns regarding the fiscal sustainability 
of the welfare state and international competitiveness.
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In terms of the political economy, the 1990s saw a major revival of 
negotiated welfare state reform via social pacts (see the Netherlands , 
Austria , but also Spain and Italy ) and stronger state intervention, e.g. by 
introducing a parliamentary vote on the social budget (France ). Reform 
capacities of Bismarckian welfare states were improved by a wave of suc-
cessful tripartite agreements and a stronger role of governments. Social 
partnership also contributed to reforms narrowing the divide in labor 
market regulation and job protection between permanent and temporary 
employees after a period of strong growth in the flexible segment of the 
labor market (see in particular the reform sequence in Spain in the mid-
1990s).
Third Phase: Mobilizing the Labor Force
The reforms of the early 1990s paved the way for institutional change be-
yond retrenchment . In an increasingly globalized and Europeanized eco-
nomic context, welfare systems were partly seen as a cause for crisis in 
terms of social exclusion brought about by work disincentives and higher 
unemployment driven by structural weaknesses such as rigid labor market 
regulation and a heavy burden of taxes , and even worse, social insurance 
contributions. Corporatist settings were seen as somewhat detrimental to 
more far-reaching labor market and welfare state reforms. Building upon 
earlier reforms, new universal or targeted benefits beyond Bismarckian 
social insurance became increasingly important. The same held for the 
share of taxes in welfare state funding and state-driven governance as op-
posed to administration by the social partners . This was also associated 
with new modes of governance including a more prominent role of private 
providers of public/private partnership. This broader process of ‘defrost-
ing’ spread across Bismarckian welfare states.
It is not an easy task to change policy direction, as policy actors are 
locked into the short-term bargains of dominant policy legacies. They 
need to be convinced, often by dramatic and highly visible events, that 
the regime has to change. Central to the ‘defrosting’ of the Bismarckian 
welfare system was a change in the problem definition of the crisis of the 
Bismarckian welfare state in the late 1990s, away from fighting unemploy-
ment through early exit . Instead, the Scandinavian preoccupation with 
maximizing the rate of labor force participation became the number one 
priority. The commitment to high levels of employment, ‘jobs, jobs and 
more jobs’, became the core social and economic policy objective of the 
Dutch governments led by Wim Kok in the 1990s.
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Regarding activation, Germany, in contrast to early stages of the reform 
trajectory , shifted from a passive to a more active social policy by phas-
ing out early retirement and increasing the individual’s burden of proof 
with respect to suitable job offers, withdrawing human capital safeguard 
provisions as well as stabilizing non-wage labor costs by way of higher tax 
funding, e.g. green taxes . In many Bismarckian countries, earlier reforms 
towards the activation of benefit recipients and the liberalization of flex-
ible jobs continued, but also triggered some more restrictive counter ac-
tion (see France or Germany ). To foster efficiency in labor market policies , 
public employment service monopolies were removed (e.g. in Germany or 
Italy ) to allow for private agencies to enter this market. In reaction to the 
purification of contributory social insurance and the limitations to social 
insurance coverage, countries such as France strengthened minimal so-
cial guarantees by creating non-contributory means-tested benefits for 
income (RMI) and health (CMU) protection. The Netherlands probably 
pursued the most ambitious strategy to raise labor force participation in 
a low unemployment situation. This involved tackling the disability issue 
by tightening access to benefits, as well as using new modes of gover-
nance. In order to activate social assistance claimants a contractual ap-
proach and stronger municipal responsibility in terms of measures and 
resources was implemented. Performance-oriented management was also 
a core element of Swiss activation policies implemented after 1995. In the 
late 1990s, the Netherlands also managed to negotiate better employment 
protection for flexible jobs in exchange for some changes in dismissal pro-
tection for employees on permanent contracts (‘flexicurity ’ legislation).
Fourth Phase: A more Fundamental Transformation towards 
Employment-Friendly Social Protection
Given the increasingly intensive reform dynamics spreading across coun-
tries and policy areas, the fourth phase of reforms in the 2000s can be de-
scribed as path-breaking change recalibrating the welfare state to bring it in 
line with the reformed labor market institutions in the Bismarckian coun-
tries. By layering , i.e. adding non-traditional and non-Bismarckian elements 
to established arrangements of social and labor market policies , the overall 
character of the institutional ediﬁ ce was modiﬁ ed and eventually allowed 
for more transformative reforms . Given European and global economic in-
tegration as well as the relevance of new social risks , Bismarckian countries 
changed their basic institutional settings and are fundamentally diﬀ erent 
from the arrangements found in the 1970s. Th is was not a swift and coherent 
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change but rather the result of long and more or less protracted sequences of 
partial reforms. At least in some crucial situations some of the Bismarckian 
countries could rely on negotiated and more strategic institutional reforms 
while others mostly started reforming the margins of the labor market and 
the welfare state so that new provisions could grow in importance and pave 
the way for more far-reaching reforms aﬀ ecting core elements.
The 2000s were characterized by increasingly generalized activation 
policies and the prominent role of employment incentives and employ-
ment-friendly benefits as stronger work incentives have become a major 
policy orientation since the late 1990s in countries which used to pur-
sue a social approach to unemployment . As shown by Palier (2006), the 
growth of minimum income protection as well as the establishment of 
second, occupational or third, private pillars in the pension system imply 
a certain dualization of social protection between social insurance and 
social assistance programs and between public and private regimes. Both 
the subsidization of private social policies and the growing importance 
of means-tested minimum provisions bring about a higher share of tax-
funding in Bismarckian welfare states. The Bismarckian regime entered a 
phase of more fundamental change.
Reforms in the most recent phase were not heavily driven by the mo-
mentum of EMU but rather followed from earlier steps towards flexibility 
and activation. The major objective of social security now changed from 
passive compensation of social risks to setting individual behavioral in-
centives for both employers and benefit claimants to achieve labor market 
integration: out-of work benefits were complemented by in-work bene-
fits, human capital safeguard clauses in activation were replaced by strict 
suitability criteria. Activation was dominated for some years at least by a 
work-first orientation, but more recently preventative social investment 
in human capital through early childhood education, schooling, train-
ing and lifelong learning moved up the public policy agenda (especially 
in Spain , Switzerland or Germany ). However, activation policies not only 
stressed labor market (re)integration of virtually all working-age beneﬁ t 
recipients but also meant a generalization of minimum income support 
for the population (Eichhorst and Konle-Seidl 2008). Exit routes such as 
disability and early retirement are being closed in those Bismarckian coun-
tries that had continued those schemes over the 1990s (see the Nether-
lands or Austria ), whereas Belgium has been more reluctant when it comes 
to curtailing early retirement and activating unemployment beneﬁ ts.
Activation is now a general objective implying intensified active la-
bor market policy and new modes of governance such as target-oriented 
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management of public agencies, which have become more autonomous 
from social partner influence over time, and contractual relationships 
between the state and the individual as well as between government and 
private providers (see e.g. in the Netherlands , Switzerland or Austria ). 
This, in fact, is associated with a dual social protection model, combin-
ing Bismarckian social insurance, which is still in place for core workers , 
with Beveridgean minimum income protection systems. Both Belgium 
and France also targeted stricter activation at recipients of minimum in-
come support and implemented stronger in-work benefits for low-wage 
earners (e.g. the French ‘prime pour l’emploi’) or their employers via ex-
emptions from social insurance contributions. With the 2005 Hartz IV 
reform, Germany implemented a similar general assistance scheme for 
all working-age inactives who were capable of working by merging for-
mer unemployment assistance and social assistance . This was comple-
mented with tight suitability criteria and sanctioning provisions so that 
strong activation requirements concerned all long-term unemployed. 
Germany shifted from a passive welfare state accommodating economic 
restructuring through long-term benefit receipts to one of the most am-
bitious and universal activation regimes. However, most countries aim 
at a more unified mode of governance and administrative streamlining 
of benefit payments, activation and service provision for all jobseekers, 
in particular the long-term unemployed. This leads to new cooperation 
arrangements or mergers between municipal welfare offices, public em-
ployment services and/or unemployment insurance (see the German 
ARGE for long-term unemployed or the most recent French ‘pôle em-
ploi’ bringing together unemployment insurance and public labor mar-
ket policies ).
Parallel to further benefit recalibration in public pension schemes and 
the introduction of minimum pension provisions, a new wave of pension 
reforms introduced or strengthened employer-based supplementary pen-
sions and the fully-funded, private , but subsidized pillar of old-age pen-
sion, e.g. the Riester reform in Germany or PERP and PERCO in France . 
A similar objective lies behind the new severance pay funds in Austria 
(‘Abfertigung neu’). Finally, the growing role of flexible employment paved 
the way to further flexicurity legislation in highly regulated labor markets 
such as Spain , while in other countries such as Germany temporary work 
agencies, self-employment and also part-time jobs provide for alterna-
tive flexibility channels so that dismissal protection is less under pressure 
than a decade ago. The Visegrad countries , which had implemented pas-
sive social policies to cope with the transition crisis in the 1990s – similar 
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to what the other Bismarckian countries had done in the 1970s and 1980s 
– embarked on a trend towards retrenchment , recalibration and activa-
tion in the current decade (Cerami, this volume).
12.4 An Unfi nished Social Reform Agenda for Bismarckian Countries
Neither the doomsday scenario of the demise of the Bismarckian wel-
fare state, predicted by mainstream economists in the early 1990s, nor 
the prevailing image of a ‘frozen welfare status quo ’ can be corroborated 
by the welfare reform experience highlighted above. Over the past two 
decades, as the above inventory of reforms shows, many European welfare 
states have – with varying degrees of success – taken measures in order 
to redirect economic and social restructuring by pushing through adjust-
ments in macroeconomic policy, industrial relations , taxation , social se-
curity, labor market policy , employment protection legislation, pensions 
and social services and welfare financing. The result has been a highly 
dynamic process of self-transformation of the Bismarckian welfare fam-
ily (Hemerijck 2002), marked not by half-hearted retrenchment efforts 
but by more comprehensive trajectories of ‘recalibration ’, ranging from 
redesigning welfare programs to the elaboration of new principles of so-
cial justice (Ferrera, Hemerijck and Rhodes 2000; Ferrera and Hemerijck 
2003; Pierson 2001a). It is no exaggeration to say that Continental welfare 
states are in the midst of a general paradigmatic shift away from systems 
geared to income and status maintenance towards more universal , but 
activating and employment-friendly as well as gender -neutral welfare sys-
tems. Many reforms were unpopular, but a fair amount occurred with the 
consent of opposition parties, trade unions , and employer organizations. 
A core feature, however, is the sequential character of reforms. More far-
reaching institutional changes were facilitated by early reforms, initially 
often of minor character or at the margins of the labor market or the 
welfare state, but later to be generalized as a consequence of institutional 
layering (Palier 2005b; Bonoli and Palier 2007).
What stands out in the Bismarckian reform momentum of recent times 
is the redefinition of the employment problem away from managing un-
employment towards the promotion of employment, on the basis of acti-
vation, active ageing/avoidance of early retirement , part-time work , life-
long learning , parental leave, gender mainstreaming, flexicurity , balancing 
flexibility with security, and reconciling work and family life. Moreover, 
Bismarckian welfare states are in the process of moving away from the 
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breadwinner/caregiver model, under which mothers are expected to stay 
at home with children, to a model of ‘employment for all’, under which 
mothers are expected to enter the labor force. This transition, which Ann 
Orloff captures in terms of the ‘farewell to maternalism’, is not merely 
the product of changing gender values (normative recalibration ), it is also 
part of a more deliberate strategy of policy-makers to attract mothers in 
the face of population ageing into the work force through activation pro-
grams, tax subsidies, part-time employment regulation, and the expan-
sion of family services (Orloff 2006).
Welfare reform in Bismarckian systems remains, as we have exempli-
fied above, extremely difficult, but surely not entirely inconceivable. Path-
breaking reforms, such as the Dutch reforms of the 1990s and Hartz re-
forms in Germany , brought policy reformers to expose the drawbacks of 
the widely popular welfare status quo , together with the old objectives, 
purpose and principles standing social policies were based on. By framing 
reform resistance as problematic, policy reformers offended entrenched 
policy stakeholders and organized interests in all Bismarckian states. This 
necessarily implied that reform oriented policy-makers have had to make 
consistent attempts to legitimize new policies and their underlying (new) 
normative principles. Communicating will-power to reform, while propa-
gating fair solutions, has proved to be imperative to changing prevailing 
policy repertoires. In the Bismarckian institutional context, there is an 
inherent tension here between, on the one hand, exposing stakeholders 
abuse of their vested interest positions, and, on the other hand, to ap-
peal to stakeholders to rethink reform resistance in order to forge a more 
productive political and societal consensus. However, structural change 
in Bismarckian countries also means a recalibration of the relationship 
between government, employers and trade unions – some of the most 
important reforms were implemented by the social partners in the gov-
ernment’s ‘shadow of hierarchy’ (Scharpf 1997a) or brought about a struc-
tural weakening of social partnership in some countries, e.g. Germany or 
France , whereas in others such as the Netherlands , Switzerland or Aus-
tria , tripartite dialogue was revived and proved capable of adjusting to a 
new economic and societal environment (See Ebbinghaus, this volume). 
Moreover, strong and operative social partnership seems to be associated 
with less severe dualization of labor markets and smoother adjustment.
In recent years, the normative focus of social policy hereby shifts from 
ex post social insurance compensation towards preventive or ex ante em-
ployability, hinging on the deployment of resources to improve and equal-
ize citizens’ individual abilities to compete in the knowledge economy. In 
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order to connect social policy more fully with a more dynamic economy 
and society, citizens have to be endowed with capabilities, through active 
policies that intervene early in the life cycle rather than later with more 
expensive passive and reactive policies (Esping-Andersen et al. 2002). At 
the heart of the new narrative lies a reorientation in social citizenship, 
away from freedom from want towards freedom to act, prioritizing high 
levels of employment for both men and women as the key policy objec-
tive, while combining elements of ﬂ exibility and security, under the pro-
viso of accommodating work and family life and a guaranteed rich social 
minimum serving citizens to pursue fuller and more satisfying lives (Dia-
mond 2006). In the shadow of intensiﬁ ed economic internationalization 
and post-industrial societal change, a relative shift from the social pro-
tection function of the welfare state to more of an emphasis on the social 
promotion function of the welfare state seems imperative. Th e jury is still 
undecided whether the Continental welfare systems will intensify the mo-
mentum with a greater emphasis on social investments. Th e diﬀ erences 
in the allocation of public resources to either investment policies (such as 
education and training) or to compensating policies such as social beneﬁ ts 
and passive and active labor market policies are most evident in ﬁ gure 12.9 
Figure 12.9 Public social expenditure and spending on education as percentage of GDP, 2005
Source: OECD
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which shows public spending on education and social expenditure com-
bined in percentage of GPD in 2005. While the overall association be-
tween both areas of public spending is positive in the Scandinavian ones, 
also some Bismarckian countries like Belgium and France now combine 
above-average spending on social policies with above-average spending 
on education. Germany and Italy , in contrast, spend a lot on social pur-
poses but are relatively stingy on educational expenditure.
Following several years of sound economic growth and strong employ-
ment expansion, European welfare states now face a dramatic economic 
downturn, for the first time since the launch of the Lisbon strategy in 
2ooo. A major stress test for the Continental welfare state lies ahead. As 
the financial crisis deepens and spills over into rising unemployment and 
social duress, the need for resilient employment and social policy is great-
er than ever. This precarious juncture creates a number of policy tempta-
tions. There is the obvious temptation of completely abandoning fiscal 
discipline to save jobs and maintain, as much as possible, the welfare sta-
tus quo . Then there is the short-sighted seduction of retrenching current 
welfare commitments to foster financial and budgetary stability. Equally 
ineffective is the still alluring strategy to fight unemployment through 
reducing labor supply through early retirement , for which all Bismarckian 
welfare systems fell in the 1980s and 1990s. Worse still is the nationalist 
and protectionist temptation that proved so disastrous in the 1930s. There 
is a real danger of adopting incoherent policy combinations that may ac-
tually deepen the economic downturn, worsening job losses, reducing 
state revenue, eroding pensions, and widening the gap between rich and 
poor. Historical mistakes, like deflationary contraction of the 1930s, and 
Continental labor supply reduction of the 1980s and 1990s, should surely 
be avoided. In these uncertain times, we must not lose sight of the overall 
aim of creating employment-friendly , fair and efficient, welfare systems. 
Short- to medium-term macroeconomic measures are necessary to re-
spond to immediate needs, but such measures should be consistent with 
the ongoing recalibration efforts to prepare domestic welfare state and 
EU social policy for the challenges of the 21st century. There are seven 
policy priorities at stake:
Let Automatic Stabilizers Work
So as to prevent a global economic abyss, it is necessary to let automatic 
stabilizers work, to protect citizens from the harshest effects of rising 
unemployment , while at the same time serving to safeguard economic 
demand. In the longer run, confidence in the economy relies on sound 
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public finances. Today we can observe, in sharp contrast to the Great De-
pression, how a fierce anti-deflationary macroeconomic policy response 
has rapidly come to fruition in the OECD area. There is clear policy con-
sensus that a Keynesian crisis should be met by an expansionary policy 
of anti-cyclical macroeconomic management across Europe. This kind of 
European policy coherence was surely lacking in the 1970s and 1980s era 
of stagflation. Also the stability of the euro should not be underestimated, 
in that a common currency forestalls any policy of competitive devalua-
tion. The internal market, enhanced in scope and strength by the addition 
to the EU of ten new member states from Central and Eastern Europe, 
surely puts a break on excessive protectionism. Last but not least, under 
the current financial crisis, it should not be forgotten that with social 
protection outlays averaging 28 percent of GDP in the EU , European so-
cial policies already act as important anti-cyclical automatic stabilizers. 
Rules and regulations in public finances, like the Stability and Growth 
Pact, define all government expenditures as consumption. Many of the 
policy proposals listed below concern social investments with a reason-
able rate of long-term return for economy and society. We have to find a 
way to prioritize social investments without undermining the principles 
of sound public financing. Take social investments out of SGP rules could 
be a step in the right direction.
Strengthen Long-Term Attachment to the Labor Market
The overriding policy lesson in our advanced economies is that in the 
face of demographic ageing and in the light of a declining work force, 
nobody can be left inactive (for long). Impending redundancies should 
be mitigated by temporary and short-term unemployment benefits, com-
bined with additional training measures. Any kind of job, be it short-term, 
part-time or subsidized, is better than no job at all to forestall unemploy-
ment hysteresis and deskilling. With ageing, labor markets will be tight 
in the long run. The interaction between economic performance and the 
welfare state is largely mediated through the labor market. The majority 
of Europe’s Bismarck -type welfare states are confronted with a syndrome 
of labor market segmentation between ‘insiders ’ and ‘outsiders ’ (Schmid 
2008). Relaxed hiring and firing legislation is best combined with gen-
erous social protection and active training and labor market policies to 
maximize employment. The ability to balance careers and family life is 
also crucial for removing gender biases in the labor market. While there 
is strong social security on the side of ‘guaranteed’ breadwinner work-
ers with quasi-tenured jobs, most Bismarckian welfare states continue to 
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provide only inadequate protection for vulnerable groups such as young 
labor market entrants, women , immigrants and older low-skilled work-
ers. Most likely, labor markets will become ever more flexible . While 
the boundaries between being ‘in’ and ‘out’ of work have been blurred 
by increases in atypical work, low wages, subsidized jobs, and training 
programs, one job is no longer enough to keep low-income families out 
of poverty . Post-industrial job growth is highly biased in favor of high-
skill jobs. However, increased labor market flexibility , together with the 
continuous rise in female employment will, in addition, also encourage 
the growth of a sizeable amount of low-skill and semi-skilled jobs in the 
social sector and in personal services. The Bismarckian policy challenge 
is how to mitigate the emergence of new forms of labor market segmenta-
tion through what could be called ‘preventive employability’, combining 
increases in flexibility in labor relations by way of relaxing dismissal pro-
tection, while generating a higher level of security for employees in flex-
ible jobs. Flexible working conditions are often part and parcel of family-
friendly employment policy provisions. There is a clear relation between 
the ratio of part-time jobs and female employment growth. But the ability 
of part-time employment to harmonize careers with family depends very 
much on employment regulation, whether part-time work is recognized 
as a regular job with basic social insurance participation, and whether it 
offers possibilities for career mobility.
Active Family Investment Strategy
The revolution in women ’s roles remains incomplete, raising new wel-
fare problems that need to be addressed. Depressed female participation 
widens the gender gap and constrains economic growth. Moreover, also 
fertility hinges on effective gender equality. Generous parental leave, em-
ployment security, and, especially, high quality childcare , in turn, posi-
tively affect long-term productivity through higher fertility, higher female 
earnings, more tax revenue and better skills on the part of future genera-
tions, thus significantly mitigating the adverse effects of population age-
ing. The Bismarckian welfare states still have to adjust to the feminization 
of post-industrial labor markets. As inequalities widen, parents’ ability to 
invest in their children’s success is also becoming more unequal. Since life 
chances are so strongly determined by what happens in childhood, a com-
prehensive child investment strategy is imperative. Inaccessible childcare 
will provoke low fertility, low quality care is harmful to children, and low 
female employment raises child poverty . Increasing opportunities for 
women to be gainfully employed is a key step. But the concept of early 
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childhood development needs to go beyond the idea that childcare is nec-
essary to allow parents to reconcile work and family life. Early childhood 
development is imperative to ensure that children will be lifelong learners 
and meaningful contributors to their societies.
Lifelong Human Capital Investment Push
In the new, knowledge-based economies, there is an urgent need to invest 
in human capital throughout the life of the individual. Youth with poor 
skills or inadequate schooling today will become tomorrow’s precarious 
worker. Considering the looming demographic imbalances in Europe, 
we cannot afford large skill deficits and high school dropout rates, es-
pecially in the southern Continental welfare states (above 30 percent in 
Spain , almost 25 percent in the Netherlands and less than 15 percent in 
Denmark or Sweden ). Strong social inheritance is not affordable in the 
long run. The architecture of education systems makes a real difference. 
High inequality and high educational differentiation reinforce cogni-
tive poverty , early stratification, and social segregation. Social and em-
ployment policies that are aimed at increasing skills and developing the 
quality of human resources act as ‘productive factors’ in our economies. 
The revitalization of both the Irish and the Finnish economy is in part 
based on increased investments in education, preventing early depar-
ture from formal education and training, and facilitating the transition 
from school to work, in particular school leavers with low qualifications. 
Here the majority of Bismarckian welfare states continue to lag behind 
significantly.
Later and More Flexible Retirement 
As life expectancy increases and health indices improve, it will be neces-
sary to keep older workers in the market for longer. Sustainable pensions 
will be difficult to achieve unless we increase employment rates of older 
workers and raise the retirement age to at least 67 years. Two trends jus-
tify an adjustment in our thinking about retirement : a) the health status of 
each elderly cohort is better than that of the last; at present a man aged 65 
can look forward to a further 10 healthy years. And, b) the gap between old 
age and education is rapidly narrowing, so that older people in the future 
will be much better placed than now to adapt in the coming decades with 
the aid of retraining and lifelong learning . The education gap between 
the old and the young will begin to disappear when the baby-boomers 
approach retirement . Beyond the development of multi-pillar, including 
both PAYG (pay-as-you-go) and funded schemes, in the area of pension 
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policy, the challenge lies in how to allocate the additional expenditures 
that inevitably accompany population ageing (Myles 2002). Of crucial im-
portance remains a general, revenue financed, first tier pension guaran-
tee with a price index guarantee for the next generation of flexible labor 
market cohorts. Sustainable pensions will be difficult to achieve unless 
we raise employment rates of older workers and raise the retirement age 
to at least 67 years. Delaying retirement is both effective and equitable. It 
is efficient because it operates simultaneously on the nominator and de-
nominator: more revenue intake and less spending at the same time. It is 
intergenerationally equitable because retirees and workers both sacrifice 
in equal proportions. We are all getting healthier and more educated with 
each age cohort. Flexible retirement and the introduction of incentives to 
postpone retirement could greatly alleviate the pension burden. Although 
there has been a slight increase of part-time work among the elderly , it has 
been shown that part-time work and participation rates among older peo-
ple are positively related; there is still little systematic and comprehensive 
policy activity to enhance the variable opportunity set for older workers. 
If older workers remain employed ten years longer than is now typically 
the norm, household incomes will increase substantially. This means less 
poverty and need for social assistance as well as greater tax revenue.
Migration and Integration through Participation
Priority should be given to problems of participation and integration of 
migrant groups, whose rates of unemployment in the EU are, on average, 
twice that of nationals. Integration and immigration policy should have a 
central place in our discussion about the future of the Continental welfare 
state, something we failed to do in the past. In Europe’s ethnically and 
culturally diverse societies, the welfare state faces a major challenge in 
ensuring that immigrants and their children do not fall behind. Economic 
exclusion and physical concentration (ghettoization) reinforces educa-
tional underperformance, excessive segregation and self-destructive spi-
rals of marginalization.
Minimum Income Support
We cannot assume that the measures described above will remedy cur-
rent and future welfare deficiencies. Hence, it is impossible to avoid some 
form of passive minimum income support. An unchecked rise in income 
inequality would worsen citizens’ life chances and opportunities, result in 
lost productivity and more passive income support costs. It is therefore 
necessary to have an even more tightly woven safety net below the estab-
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lished welfare state for the truly needy to meet minimum standards of 
self-reliance. The key lesson of the Great Depression of the 1930s eventu-
ally ushered in Keynesian demand-side policies and, after the devastating 
World War II, firmly established the need for some sort of safety net in 
every major industrial democracy. This lesson to match social promotion 
with social protection continues to stand tall.
12.5 Conclusion
Over the last decade, the Bismarckian countries have improved quite 
significantly in terms of labor market performance. From our point of 
view, we interpret this not as the cyclical effect of a positive business en-
vironment, but as the result of a sequence of reforms leading to a more 
employment-friendly institutional arrangement. However, with hindsight 
one can argue that the dynamic economic activity in the EU over the last 
years has certainly contributed to this positive judgment, having led to 
increased employment and declining unemployment . The situation will 
certainly change with the impact of the current global economic crisis 
on European labor markets. We can expect that some of the increase in 
employment/population ratios over the last years will be lost and some 
severe labor market problems may (re)emerge within the next years. So 
far, core parts of the labor market are still remarkably stable, but flexible 
jobs such as agency work or fixed-term contracts are more heavily hit so 
that we see a dualized reaction of labor markets in Bismarckian countries.
However, to the extent that policy-makers in Bismarckian countries 
do not fall back into policies aiming at reducing labor supply, but fol-
low the lines we defined as elements of a future-oriented policy package 
combining work and welfare, we can assume that we will not see a struc-
tural and persistent employment crisis like that of the late 1970s and the 
1980s. Currently, there is some tendency to expand cushioning policies 
such as short-time work allowances. Emergency action of this kind may 
help bridge a severe, but short, crisis and help stabilize employment and 
skilled labor in core sectors of the economy. However, the longer the crisis 
lasts, the more policy-makers will have to reject the temptation to rely on 
a social policy approach towards unemployment , such as the withdrawal 
of activation policies or the reintroduction of implicit or explicit early 
retirement . Social policies of this kind may appear as an attractive ‘soft’ 
solution in the short run, but will eventually result in a reemergence of the 
‘welfare without work ’ syndrome, increase financial pressure on the wel-
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fare state in a phase of demographic ageing and reduce resources available 
for future-oriented, investive policies. Hence, it remains to be seen if and 
to what extent the Bismarckian countries have learned the lessons from 
the past and, facing an unprecedented crisis, not only refrain from old, 
but wrong recipes, and take the crisis as a trigger to implement further 
employment-friendly policies.
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13 The Long Conservative Corporatist Road to 
 Welfare Reforms
Bruno Palier
13.1 Introduction
This final chapter provides a cross-cutting reading of the earlier contri-
butions in an attempt to account for the common characteristics of the 
Bismarckian welfare reform trajectory . It will not concentrate on the de-
tailed contents of each reform1, or on the differences between them, these 
having been exhaustively detailed in the national chapters that make up 
the main part of this volume. Instead, this chapter will focus on the speci-
ficities of each phase of the common reform trajectory , with a particular 
emphasis on the diagnoses, the politics and the consequences of the re-
forms adopted. The aim is to give a general answer to the question: ‘how 
did Bismarckian welfare systems change’?
Variations across countries and policy fields notwithstanding, it is pos-
sible to discern four main stages in this sequential process of change:
1) The first reaction to the crisis consisted mainly of raising social con-
tributions to rebalance the accounts of social insurance schemes, 
destabilized by increasing unemployment and slow growth. The key 
focus was to save the economic and social model based on the highly 
skilled , highly paid, and highly productive sectors and workers. This 
was done by preserving (and protecting) the jobs and social protec-
tion of the most productive male breadwinners , and by removing the 
least productive workers from the core labor market. Social insur-
ances were highly instrumental in the implementation of this strategy. 
This first phase happened ‘before retrenchment ’ and involved a ‘labor 
shedding ’ strategy, an increase in social contributions and some mod-
erate ‘consolidation’ measures.
2) However, these policies had the consequence of decreasing overall 
employment rates and increasing labor costs through the continuous 
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increase in social contributions , as fewer people working had to pay 
more and more to preserve their social protection and to provide 
the growing number of inactive people with income. This trend ap-
peared to be in considerable tension with the new economic context 
of the early 1990s, when the single market was implemented (1992) 
and preparation for the single currency was underway. Hence a sec-
ond phase of the reforms trajectory can be identified, with a lot of 
decisions aimed at stabilizing if not retrenching social expenditure. 
Aimed at ‘saving the welfare system’, retrenchment was usually ne-
gotiated with the social partners , guaranteeing relatively low costs 
for current ‘insiders ’ (long phasing in of pension reforms, partial 
recalibration of unemployment insurance benefits, targeting of ac-
tivation measures to the outsiders) and introducing a new world of 
welfare through the development of tax-financed , non-contributory 
benefits.
3) The political difficulties raised by these attempts at retrenchment – 
the mid-1990s saw strong political opposition to these measures – as 
well as their relative failure – social expenditure continued to increase 
and unemployment to be high – led governments to realize gradu-
ally that the institutional setting of the system itself had become a 
problem. They thus developed more and more ‘institutional reforms ’, 
aimed at transforming the very basis of the welfare system: changes 
in the financing mechanisms (towards fewer social contributions and 
more taxes ) as well as in the governance arrangements (weakening 
of the social partners , privatization or ‘étatisation’). These changes 
undermined the traditional supports of the Bismarckian welfare sys-
tems, thus allowing for the more structural changes that occurred 
from the early 2000s.
4) The last phase consists of paradigmatic changes, since the objectives 
and instruments of the reforms are quite different from what was the 
traditional reaction of Bismarckian systems to the social problems. Re-
forms here include the introduction of funded schemes in the pension 
system, the activation of the inactive population, including mothers 
(even lone mothers ) and thus defamilializing care, the development of 
basic safety nets, and the extension of privatization and the introduc-
tion of competition in health insurance . These structural changes en-
tail a shift away from the typical answers to the difficulties elaborated 
within the traditional Bismarckian welfare regime in the 1970s and 
1980s, that is, the ‘labor shedding strategy’ and its associated ‘welfare 
without work ’ trap. This has also meant a structural transformation 
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of the Bismarckian welfare systems themselves, at least in respect to 
their capacity to provide coverage to all, solid income guarantees and 
comprehensive protection against all social risks. These changes are 
institutionalizing dualisms both in the labor market and in social pro-
tection.
In the next section of this chapter, I detail more fully the main common 
characteristics of each of these four sequences. The account tries to draw 
out the main features of the reform trajectory followed by all Bismarck-
ian welfare systems, and is inevitably a generalization that underplays the 
many differences between the country cases. Its aim is to provide an al-
ternative both to the ‘frozen landscape’ interpretation of welfare develop-
ment in Continental Europe, and to the notion that reforms there have 
simply arisen erratically and unpredictably, in the context of contingent – 
and perhaps transient – nationally-specific circumstances.2 The reality is 
instead that Bismarckian welfare systems have in large measure followed 
a similar road to reform, partly shaped by their institutional design and 
by the feedback effects that each sequence of reforms engendered for the 
following one.
After having shown the common characteristics of the Bismarckian 
welfare reform trajectory , I will propose a general interpretation of the 
overall trajectory. I will then assess the main changes in goals and insti-
tutions that it entailed for the Bismarckian welfare systems. The chapter 
concludes by discussing the overall economic and social outcomes of the 
reforms analyzed in this volume.
13.2 How did Continental European Welfare System Change? The 
Commonalities of the Typical Bismarckian Reform Trajectory 
In what follows, the comparative grid that was developed for the analy-
sis of the national cases is used to draw out common elements of the 
context, diagnosis, content of policies, types of change and the politics 
that characterized each sequence in the reform trajectory, as well as 
the consequences of each sequence for the next one (see tables 13.1 to 
13.4).
 THE LONG CONSERVATIVE CORPORATIST ROAD TO WELFARE REFORMS
Before Retrenchment (from the Mid-1970s to the Mid- to Late 1980s)
Context
From the mid-1970s, social protection systems in affluent democracies 
were exposed to new socio-economic challenges: increasing capital mo-
bility, intensified competition between economies, deindustrialization, 
mass and structural unemployment , population ageing and rising female 
labor market participation .3 This new context translated into relatively 
different problems in the different welfare regimes, however, since their 
institutional arrangements acted as filters (Scharpf and Schmidt 2000; 
Sykes, Palier and Prior 2001).
In Continental Europe, the main problems created by the oil shocks 
and the ensuing economic slowdown were unemployment and deficits 
in the social insurance funds . Unemployment has a very direct ‘scissor 
effect’ on social insurance budgets, through a reduction in their incomes 
(based on social contributions levied on wages) and additional spending 
as more people come to depend on benefits (whether unemployment ben-
efits, invalidity allowances, or early retirement pensions). The financial 
consequences of an economic downturn for the social insurance schemes 
are all the more visible given that social insurances budgets are separate 
from state budgets.
Table 13.1 Characteristics of the fi rst reactions to the crisis
Context Diagnosis Content of the policy
– Economic downturn
– Rise in unemployment 
– Social budget defi cits
– Social benefi ts can help the 
victims of the crisis
– Increase in social 
contributions 
– Changes in the generosity of 
the benefi ts
– ‘Smooth consolidation’
– Labor shedding
– Welfare without work
Type of change Politics of the reforms Consequences
– First order 
(mainly changes in the level 
of social contributions and 
a few changes in the level of 
benefi ts)
– Applying ‘good old recipes’
– Consensual decisions 
(between the state and the 
social partners )
– It is easier to raise social 
contributions than to increase 
taxes or to cut social benefi ts
– No big changes of the 
welfare state, ‘frozen 
landscape’
– Increasing ineffi  ciencies 
of such policies (low rate 
of employment, high labor 
cost, rise in unemployment , 
stagfl ation)
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Diagnosis: Social Insurances should Help the Victims of the Crisis
Though neoliberal politicians were about to sweep to power in the UK 
(1979) and in the US (1981) on a platform of welfare state retrenchment 
(Pierson 1994), in Continental Europe none of the main political actors 
criticized welfare systems for being too costly or in some way at the ori-
gins of the crisis. On the contrary, social insurance (particularly unem-
ployment benefits, invalidity allowances and early exit pensions) were 
seen as key instruments to help individuals to cope in these dire times, 
and to support the main economic strategy initially chosen to face the 
crisis, namely reflation policies and labor shedding . The deficits in the 
social insurance funds of course appeared to be a huge problem, but it 
was a problem that was to be solved either by further increasing social 
contributions and/or through some limitations in spending in the form of 
‘consolidation measures’. These measures aimed at guaranteeing the sol-
vency of social insurance funds , in order to preserve them and guarantee 
their medium-term viability.
For most of the Continental European countries, what was really at 
stake was to save their (industrial) economic and social system. Dein-
dustrialization particularly hit old industrial countries (or regions) like 
Germany , France , Belgium , Northern Italy and Austria . Confronted with 
an increase in international competition, especially in manufacturing, 
governments in most Continental countries wanted neither to give up 
on industry in favor of high and low-skill services (the option that, in 
essence, the UK government adopted), nor to promote and invest in in-
novation and new industries (as in California or the Nordic countries); 
instead they decided to defend and preserve as much as possible their 
traditional industries through productivity increases levered by laying 
off older and less productive workers, and the outsourcing of many activ-
ities (mainly low-skilled services) that had previously provided relatively 
well paid and protected jobs within industrial firms themselves (Palier 
and Thelen 2010). In order to support this strategy, unemployment in-
surances, invalidity allowances and early retirement pensions should be 
used to provide income to the people ‘removed’ from the main economic 
circuits.
Main Policies
Both governments and the social partners agreed upon an apparently 
contradictory mixture of both expansions and limitations of social ben-
efits. In fact, income maintenance benefits for redundant workers were 
expanded, while other types of benefits were limited. There were some 
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cuts in health care provision, family benefits, and in assistance benefits. 
In unemployment insurance, reforms effected a ‘reactionary recalibra-
tion ’ (Clegg 2007), increasing benefits for the core workers with long con-
tribution records, and reducing them for the long-term unemployed and 
those whose contributory record was low or non-existent (young people, 
the marginally employed, those who had been outside the labor market).
Two contrasting solutions were adopted in the face of deficits in the 
social insurance funds ; either social contributions were increased (and 
some costs contained) to restore financial balance, or the deficits were 
simply allowed to build up. As Manow argues in his chapter in this vol-
ume, the solution chosen in this respect was highly dependent on the sta-
tus and policy of the central bank. Where it was independent and thus not 
accommodating (as in the case of Germany , the Netherlands , Switzerland 
and to a lesser extent Austria ) then consolidation measures were adopted; 
where it was less autonomous and more accommodating (as in the case of 
Italy , Belgium , Spain or France before the mid-1990s), social deficits and 
public debt increased.
The strategies pursued up to the early 1990s were closely linked to 
the social protection model based on the ‘family wage’: the man is the 
source of income for the entire household, from his wages and transfers, 
and hence it is the income and social protection of this man that should 
be protected first and foremost. Continental European countries thus 
favored income guarantees, early retirement and reductions in working 
hours in order to maintain the salaries and job security of highly skilled , 
highly productive, permanent (male ) workers. Businesses themselves at 
first privileged a strategy based on high salaries and high quality produc-
tion, both of which benefited permanent and highly qualified workers at 
the expense of less qualified or unqualified workers. Workforce reduc-
tions were often negotiated on the basis of income guarantees and early 
retirement , in the hope that the cost of massive retirement could be off-
set by proportionate gains in productivity (Kohli et al. 1991). These coun-
tries sought thus to resolve their employment problem by decreasing the 
supply of work through the implementation of a ‘labor shedding ’ strat-
egy, which led to what Esping-Andersen (1996a) called a ‘welfare without 
work ’ syndrome. This strategy was supported by the social protection 
system, which on the one hand provided significant subsidies for early-
retirement arrangements and maintained a high level of unemployment 
compensation, and on the other started to (re)create a variety of social 
security benefits designed to guarantee minimal incomes for individuals 
outside the labor force.
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Politics
As is underlined in all country chapters, this first reaction was extremely 
consensual: all the main actors (among them the social partners , where 
unions and employers from the manufacturing industry were dominant 
– see Ebbinghaus and Visser 2000) agreed that the best way to respond 
to the crisis was to protect the jobs and social protection of the most 
productive employees, and to remove the least productive ones (who 
were not well represented anyway in the political and social systems of 
Continental Europe, see Häusermann 2010b). This strategy of course 
had a price – numerous and generous allowances had to be financed – 
but apparently almost everybody was ready to pay this, especially since 
it was not the state budget and therefore the taxpayers who would have 
to shoulder this burden, but instead the social insurance schemes and 
social contributions . Indeed, an often neglected but crucial feature of 
the Bismarckian welfare reform trajectory is that it was social insurances 
that had to foot the bill for the labor shedding strategy. ‘Loading’ the 
social insurances system in this way was a low-risk political strategy for 
governments in the short term, as they had neither to impose cuts nor 
to increase taxes . They could thus claim credit for helping the victims 
of the crisis, while justifying increases in social contribution rates as 
necessary to guarantee the viability of highly popular social insurance 
schemes.
In Continental Europe, therefore, governments long preferred to in-
crease social contributions than to cut social benefits. This is rather 
counter-intuitive from an Anglo-Saxon (and even a Scandinavian ) point 
of view, where cutting benefits will always be less politically risky than 
raising taxes . The explanation lies in differences in the type of benefits 
and in the way that they are financed. In Bismarckian countries, since 
benefits are mainly contributory , people believe that they have ‘bought’ 
their own social benefits through the social contributions they pay or 
have paid in work. Where Reagan , Thatcher or Major could denounce 
the excessive weight of taxes and the unwarranted cost of the social 
benefits delivered to those who ‘do nothing’, it was much more difficult 
for Continental European politicians to attack social insurance rights 
acquired by all the working population through the payment of social 
contributions . People are simply not ready to accept a reduction in pro-
vision for which they have – as they see it – worked and paid. On the 
contrary, they are ready to pay even more, as long as this guarantees a 
high level of benefit.
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Consequences
Th ese reforms seem at ﬁ rst glance not to have changed anything in the Con-
tinental welfare systems (hence the typical ‘frozen landscape’ assessment). 
By using the available instruments (social insurance beneﬁ ts) to confront 
the crisis, the ﬁ rst reactions to the crisis actually changed the settings of 
these instruments, thus meaning a ﬁ rst-order change . However, over time, 
these changes had problematic consequences. Th ree eﬀ ects of these poli-
cies appeared particularly harmful: low levels of employment, a dualization 
of the labor market and an explosion of social contribution rates.
Over time, the labor shedding strategy resulted in very low overall levels 
of employment. While in the 1990s the rate of male labor force participa-
tion was comparable to that of the Nordic countries (between 75 percent 
and 80 percent), the rate for persons between 55 and 64 years of age was 
far lower: in 1992, only 22.2 percent in Belgium , 36.2 percent in Germany , 
29.8 percent in France and 28.7 percent in the Netherlands (Eurostat em-
ployment data series). An ever smaller group of people were working and 
had to pay more and more to support the inactive population.
Moreover, the focus on protecting the most productive core workers 
and the outsourcing of non-central less productive services, all led to a 
high degree of labor market polarization between a well integrated seg-
ment (skilled males between 25 and 55 years of age) and a marginalized or 
excluded one (poorly skilled or unskilled workers, youth , women , workers 
over 55 years of age and migrants) (Esping-Andersen, 1996). More and 
more, specific new social protection measures appeared necessary for this 
growing segment of the population. Assistance schemes offering a ba-
sic minimum income were either reinvigorated or put in place, and once 
again it was the shrinking active population that had to pay for them.
Because ever more benefits had to be financed, the volume of social 
contributions kept increasing. In Austria , Belgium , France , Germany , 
the Netherlands and Italy , the share of social insurance contributions in 
GDP went up from 12 percent to above 16 percent between 1970 and 1985 
(Manow, this volume). Because fewer people were working and each one 
thus had to pay higher social contribution rates, during this period the 
‘non-wage costs’ of employment (i.e. employers and employees’ social 
contribution) increased markedly, going beyond half of the total labor 
cost in many Continental European countries.
At the beginning of the 1990s, this strategy appeared increasingly unsuc-
cessful, and moreover, in contradiction with the main policy orientations be-
ing ever more strongly aﬃ  rmed at the European level. It was in this context that 
the ﬁ rst negotiated retrenchments started to appear in Continental Europe.
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The First Wave of Retrenchment , in the Early 1990s
Context
After some years of economic recovery in the late 1980s, the new eco-
nomic downturn of the early 1990s (and the recession of 1992/1993) 
brought forth the same problems as had been experienced in the late 
1970s and early 1980s: rising unemployment , social budget deficits and, 
for most countries, public indebtedness. This time, however, the prob-
lems were aggravated by the effects of the previous path of action, no-
tably the labor shedding strategy. This strategy had the consequence of 
reducing the overall employment rate and increasing labor cost: once 
again, the smaller number of people still working had to pay more and 
more to preserve their social protection and to provide support to the 
inactive.
Th ese trends were in direct conﬂ ict with the new European context of 
the early 1990s, when the single market was implemented (1992) and the 
single currency was being prepared (Maastricht criteria adopted in 1993). As 
Scharpf has demonstrated, European integration seriously limited the policy 
instruments available to governments. ‘Th e Maastricht criteria for joining the 
Monetary Union have practically eliminated deﬁ cit spending as a policy tool; 
Table 13.2 Characteristics of the fi rst retrenchments
Context Diagnosis Content of the policy
– Persisting debt and 
unemployment 
– Single market
– Economic recession (early 
1990s)
– Preparation of the single 
currency
– German unifi cation
– Social insurance schemes 
are victims of the crisis
– The level of social 
contributions is too high
– Social expenditure needs to 
be limited in order to save the 
system
– Increase in the contributivity 
of social insurance benefi ts
– Tax fi nancing of non-
contributory benefi ts
Type of change Politics of the reforms Consequences
– Second order 
(new instruments such as new 
modes of calculation, new 
income-tested benefi ts)
– Mobilization against 
retrenchment
– No reform can be passed 
without negotiation
– Negotiated on the bases 
of clarifi cation between 
insurance and assistance/
solidarity
– From social to more 
individual insurance
– Seeds of dualization in 
welfare: social insurances are 
not universal anymore
– Political learning : social 
partners can prevent 
profound reforms
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and the realization of the Monetary Union has completely removed monetary 
policy and exchange rate policy from the control of its member states’ (Scharpf 
2002: 88).
In France , Italy , Spain , Belgium , in accessing countries like Austria 
and later the Visegrad countries (see respective chapters), these ‘Euro-
pean constraints’ were crucial in halting the traditional social policy re-
sponse to economic and social difficulties. Even for countries for whom 
the Maastricht criteria were not so novel, like Germany and other coun-
tries attached to the Deutschmark, the fact that they had previously also 
increased levels of social contributions (in the name of consolidation and, 
in the German case, to finance unification) generated problems in the 
context of globalization and single European market. As all the country 
chapters underline, what triggered a reversal in the reforms from expand-
ing social benefits to support industrial restructuring and buffer the main 
consequences of the crisis towards a growing emphasis on cost control 
was the perception that the level of social contributions was growing to 
economically unsustainable levels.
Diagnosis: As a Victim of the Crisis, the System should be Rescued
In the early 1990s, the continuing problems of unemployment , slow 
growth and public deficits resulted in the previous ways of solving prob-
lems being increasingly questioned, and many Continental European 
countries began to perceive themselves as being ‘sick’ economies. Though 
the symptoms varied across countries (the ‘Dutch disease’ of inactivity , 
soaring deficits and inflation in Italy , huge public debt in Belgium , mass 
unemployment in many countries...), the diagnosis was everywhere much 
the same: Continental Europe suffers from excessive labor costs, due to 
the high level of social contributions (Scharpf and Schmidt 2000; Daly, 
2001). As also underlined by Manow in this volume, the 1990s public de-
bate in Continental Europe identified high non-wage labor costs as the 
most detrimental factor inhibiting employment growth (especially in the 
low-skilled service sector) and competitiveness.
What is however striking in the discourses justifying most of the re-
forms of this period is that, even if the level of social contributions was 
criticized, the system of social insurance as a whole remained unscathed. 
Indeed, it was most often presented as itself being a victim of the continu-
ing crisis, with unemployment and slow growth increasing deficits and 
starving the system of resources. When governments presented reform 
proposals during the 1990s, the announced goal was very often to ‘save the 
system’, even if the means to this end was retrenchment.
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What changed, though, were the instruments that were used in re-
forms. This was a result of the delegitimization of previous ways of doing 
things, such as increasing social contribution levels or debt to avoid re-
trenchment. A combination of greater awareness of globalization and the 
advent of Maastricht both undermined these previous alternatives, and 
policies were reoriented towards retrenchment. In order for the economy 
to remain competitive, governments thought that they had to limit the 
increase in social contributions . In order to respect Maastricht criteria, 
they needed to control public debt. In order to save the social insurance 
system, that is to avoid their financial bankruptcy, these schemes would 
have to spend less, or at least the growth in their expenditure would have 
to be controlled.
Main Policies
These reforms were aimed at reducing levels of social benefits while si-
multaneously preserving the logic of the system (second-order changes ). 
The Bismarckian logic was in fact at the heart of the reforms, since these 
generally reinforced the ‘equivalence principle’ (the contributivity of ben-
efits) and since they also removed from social insurances the ‘burden’ of 
having to finance non-contributory benefits.
Whether in old-age pensions, unemployment benefits or invalidity 
allowances, in all our cases the main technique for reducing social in-
surances benefits was a strengthening of the link between the amount 
and duration of contribution and the volume and duration of benefits 
(through a change in the calculation formula and or stricter entitlement 
rules). This of course relied on the already existing logic of the schemes 
(their contributivity, i.e. the right to social benefits derives from paying 
social contributions ), even though these reforms usually meant a shift 
away from redistributive (horizontal and vertical) towards more actuarial 
principles. Typically, unemployed (or invalid) people now needed to have 
contributed during a longer period to be entitled to the full allowance; the 
number of years for being entitled to a full pension was also increased, 
and/or deductions for pensions claimed before the standard age of retire-
ment were introduced. Benefits were thus reduced mainly for those who 
could not have a relatively unbroken and fulltime career, but preserved for 
the more ‘typical’ workers. In order to relieve social insurances deficits, 
decisions were also made to remove the financing of ‘non contributory 
benefits’ from the social insurance budget.
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Politics
A first noticeable conclusion of the comparison of retrenchment poli-
cies in Continental Europe is that partisan politics did not really matter. 
Both Social Democratic and Conservative governments, as well as coali-
tions, implemented these same types of policy. Reforms seemed more 
driven by the EU constraints, and/or the worries about the level of so-
cial contributions , than by partisan dynamics. There has of course been 
political controversy, but comparisons show that different governments 
have implemented quite similar policies.4 The real conflicts were more 
frequently between governments, on the one hand, and trade unions , on 
the other.
In all our cases, the retrenchment reforms were not presented as a 
means to dismantling the social insurance system, but rather as a strat-
egy for preserving it. In the political discourses justifying reforms, the 
message is that if a reform is necessary it is not because the system is 
dysfunctional, but simply because it suffers from the current situation, 
where resources are decreasing (because of economic slow down, unem-
ployment ) and spending increasing (because of unemployment , aging, 
new social demands). Since it appears to be no longer possible in the new 
European context to further increase resources, governments are forced 
to retrench, a little. Since the benefits to be retrenched are extremely 
legitimate, these reforms are not enacted in response to criticisms of 
welfare redistribution, but rather in the name of the crucial necessity to 
restore its viability.
Despite this cautious rhetoric, that once again contrasts particularly 
with the accusatory tones in which retrenchment is framed in the Anglo-
Saxon world5, reform projects in the early 1990s often triggered consider-
able opposition, and had to be negotiated with the social partners to gain 
acceptance. Since the systems are financed through social contributions 
levied on wages and not through taxation , and since in many cases they 
participate in the management of social insurance funds , the representa-
tives of those who contribute to and benefit from the systems (i.e. the 
wage earners) were among the key players in the political game around 
social policy reform. Insurance-based transfers are well defended by orga-
nized interests and in particular by trade unions of the different branches 
corresponding to the different professional schemes. They had a say in the 
process, and the power to block proposals with which they did not agree. 
Acceptance by the social partners of benefit cuts was thus usually levered 
as a quid pro quo (Bonoli and Palier 1996; Bonoli 1997), linked to adjust-
ments in financing formulas.
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As we have seen, during the preceding period, the cost of new social 
expenditure aimed at buﬀ ering the consequences of the crisis, and the cost 
of labor shedding , was supported by the social insurance schemes, and in 
Germany social insurances were ﬁ nancing partly the cost of uniﬁ cation. 
Th e social partners long complained about this, claiming that much of the 
new burden weighting on social insurance was not justiﬁ ed (since it was 
paying beneﬁ ts without receiving corresponding contribution). According 
to them, the cost of the non-contributory beneﬁ ts explained much of the 
ﬁ nancial diﬃ  culties facing the social insurance system. In almost all Con-
tinental countries, the social partners asked the state to take on more re-
sponsibilities and to ﬁ nance non-contributory beneﬁ ts out of taxes . Th us, 
in Germany the social partners claimed that ‘the beneﬁ t components not 
based on contributions out of own earnings (versicherungsfremde Leistun-
gen) should not be borne by the community of insured’ (Hinrichs, this vol-
ume)6; in France , the fact that social insurance schemes had to pay beneﬁ ts 
for people who exhausted their contributory rights or had paid insuﬃ  cient 
contributions was called ‘undue charges’ (‘charges indues’), and social part-
ners continuously demanded that the state take over their ﬁ nancing (Palier 
2005a and this volume); in Spain , ‘the recommendations of the Toledo Pact 
included the split of ﬁ nancing sources, so that contributory beneﬁ ts were to 
be ﬁ nanced out of social contributions and taxes were to be used to ﬁ nance 
non-contributory transfers and welfare services’ (Guillén, this volume).
Many reforms that passed were those which were accompanied by such 
a ‘clarification of responsibility’, with the government offering to take over 
the financing of non-contributory benefits (flat-rate social minima for the 
elderly , the handicapped, the long-term unemployed; credit of contribu-
tion for period out of work because of unemployment , child rearing...) 
in return for the acceptance by the social partners of cost containment 
measures in social insurance benefits.7 In the eyes of the social partners , 
such reforms guaranteed the financial viability of social insurances, and 
secured their future.
Consequences
Though they helped the Continental countries balance their social insur-
ance budgets, and hence to qualify for the EMU in 1998/9, these measures 
were not able to resolve the problem of unemployment and low employ-
ment rates, which were still acute at the end of the 1990s (see Hemerijck 
and Eichhorst, this volume).
In this phase of reforms, the changes are based on new instruments 
(changes in calculation rules, creation of new State subsidies...), but are 
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perceived as preserving the very nature of social insurance, and sometimes 
even as re-enforcing it (the social partners often think that making the state 
pay for non-contributory beneﬁ ts helps to ‘purify’ and thus reinforce social 
insurance). Th e reforms do not really challenge the principles of social in-
surance and can be considered to be second-order changes .
What they did change, however, is the capacity of social insurance 
schemes to be ‘quasi-universal ’, as they were supposed to be since the 
1960s-1970s (see first chapter). By reducing the replacement rates in 
unemployment benefits or pensions, they no longer ensure ‘full income 
guarantees’. By removing more and more people (with atypical profiles) 
from social insurance, they no longer cover the whole population. Since 
one consequence of these reforms is that the coverage of social insurance 
shrinks (fewer people covered, less generous benefits), more and more 
space is created for the development of new benefits, on top of compul-
sory social insurance (voluntary private pensions , for instance), or below 
it, for those who have lost (or never gained) rights to social insurance (as-
sistance benefits).
As a result of the way they were negotiated, these reforms also sowed 
further seeds of dualization . In order to ‘relieve’ social insurance from 
covering the long-term unemployed and non-standard workers, reforms 
have institutionalized a new world of welfare for ‘atypical’ workers, or-
ganized around tax-financed , non-contributory , and income-tested ben-
efits. Furthermore, in the negotiations of the retrenchment measures, 
the trade unions managed to guarantee the position of current ‘insiders ’, 
through a long phasing-in period for reforms in pension rights (Bonoli 
and Palier 2007), and a dual recalibration of unemployment insurance 
benefits, with greater benefits for those who previously worked fulltime 
and less for those with more broken careers (Clegg 2007).
Moreover, these reforms progressively underscored some structur-
al problems linked with Bismarckian social insurances, but which have 
never been really ‘problematized’ all together before: they are unable 
(and unwilling) to cover those who cannot fully contribute to the system 
(the socially excluded, precarious workers and those with atypical em-
ployment profiles); their main source of financing (social contributions ) 
seems to hinder job creation and competitiveness; and their traditional 
‘spokesmen’ (the social partners , and especially unions ) are able to block 
important reforms. From victim, the welfare systems gradually came to be 
seen as a major cause of the economic and social difficulties of Continen-
tal European countries, ushering in a phase of (incremental ) institutional 
reforms that would set the scene for deeper structural reforms.
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Institutional Reforms (Partly Parallel to First Retrenchment , and beyond, 
1990s and 2000s)
Context
The first retrenchment initiatives were extremely difficult to implement, 
triggering widespread discontent and having to be frequently watered 
down to gain acceptance. The political difficulties they caused and their 
relative failure in terms of outcomes (social expenditure continued to in-
crease and unemployment remained obstinately high in most countries) 
taught governments the lesson that the institutional design of the systems 
had itself become a problem.
Two main institutional characteristics of Bismarckian welfare systems 
have been of crucial importance in shaping problems and solutions: fi-
nancing through social contributions and the (formal and/or informal) in-
Table 13.3 Characteristics of the institutional reforms 
Context Diagnosis Content of the policies
– Past reforms are still 
unable to solve the 
unemployment and fi nancial 
problems;
– Institutional and political 
learning ;
– Academic literature and 
international criticism of 
‘Conservative corporatist ’ 
stalemate
– Welfare systems are partly 
the cause of the crisis:
– Contributions damage 
competitiveness and create 
unemployment ;
– Corporatist management 
rules hinder reform capacities
– New modes of fi nancing, 
new taxes , lower social 
contributions 
– New modes of management 
(empowerment of the state, 
new public agencies, or an 
increasing role for private 
actors)
Type of change Politics Consequences
Institutional change:
– Non-Bismarckian institutions 
are introduced, and traditional 
ones are incrementally 
transformed: diminishing 
of the share of social 
contributions ; new taxes ; new 
decision-making practices 
and/or new governance 
arrangements, weakening the 
traditional ‘social partners ’, 
new role for the state and/or 
private actors
– Mostly consensual for shifts 
in fi nancing, much more 
confl ictual for changes in 
governance
– New provisions and new 
institutions are implemented 
at a marginal point in the 
system
– Then they develop so as 
to change the politics of the 
system (weakening the unions 
especially)
– Weakening of traditional 
social insurance mechanisms 
and actors
– Development of stronger 
and new state capacities
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volvement of the social partners in the governance of the systems. These 
two institutional traits strongly differentiate Bismarckian social protec-
tion systems from statist or market ones. They seem to have generated 
many of the economic and political problems faced by welfare systems 
in Continental Europe. The high level of social contributions appeared 
detrimental from an economic point of view, but also had political conse-
quences, since this mode of financing highlighted the link of Bismarckian 
social protection to the realm of employment and work and thus to the 
representatives of this world, who claimed to have a say in the reforms.8 
The social partners , and especially the unions , have often been able to 
block reforms.
Gradually realizing how much these institutional traits were at the root 
of their difficulties in carrying through the reforms they sought to imple-
ment, governments concentrated more and more on institutional ‘me-
ta-policy reforms’ (Clegg 2007), aimed at transforming the very bases of 
these welfare systems. Changes in financing mechanisms (towards fewer 
social contributions and more taxes ) as well as in governance arrange-
ments (weakening of the social partners , privatization or ‘étatisation’) 
thus came onto the political agenda.
Diagnosis: From Victim to Cause of the Crisis
Since the early and especially the mid-1990s, welfare systems based on 
social insurance have increasingly been perceived in their own countries 
as exacerbating economic and political difficulties. Before retrenchment, 
social insurance benefits were used as a support for the victims of the 
crisis (compensation) and as a tool to counter it (reflation policies, labor 
shedding strategies). In the following period, when continuous increases 
in social spending appeared to be unsustainable, retrenchments were at-
tempted, but essentially to save a social insurance system perceived as 
itself a victim of the crisis. Because of continuing difficulties, more and 
more analyses called for reforms that went further and deeper. In such 
analyses, the systems themselves had come to be seen as the cause of the 
crisis.
Social insurance was now accused of being to some extent the cause of a 
variety of economic and political ills: leading to unbearable social contri-
bution rates, hindering competitiveness9, preventing job creation (in the 
low-skilled service sector at least) and weakening the state’s capacity to 
control expenditure and implement reforms by giving undue influence to 
the social partners . The very characteristics of these systems themselves 
(contributory benefits, financed by social contribution and managed by 
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the social partners ) came to be seen as the causes of difficulties. This 
being the case, they should not only be retrenched, but also profoundly 
transformed.
It is, therefore, not only social scientists who acknowledge the impact 
of institutions on problems, and their role in shaping, and sometimes pre-
venting, change. Through learning processes (and the diffusion of aca-
demic analyses), experts and politicians have also come to recognize these 
effects – and sometimes also to decide to change these institutions. In 
most of the social insurance based welfare systems, institutional reforms 
have taken place in order to face these difficulties. Scholars working on 
welfare state reforms have tended to overlook these changes. As is dem-
onstrated in many chapters in this volume, however, these reforms have 
been essential in giving governments the capacity to overcome the block-
ages to change that the typical Bismarckian institutional design had gen-
erated. It could be argued that in a second historical reversal, after having 
initially moved from being seen as ‘effects’ to being seen as ‘causes’ (Pier-
son 1993), welfare institutions have now become objects of reforms, with 
the aim to render the welfare state more ‘movable’.
Main Policies
Some recent reforms have been aimed at modifying these institutional 
arrangements, especially the predominance of social contributions in the 
financing of social expenditures and the role played by the social partners 
in social policy-making (the two often being interrelated). These reforms 
consisted mainly in trying to reduce the share of social contributions in 
the financing of welfare systems, and to diminish the role and power of 
the social partners (mainly the unions ) in the national social policy-mak-
ing process. As they are crucially important for understanding the reform 
trajectory in Continental Europe, two chapters in this volume are devoted 
to these institutional traits of Bismarckian welfare systems, and to their 
progressive transformation (Ebbinghaus on ‘Bismarckian corporatism ’, 
Manow on financing).
It should be noted that these reforms have sometimes been implement-
ed separately from other types of reforms, and sometimes simultaneously. 
For the sake of clarity they are treated separately here, but acknowledging 
that some of them have been part of a package that also included struc-
tural reforms (see below). Since we consider changes in the institutional 
design of Bismarckian welfare systems as ‘pre-conditions’ for structural 
reforms, they are dealt with first.
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Politics and Mechanisms of Institutional Transformation
These changes are difficult to categorize as either first-, second- or third-
order changes. Visser and Hemerijck (1997) have called changes of this 
type ‘institutional changes’, while as mentioned above Clegg refers to 
‘meta-policy reforms’, meaning ‘a reconsideration of how to make pol-
icy itself ’ (Clegg 2007: 77; quoting Dror 1968). As various chapters in 
this volume indicate, these institutional reforms belong to the family of 
institutional evolutions that have been analyzed by Thelen and Streeck 
(2005).
Changes in Financing
Modifications in financing have usually been rather consensual.10 They 
progressively became part of the demands of almost all social protection 
actors (albeit for different reasons, see Palier 2005b). Since the mid-1990s, 
many reforms have been triggered by the desire to stop the spiraling of 
labor costs, often by fixing a ceiling for social contributions .11 This gen-
erated not only the switch towards retrenchment that we have analyzed 
above, but also the necessity to look for new types or resources, either by 
moving from contributions to general taxes , or by creating specific new 
taxes for new expenditures.
Three main mechanisms have driven the movement from contribution 
to tax financing: firstly, the role of tax financing has been increased in 
the cases of (negotiated) retrenchment reforms, when governments com-
mitted to pay for non-contributory benefits that were financed through 
social insurances previously12; secondly, in the framework of employment 
policies, many Continental European governments decided to exempt 
employers from paying some social contribution in order to lower the cost 
of unskilled labor; in these cases, governments either offered tax subsidies 
to employers, or compensated the social insurance funds with tax money 
for the loss of social contributions due to these exemptions, thus again 
switching the financing of social expenditure from social contribution to 
taxes 13; finally, and more rarely, genuine new taxes have been created, ei-
ther to substitute for social contributions or to finance new types of social 
expenditure.14
Changes in Governance
Contrary to changes in financing, the changes in the governance of the 
system, and especially the attempts to weaken the social partners (primar-
ily the unions ) within the social policy-making process, have been hugely 
controversial. International analysts and commentators have sometimes 
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analyzed the often massive demonstrations organized by trade unions in 
Continental Europe in response to welfare reforms as mere opposition to 
retrenchment, when very often it was (also) opposition to the measures 
that would undermine the unions ’ power within the system.15
Mechanisms that weakened the inﬂ uence of the social partners have also 
been varied. One has been removing the social partners as a ‘natural’ con-
sequence of the changes in ﬁ nancing: when the state ﬁ nances, it expects to 
control decision-making, as well16; another route has been to simply bypass 
the social partners , by excluding them informally or formally from consulta-
tion/concertation games (see Ebbinghaus, this volume). In many cases this 
occurred through a shift in power from the social partners to the Parliament, 
the social partners losing their traditional role in the social policy-making 
through procedural changes.17 Administrative reforms have also contribut-
ed to weakening the role of the social partners , by changing the governance 
structure of some important social insurance bodies.18 Finally, liberalization 
or privatization (complete or partial) of former funds/agencies held by the 
social partners has also contributed to reduce their traditional powers.
While it is evident that the state is increasing its decision-making and 
control capacity over the compulsory social insurance schemes, it should 
however not be forgotten that, since these compulsory schemes are shrink-
ing, occupational social provision (in pension and health) are expanding 
(see also below). Th ese are often domains regulated by collective agree-
ments, and in which the social partners are therefore still central actors.19
‘Meta-policy reforms’ have been less important in some countries. In 
Italy , the main preoccupation was to change the political system itself, and 
the politics of welfare reforms has remained highly conﬂ ictual; in Belgium , 
‘there have been no changes in social policy-making, only defensive mea-
sures. Th e social partners have sought and largely succeeded to maintain 
their autonomy from government in the domains of collective bargaining 
and governance of the social security system’ (Hemerijck and Marx, this 
volume). As we will see in the next section, this partly explains why fur-
ther structural reforms have been more diﬃ  cult to implement in these two 
countries, at least when compared to their neighbors. In the case of the 
Visegrad countries , trends seem to go rather in the opposite direction, since 
a greater ﬁ nancing role has been given to social contributions , and poli-
cies have tried to reinforce the capacity of civil society through a ‘state-led 
corporatism ’ that has been instrumental in developing and reforming wel-
fare institutions (Cerami, this volume). Th is is explained by a quite diﬀ erent 
point of departure, where the state had a far more central role.
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Consequences
While it stabilized or even increased in all other European countries (in-
cluding the Visegrad countries ), the weight of social contributions in Con-
tinental European countries has decreased between 1995 and 2006. As 
a percentage of total taxation , social contributions have declined by -1.5 
percentage points in Austria , -2.3 in Belgium , -6.2 in France , -1.8 in Ger-
many , -1.4 in Italy , -3.5 in the Netherlands , and -2.7 in Spain .20 Even if so-
cial contributions still represent the largest share of financial resources for 
Continental welfare systems, the relative share of other taxes has greatly 
increased over time.
Changes in financing introduced or increased the role of new instru-
ments, usually linked to a different logic of welfare. It might be logical to 
assume that a ‘hybridization’ dynamic is at play, leading to a more mixed 
type of welfare system. Our analysis on the contrary shows that the chang-
es in financing are contributing to an ever clearer separation between two 
worlds of welfare, the realm of contributory social insurance financed by 
social contribution on the one hand, and that of non-contributory ben-
efits on the other, financed by taxes . It is in this second world of welfare 
that we find the various, basic safety nets. The new sources of finance may 
also be used to fund new or developing services, more clearly separated 
from insurance than before, such as health care , services for labor market 
(job placement, training, etc.) and care policies.
As far as governance is concerned, the trend is also clear. The tradi-
tional role of the social partners in compulsory social insurance has been 
weakened, and governments have progressively gained greater political 
capacities to impose their reforms, as will be shown in the next section. 
Again, the conclusion should not necessarily be one of a general weaken-
ing of the social partners in labor market and social policies, since em-
ployers have been quite influential in shaping the most recent reforms, 
and collective negotiation may undergo a revival, both in complementary 
social protection (especially pensions) and within decentralized labor 
market policies (see Ebbinghaus, this volume).
With these institutional transformations, governments have at a mini-
mum gained more control over the financing and decision-making pro-
cess in social protection. They have acquired new political capacities to 
take the tough decisions, and some financing capacities for new types of 
benefits aimed at either targeting the most needy, and/or covering new 
social risks . As is shown by our national cases (and by the counter exam-
ple of Belgium and partly Italy ), ‘meta-policy reforms’ thus appear to be a 
pre-condition for further changes (see also Clegg 2007: 77). They enabled 
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further retrenchments to be imposed, and paved the way for the deeper 
structural changes that became visible during the 2000s.
Further Retrenchments, Activation and Structural Reforms: From the 
Late 1990s/Early 2000s up to the Crisis of 2008
Context
In the late 1990s, despite a decade of diﬃ  cult economic and social policy 
reforms, Continental European countries still faced considerable economic 
and social problems.
If the level of unemployment was falling everywhere in Europe at the 
end of the decade, employment rates in Continental Europe were still very 
Table 13.4 Characteristics of the structural reforms
Context Diagnosis Content of the policies
– Structural economic 
problems
– Greater awareness of socio-
demographic changes and 
new social risks 
– Spreading of a new social 
policy paradigm 
– Welfare systems need a 
profound adaptation to the 
new economic and social 
contexts
– Multiplication of pillars in 
pension, active ageing
– Selective activation of the 
unemployed
– Competition and more state 
regulation in health
– Timid modernization :
– Care policies
– Extension of tax-fi nanced 
basic safety nets
Type of change Politics Consequences
– Third-order , paradigmatic 
reforms, though not 
wholesale transformation of 
the systems
– Divisive reforms
– Imposition
– We are all supply-siders now
– Bismarckian welfare systems 
have moved from income 
maintenance to activation, 
work incentives , employment-
friendly  benefi ts
– Recommodifi cation for 
some, privatization of 
complementary provision for 
others, but not liberalization 
for all
– Dualization of the systems 
(social and private insurances/
assistance)
– Dualization of society
 THE LONG CONSERVATIVE CORPORATIST ROAD TO WELFARE REFORMS
low (see Hemerijck and Eirchhorst’ figures, starting in 1997, this volume). 
Though deficits had been contained to meet Maastricht criteria, some 
countries still had a huge debt (Belgium and Italy especially); and deficits 
were generally higher in Continental Europe than in many other Europe-
an countries (some of which even had surpluses in the early 2000s). Apart 
from a few exceptions (like the Netherlands or Spain ), economic growth 
rates on the continent were lower than in the other European countries 
(and than in the US or Canada). From outside, ‘Old Europe’ faced criticism 
for its poor economic performance, when other models (Anglo-Saxon or 
Nordic) had demonstrated a capacity to overcome their own difficulties.
In the late 1990s, moreover, the negative impacts of social and demo-
graphic changes were becoming more visible. While the inactivity rate of 
elderly workers was on the increase21, the ‘baby boomers’ were nearing 
retirement age. The demographic dependency ratio (inactive/active) was 
the most unfavorable in Continental Europe, especially on its southern 
border. While women wanted to, and did, enter the labor market in most 
European countries, their difficulties in combining work and family life 
in most Conservative welfare systems became more evident, and the idea 
that this could be detrimental to fertility began to be discussed. Finally, 
although unemployment was fluctuating and in some places declining, 
long-term unemployment and social exclusion was increasing, especially 
among low-skilled workers. In the European continent, there was an in-
creasing awareness of the emergence of ‘new social risks ’ (such as pre-
carious employment, long-term unemployment , in-work poverty , single 
parenthood, or the inability to reconcile work and family life, see Bonoli, 
2005), and of the incapacity of the traditional welfare systems to protect 
people against them.
Confronted with continuous difficulties and the failures of their past 
attempts to address them, Continental European governments became 
convinced that to solve their structural difficulties, only structural chang-
es of their welfare systems would suffice, including the adoption of a to-
tally new social policy agenda. For the first time, reforms were explicitly 
aimed at changing and restructuring the welfare systems.
Diagnosis: The Welfare Systems are Ill-Adapted to the New Economic and 
Social Context and Need to be Reoriented
In many Continental European countries, there was a sense of an accumu-
lation of failures over the previous two decades, leading some to question 
the merits of the system itself and push for changing both the instruments 
and the goals of social policies.22 A variety of reform failures – inabil-
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ity to solve the deep financial and employment difficulties of European 
countries (since the late 1970s in many countries), the perception of the 
detrimental effects of the social insurance structures on the economy 
(since the late 1980s), the incapacity of the existing social insurances to 
face the recurrent and emerging social problems (since the late 1990s) – 
together seemed to suggest that the system itself had failed and needed 
to be changed. In order for changes to occur, this shared sense of failure 
is necessary, but it is not sufficient; alternative solutions also need to be 
available, and credible.
Since the early 1990s, new social policy paradigms and programs, from 
outside Continental Europe, had been circulating. These new ideas and 
experiences constituted a credible alternative to the typical Continental 
answers (i.e. ‘passive ’ income compensation, labor shedding ), and seemed 
adapted to the new economic context (globalization, the single market 
and increased competition) and the new economic policy orientation that 
accompanies the Maastricht criteria (a sound public budget, limited debt, 
low inflation rate). Moreover, these ideas also addressed new social risks , 
and appeared to have been implemented successfully in some European 
countries (Nordic countries and, in a different way, UK  ).
After having contributed to define the new (supply-side) economic or-
thodoxy known either as monetarism (Hall 1993) or as the ‘Washington 
consensus’ (Williamson 1990), international financial and economic orga-
nizations started to define a new (post-Keynesian ) orthodoxy concerning 
labor market and social policies. Flexibility and workfare on the labor 
market, multi-pillar pensions (including compulsory and voluntary fund-
ed schemes), and increased competition and managed care in the health 
sector were put high on the policy agenda by the OECD and the World 
Bank .23 While the first versions were rather crudely neoliberal (and not 
adoptable as such in ‘Old Europe’), by the mid-1990s these ideas had been 
‘Europeanized’ and made more amenable to the European social model. 
The Dutch and the Nordic reforms of the 1990s (flexicurity , social invest-
ment ), the British ‘Third Way’ and the European Employment Strategy 
and Open Method of Coordination (OMC)24 all made these new ideas 
available as an alternative new paradigm to the failed Continental social 
policy paradigm .
It is not the purpose here to analyze the development and content 
(and nuances) of this new global social policy paradigm , but simply to 
underline some of its main trains (at the risk, of course, of caricature). 
Whereas social expenditure was long conceived as being favorable to eco-
nomic growth (under the Keynesian macroeconomic paradigm ), one of 
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the main new orientations is now to reduce public social spending and 
labor costs in order to boost economic activity by restoring and fostering 
firms’ profitability. The reforms should make social protection schemes 
more conducive to employment by reducing their cost, rather than by 
increasing social spending. The basic philosophy is to adapt social protec-
tion schemes to a supply-side rather than a demand-side macroeconomic 
policy. According to the new norms being developed, the welfare state 
should be placed at the service of competition (among businesses, states 
and individuals).
In this perspective, social programs are supposed to be more employ-
ment-friendly by linking benefits to incentives that make it preferable to 
work rather than to receive social security benefits for doing nothing. 
Employment and social policies are more and more thought of in terms 
of incentives rather than in terms of rights (or ‘decommodification ’). Em-
ployment policies are now focused on stimulating labor supply and ac-
tivation strategies. Increasing female participation in the labor market 
and therefore facilitating family/work reconciliation is also at the heart of 
the new social policy paradigm . In pensions, a multi-pillar system which 
includes both pay-as-you-go and funded schemes (in order to promote in-
vestment capacities in the country) is promoted, with an emphasis on the 
tight link between the level of the pension and the volume of contribution 
paid. In health care systems, the introduction of managed competition 
has become the main tool for regulation.
Adopting this new agenda meant, for Continental European countries, 
a radical reorientation of their main strategies (labor shedding ); or as 
Hinrichs (this volume) puts it, to turn around in what had become per-
ceived to be a dead end. In that sense, it entailed implementing a paradig-
matic change in the policies adopted (from labor shedding to activation), 
but without necessarily implying that the whole system would have to be 
changed (see below).
Main Policies
Most of the Continental European countries seem to have adopted (even 
if in somewhat modified form) this new social policy agenda. Since the 
early 2000s, a new wave of reforms has been developing, that testify a 
new will to overcome the ‘welfare without work ’ trap. Activation of the 
unemployed, the limitation of early exit , measures for increasing the par-
ticipation of women , older workers and unskilled workers are amongst 
the biggest innovations. Important pension reforms have also been adopt-
ed, aimed at further reducing the cost of public pensions and at favoring 
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the development of private fully funded complements. In health care , in 
the countries with a health insurance system, more regulatory power has 
been given to the state, and more competition between health insurances 
is being introduced. Minimum income protection has also been general-
ized, to protect the weakest from the further retreat of social insurance 
that has happened through the structural transformation of traditional 
social insurances (see box 13.1). Finally, reforms (in a more limited num-
ber of countries) also include attempts at ‘modernizing’ Bismarckian wel-
fare systems in order to provide better protection against new social risks 
through the (more or less timid) development of new social policies.
Box 13.1 The structural reforms in traditional social insurances
• In Germany, the 2001 Riester pension reform planned further restrictions of the level of 
public pension, but also created the possibility for complementary future pension rights 
through personal or occupational pension plans. The pension replacement rate was further 
reduced in 2004, and the postponement of the legal retirement age to 67 is planned; during 
the early 2000s, the four so-called Hartz reforms deeply transformed German labor market 
and unemployment insurance, introducing activation and expanding low-cost jobs; bet-
ween 2003 and 2007, increased healthcare co-payment for patients, increased competition 
amongst health insurance providers and new tax-fi nancing arrangements were implemen-
ted (Hinrichs, this volume).
• In France, the 2001 unemployment reform generalized activation to most of the unem-
ployed, while more and more in-work benefi ts have been developed (Prime pour l’emploi, 
revenu de solidarité active). The 2003 pension reforms expanded the scope of retrenchment 
to public sector workers , but also created pension saving plans, both individual and occupa-
tional . Throughout the 2000s, co-payments have been increased in the ambulatory health 
care sector giving private insurance an increasing role in the system, while the 2004 and 2008 
health reforms increased the control of national and regional public authorities over the rest 
of the system (control of patients in general, and over the hospital sector) (Palier, this volume).
• In Austria, the various pension acts of the fi rst half of the 2000s closed early-exit options, 
harmonized the system by integrating federal civil servants into the general scheme, dimi-
nished the level of pay-as-you-go benefi ts and progressively introduced a supplementary 
private pillar (fi nanced through the conversion of the previous severance payments). Em-
ployment policies have also been characterized by tighter eligibility conditions for unem-
ployment benefi ts, a stronger reliance on activation policies and increased eff orts to create 
employment opportunities for the unskilled . In health care , due to ever-increasing co-pay-
ments, the share of private health expenditure as a percentage of total health expenditure 
has increased continuously and new funding principles apply (diminishing employers ’ con-
tributions), while new state agencies have been created to better control the system (Obin-
ger and Tálos, this volume).
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• In Belgium, after the reform of unemployment insurance, the focus was more on minimum 
income protection, some timid activation measures were adopted between 1999 and 2005, 
and a ‘generation pact’ aimed at diminishing early retirement was introduced (but without 
great success); public pensions, as provided through social security, have become so low that 
average to high earners have come to rely on occupational and private schemes to obtain 
a pension commensurate with their past earnings. The 2003 Law Vandenbroucke on sup-
plementary pensions aimed to generalize access to such private provision (Hemerijck and 
Marx, this volume).
• In the Netherlands, activation policies date back to the mid-1990s, with the so-called ‘Melkert 
jobs’ for low-skilled workers , women , younger workers , foreign nationals , and the long-term 
unemployed; activation was pushed further with the introduction in 1997 of cuts in employers ’ 
social security contributions for hiring the long-term unemployed and low-paid workers , 
and with the Jobseekers Employment Act (WIW) in 1998, which imposed an individualized 
assessment interview on each new unemployment benefi t. Competition between health 
insurance schemes became eff ective in 2005. Since a majority of pensions were already fully 
funded, there have not been such big changes in this area as in the other cases, but strong 
incentives have been created to reduce early exit (Hemerijck and Marx, this volume).
• In Italy, structural pension reforms date back to 1995, the Dini reforms having introduced 
a public notional defi ned contribution system, to be implemented through a long transition 
process that would preserve the unions ’ core constituencies; in the 2000s, supplementary 
defi ned contribution schemes have been highly favored through the automatic conversion 
of severance payments (Tfr) into pension saving plans; the fl exibilization of the Italian labor 
market as well as active labor market policies (mainly targeted at the most disadvantage 
groups) were developed in the late 1990s. Blockages could however not be overcome to 
promote adequate unemployment insurance and a real minimum income safety net (Jessoula 
and Alti, this volume).
• In Spain, despite the absence of such visible pension reforms as in the German, Italian or 
French cases, private pensions introduced in the late 1980s have grown steadily. The labor 
market has also been fl exibilized (through the massive use of temporary work contracts), and 
active labor market policies have also been introduced (Guillén, this volume).
• In Switzerland , fully funded pensions already existed, and private health insurances were 
already in competition. Changes towards including some ‘outsiders ’ within the scope of 
insurance schemes have been adopted. The turn to activation is also very visible, starting in 
1995 with more access to training, followed in the 2000s with a strengthened commitment 
to the reintegration of the disabled and changes in family policies to improve the capacity to 
combine work and family life (Häusermann, this volume).
• In the Visegrad countries , the changes do not go in the same order, since the second half 
of the 1990s witnessed a lot of liberalization and privatization measures in the pension and 
health sectors, and these have been reconsidered during the 2000s. Private pillars in pension 
and health have been recalibrated. However, it is indeed during the 2000s that activation 
measures have been subsequently taken to overcome employment rates that are among the 
lowest in Europe (Cerami, this volume).
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These structural reforms all entail third order changes : new instruments 
are implemented (activation, conditional benefits and new services for 
the unemployed, fully funded pension schemes, new types of financing 
and management in health care ), and one main new goal is put forward: 
rendering the welfare system employment-friendly by reducing its public 
part and reorienting benefits from income maintenance towards activity. 
Of particular importance for the Continental European countries are the 
attempts at increasing the employment rate of the elderly (meaning a shift 
away from the early exit strategy) and the attempt to support women ’s 
durable entry to the labor market. Since the latter goal cannot be levered 
only with social insurance, and since other new social risks have emerged, 
new social policies (marked by both new goals and new instruments) are 
also emerging: minimum income guarantees, new types of parental leave 
and care policies. As underlined by Häusermann in this volume, these lat-
ter reforms can be described as ‘updating recalibration ’ (Pierson 2001a: 
455) or ‘modernization ’ (Bonoli 2005; Häusermann 2006) of the welfare 
system, ‘because they adapt it to specific post-industrial social needs and 
demands of mostly labor market outsiders and women ’.
Confronted with long-term unemployment , more volatility on the la-
bor market, precarious jobs, social exclusion and above all the shrinking 
coverage of social insurance, all countries but Italy have either created or 
expanded and generalized minimum income guarantees, either as a gen-
eral safety net25, or as speciﬁ c minimum incomes in diﬀ erent policy ﬁ elds.26 
Italy launched an experimentation of minimum income, but was unable to 
overcome institutional and political obstacles to its generalization.
This development of assistance schemes shows that instead of a tem-
porary cyclical change on the labor market, the increasing number of 
atypical workers, the development of long-term unemployment and the 
growing numbers of outsiders is now perceived as a durable phenomenon 
that necessitates a permanent answer. This development (or rediscovery) 
of assistance schemes was also the result of the politics of retrenchment , 
which saw social insurance shrink and renounce the responsibility to 
protect the most ‘atypical’ profiles. This might be interpreted as a return 
to Bismarckian origins, when the policy for the worker (Arbeiterpolitik) 
was clearly distinguished from the policies for the poor (Armenpolitik, 
see Leifreid and Tennstedt 1985); but it is also a clear rupture with the 
post-war compromise, when Bismarckian institutions were supposed to 
reach Beveridgean goals and cover the whole population. In this context, 
it appears more as the institutionalization of a new dualism within social 
protection (see Palier and Thelen 2010).
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One should however note that in some countries, while basic safety 
nets were developed for the poorest, reforms have also tried to reinte-
grate within social insurances some workers (mainly part-time workers) 
previously excluded by too strict eligibility criteria. In the Netherlands, 
better rights to social insurance for part-time workers were decided in 
1995 and in 1996, and an agreement on ‘Flexibility and Security’ was later 
adopted, paving the way for a new Working Hours (Adjustment) Act in 
2000, which gave part-time workers an explicit right to equal treatment 
in all areas negotiated by the social partners , including wages, basic so-
cial security, training and education, subsidized care provision, holiday 
pay, and second tier pension rights (Hemerijck and Marx, this volume). 
In Spain, various ‘social pacts have resulted in increased protection of 
non-core labor workers in the late 1990s’ (the ‘Agreement on Employment 
and Social Protection of Agrarian Workers’ of 1996 enacted in 2000; the 
‘Interconfederal Agreement for Stability in Employment’ of 1997; and a 
specific agreement on part-time workers reached in 1998). ‘Conditions 
for access to social security were conflated with those of core-workers 
in terms of the relation between time worked and benefits, and in terms 
of sickness allowances and maternity benefits’ (Guillén, this volume). In 
Switzerland , the pension rights of non-working women were improved 
in 1995, the second pillar of occupational pension was extended to more 
low-income earners, meaning more social rights for part time – main-
ly female – workers, and unemployment reforms during the 1990s also 
prolonged the benefit period, thus extending coverage to the long-term 
unemployed. In France, part-time workers were given some additional 
pension rights in the 2003 pension reform. In Austria, new professions 
(quasi-freelancers, self-employed ) were included in the unemployment 
insurance in 2007 and 2008.
Other innovations have also been introduced since the late 1990s to cope 
with new social risks . In the field of long-term care , Germany expanded 
its social insurances in 1995 by creating a specific regime to cover this new 
risk. Apart from the fact that employers were compensated for their social 
contribution payments to this new scheme (thus breaking the golden Ger-
man rule of Parität in the financing of compulsory social insurances), no 
significant innovation was introduced with the Pflegeverischerung. More 
innovative were the subsequently adopted tax-financed scheme in Austria 
(Pflegegeld) and the new benefit for the dependent people in France (Al-
location personnalisée d’autonomie).
What appears really innovative for some Bimarckian systems, however, 
are the new measures aimed at investing in children’s development, con-
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ciliating work and family life and promoting gender equality. Some of the 
most Conservative welfare systems have started to adapt to the demise 
of the male breadwinner model, providing more formal care facilities for 
children, reforming their parental leaves so that they no longer inevitably 
break female careers by encouraging a better share of care work between 
mothers and fathers, and better protecting single mothers . The changes – 
and other plans in the pipeline – are quite radical in Germany , Spain , Swit-
zerland and the Netherlands , where governments are trying to modernize 
their welfare systems and render them less Conservative. This ‘revolution’ 
is however quite ambiguous, since these policies have been as much about 
stimulating an expansion in lower paid jobs (for women ) in the service 
sector (Morel 2007) and encouraging higher fertility (Henninger et al. 
2008) as they have been about improving conditions for women .
Meanwhile, some other countries – Italy , Austria and most of the 
Visegrad countries – have remained quite Conservative , mainly as a result 
of Conservative parties opposing these types of adaptation. France and 
Belgium are for their part somehow regressing, as some of the traits that 
traditionally made them distinctive from the typical male breadwinner 
model are currently being weakened under fiscal constraints. In France , 
for example, the écoles maternelles have recently been closing some class-
es for the youngest children.
Politics
So far we have seen that partisan politics did not seem to make an enor-
mous difference in the policies implemented, and this remained true for 
the further retrenchments and structural reforms of traditional social in-
surances (cf. box 13.1). Here again, whatever the ‘color’ of the government, 
similar policies were implemented, and conflicts were again much more 
between governments and certain unions . Concerning modernization 
policies, however, a clearer impact of political cleavages is discernible.
Most of the structural reforms implemented in traditional social in-
surances were conflict-ridden, since projects usually triggered consid-
erable discontent and sometimes – as in Austria (pension reform) and 
Germany (Hartz IV) – mass strikes and demonstrations. Governments 
no longer appeared so cautious in their way of presenting the negative 
impact of social protection structures. Political discourses became ex-
plicit: the systems needed to be changed, scaled back, activated and 
modernized. Not all the unions opposed the reforms, and governments 
often tried to play on these divisions, giving concessions to the mod-
ernizers (such as Ver.di in Germany , or CFDT in France ) against more 
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traditional oppositional unions (IG Metall in Germany , FO and CGT in 
France ). These reforms were implemented though social pacts in Spain 
and in the Netherlands , but this procedure did not necessarily prevent 
political and social conflicts. Partly because they had gained political 
capacity as a result of the institutional reforms reviewed above, and 
partly because of a ‘divide-and-rule’ strategy, governments were able to 
impose reforms in spite of opposition and discontent. As we will see, 
however, concessions were often made to the unions and their core con-
stituencies (long phasing in of pension reforms, strategic targeting of 
activation measures).
The new social policies were more consensual among the social part-
ners , probably because they did not affect the core social insurances but 
instead added new layers to the existing social insurance system. The de-
velopment of assistance-based minimum income benefits was welcomed 
by most of the social and political actors, because it addressed a manifest-
ly pressing social issue, and furthermore relieved social insurances from 
an ‘undue’ burden. Difficulties were not entirely absent though, especially 
for the policies concerning families and women . Parliament had to by-
pass the social partners in Switzerland ; Schröder ’s childcare projects were 
put on hold until the arrival of the grand coalition; the Spanish Catho-
lics strongly opposed Zapatero ; and in Italy and Austria , the modernizing 
projects of the Social Democrats were buried by the Conservatives on 
their return to office.
These reforms also had a number of significant consequences. These 
are discussed in detail in two sections below, following our explanation of 
the Bismarckian welfare reform trajectory as a whole.
13.3 How to Explain the Bismarckian Welfare Reform Trajectory ?
The politics of welfare state reform in Continental Europe has been ana-
lyzed from a range of theoretical perspectives. As underlined in the first 
chapter of this volume, most research has used the concept of path de-
pendence , and concluded that Conservative corporatist welfare systems 
have not changed considerably. As this volume shows, this interpreta-
tion will no longer suffice. Among those who identified possibilities for 
change in Continental European welfare states, some have argued that 
partisan politics is central. Levy (1999) in particular argued that left-wing 
parties are in a position to be able to turn ‘vice into virtue’. While parts of 
the story told by the chapters in this volume appear to confirm this argu-
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ment, it is not able to explain the general and common turn to structural 
reforms and activation in the 2000s, which have been implemented even 
under Conservative governments. To understand this shift, we need to 
take into account the emergence and adoption of a new social policy 
paradigm . This perspective emphasizes the role of reform learning and 
policy ideas in the dynamics observed. When comparing the processes 
traced in this volume with those documented by Peter Hall , however, we 
see that more explanatory weight needs to be given to mechanisms of 
institutional evolution, leading us to understand the Bismarckian welfare 
reform trajectory as a succession of institutional changes nurtured by 
various reform feedbacks, ultimately leading to the adoption (and ‘Con-
servative corporatist ’ adaptation) of the dominant orthodox social policy 
paradigm .
Vice into Virtue?
One possible interpretation for the most recent and significant reforms in 
Bismarckian welfare systems is that they have been implemented by pro-
gressive parties, who have been able to target the ‘vices’ of these systems 
in order to render them both more economically efficient and socially 
just. In his famous article, Levy (1999) suggested that Social Democrats 
in Continental Europe could profit from the crisis to transform their typ-
ical weaknesses into strengths. By attenuating historic inequities, such 
as ‘overtaxation of wage earnings, polarization of benefits, rigid insider -
outsider cleavages, and indifference or even hostility to women trying 
to juggle maternal and career roles’ (Ibid.: 246), ‘progressive reformers 
have been able to extract resources with which to pursue a variety of 
“virtuous” objectives: redistributing income towards the poor without 
increasing public spending; improving the functioning of the economy 
without reducing benefits to the truly needy; and facilitating (through 
side-payments) the negotiation of far-reaching, tripartite social pacts 
to redesign basic parameters of welfare, labor market, and fiscal policy’ 
(Ibid.: 240).
Some cases seem to confirm this analysis. Most of the ‘modernization ’ 
reforms, aimed at improving the condition of part-time workers and es-
pecially of women , have been implemented either by Social Democratic 
governments or by coalitions including parties of the Left. The Italian 
pension reforms, which depended on the support of the Left, were ex-
plicitly aimed at reducing the inherent inequalities of a pension system 
that paid extremely generous pensions to civil servants and rather poor 
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pensions to the self-employed and farmers. Schröder ’s 2001 pension re-
form in Germany created minimum benefits for the elderly and partly 
improved the pension calculation rules for women . More recently, mod-
ernizing changes in social insurances, pushed by the new Left, the Greens 
and women ’s organizations, have allowed a better integration of part-time 
work and an improvement of women ’s situation in Switzerland , while si-
multaneously reducing the level of benefits for core insiders . In Spain, the 
socialist government of Zapatero has greatly contributed to an improve-
ment in the situation of labor market outsiders , and especially women . 
What is at stake here is whether the new social risks bearers can lever 
some representation within the parties that are or can be in government 
(Häusermann 2010b).
However, the implementation of such reforms has not in fact been the 
monopoly of the center-Left, since in Austria , it was the grand coalition 
that introduced new measures to cope with poverty and new social risks ; 
in France, the right-wing Fillon government that introduced slightly bet-
ter calculation rules for part-time work in its pension reform; and in Ger-
many , the grand Coalition that has pushed forward the creation of day 
care facilities.
Moreover, few clear examples can be found of explicit ‘vice-into-virtue’ 
bargains, where those representing insiders make some concession to al-
low improved protection of the usual losers of Bismarckian systems (atyp-
ical workers, labor market outsiders , women , unskilled workers, etc.). We 
could even underline that, in the recent structural reforms as in earlier 
ones, material concessions have been made above all to core insiders . Al-
most all pension reforms have included long phasing in periods, so that 
the current core constituencies of trade unions will not be immediately 
hit by the reforms (Bonoli and Palier 2007). Activation has not been im-
posed on all the unemployed, but mainly targeted on the margins of the 
labor market. While core workers have continued to benefit from early 
exit and still relatively generous unemployment benefits, the long-term 
unemployed and beneficiaries of the new or expanded minimum incomes 
have progressively been put under activation pressures (Clegg 2007). Care 
policies have not attempted to alter the gendered division of household 
labor, and have tended to reproduce the patterns of stratification specific 
to Bismarckian welfare systems, with lower-income women particularly 
encouraged to use long, low-paid care schemes that result in their with-
drawal from the labor market (Morel 2007).
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Social Policy Paradigms , Reform Learning , and the Welfare State
Many similar reforms have thus been implemented, by right-wing, left-
wing and coalition governments. Moreover, the reforms very often re-
inforce the segmentalist tendencies of Conservative corporatist welfare 
systems, notably by institutionalizing dualisms (see below, and Palier 
and Thelen 2010). These reforms cannot therefore be said to have been 
driven by a ‘vice-into-virtue’ strategy. This approach can help to explain 
some of the modernization reforms, but certainly not all of the further 
retrenchments and the structural reforms of traditional social insurances. 
As we have suggested, the biggest innovations within the Bismarckian 
welfare systems, such as the development of minimum income protec-
tion schemes, the rise of activation policies and the emergence of private 
tiers in the pension and health care systems appear instead to be a sort of 
Bismarckian adaptation of the new orthodox social policy paradigm that 
has been in circulation since the late 1980s.
However, the turn to this supply-side approach did not happen in ex-
actly the same way as the adoption of the new macroeconomic policy par-
adigm, as described by Hall (1993). For sure, there are striking similarities 
in the two processes. The reform of Bismarckian social protection systems 
featured the three sequences identified by Hall ; first, using available in-
struments: the labor shedding strategy; second, changing the instruments 
to face the persisting difficulties while trying to save the system: the first 
retrenchments; third and last, adopting a new social policy paradigm as 
the only way to overcome the accumulating anomalies that have become 
a crisis of the system itself. Like Hall , we have also underlined the impor-
tance of learning from one reform to the other, and we have seen a shift 
in the locus of power to allow for the third order change , from a (usually) 
tripartite social policy-making to a re-enforcement of state capacities and 
control over welfare reforms. In our cases there have however been more 
than three steps, and there has been more continuity than Hall observed 
for macroeconomic policies. Contrary to Hall ’s case, there was not a com-
plete departure from the past and a general replacement of previous poli-
cies by new policies. The adoption of the new paradigm has rather been 
made possible by the development of past reforms, which served as a basis 
for implementing new policies.
Because of the ‘stickiness’ of welfare state institutions (Pierson 2001a), 
and because of their huge popularity, governments were not able to 
change the whole system even when they claimed that these systems 
were failing in dealing with economic and social issues. Structural wel-
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fare reforms have rarely been put at the heart of political platforms in 
Continental Europe. Rather, changes were initially incremental , passing 
through an intermediary phase based on a relatively ‘silent’ evolutionary 
institutional transformation (changes in financing, changes in power re-
lations), that weakened the institutional and political bases of the welfare 
systems and facilitated structural reforms based on a new social policy 
paradigm. Even these new social policies have not entirely replaced the 
former ones, but merely contributed to a conversion of the old system to 
the new goals.
Hence, our analysis leads us to contest the idea of changes driven by 
sudden rupture in a long-term equilibrium27, and instead emphasize 
evolutionary transformation based on incremental but cumulatively 
transformative incremental changes (Streeck and Thelen 2005b). The 
adoption of the new social policy paradigm should not be conceived as 
a sudden innovation, introduced through a paradigmatic revolution in 
the 2000s. Even if there was another economic slowdown in the early 
2000s, it was no more dramatic than earlier cyclical slowdowns dur-
ing previous economic cycles occurred, and less so than the commodity 
price shocks of the 1970s. One cannot therefore explain these changes 
very well with reference to a critical juncture (Gourevitch 1986) that 
undermined a pre-existing equilibrium. What led to third order changes 
was more a progressive transformation through less visible institutional 
evolution, and this pre-conditioned and enabled the more visible para-
digmatic changes.
How did Bismarckian Institutions Evolve?
In Bismarckian social protection systems, structural reform should be 
understood as the result of an accumulation of previous reforms, which 
created the conditions for radical transformations to occur. The transfor-
mation did not, however, consist in replacing an old welfare system with 
a new one. Instead, it consisted of a progressive transformation of the 
whole architecture by the introduction of new ‘layers’ at the margins, and 
then the conversion of existing social policies to new goals and orienta-
tions. We need therefore to associate Hall ’s approach with the perspec-
tives developed by Thelen and Streeck to fully understand the process 
of change. The paradigmatic change was the result of the progressive 
exhaustion of the first responses to the crisis (e.g. labor shedding ), and of 
the shrinkage (a kind of drift ) of social insurance to allow the implemen-
tation of two types of institutional innovations: the layering of new so-
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cial policies, and the implementation of (initially marginal) institutional 
reforms (new taxes , new governance procedures,). Finally, despite the 
explicit rupture with the past in many reforms of the early 2000s, much 
happened through the conversion of existing policies (activation of as-
sistance policies, residualization of compulsory social insurances), and 
through new interactions and drifts between the various segments of the 
social protection system.
The first mechanism documented in our cases is the implementation 
and then progressive exhaustion of the first type of reaction to the crisis, 
typically driven by the Bismarckian framework of social policy, i.e. the 
labor shedding strategy as well as increases in social contribution rates. 
These first policies were partly exhausted by their endogenous disequilib-
rium: asking the ever fewer people in work to be ever more productive, 
and to pay for ever more social expenditure. The more deeply this strategy 
was implemented, the fewer human and fiscal resources there were to 
sustain it.
Despite the endogeneity of such mechanisms, however, there was an 
exogenous element that pushed actors to reassess their strategy, and that 
provided arguments (if not real constraints) for a first reorientation. In 
most of the cases, this exogenous element came from the implementa-
tion of the single market and the preparation of the European single cur-
rency (with unification being more important in the German case). This 
new context was crucial for revealing the failure of the initially adopted 
strategy. Governments then turned to second order changes , the content 
of which were also tightly bound to the existing welfare institutions : re-
trenchments ‘à la Bismarckian ’.
These retrenchments were implemented through stricter calculation 
rules to access social insurances (typically, longer contribution periods 
are necessary to acquire rights to the same benefits). Not only does this 
not change the basic elements of the system, it on the contrary reinforces 
them: the contributivity of the benefits is increased and the ‘equivalence’ 
principle reaffirmed.
These retrenchments however led to a first kind of drift in the system, 
in this case shrinkage in the coverage of social insurances that has been 
compensated by new types of social provisions. As discussed in the first 
chapter, the characteristics of Bismarckian welfare systems as they were 
(in the late 1970s) included the aim to (directly or indirectly) cover the 
whole population for all the risks they were exposed to, by guarantee-
ing the maintenance of living standards of the insured and their family. 
The retreat of social insurances has diminished the coverage capacity of 
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social insurances: fewer people are covered, replacement rates are lower, 
while certain risks – new social risks – are not covered. Social insurance 
has retracted such that in many countries it has been reduced to mainly 
covering core workers exposed to traditional risks; and covering the latter 
less well than in the past.
This shrinkage is another endogenous mechanism that led to the layer-
ing of innovative politics, at the margins of the system, which themselves 
contributed to make the paradigmatic changes of the early 2000s pos-
sible. New gaps in coverage had to be compensated or plugged in some 
way, and they have been by new types of policies. In order to compensate 
for the reduced coverage of people, a new layer of assistance policies (tax-
financed targeted minimum income benefits) has been either expanded 
or created for those not contributing enough or at all to social insurances. 
This has been done not to replace the social insurances but instead to ‘pu-
rify’ them, with social insurance henceforth financing only contributory 
benefits, and social assistance delivering ‘non-contributory ’ benefits. The 
expansion of the latter was initially symmetrical to the retreat of social 
insurance (the fewer people are covered by insurance, the more of them 
fall under assistance schemes).
In order to compensate for the lower replacement rates guaranteed 
by traditional social insurances, new layers of private pension funds and 
private health insurance provisions have expanded on top of the system. 
The development of these private pillars within systems that were origi-
nally meant to be sufficient to guarantee the maintenance of standard 
of living has also been incremental . It was initially through individuals’ 
own initiatives to save more for their pension as they anticipated the con-
sequences of the first retrenchments that private pensions have grown 
(Bonoli and Palier 2007); it was only progressively that private health 
insurances have grown to complement the compulsory system (Hassen-
teufel and Palier 2007). In both cases, we can speak of a creeping priva-
tization .
The dynamics unleashed by the first retrenchments have thus allowed 
the development of new policies at the two ends of the system. The mul-
tiplication of new layers has led to a more heterogeneous system of so-
cial protection, which combines different types of entitlement rules, of 
benefits and of financing modes and which was much more complex to 
control, run and manage. Confronted with this increasing complexity, 
as well as with the increasing conflict around the decisions to be taken, 
governments (and on occasion social partners ) learned from the failures 
of past reforms and decided to ‘clarify’ things by defining more clearly 
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who finances what, and who decides on what. What we have called in-
stitutional reforms (changes in financing and in policy-making proce-
dures) were supposed to solve these problems of complexity by using 
taxes to finance the increasing amount of non-contributory benefits, 
and enhancing the state’s power to push through decisions perceived as 
necessary.
As has been shown, the turn to structural reforms occurred as the re-
sult of an adoption of new social policy goals (activation, modernization ), 
and implementation of innovative social policy instruments . They were 
however made possible only by the institutional reforms and by the previ-
ous development of the new layers just mentioned.
The development of private pensions relied on existing trends and 
tools. It consisted merely in encouraging an already existing tendency to 
increasing saving, either by creating new instruments (such as the Riester 
funds in Germany , and the PERP and PERCO in France ) or by converting 
already existing measures such as the redundancy payment systems in 
Italy and Austria .
In many cases, other important conversions of existing policies and in-
struments towards the new social policy goals are visible.
Firstly, activation has mainly been implemented in Continental Europe 
through the activation of social assistance schemes, and limited to labor 
market outsiders . Instead of the entire unemployment benefit system be-
ing turned into a system of conditional benefits for all, new conditions 
(and sometimes services) have been grafted onto income- or means-tested 
benefits, thereby converting assistance schemes into in-work benefits (the 
Hartz IV reforms in Germany and the creation of the RSA in France are 
the clearest examples).
Secondly, replacement rates in pensions were further reduced in the 
early 2000s, thereby converting old-age insurance goals from income 
maintenance to the provision of a basic pension guarantee. Through in-
creases in the retirement age and in the number of contribution years nec-
essary to receive a full pension, actuarial neutrality has been put forward 
as the new principle for calibrating pensions. In some cases, the replace-
ment rate has been lowered so much that adequate income replacement 
is no longer guaranteed, but instead a (relatively generous) minimum in-
come (like in Belgium , Germany or Austria ). People are encouraged to 
rely on funded complementary schemes to replace their past income in 
the future. This residualization of pensions has been facilitated by the 
development of the private complements, as governments could explain 
that the future role of private complements is to ensure income replace-
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ment while the role of the public pension schemes is to guarantee basic 
pensions.
The analysis here largely confirms Thelen and Streeck ’s hypothesis that 
complex institutional systems change fundamentally through an interac-
tion between existing institutions and various layers that have been in-
troduced initially at the margins as merely adaptive adjustments. Their 
notion of policy drifts, through which the relative importance of different 
policy segments changes so much as to ultimately transform the whole 
institutional architecture, is also relevant. Table 13.5 tries to classify the 
various types of change seen in Bismarckian social protection systems 
according to whether they are changing the goals and/or the instruments 
of social policies and with reference to Thelen and Streeck ’s typology of 
institutional changes.
Before asking whether this new architecture means a real welfare regime 
change for Continental Europe, it should be reiterated that the trajectory 
sketched out should be read only as the ‘typical’ trajectory, and that ‘real’ 
countries have always followed their own route, with their own idiosyn-
crasies. Even a focus on these differences, however, very much confirms 
our basic hypothesis, namely that welfare institutions matter very much 
in shaping welfare reform trajectories, but do not prevent important con-
sequential change.
Accounting for Diff erences: Welfare Institutions Matter!
As any scrupulous reader of the country chapters in this book will have 
noticed, the exact same reform trajectory has not been followed every-
where. The Netherlands started structural reforms much sooner, Belgium 
has not really witnessed a turn to activation, and Italy and Austria did not 
modernize their social policies. The politics of reform has also been dif-
ferent; reforms have been very conflictual in some countries and negoti-
ated through social pacts in others, Europe mattered more in some cases 
– such as Italy , Spain , Belgium and France – than in others, and so on...
Some chapters discuss the reasons for these variations (see especially 
the chapters on Belgium /the Netherlands , on Spain and on Switzerland ). 
The stated intention of this chapter is not to explain variation, but instead 
to underline the similarities. Relying on the chapters mentioned, we can 
nonetheless highlight some variables that appear to help us understand 
the ‘variations on the common theme’.
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Table 13.5 The various types of changes implemented in Bismarckian welfare systems
Goals, Welfare institutions
principles Same New
Same
STATUS QUO
Towards EXHAUSTION?
Belgium unable to close its early 
exit route
(data, if not policies, show similar 
trends in many other countries),
Italian incapacity to reform its 
labor market, and to implement a 
minimum income 
Italian and Austrian conservatism 
on family policy 
Frozen Landscape
RECALIBRATION
DUALIZATION THROUGH LAYERING 
AND DRIFT
‘Reactionary recalibration ’: long 
phasing in of public pension reforms 
for current insiders 
– supplementary private pensions 
accessible mainly to the well off 
– Increase in or maintenance of 
unemployment allowances for 
insiders , decrease for outsiders 
(plus more conditionality),
– Increasing role of assistance 
schemes
– Care policies: From labor shedding 
to cheapening labor, the fallacies of 
free choice
Neo-Conservative /neo-corporatist 
welfare system
New
CONVERSION 
From income maintenance to 
minimum income guarantees:
– Belgian unemployment 
insurance
– Old-age public pensions in 
Germany , Belgium , Austria , Italy 
Activation of assistance schemes
Targeted activation
A ‘Liberal ’ dynamic in Bismarckian 
welfare system
INNOVATIONS
Through LAYERING and DRIFTS
Progressive universalization of health 
care 
Development of childcare facilities
Post-Bismarckian reforms
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When Politics Matter
As already mentioned, if partisan politics does not appear to matter much 
for the retrenchments and structural reforms of Continental European 
welfare systems, it is more significant for their modernization . It is when 
parties (usually, but not always, of the center-Left) are able to build new 
coalitions including new social risk bearers that modernization policies 
are implemented (see Häusermann 2010b). Inversely, it is largely when 
there is a clear Conservative majority in government that they are not.
In general, the rhythm of the reform trajectory is also highly dependent 
on partisan politics, very often a change in sequence being triggered by 
the arrival in power of a new majority or coalition. The political color 
of this new government does not however seem to determine much the 
content of the new phase (cf. the striking similarities in the policies imple-
mented by Schröder in Germany and right-wing governments in France ).
Macropolitical institutions such as the structure of the state, the elec-
toral system and the degree of fragmentation in the industrial relations 
system are also of crucial importance in accounting for variations, es-
pecially in timing and intensity (if not the content) of reforms. This is 
very well illustrated by the Dutch-Belgian comparison: ‘the two countries 
are distinct in terms of the institutional frameworks of the political sys-
tem within which their welfare states and industrial-relations systems are 
embedded, suggesting possible explanatory variables for divergent policy 
outcomes. Compared to the Netherlands , Belgian federalism and linguis-
tic regionalism have decisively constrained the scope of government in-
tervention not only in wage bargaining but also in a host of other social 
and economic policy areas. Also social partnership is more fragmented, 
making it difficult to establish and enact broad corporatist social pacts’ 
(Hemerijck and Marx, this volume). Further comparisons would certainly 
demonstrate that macropolitical institutions can help explain differences 
in timing , political mechanisms (negotiation, blockage or imposition) and 
in the depth of reforms between countries.
Welfare Institutions Matter
What seems, however, to be the main explanandum for whether coun-
tries have followed the same trajectory or not is related to the initial 
institutional configuration of their welfare systems. In this book, the main 
divergences are explained by differences in the point of departure. This 
is obvious for health care in the case of Italy and Spain . As the Span-
ish chapter makes clear, it is because the health insurance system was 
not based on a diversity of autonomous funds that it could be univer-
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salized.28 In general, as Guillén (this volume) puts it, in Spain ‘some of 
the corporatist institutional arrangements were missing, especially those 
related to the existence of independent professional funds and those con-
cerned with the management and administration of the system and the 
role played by the social partners (...) it is precisely this lack of intense 
corporatist traits that eased the way for the paradigmatic reforms of the 
1980s and the recalibration of the 1990s. Conversely, the “Conservative 
familialist” character of the Spanish welfare state has proved more dif-
ficult to overcome.’ In the same vein, the initial structure of pensions and 
health care in the Netherlands or in Switzerland account for much of 
their specific reform trajectories. The same could be said to explain the 
Belgium exceptionalism as far as unemployment is concerned29, or some 
reverse tendencies in the Visegrad countries .
As Hemerijck and Marx point out (this volume), ‘national social policy 
legacies and political institutional particularities shape both the options 
available to state and non-state policy actors to reconfigure Continental 
welfare arrangements’. To put it in a nutshell, the more the point of depar-
ture diverged from the Bismarckian norm, the more ‘deviant’ the reform 
trajectory has also been.
Otherwise, it should also be acknowledged that similar trends (and 
even trajectories) to the ones described in this volume can also be seen 
outside Continental Europe. To a large extent, this again confirms our 
basic hypothesis, for generally these similarities are to be found in social 
policy fields where at least parts of the welfare institutions are similar 
to the ones to be found in Continental Europe (especially entitlements 
based on work record and a predominance of contributory benefits). Re-
maining differences are again explained by variations in the institutional 
architecture of welfare systems, especially in terms of financing and gov-
ernance. An exhaustive account of welfare state changes in the world 
is obviously beyond the scope of the present chapter, but a few can be 
mentioned. Most countries adopted explicit or implicit early exit policies 
as a first response to the crisis in the mid-1970s, but many did not per-
sist with these, largely because the financing of this strategy was not as 
heavily based on social contributions as in Continental Europe. The poli-
tics of pension reform in the US shows some similarities with the trends 
analyzed in our cases, and this should be attributed to the fact that the 
American Social Security is a strongly contributory system. Finally, the 
turn to activation often follows a similar route to the one we have ana-
lyzed, and dualization can also occur elsewhere, including in Scandina-
via (Davidsson 2009). What should be remembered here is that in most 
 THE LONG CONSERVATIVE CORPORATIST ROAD TO WELFARE REFORMS
countries unemployment protection is organized as a social insurance, 
and hence follows a relatively similar route. However, the importance of 
dualization in Nordic countries should be scrutinized closely, and com-
pared to the size of the phenomenon in Continental Europe (Martin and 
Thelen 2007).
It is now possible to turn to the general assessment of the impact of the 
welfare reform trajectories in Continental Europe, starting with the effect 
of reforms on the systems themselves (outputs), and then turning to their 
economic and social consequences (outcomes).
13.4 What have the Bismarckian Welfare Systems Become?
We have seen that in recent decades many reforms have introduced new 
principles and new instruments in Continental European social protec-
tion systems, thus implementing third order changes . Does that entail a 
wholesale change in the welfare systems of these countries? All national 
chapters assess the transformation of their own welfare system, and many 
differences are visible. There are however similar evolutions that merit 
being underscored. Referring to the general goals, principles and insti-
tutions of Bismarckian welfare systems as they were stated in the first 
chapter of this volume, it is possible to measure the general changes that 
have occurred, starting with changes in the goals and principles, and then 
looking at changes in the social policy instruments . Taken together, all 
the reforms have contributed to a reorganization of the entire welfare 
systems: they have lost their encompassing capacities, partly turned to 
activation and employment-friendliness, and weakened the strongest ele-
ments of their male breadwinner bias. Instead of the emergence of new 
hybrid welfare systems, we conclude that Continental Europe witnessed 
the development of dual welfare systems that differentiate between the 
protection of the core workers and the activation of the ‘atypical’ (low-
skilled ) ones.
A Long Goodbye to Encompassing Social Insurances
A first key change is that the compulsory social insurances are no longer 
able to guarantee income maintenance , to cover the whole population, 
and to protect against all the main social risks.
As seen in the first chapter, the main goal of social protection in Bis-
marckian systems was initially to provide income security to workers 
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and their families. This goal was broadened in the late 1960s, and so-
cial insurances were then supposed to cover the whole population, all 
social risks and guarantee near-total income maintenance . Even if they 
did not in reality cover the whole population in the past, at least in the 
late 1960s and the 1970s (and sooner for Germany, see the 1957 pen-
sion reform), covering the whole population – directly through social 
insurance for male workers or indirectly for their spouse and children 
through the ‘family wage’ (Esping-Andersen 1996a) – was clearly the 
objective. The explicit goal was to include the whole population in the 
social insurance schemes and for social assistance to be consigned to 
history.
As we have seen, the various waves of retrenchments have increased 
the ‘contributivity’ of benefits and the ‘equivalence’ principle, leading cov-
erage and replacement rates to decline. In most of the cases, fewer people 
are covered than before and a lower proportion of past wages are replaced 
in both old-age insurance and unemployment insurance. Though some 
recent reforms have endeavored to include part-time workers within 
the systems (in the Netherlands , Switzerland , Spain and partly Austria , 
France and Germany ), social insurance can no longer be considered as 
‘quasi-universal ’ (Leisering 2009).
The goal of securing the previously achieved standards of living has 
also vanished. In most of the cases, replacement rates have been lowered 
in pensions, so that people need a private complement to maintain their 
standard of living during old age . In some cases the equivalence prin-
ciple has itself disappeared (in Belgian unemployment insurance, where 
it did not really exist for long, but more importantly, in German, Aus-
trian, Belgian and Italian compulsory old-age insurance), to be replaced 
by a relatively generous minimal pension guarantee. Income maintenance 
does not seem to be an achievable goal for Bismarckian welfare systems 
anymore, and is being progressively replaced by minimum income main-
tenance.
More and more assistance schemes have been developed to cover the 
uninsured and to guarantee a basic safety net, thus adding a new goal to 
the system: preventing poverty . What Bleses and Seeleib-Kaiser (2004: 92) 
observe for Germany can be applied to all Continental European coun-
tries; ‘the principle of publicly guaranteeing the achieved living standard 
is on the retreat, while the principle of publicly securing a minimum of 
existence is increasingly gaining importance’.
As demonstrated by Armingeon and Bonoli (2006) as well as in the 
chapters in this volume, traditional Bismarckian welfare systems were 
 THE LONG CONSERVATIVE CORPORATIST ROAD TO WELFARE REFORMS
also not easily able to cope with new social risks , and needed to add new 
social policies to address them. Hence it can also be said that the typical 
Bismarckian institutions are no longer able to cover all social risks, and 
needed other types of policies (new services and targeted benefits).
If the Bismarckian welfare systems are less fragmented in various social 
insurances funds than before (there have been mergers, concentration 
and reduction of the number of schemes and funds in many countries), 
they are now simultaneously more fragmented into a greater diversity of 
social policies, the core of social insurance no longer being able to suffice.
Farewell to Maternalism?
As shown in the various papers, the Bismarckian welfare systems have 
also tried to adapt to changes in society, notably the demise of the male 
breadwinner model. It certainly cannot be said that in Continental Europe 
social policies have driven the entry of women into the labor market, but 
they have belatedly tried to adjust to this trend by offering more scope for 
women to combine work and family life. This however has been done in 
quite a ‘Conservative ’ way, since in the name of ‘free choice’ low-skilled 
women are still given incentives to stay at home to take care of the chil-
dren, while more skilled women are offered more (but still very expensive) 
possibilities to have their children cared for (Morel 2007).
Towards Employment-Friendliness
Progressively, at least in the reforms, the former goal of supposedly ‘pas-
sive ’ income maintenance has been replaced by a new one, activation, 
in all fields: unemployment , active ageing, and supporting women ’s par-
ticipation in the labor market. As Hinrichs (this volume) puts it: ‘Instead 
of income support, the focus is now on a maximum integration of the 
(long-term) unemployed, older workers and mothers into paid employ-
ment.’ As will be seen below, this activation has been relatively successful 
in terms of employment rates, but not in terms of job quality and associ-
ated social protection.
All the common trends are very well summed up by Hinrichs in this 
volume: ‘Reduced levels of income security through wage earner schemes, 
accompanied by demands for self-responsibility and more private provi-
sion, stronger reliance on means-tested benefits, and stricter activation 
measures.’
Next to these new goals and principles, there has also been a modifica-
tion in the policy instruments deployed.
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Dual Welfare Systems
Th e multiplication of policies and the diversiﬁ cation of goals and principles 
might lead us to conclude that the Continental European welfare systems 
have become more hybrid, where traits of the two other ‘worlds of welfare’ 
can today be found. Instead of a blurred and incoherent mix of policies, 
however, we would instead argue that the new welfare systems of Continen-
tal Europe are in fact characterized by a dualized structure, comprised of 
(less and less) social insurance on the one hand (for the ‘insiders ’) and more 
developed targeted assistance and activation schemes (for the ‘outsiders ’).
Access to Benefi ts
In most of the countries studied, entitlements to old-age pension, unem-
ployment insurance, invalidity and work accident insurance are still based 
on work records and status. However, as a result of retrenchment policies, 
the amount of contribution paid is more central to the calculation of the 
benefits than before, thus increasing the ‘actuarial’ principles in the eligi-
bility criteria.
Next to the traditional social insurances, access to other benefits is 
now based on different criteria: citizenship is more and more a defin-
ing entitlement to health care , family benefits and access to services such 
as childcare . Poverty and citizenship conditions are often combined into 
what some authors call a ‘selective universalism ’ (Ferrera 2006) that de-
fines access to minimum income assistance schemes.
Types of Benefi ts
There has been a clear diversification of the types of benefits in recent 
decades. Though contributory cash benefits still play the most important 
role, they are now less proportional to former wages than calibrated on 
‘real’ amounts and durations of contributions paid. One can even see a 
certain residualization of benefits in some cases (old-age pension in Ger-
many , Austria , Italy and Belgium; unemployment benefit in Belgium), 
where formerly proportional earnings-related benefits are becoming 
more and more like minimum income guarantees.
For those who can no longer access contributory benefits, income and 
sometimes means-tested benefits have been either expanded or created in 
all countries. In-work benefits have been added to assistance ones (cf. the 
‘1 euro jobs’ in Germany , or the RSA in France ).
Bismarckian welfare systems still lack social services , despite plans 
to increase child and elderly care. In many cases, instead of these new 
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services being directly provided, cash benefits (often income-tested) 
are used to pay for these services whose growth in the market sphere is 
being encouraged either by subsidies or by social contribution exemp-
tions.
Next to public welfare, private protection is also playing an increas-
ing role, especially in pensions and health care . Complementary private 
pension funds are voluntary, and can take two main forms, either collec-
tive (thus being funded jointly by employees and employers, with state 
subsidies), or individual (with the state subsidizing individuals or house-
holds).
Financing
As shown in the various chapters and as analyzed by Manow (this volume), 
the modes of financing have also changed, drifting from social contribu-
tions to taxes in order to make the welfare system’s financing more ‘em-
ployment-friendly ’. After a sharp increase in social contributions up to the 
mid-1990s, a reversal has subsequently been implemented, and the share 
of social contributions has been decreasing since the mid-1990s (from 17 
percent to less than 15 percent of GDP on average in Manow ’s Bismarck-
ian cluster, including Austria , Belgium , France , Germany , the Netherlands 
and Italy ). Social contributions are far less than before the main means 
of financing social benefits in Continental Europe, even though they still 
play the biggest role (see the precise figures in the various country chap-
ters, but on average, they got closer to 60 percent of all resources, com-
pared to the earlier average of 70 percent). Once again, this is not so much 
suggestive of a blurring of the system, since in many countries reforms 
have strictly distinguished between the uses of social contributions (to 
pay for contributory benefits in social insurance), and the use of other 
forms of taxation , to be allocated to non-contributory (either universal or 
targeted) benefits.
Governance
Due to other institutional reforms , social policy-making has also greatly 
changed in Continental Europe. In most countries, the social partners 
can no longer be considered as veto players , at least for compulsory social 
insurances. Because of étatisation or privatization , and sometimes both 
together, they have increasingly been bypassed in reform events. Even 
if the status of social insurance funds has rarely been changed (with the 
notable exception of health insurance in the Netherlands , Germany and 
France ), those who decide on and manage them are closer to the state (na-
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tional or local public authorities) than it was the case before. Moreover, 
private companies play a much more important role, whether in employ-
ment policies and job placement, pensions (new facultative funded pen-
sion plans) or health care (mutuelles complémentaires in France, health 
insurances for glasses and dental care in Germany).
We are all Supply-Siders Now!
The interpretation of these shifts is not easy (see table 13.5), and varies 
within this volume. For Hinrichs (this volume), these changes suggest a 
turn to the Liberal model. For Häusermann (this volume), by contrast, 
‘abandoning the income maintenance of the breadwinner is likely to be 
accompanied by the introduction of innovative goals (poverty preven-
tion), principles (selective universalism ) and policy instruments (mini-
mum insertion income, means-tested family benefits, development of so-
cial services ) that, if fully institutionalized, might have helped to bridge 
the traditional insiders /outsiders gap.’
With reference to the above discussion of the welfare reform trajectory , 
we can in fact consider that these new goals and new instruments reflect 
the adoption of the new orthodoxy in social policy: we are all supply-
siders now! This adoption does not however mean a total absorption and 
radical transformation of Continental welfare systems. As much as Hall 
(1989) detected different variants of Keynesianism , we see here the emer-
gence of a Continental European variant of supply-side social policies. 
The new supply-side orientations have been adapted to Bismarckian ways 
of thinking and doing. Though one can see some Liberal dynamics in the 
residualization of public pensions, the increasing role of private ones, and 
the development of assistance schemes (see the bottom-left cell in table 
13.5), one should notice that many private pensions are based on collective 
agreements, and thus keep a corporatist flavor. Furthermore, when as-
sistance schemes were activated, these targeted only the outsiders , while 
shielding most of the former insiders . What is most striking is the dualiza-
tion of welfare, which makes most of the Continental European countries 
switch to what can be called a neo-Conservative , neo-corporatist welfare 
system (top-right in table 13.5). Only few ‘post-Bismarckian ’ social policy 
fields have emerged: universal health care in some countries, develop-
ment of childcare facilities (bottom-right in table 13.5). This dualization 
of welfare both reflects and contributes to the dualization of Continental 
European labor markets and societies.
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13.5 What are the Main Economic and Social Consequences of the 
Welfare Reform Trajectory ?
The Economic and Social Consequences of the Reforms
By adopting but also adapting the new ‘orthodox’ social policy agenda, 
Bismarckian systems may have found their own specific ‘way out’ of their 
economic and social difficulties. As Häusermann puts it in this volume: 
‘We may be witnessing the start of a genuinely Continental “way out” of 
the post-industrial challenges: the inegalitarian and  insurance-related 
aspects are reinforced with the reduction of replacement rates, the 
lengthening of contribution periods and the inclusion of [some] former 
outsiders in the insurance schemes. At the same time, however, a basic 
minimum protection allows for this reform strategy by easing the most 
pressing poverty risks, and by providing the reforms with the necessary 
political legitimacy.’
How successful has this strategy been in overcoming the specific prob-
lems that have haunted Continental Europe for decades: mass unemploy-
ment , low employment rates, slow growth rates and high labor costs? Ac-
cording to Hemerijck and Eichhorst (this volume), these countries have 
recorded impressive successes on the employment front (before the 2008 
crisis), but modernization remains limited and further efforts are needed. 
However, the welfare reforms have also contributed to increase dualisms 
both in labor markets and in societies more generally.
Away from the Labor Shedding Strategy
Th e data analyzed by Hemerijck and Eichhorst are striking. After two de-
cades of slow ‘jobless growth’, Bismarckian welfare systems seem to have 
been able to overcome the ‘welfare without work ’ trap. Between 1997 and 
2007, all key economic indicators seem to switch in a positive direction: 
lower levels of unemployment , higher employment rates for women and 
for older workers (Germany and the Netherlands being even able to reach 
the EU targets of 50 percent of activity for the 55-64) and for the low-
skilled . Th is can arguably be attributed to structural reforms (activation) 
and to changes in ﬁ nancing. Bismarckian welfare systems have been able to 
address their main regime-speciﬁ c challenges, as ﬁ rst outlined by Esping-
Andersen (1996a) and Scharpf and Schmidt (2000): the cost of (unskilled ) 
labor has been reduced, ‘passive ’ income maintenance has been trans-
formed into targeted activation and in-work beneﬁ ts. What remains to be 
seen is whether the increase in unemployment and the huge level of public 
debts and deﬁ cits associated with the 2008/2009 crisis will be addressed 
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in the same ways as in the 2000s or if diﬀ erent approaches will be used, 
whether older recipes or the kind of social investment strategy proposed 
by Hemerijck and Eichhorst , as well as Esping-Andersen , in this volume.
From Labor Shedding to Labor Cheapening and Flexibilization : 
Increased Dualism on the Labor Market
Though relatively good results have been obtained on the employment 
front from a quantitative point of view, the quality of many of the jobs 
created is in fact low. During the 1990s, and in parallel to the first wave 
of retrenchment , Continental European countries introduced more flex-
ibility on the margin of their labor markets, leading to the development 
of a growing secondary sphere of temporary and part-time jobs generally 
attached to limited levels of protection (Palier and Thelen 2010). In the 
2000s, the activation turn, the development of subsidized jobs through 
social contribution exemption (such as mini and midi jobs in Germany , 
emplois aidés in France ) and the development of in-work benefits have 
all driven the further expansion of this secondary labor market. Even if 
their number is increasing fast, these new jobs are often called ‘atypical’ 
in Continental Europe, with the term itself implying that different norms 
and rules apply in this segment of the labor market. To the extent that 
such employment is considered ‘exceptional’, even as it grows, it is also not 
allowed to compete with the core sector (i.e. not putting so much pressure 
on it so as to compromise the wages and security of insiders ) (Palier and 
Thelen 2010).
Like for the welfare systems, labor market transformation is progres-
sive and does not attack the core frontally: the core labor market remains 
highly protected, though fewer and fewer ‘typical’ jobs are created, while 
more and more of the ‘atypical’ jobs are created instead. Since in most of 
the cases ‘atypical’ jobs do not benefit from typical social protection (with 
the notable exception of the Netherlands , and some part-time workers 
in various countries), it can hardly be concluded that, in Continental Eu-
rope, the outsiders benefited unambiguously from the labor market and 
welfare reforms.
As comparative and general data on labor markets (such as OECD em-
ployment protection legislation indicators) does not capture these real 
trends well – on average, employment protection legislation is still ‘rigid’ 
in Continental Europe –, we can refer to some of the national chapters 
in this volume to illustrate this growing dualization of Continental labor 
markets30 (see box 13.2).
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Box 13.2 The increased dualism in Continental labor markets
In Germany, in 2006, 14.3 percent of fulltime and 23.4 percent of (covered) part-time wor-
kers earned an hourly wage of less than two-thirds of the median (Bosch et al. 2008). The 
spreading of the working poor is only one aspect of increasing labor market fl exibility . 
Furthermore, fewer employment careers corresponding to the Standard Employment Re-
lationship model result from more frequent spells of (long-term) unemployment , (mar-
ginal) part-time work or periods of uncovered self-employment . Very often, workers in 
low-paid or precarious jobs lack the funds to additionally save for a Riester-Rente that be-
comes indispensable to ensure a modest standard of living after retirement (Hinrichs, this 
volume).
In France, the number of  ‘atypical’ working contracts and jobs has expanded massively since 
the 1970s. In 1970, atypical jobs (fi xed term, part-time and agency jobs) represented 3 per-
cent of all employment, but this fi gure had jumped to more than 25 percent by 2007. Most 
strikingly, perhaps, 70 percent of the new job contracts are currently ‘atypical’ (Castel 2009: 
165). As for other countries, this trend started in the 1990s, and has increased during the 
2000s. ‘Between 1990 and 2000, people employed with a short-term contract grew by 60 
percent, those who benefi ted from a training period or special contract with public fi nancing 
by 65 percent, and temporary workers by 130 percent. During the same period, employment 
in “regular” jobs increased by only 2 percent. In France , the victims of the kind of fl exibility 
represented by new forms of work are mainly found among youth , women , and groups with 
lower skill populations.’ (Lallement 2006: 57). The number of subsidized fi xed-term, low-paid 
jobs for low-skilled workers peaked in 2005 at around 500,000. In 2004, 7.3 billion euros was 
spent on these jobs, to which one should add the social contribution exemption of 17 billion 
euros for the low-paid ‘normal’ jobs (Palier and Thelen 2010).
In Austria, between 2000 and 2006, the number of quasi-freelancers and persons holding a 
marginal job increased by some 20 percent. In addition, the ratio of part-time workers went 
up from 14.7 percent in 1997 to 21.1 percent in 2006 (Obinger and Tálos, this volume).
In Italy, though a high level of job protection (and stability) has been maintained for the 
‘insiders ’ – due to the strong resistance by the major unions on this issue – the pattern of 
employment based on fulltime permanent contracts has been overcome, at least for the new 
entrants in the labor market, and fl exibilization has rapidly increased. In Italy , the share of 
‘atypical workers ’ on total employment has gone from 9.3 percent in 1993 to 16.2 percent in 
2003. The spread of fl exible contracts amongst the new entrants the labor market indicated 
that at least for the younger generations the traditional pattern of job security had been 
abandoned (Jessoula and Alti, this volume).
In Spain, since the mid-1980s, labor market liberalization took place. This move had a decisive 
infl uence on the confi guration of the Spanish labor market. Temporary contracts facilitated 
the adaptation of staffi  ng to cyclical conditions and stimulated the creation of employment. 
Still, fi xed-term contracts quickly reached 30 percent of all salaried workers (the highest rate 
in the EU up to the present), produced a dualization of the labor market structure and were 
not able to drastically reduce unemployment (15 percent at the end of the 1980s) (...) The 
deep fragmentation of the Spanish labor market, the still soaring proportion of fi xed-term 
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This increasing dualism on the labor market and in social protection has 
reinforced and nurtured dualism in European societies.
The Institutionalization of Dualisms in Society
The reforms of the last decades that we have analyzed have resulted in 
multiple dualizations: the development of two worlds of welfare within 
the public system; the addition of a private component to the public sys-
tem; and the division of the population between insured insiders and as-
sisted and/or activated outsiders . The shrinking of social insurance has 
left space both above (for private voluntary components, i.e. private pen-
sion funds and private health insurances ) and underneath (for covering 
the poorest with minimum incomes) the public system. As we have seen, 
beside the remaining – but more individualized and partly privatized – 
social insurance schemes, a secondary world of work and welfare is devel-
oping for outsiders , made up of secondary ‘atypical’ jobs, activation poli-
cies and income-tested targeted benefits. This is a new architecture for 
the Bismarckian welfare systems, with social insurance still central but no 
longer hegemonic. This new architecture has created new forms of verti-
cal dualism in society and will probably generate more social inequalities.
The population itself seems to be increasingly divided into, on the one 
hand, those who can rely on rather generous social insurance programs 
and continue to have access – thanks to their employers or their own 
wealth – to private complements, and on the other hand, those who have 
fallen out of that system and are dependent on minimum benefits. To the 
latter group, one should probably add those being activated into ‘atypi-
cal’ contracts under which they benefit from second rank jobs and social 
protection (Clegg 2007). Social protection reforms have thus contributed 
to increase inequalities and divide society between insiders and outsiders .
In many countries (especially Italy , Belgium , Germany and Austria ), 
public pensions provided through social security have become so low 
jobs , and the fact that it is young people and women who are the losers is hardly a reason for 
rejoicing (Guillén, this volume).
In Switzerland , by 2000, the proportion of part-time employees in the Swiss labor market 
had reached 30 percent, almost 80 percent of which being female . About 5 percent of the 
workforce holds employment contracts of less than two years duration and self-employment 
has increased over the 1990s from about 15 to almost 20 percent (Häusermann, this volume.)
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that average to high earners will have to rely on occupational and private 
schemes to obtain a pension commensurate with their past earnings. A 
duality has emerged between people with access to such schemes and 
those without (Jessoula, this volume). Even if some governments (like the 
German one) have planned a progressive state subsidy (taking the income 
and number of children into account), the development of complementary 
pension funds will induce broader inequalities among pensioners , again 
entrenching divides between insiders (having good income and being em-
ployed in large ﬁ rms, where they enjoy good collectively bargained ben-
eﬁ ts) and outsiders , whose employers are too small to aﬀ ord pension plans, 
and who themselves do not have the means to put extra money aside.
In countries where private complementary health insurances are play-
ing a growing role (France , but also Germany , the Netherlands or Switzer-
land , in their own fashion), the same trends can also be observed in the 
health care sector (Hassenteufel and Palier 2007).
What is also striking is the social impact of the dualization of welfare 
itself. The creation of a secondary world of welfare, made of assistance 
schemes (and subsidized cheap jobs), for those who cannot afford ‘nor-
mal’ social insurances is in itself institutionalizing dualism in society.
It may be in Germany that the trend towards dualization is most vis-
ible and consequential. With the Hartz IV reforms, ‘the unemployed 
with no prior or insufficient ALG I entitlements are dependent on the 
flat-rate benefit from the very start. ALG II is not merely a basic security 
scheme for the registered unemployed: rather, it is designed to serve all 
needy people of working age. As with social assistance before, ALG II may 
be paid if income from employment is too low to meet the needs of the 
household’ (Hinrichs, this volume). Increasing poverty in Germany can 
be traced to the implementation of this dualizing reform. Hinrichs (this 
volume) underlines the increased number of poor children in Germany . 
‘Unemployment of their parents and single parenthood are the prima-
ry reasons. In January 2008, three years after the implementation of the 
Hartz IV act, about 1.9 million children below the age of 15 lived in house-
holds of ALG II recipients (Bedarfsgemeinschaften), i.e. every sixth child 
received means-tested benefits.’
In France, the number of RMI recipients has continuously increased 
over the 1990s, reaching 1.2 million in 2007, about 3.5 percent of the pop-
ulation (family members of the recipients are included). About 10 percent 
of the population depends on a minimum income , and more and more of 
the poorest are ‘activated’ into bad jobs. As Gazier and Petit (2007: 1051) 
point out: ‘the composition of poverty [has] changed dramatically. The 
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poor (defined as households living with less than 50 percent of the median 
household income) at the beginning of the 1980s were mainly out of the 
labor force; during the 1990s, poor households with at least one member 
belonging to the labor force became the majority. (...) In order to fight 
exclusion, the French policies largely contributed to create a new segment 
of disadvantaged workers : the working poor often combining low pay and 
transfer payments.’
In Austria, ‘the strengthening of the equivalence principle makes clear 
that the losers of past welfare state reforms are employees whose employ-
ment record deviates from the standard employment relationship . These 
groups consist mainly of women , immigrants and low-skilled workers . As 
a consequence of the dualization between insiders (the fulltime employed 
labor force) and the new social risk groups, a higher share of the popula-
tion will be doomed to rely on means-tested benefits. For example, the 
number of recipients of social assistance benefits increased by 105 per-
cent between 1996 and 2008’ (Obinger and Tálos, this volume).
If the dual route to welfare and labor market reform is the typical ‘Con-
servative -corporatist ’ way of adapting to the new economic and social 
environment, this segmented pathway will be quite robust and will shape 
the future of Continental Europe. Even if the situation was already frag-
mented and inegalitarian before, certainly in Germany , France , Italy and 
Austria , but also partly so in most of the rest of Continental Europe, re-
cent trends will deepen divisions and lead to the consolidation of an in-
creasingly cleaved world: dual labor markets, dual welfare systems and a 
society divided between insiders and outsiders .
13.6 The Crisis and Beyond
Since 2008, the world has entered a period of intense crisis, which has 
led to economic recession and a sharp increase in unemployment . It is of 
course impossible to predict precisely what the consequences of this crisis 
will be on the welfare reform trajectory of Bismarckian welfare systems. 
Before the crisis, welfare systems seemed to have adapted to new circum-
stances, but often at the price of an increasing number of jobs of bad qual-
ity and the institutionalization of a ‘second division’ in society, living off 
assistance schemes and subsidized precarious jobs. Only some countries 
have started to positively modernize their welfare systems.
As argued by Esping-Andersen in this volume’s prologue and by Heme-
rijck and Eichhorst in their chapter, what is at stake is the capacity to im-
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prove economic growth and the social situation of people, by investing in 
knowledge-based economic activities, and thus in human capital forma-
tion, childcare , education and lifelong learning , and – as long advocated by 
the feminist scholars who ﬁ rst directed attention to care work – by paying 
more attention to the situation of women (Orloﬀ  1993 and for a review, see 
Orloﬀ  2009). Th ese are the conditions for a positive adaptation of Conti-
nental Europe to the new world of the 21st century.
Will this crisis provide the opportunity for further changes in such a di-
rection? Or will its consequences (and especially its fiscal consequences) 
on the contrary lead to the implementation of further reactionary dual-
izing retrenchments? The explosion of public deficits and debts in 2009 
may well augur ill for the future, if governments continue to rely on their 
existing instruments and strategies. As we have seen in this volume, the 
first reactions to deep crises are not normally dramatic changes in the 
instruments and goals of the policies, but rather the continued use of the 
previous existing policy instruments and recipes.
One likely scenario for the years to come is thus an acceleration of some 
of the trends we have analyzed, pushed by the new economic circumstances. 
Th e main reaction of governments in 2008 and 2009 has been to ‘let auto-
matic stabilizers play’ through unemployment insurance and job subsidies, 
all leading to enormous increases in public deﬁ cits and debts. Confronted 
with this, governments may in the near future feel forced to implement 
a third wave of retrenchments, to further residualize public social insur-
ances and to force people to rely ever more heavily on private insurance 
for their income maintenance . Governments will also be tempted to add 
stricter conditions to assistance schemes, to implement further activation 
programs and to support the multiplication of low-paying, poorly protect-
ed low-skilled jobs in the service sector. Th is would not overcome but re-
inforce the most negative eﬀ ects of the typical Bismarckian welfare reform 
trajectory , especially dualism and inequality, but also sluggish growth.
Adopting the policies advocated by Esping-Andersen , Hemerijck and 
Eichhorst and others would require a very different path of reforms. If 
important changes are to come, however, it will probably be more incre-
mentally than through a social policy revolution. Against the idea that 
paradigm change is inevitably a result of a rupture in the past equilibrium, 
we have seen amply in this volume that they have also (and more often) 
come through an accumulation of incremental but cumulatively transfor-
mative reforms . We can conclude this volume by summing up what the 
main conditions for such structural changes in deeply institutionalized 
social protection systems appear to be:
THE CRISIS AND BEYOND
– a shared sense of failure of past reforms;
– changes in the European context;
– layering of new social policies, at the margin of the existing system;
– meta-policy reforms to circumvent institutional and political obsta-
cles to further moves;
– the availability of a new social policy paradigm , and
– for modernizing policies, a renewed political coalition involving new 
social risks bearers.
For the proposed ‘social investment ’ strategy31 to be fully implemented in 
Continental Europe, the following conditions should be met:
– a shared sense that past reforms have increased dualisms, and do not 
provide tools for economic sustainable growth and social progress;
– an explicit endorsement of the social investment strategy for the post-
Lisbon agenda. The Lisbon strategy ambiguously adopted some of the 
traits of the social investment approach in 2000, but they were down-
played in 2005. It remains unclear what will come after 2010;
– an expansion and stabilization of the few new policies already imple-
mented in some Continental European countries, such as ‘continu-
ous minimum income support’, ‘active family investment strategy’, 
focusing on childcare , parental leave, and further investments in em-
ployment policies that ‘strengthen long-term attachment to the labor 
market, promote lifelong human capital investment, and push later 
and flexible retirement ’. New policies towards migration, aimed at ‘in-
tegration through participation’, should also be developed (Hemerijck 
and Eichhorst, this volume);
– meta-policy reforms to circumvent institutional and political ob-
stacles to further moves: renewed attempts to develop social pacts, 
transformation of fragmented social insurances into more inclusive 
systems, creation of new taxes to replace some social contributions 
and pay for new policies;
– the diffusion and adoption in Continental Europe of the social invest-
ment perspective as the new social policy paradigm ;
– the emergence of new political coalitions favoring further modern-
izing policies, involving both insiders and new social risks bearers.
If these conditions could be brought together, there would really be an op-
portunity to say goodbye to the most negative aspects of the Bismarckian 
welfare tradition.


 Notes
 Prologue
 The following draws on G. Esping-Andersen (). The Incomplete Revolu-
tion. Cambridge: Polity Press.
 Chapter 1
 I wish to thank Daniel Clegg for his careful reading of this text, and for his 
support and friendship.
 The present book is one of the products of a broader project, which also 
involved comparative analyses of ‘sectoral reforms’. These studies have been 
published in a special issue of Social Policy and Administration (, vol. 
, no. ), and as a book: Palier B. and Martin, C. (Eds.) () Reforming Bis-
marckian welfare systems, Oxford, Blackwell. In our project, sectoral reforms 
in old age insurance (Bonoli and Palier ), sickness insurance (Hassen-
teufel and Palier ), unemployment insurance (Clegg ) and child and 
elderly care policies (Morel ) were compared.
 Esping-Andersen (b); Ferrera and Rhodes (); Scharpf and Schmidt 
(); Ebbinghaus and Manow (); Huber and Stephens (); Leibfried 
(); Pierson (b); Sykes, Palier and Prior (); Swank (); Wilen-
sky ().
 See for instance Pierson (); Orloff, O’Connor and Shaver (); Kautto 
et al. (); Hvinden ().
 For example on the Netherlands (Visser and Hemerijck ), Italy (Ferrera 
and Gualmini ), France (Palier a) or Germany (Bleses and Seeleib-
Kaiser )
 I would like to thank Karen Anderson for having pointed this out to me. For 
a good illustration of how pension program structures do influence politics, 
see Anderson and Meyer ().
 Castles () has shown that from an analysis of expenditure data not so 
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much appears to have changed in the worlds of welfare states over the last  
years, especially compared to developments in other policy fields. 
 For an illustration of this method, see the tables . to . on France, . to . 
on Austria and . to . on Switzerland, where institutional changes at the 
beginning and the end of the period studied are summarized and compared.
 Jelle Visser and Anton Hemerijck () have similarly underlined the im-
portance of ‘institutional changes’ in the Dutch case, especially concerning 
the role of the social partners within the system.
 An increasing number of scholars have adopted this framework of analysis 
to understand social policy reforms, especially in Bismarckian countries (see 
for instance Visser and Hemerijck ; Palier ; Hinrichs , among 
others).
 Myles and Quadagno () illustrate this. Within pension systems, a tran-
sition from a defined benefit to a defined contribution scheme involves a 
change in the mode of pension benefit from deferred wages to savings, for 
instance.
 Thelen and Streeck identify five main mechanisms of this type: layering , con-
version , drift , exhaustion and displacement.
 For example, under a Keynesian interpretation, unemployment is perceived 
as a consequence of weak demand, and calls essentially for reflation policies. 
Under a neo-classical interpretation, by contrast, unemployment is conceived 
of as a problem of supply, and calls for very different policies such as lowering 
labor costs, flexibilization of labor markets and increasing the incentives for 
unemployed people to look for and accept jobs. The same problem can thus 
lead to diametrically opposed policy recommendations, with more or less 
social spending depending on the diagnosis adopted.
 Traditionally, no social policy reforms could be passed in Continental Europe 
without (at least implicit) agreement of (at least a majority of ) the social part-
ners . On the notion of ‘veto players’ more generally, see Tsebelis ().
 This section is partly based on Palier ().
 In opposition to so-called new social risks , especially badly covered by Bis-
marckian social insurances, such as long-term unemployment , lack of educa-
tion and skills, lone parenthood, difficulties to combine work and family life, 
old age dependency. On new social risks, see Bonoli (). 
 See for instance the German replacement rates in the early s: ‘No in-
come losses occured to workers whose sickness lasts less than six weeks and, 
after the employer’s wage continuation ends, sick pay regularly amounted 
to  percent of net earnings in . That year, the target replacement rate 
(net) for a “standard pensioner” – which assumed an insurance career of  
years and always having earned the average wage – stood at . percent. 
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Unemployment insurance benefits, paid up to a maximum of  months, 
amounted to  percent of former net earnings until .’ Hinrichs (this 
volume).
 Chapter 2
 Traditionally, the term ‘welfare state’ has had a negative connotation in Ger-
many – meaning excessive state interventions, suppressed self-responsibility 
and weak economic incentives. It is still not widely used in public discourses. 
More common is the term ‘Sozialstaat’. In the constitution (Basic Law) it is 
defined in a normative way as an objective of the state (cf. Kaufmann : 
-). Because a direct translation (‘social state’) would be somewhat awk-
ward I will use the term ‘welfare state’ (but not ‘welfare system’) throughout 
this article.
 In tying social policy development to the SER concept, Germany was very 
much similar to other ‘conservative’ welfare states (Lewis ).
 The Ersatzkassen, sickness funds which until the s were only accessi-
ble to white-collar workers and certain blue-collar occupations, have always 
been an exception. Here the employers are not represented.
 Some side-payments made to states led by a SPD/CDU government bribed 
them to vote in favor of that part of the reform package requiring a majority 
in the Bundesrat.
 At present,  years of always earning the average wage is required to obtain 
a public pension as high as the basic security level when retiring at standard 
age (proportionally more years at a lower covered wage). In , for a sin-
gle worker about  years will be required to avoid becoming dependent on 
means-tested benefits (Sachverständigenrat : -).
 Chapter 3
 I would like to thank George Ross, Daniel Clegg, Silja Häusermann and 
Chantal Barry for inspired comments on this chapter.
 For example, a minimum pension benefit was created in  for people with 
insufficient contribution records in old age insurance pension, but it was 
partly financed through social contributions . The social partners denounced 
this as an ‘undue charge’ weighing on social insurance (Valat ).
 Though this representation of acquis sociaux is widespread in France, histor-
ical work shows that, as in other Bismarckian countries, the power resource 
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approach is not the best theory to explain the development of the French 
welfare system (Hatzfeld ).
 AGIRC (Association générale des institutions de retraite des cadres) and 
ARCCO (Association des régimes de retraites complémentaires).
 One can find a presentation of the content of all these plans in Palier, a, 
appendix .
 In , . percent of the health expenditure paid by the insured person 
was reimbursed by the basic social insurance funds ,  percent in  and 
. percent in .
 Source: Statistics from the Ministry of Social Affairs: SESI (various years). 
Comptes de la protection sociale.
 Father Wresinski is the founder of the association Aide à toute détresse quart 
monde.
  years of successive shift work or production line service, more than  
nights shifts a year over  years, or disability .
 UNCAM – Union Nationale des Caisses d’Assurance Maladie.
 Agence régionale de santé.
 The remaining ones are to be found among low income groups.  percent 
of workers and employees of small companies do not have complementary 
health insurance and  percent of the poorest do not have such insurance, 
whereas the rate is at . percent for the whole population. Observatoire des 
inégalités.
 
 Chapter 4
 We thank Frank Castles and Bruno Palier for their valuable comments.
 Differences between blue- and white-collar workers in health insurance have 
leveled out over time.
 Post-war Austria maintained one of the largest public enterprise sectors in 
the Western world.
 Health care is along with social assistance the program where the impact of 
federalism is most pronounced.
 Recall that the Social Democrats attempted to rollback tax breaks in the 
s.
 In cases of financial hardship, however, caregivers can apply for a special 
grant.
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 Chapter 6
 Opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect 
an official position of the related institution.
 Especially in the field of old-age protection, however, fragmentation was high 
due to the proliferation of numerous independent (i.e. non-public, self-ad-
ministered) funds for those categories not included in Inps (public transpor-
tation and maritime workers, and others).
 See Ferrera and Gualmini () for a comprehensive presentation in Eng-
lish.
 After , individual firing was restricted by law to cases of motivated dis-
missal and, above all, with the adoption of the Worker’s Chart (Statuto dei 
Lavoratori) in  a crucial provision (article ) stated that (in firms that 
employed more than  workers) employers were obliged to reintegrate fired 
workers if the Court did not accept the motivations for dismissal.
 Due to this change, in the following we will not analyze the developments of 
the health care sector in Italy. See Maino () for a full illustration.
 A report by the Treasury Ministry forecast an increase of pension expendi-
ture to . percent of GDP in  and - percent in  (Ministero del 
Tesoro ).
 Also plans for more comprehensive pension reforms were proposed by al-
most every government during the s, but these plans were never adopt-
ed. For a detailed illustration of the Italian pension policy over the last three 
decades see Cazzola (), Franco (), Ferrera and Jessoula (, ), 
Jessoula ().
 The Tfr (Trattamento di fine rapporto) is a compulsory severance pay for pri-
vate employees, financed through social contributions (ca.  percent of gross 
yearly wage) and managed by employers. See Jessoula ().
 Only a few, minor interventions were included in the  budget law.
 Cfr. Bonoli and Palier ().
 According to this mechanism, workers would have six months – from Janu-
ary  – to decide if they want to keep the Tfr or transfer it to supplemen-
tary pension funds. In the default option (‘silence’), the Tfr would be auto-
matically paid into occupational pension funds. See Jessoula (, ).
 Chapter 7
 With the exception of two autonomous regions, namely the Basque Country 
and Galicia. 
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 The Spanish Constitution defines the state as a-confessional. The Catholic 
Church is the only one mentioned explicitly in the Constitution but its pres-
sure power has decreased steadily. Abortion, gay marriage and adoption by 
gay couples are allowed in Spain. 
 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/indicators/general_government_
data/government_data_en.htm.
 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/indicators/general_government_
data/government_data_en.htm.
 See, for example, Rodríguez Cabrero (), Moreno and Sarasa ().
 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/indicators/general_government_
data/government_data_en.htm.
 For example, a worker’s kin was covered until they became of age (), then 
until they reached their st birthday and finally for their whole lives pro-
vided, of course, that they were not working themselves.
 This has been due to the opposition of the unions to change the eligibility 
principle, although, as noted it has not impeded to reach universal coverage.
 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/indicators/general_government_
data/government_data_en.htm.
 El Mundo,  March , p. .
 On Europeanization of the Spanish welfare state, see Guillén and Álvarez 
(). On the influence of the OECD on Spanish social and economic policy 
(see Álvarez and Guillén ). 
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 The transfer of the authority from the cantonal to the national level even 
requires a ‘double majority’, meaning that it has to be approved by both a 
majority of the voters and a majority of the cantons. This excess majority-
rule introduces an additional break to the development of national welfare 
policies. 
 This does not imply, however, that inequality is much higher in Switzerland 
than in other countries, because of the rather egalitarian distribution of in-
comes. Hence, the Gini-coefficient in Switzerland before taxes and transfers 
is roughly equal to the Gini-coefficient in France after taxes and transfers 
(Künzi and Schärrer : ). 
 Sources for figures . to .: Comparative political dataset (http://www.ipw.
unibe.ch/content/team/klaus_armingeon/comparative_political_data_sets/
index_ger.html); Welfare state data set (http://www.lisproject.org/publica-
tions/welfaredata/welfareaccess.htm); www.oecd.org; Eurostat;
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 Most of the rise in social assistance costs must be attributed to the exclusion 
of long-term unemployed from unemployment insurance benefits after . to 
 years of unsuccessful job search. 
 Excluding health care costs, which are paid for mainly by individual premi-
ums.
 It was so far the most clear and ‘purest’ attempt at retrenchment . Moreover, it 
was subjected to the popular vote simultaneously with a tax reform alleviat-
ing taxes for higher income classes, so that the voting campaign gave rise to 
a strong left-right class cleavage (Engeli ).
 Swiss supplementary pension benefits are means- and not only income-test-
ed, since they also take into account assets, estates (including those that the 
elderly have previously transferred to their children as an advancement of 
heritage). However, they do not take into account the own income and assets 
of the children.
 In addition, several left-wing propositions to make contributions earnings-
related were declined in popular referenda. The last one in March , when 
a popular initiative by the Socialist party for a single public insurance provid-
er and incomes-related contributions was rejected by more than  percent 
of the voters.
 However, unlike in many other Bismarckian countries, there was no strategy 
to introduce ‘mini jobs’ in Switzerland, i.e. low-skilled low-paid jobs exempt 
from social contributions . This difference may be due to the relatively flex-
ible labor market in Switzerland, employment-protection being comparative-
ly weak (The OECD employment protection legislation index for Switzerland 
is about ., whereas the other Bismarckian countries have values ranging 
between  and ).
 Social assistance is not reported here, because these benefits are regulated 
at the sub-state level and – apart from a limited harmonization of benefit 
levels – were not significantly changed. There is also no minimum income in 
Switzerland .
 Chapter 9
 This study has been made possible thanks to a post-doctoral scholarship re-
ceived by the author from the Centre d’Études Européennes of Sciences Po 
in Paris. During the writing of this chapter, I have, directly and indirectly, 
benefited from several discussions, comments and critiques. I must give par-
ticular mention to F. Bafoil, B. Ebbinghaus, D. Clegg, M. Dauderstädt, H. 
Ganßmann, A. Hemerijck, K. Hinrichs, P. Manow, J. O’Connor, G. Ross, V. 
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Schmidt, B. Tomka and J. Zeitlin. Special thanks should, however, be given to 
the editor of this volume, Bruno Palier, whose patience and tolerance have, 
in innumerable occasions, been tested. It goes without saying that whatever 
faults remain are entirely my own responsibility.
 In February , representatives of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland 
met in the city of Visegrad (Hungary) and agreed on a ‘Declaration of Co-
operation on the Road to European Integration’, which represented the first 
attempt to establish a common platform in order to discuss their future in 
Europe. 
 This was probably a reaction of the communist government to the Prague 
Spring. While after the demonstrations in Hungary in  the government 
responded by making liberal concessions to the populations in exchange for 
social peace, in Czechoslovakia the response was primarily concerned with 
re-establishing the communist orthodoxy. 
 Please note that it would be impossible to analyze social security expendi-
tures in CEE without considering other ‘indirect social policies’ such as job 
security, price subsidies, subvention to firms, for housing, education, etc. 
 By monetization the process of converting benefits and rights into practi-
cal monetary means is meant. During communism money had only a virtual 
value, since it did not respond to the law of demand and offer.
 The most emblematic example is provided by the so-called ‘opposition con-
tract’ between the ODS and the Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD) in the 
Czech Republic. The pact between the two main leaders, as Vodička (: 
-) explains, was: Miloš Zeman would have renounced his position as 
Secretary of the ČSSD in order to be elected as candidate super partes to 
the next presidential elections of , while Václav Klaus would have re-
ceived, in exchange for his support, the position of Prime Minister in the 
ODS minority-led government. When Zeman appointed Vladímir Špidla as 
his successor, it was implicit that tolerance for Klaus ’ economic preferences 
would have been due. Unexpectedly, Špidla, instead of supporting the already 
existent ‘opposition contract’, decided on campaigning against the ODS, but 
he was then subjected to a coup d’ état conducted by the members of his own 
party.
 For Lamping and Rüb (), the German welfare system is in transition from 
the classical Bismarckian type to an ‘uncertain something else’ that the au-
thors cautiously call a ‘conservative universalism ’. Please note that the term 
recombinant property has first been used by Stark () to describe the evo-
lution of Central and Eastern European markets. For the term recombinant 
governance, see Crouch ().
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 Chapter 11
 Comments by Robert Boyer, Eric Seils, Wolfgang Streeck, Kathy Thelen, Bru-
no Palier and Robert Franzese to previous (and quite different) versions of 
this chapter are very gratefully acknowledged. I am also grateful to Thomas 
Plümper for extended discussions and much help in data analysis, although 
only very little of our common work shows up in this version of the argument.
 This correlates with the welfare state’s performance/output side: does it em-
phasize transfers or the public provision of welfare services, including promi-
nently active labor market policies (Huber and Stephens ; )?
 Welfare state spending (the fiscal structure of the welfare state) has been 
primarily studied as a dependent variable, but not as an independent variable 
that itself may explain different patterns of welfare retrenchment or pub-
lic debt growth. Central Bank Independence (CBI) has been primarily stud-
ied in connection with national systems of wage bargaining (see the work of 
Scharpf ; Franzese ; Hall and Franzese ; Iversen a; b; 
; Way , among many others), but not in connection with welfare 
state/ public spending. 
 Given that in some countries welfare state revenue from social insurance 
contributions amount to more than  percent of total government revenue, 
it seems necessary that the literature on ‘fiscal constitutionalism’ (cf. Haller-
berg ) starts to take the welfare state budget process into account more 
systematically.
 While it is often claimed that in economic terms there is not much of a dif-
ference between taxes and social insurance contributions, in fact there are 
some profound differences: social insurance contributions are usually levied 
from a much smaller proportion of the population than taxes, usually only 
from those ‘dependently employed’, and they are usually deducted only from 
wages, not from other sources of income. Often they are also much more 
regressive, because they start at much lower levels of income than taxes, of-
ten at the first euro earned (no tax exemptions), and they are regularly only 
levied up to an upper limit, sparing higher incomes from ‘social insurance 
taxation’. 
 This case study draws heavily on Palier and Coron () and Palier (a). 
I am grateful that Bruno Palier allowed me to refer extensively to his work. 
 See Eurostat : table ., p. .
 Rapport du Comité des Sages des états généraux de la Sécurité sociale : 
.
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 Chapter 12
 As with the other figures, the Bismarckian countries are shaded dark grey. 
 Chapter 13
 These themes have partly been developed in my previous publications on 
the content of the Bismarckian welfare reform trajectory; see Palier () 
and Palier and Martin (a). For the main sequences in the turn from ‘la-
bor shedding’ to employment-friendly reforms, also refer to the summary in 
chapter  of this volume, section .. 
 For a similar argument, see Clegg .
 The comparative welfare state literature published at the turn of the st cen-
tury (see note  in chapter ) has been extensively discussing and document-
ing these trends, so that we do not need to develop these analyses here again.
 The most striking case is probably Germany, where the intense political con-
flicts about retrenchment between the Social Democrats and the Christian 
Democrats between - now appear more strategic than ideological, 
given the policies later implemented by the Schröder government.
 But also with the terms of the political debate in the Nordic countries in 
the early s, where ‘rationalization’, bringing the systems back to their 
traditional ‘workline’, and emphasizing social investment towards children, 
education and women were on the agenda (Palme et al. ).
 ‘In Germany, in , the scientiﬁ c council of the Ministry of Economics esti-
mated that the volume of all “undue charges” not covered by tax-based trans-
fers out of the public budget but ﬁ nanced by insurance contributions amounted 
to  billion euros.’ For further developments on this, see Manow, this volume. 
 See for instance the  ‘Balladur ’ pension reform in France, where the gov-
ernment agreed to pay for the non-contributory minimum income for the 
elderly , or the shift in financing in the ‘Hartz ’ reforms in the mid-s in 
Germany, where the federal government agreed to fully cover the expendi-
ture on ALG II cash benefits and social insurance contributions on behalf of 
the recipients.
 This was not all talk, as shown by the widespread opposition that unions have 
been able to mobilize against reforms they disagreed with, even in countries 
where they lost their role in the management of the welfare system. The mas-
sive demonstrations in Italy against Silvio Berlusconi ’s planned pension re-
forms in  offer a case in point.
 As Scharpf and Schmidt noted however: ‘Contrary to widespread assump-
tions about international competitiveness, there is practically no statistical 
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association between the overall tax burden and employment in the exposed 
sectors’ (Sharpf, Schmidt, , p. ). Huber and Stephens also note that, if 
any, the problem of labor cost is less important in the export sector than in 
the private service sector (Huber, Stephens, ).
 Unless they meant a total change in the nature of the system (like in the 
health sector in France and in Germany, both of them triggered or are trig-
gering heated debates, Hassenteufel and Palier ).
 In the Netherlands, the Purple coalition wanted to fix pension premiums at 
their  level of . percent; the  Riester pension reform in Ger-
many was clearly aimed at capping old age social contribution at the level of 
 percent, and in general, all the Schröder reforms and those of the follow-
ing grand coalition aimed at keeping social contributions under the level of 
 percent of gross wages; the Austrian reforms in the s also started with 
the explicit aim of capping the level of social contributions.
 For France, see the  unemployment reform, when new tax financed as-
sistance benefits were created for those without enough sufficient contri-
bution records or for the long-term unemployed (Clegg ), or the  
Balladur reform with the creation of Fonds de solidarité vieillesse, (Palier, 
chapter  in this volume); for Spain, see the recommendations of the Toledo 
Pact already mentioned, which included the splitting of financing sources so 
that contributory benefits would be financed out of social contributions and 
taxes would be used to finance non-contributory transfers and welfare serv-
ices (Guillén, this volume). For Germany, see the Hartz IV reform after which 
the federal government fully covers the expenditure on ALG II cash benefits 
and social insurance contributions on behalf of their recipients, or the  
health reform which ‘also included tax revenues from an increased tobacco 
tax that were funneled into SHI and meant to cover spending items “alien” to 
this scheme (like maternity benefits)’ (Hinrichs, this volume).
 For France, see the massive exemption of social contribution on the lowest 
wages within the plan quiquennal pour l’emploi implemented in  (Palier, 
chapter  in this volume); for Spain, see inter alia the - reforms that 
included promoting job creation through new tax and social contribution 
exemptions for employers contracting young people, the long-term unem-
ployed, people aged  and over, and the disabled (Guillén, this volume); for 
Belgium, see the measures adopted in the late s to boost demand for 
unskilled labor, when the government planned a sizeable reductions in em-
ployers’ social security contributions. To compensate for lost social security 
contributions some alternative financing was introduced, mainly in the form 
of earmarked VAT levies; for the Netherlands, see the introduction in  
of cuts in employers’ social security contributions for hiring the long-term 
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unemployed and low-paid workers (Hemerijck and Marx, this volume); Ger-
many, Switzerland, Austria have also decided to cap the level of social contri-
butions and to add on more tax finance to compensate.
 Like the Contribution sociale généralisée in France and the Ökosteuer in Ger-
many (see Manow, this volume).
 Otherwise, one could not understand why certain retrenchments were ac-
cepted (like the  Balladur pension reform in France), and others were 
not (like the Juppé pension plan in ). The main difference between the 
two reforms was that the unions found the former in line with their organiza-
tional interests, and the latter not (Bonoli, ).
 The progressive étatisation of the French health care system offers the clear-
est example.
 In Germany, during the s, government ‘no longer left the initiative to re-
form and compromise-building to corporatist bodies, but rather, took the lead 
and partly ignored the social partners ’ (Hinrichs, this volume); also in Germa-
ny, ‘“Government by commission” was another feature of social policy-making 
after the year  and also meant to take agenda-setting out of the hands of 
(remaining) “old politics” actors’ (ibid.) ; in France, in  the Constitution 
was amended so that the Parliament would vote every year the budget of so-
cial insurances (loi de ﬁ nancement de la sécurité sociale) (Palier, chapter  in 
this volume) ; in Austria, ‘consociational democracy and corporatism virtually 
came to an end at the turn of the new millennium’ because ‘the center-right 
government launched institutional reforms in order to bypass the informal 
veto powers held by the unions within the system of social partnership’ by 
using majority rules in the Parliament (Obinger and Tálos, this volume); in 
the Netherlands, in  a very important parliamentary report ‘revealed that 
social security was being “misused” by the social partners for the purpose of 
industrial restructuring and advocated a fundamental recasting of bipartite 
governance in Dutch social security administration’ (Hemerijck and Marx, this 
volume); In Switzerland, ‘in virtually all the important reforms of the s – 
the pension reforms of  and , the unemployment reform of  and 
the current disability insurance reform – it was only in Parliament that the 
modernizing elements of reform were added’ (Häusermann, this volume).
 See the reduced role of the social partners in the Federal Labor Agency (FLA) 
in Germany after the Hartz reforms; the disappearance of the social partners’ 
administrative boards in health insurance Funds in France after ; and the 
creation of the Centers for Work and Income (CWIs) in the Netherlands with 
the new ‘Work and Income (Implementation Structure) Act,’ which came into 
force on  January , reducing the role of the social partners in this area 
(Hemerijck and Marx, this volume).
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 As pointed to us by Karen Anderson; see also Ebbinghaus (this volume).
 Eurostat, Taxation trends in the European Union, Table A._T p..
 Effective (pre)retirement age was well under  in most Continental Euro-
pean countries in the late s – Hemerijck and Eirchhorst, this volume.
 We can draw some parallel here with the ‘third order’ of changes observed by 
Peter Hall (), even though the process – which passed through more incre-
mental channels – can be less clearly traced than in the case of macroeconomic 
policy, and despite the fact that the changes were ultimately less radical.
 On the OECD, see for instance Armingeon and Beyerler (), and on the 
World Bank, see World Bank () and Holzmann and Jorgensen ().
 With the OMC, European bodies have created a new form of intervention 
which is less aimed at institutional harmonization or legislation than at 
harmonizing ideas, knowledge and norms of action, in order to have policy 
goals converging towards ‘a common political vision’. The aim is ‘to organ-
ize a learning process about how to cope with the common challenges of the 
global economy in a coordinated way while also respecting national diversity.’ 
(Note from the Portuguese presidency ‘The on-going experience of the Open 
Method of Coordination’,  June ). On the OMC and its impact on wel-
fare states, see Zeitlin and Pochet (); Heidenreich and Zeitlin ().
 Like the Belgian minimex, the French RMI (subsequently renamed RSA), the 
Spanish regional assistance benefits or the basic safety nets implemented in 
the Visegrad countries.
 Such as the assistance income for the long-term unemployed (ALG II) or the 
minimum income for the elderly created in Germany, the many minimum 
protection schemes developed in Switzerland in various fields (supplemen-
tary means-tested pension benefits, subsidies for low-income earners), and 
similar measures in Austria and the Netherlands.
 On policy changes as punctuated equilibrium, see Baumgarnter and Jones 
().
 ‘The creation of a national health service was eased in Spain because of the 
existence of several institutional features, namely the fact that the health care 
system was not split in independent funds right from its creation and was 
managed and administered by a centralized institution. It also helped greatly 
that doctors were salaried employees from the beginning and doorkeepers of 
the system.’ (Guillén, this volume).
 ‘The fact that the equivalence principle was historically not as strongly en-
trenched probably also accounts for this peculiarity of the Belgian trajectory’ 
(Hemerijck and Marx, this volume).
 As said, the Netherlands appears as an exception – only very partially copied 
by other countries such as Spain or Switzerland – where ‘atypical’ jobs are also 
 NOTES
created but are at the same time given more social rights, thus implementing 
the flexicurity model. As for Belgium, it seems that strong resistance from the 
social partners , as well as the ‘universal’ flat-rate unemployment insurance, has 
prevented an increase in new types of more flexible jobs, at the price of a high 
unemployment and low employment rate.
 On the social investment strategy, see Esping-Andersen et al. (), Jenson 
and Saint Martin (), Jenson () and Morel, Palier and Palme ().
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